The problems of Tibet in Sino-British relations by Tieh-Tseng, Li
IKE-PROBLEMS. OF TIBET III SIHO-BBITISH RFLATTmis
LI IIEH-TSEHG
CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION
An Account of My Research 1
The Plan of the Thesis 5
PART I SINO-TIBETAN RELATIONS
CHAPTER I FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE SEVEN­
TEENTH CENTURY
The Earliest Contact 8
Definite Relations First Established 10
Matrimonial Alliances and their Effect on the
Religions of Tibet 16
The Extent of the Chinese Influence 19
Tibet as a Theocracy 39
The Founding of the Ming Dynasty and its
Relation to Tibet 46
The Yellow Sect and the Ming Dynasty 54
The Status of Tibet 6j
CHAPTER II DURING THE CH'ING (OR MANCEU) DYNASTY
From Occupation by the Koshate-Mongols to the 
Recognition of the Suzerainty of the Manchu 
Court 65
Events Leading to the First Campaign 76
The First Tibetan Campaign and its Consequences 82
Events Prior to the Second Expedition 86
The Changes Introduced after the Second Campaign 91.
Page
Events Leading to the Third Expedition 93
Measures for Securing the Pacification and 
Submission of Tibet after the Third 
Expedition 102
Events Leading to the Conquest of Nepal lo8
Exercise of Full Chinese Sovereignty in Tibet 112
Imperial Authority on the Decline 123
The Chinese Resume Full Sovereignty in Tibet 140
CHAPTER III UNDER THE REPUBLICAN REGIME
The Panch’en Lama’s Flight to China Proper 155
The Dalai Lama Turning Strongly Away from
Britain towards China 153
The Chinese National Government’s Effort
towards Rapprochement l6l
The Dalai Lama’s Answer to the Eight Questions 165
Armed Conflict Initiated by the Ta Chieh Ssu
Incident 171
The Chinese National Government not in a
Position to Force the Issue 179
The Truce with Sikang Signed in 1932 and with
Ch’lnghai in 1933 189
Agreement to Halt the Armed Conflict Resumed
after the Dalai Lama’s Death 194
General Huang's Mission to Tibet 196
The Panch'en Lama's Plan to Return and his
Death 203
Wu Cbung-hsln’s Mission to Officiate at the 
Installation of the Present Dalai Lama 216
Page
The Setting Up in Lhasa of a Permanent Office .
by the National Government 226
The Pro-British Young-Tlbet Group Coming to
Power 229
Tibetan Participation in the Chinese National
Assembly 235
The Installation of the Tenth Panch* en Lama 237
Chinese Nationalist Officials Ousted by the
Lhasa Authorities 244
On the Eve of the Chinese Communists* Military
Campaign in Tibet 247
The Peking Agreement on Measures for the
Peaceful Liberation of Tibet 254
PART II ANGLO-TIBETAN RELATIONS
CHAPTER IV BRITISH EFFORTS TO OPEN TIBET
Tibetan Reaction to the Approach of the British 272
Events Leading to the British Expedition 279
Lord Curzon* s Altered or Forward Policy 283
CHAPTER V THE BRITISH AHMED MISSION TO LHASA AND
AFTERWARDS
Dispatch of the British Armed Mission 296
Lhasa Reached and a Convention Imposed 506
The Convention Amended in Deference to London
Authority 317
The New Relationship Established by the Lhasa 
Arrangement 523
Page
PART III SINO-BRITISH RELATIONS CONCERNING TIBET
CHAPTER VI FROM THE MIDDLE OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
TO THE EVE OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION, 1911
Chinese Adherence to the Lhasa Convention 349
Trade Regulations Signed by the Anglo-Chinese
Plenipotentiaries and the Tibetan Delegate 3&1
Tibet*s Buffer State Status Confirmed by the ,
Anglo-Russian Convention 368
CHAPTER VII THE SIMLA CONFERENCE AND AFTER
Negotiations Leading to the Simla Conference 382
Renewed Negotiations under British Pressure 402
Britain’s Opposition to the Escorted Return of
the Panch* en Lama to Tibet 408
PART IV
CHAPTER VIII THE PROBLEMS CONCERNING TIBET 
Trade
Natural Resources 
Strategical Position 
Security Considerations
414
424
428 /
429 '
CONCLUSION 431
Page
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Documentary Sources 442
Books 444
Articles 454
Periodicals and Newspapers 459
Unpublished Material 460
Miscellaneous 46q
INTRODUCTION
An Account of rmr Research
During the Sessions 1932-1956 I studied at the London 
School of Economics and Political Science, being initially- 
registered as a candidate for the degree of M.Sc.(Econ.), 
but being, upon the recommendation of my supervising prof­
essor, Professor C.A.W. Manning, transferred during 1935 to 
registration for the degree of Fh.D. I selected as the 
subject of my doctoral thesis The Problems of Tibet in Sino- 
British Relations, partly because of my interest in the area, 
which had been aroused by. reading in my boyhood an outstanding 
piece of Chinese fiction, Hsi yfk chi, which based its plot on 
Hstan-Tsang*s journey to India in the thirties of the seventh 
century. Besides making use of the School library, I con­
sulted the comprehensive collection on Tibet in the British 
Museum library, and, through the introduction of Sir Francis 
Younghusband, had an interview with the Indian Trade Comm­
issioner and access to the India House library. In 1935 I 
started to write my thesis, several draft chapters of which 
were presented to Professor Manning and, in his own words, 
impressed him well, (Please refer to the attached testim­
onial).
In the summer of 1936 I was recalled to the Chinese
2Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and after leaving London I 
wrote three more chapters* In the following year war 
broke out between China and Japan, and I was sent to North 
West China on an important mission. All that I had written 
and the data I had collected, together with all my other 
possessions* were destroyed in a fire in my native town, 
Changsha, as a result of the "scorched earth" policy carried 
out by the defending army*
In Chungking I expressed regret to Sir Otto Nimeyer, 
the Chairman of the Court of Governors of the School, during 
his mission to the wartime capital, that I had had to break 
off my studies in response to the call of duty and that my 
manuscript and collections had been destroyed by firej and 
I mentioned something of the same sort later in Teheran to 
my British colleague, Sir Reader W* Bullard, The latter 
told me that the University of London was perhaps giving 
special facilities for students whose careers had been inter­
rupted by the war, and kindly offered to write to the Regis­
trar on my behalf. In November 1942 I was informed that the 
University would allow me to enter for the examination with­
out my returning to England. But being fully occupied with 
official functions and deprived of all the data and books,
I was not able to find the time and means to rewrite my 
thesis.
In 1950, as a result of the changed situation on the
3Chinese mainland, my services to the government came to an 
end. I felt that the time had arrived for me to fulfil the 
long-cherished hope of resuming my studies, and I planned to 
go over to London. Later, with the recognition by His 
Majesty*s Government of the new Peking regime, my passport 
and visa became obstacles. Instead, I entered Columbia 
University as a candidate for the degree of Ph.D., taking a 
course of study and starting from scratch. After having 
sucessfully passed all the required examinations, I chose to 
write a dissertation entitled A Historical Study of the Status 
of Tibet with a view to picking up the threads of my academic 
training from where I left off in London, though I realized I 
could not benefit much from my former efforts at tills distance 
of time.
After having passed the Oral Examination of the Dissert­
ation and having fulfilled all the other requirements, the 
degree of Ph.D. was conferred upon me at Columbia University 
on June 2nd, 1953— ‘the day of the Coronation in the British 
Commonwealth. In my letter to Dean Robinson, reporting the 
completion of my resumed studies here, I wrote}
How pleasant it would have been to have received 
the degree in London on that day I The granting 
of the degree here at Columbia will in some sense 
round off and complete the work which I began in 
London but which, due to circumstances beyond my 
control, I was not able to finish there. How­
ever, I should bo most glad if you could tell me 
how I stand with regard to obtaining a London 
Ph.D.j whether, for example, it is now late by 
reason of the time limit, and whether it would be 
necessary to do "more than present a thesis.«
4In a reply the secretary to the Post-Graduate Department of 
the School advised me that "there is no exact time limit 
beyond which it is impossible to submit a thesis for the Lon­
don Ph.D*...the delay might be excused in view of the special 
circumstances of your case." I lost no time in starting to 
rewrite my originally intended thesis, incorporating part of 
the work which I have already submitted for the degree of Ph.D. 
at Columbia University.
Alfred de Vigny called a man fortunate who was able in 
his maturity to carry out a plan formed in his youth} and I 
am glad to have been afforded such an opportunity. Some 
might think that the study of a subject selected twenty years 
ago and resumed after the withdrawal of British rule in India 
would be out of date. Indeed, there is no longer any problem 
of Tibet in Sino-British relations as then envisaged, except 
that there remain the problems of Tibet1 in Sino-Indian relat­
ions and that India is still a member of the British Common­
wealth. But to make a study of this subject at a time when 
it is no longer a current issue has this advantage* the sub­
ject can more easily be put in its proper perspective, thus 
enabling the writer to draw a safer conclusion, a conclusion 
which he hopes will be considered as a contribution not only 
to the knowledge of the subject but also to the understanding 
of a fundamental issue (power and security) of this troubled 
world.
5The Plan of the Thesis
This thesis is divided into four parts, the first two of 
which, dealing with Sino-Tibetan and Anglo-Tibetan relations 
respectively, present a historical background necessary to 
the understanding of the subject* Part 111 gives a full 
account of Sino-British relations concerning Tibet, pointing 
out what were the problems involved* In Part IV the writer 
endeavours to enumerate these problems and evaluate them, 
and hopes to ascertain in the conclusion the main and deter­
mining factor, or rather the sole problem, that explains the 
advance, halt and withdrawal of British power in tibet, as 
well as explaining the whole of Sino-British relations con­
cerning Tibet. ’
6P A R T  1 .
RIN0-TIB3TAN RELATIONS 
CHAPTER 1
FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO TilS SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
In treating of Sino-Tibetan relations, reliance has to 
be placed on Chinese rather than Tibetan sources* The Tib­
etans lack a sense of history as understood by other peoples. 
The number of their historical works known to the outside 
world is by no means small}— as early as 1833 the great Hun­
garian traveller and scholar, Alexander Csoaa da Kfirfls, enum-
1
erated a long list of them. They are, however, histories 
of a religion rather than chronicles of a people. The reason 
is that as the authors were Lamas, they considered the great­
est events in the reign of a king to be his gifts to monast­
eries and his building of chortens. ^Other events such as 
military campaigns, for instance, are either ignored or only 
referred to briefly. As Sir Charles Bell remarked, »History
unless it centers on religion, does not appeal to the Tibetan 2
mind,» In other words, Tibetan annals are to the history *2
1» Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal. (1833) VII, 
P t . 1 , 147. H e n c e f o r t h  citea as J&&B. 9
2, Sir Charles Bell. Tibet: Past and Present. P. 2^ 5. Rsn^- 
forth cited as Bell, tiuet.
7of Tibet what Bede's Ecclesiastical History is to the hist­
ory of England,
Not only are the Tibetan annals devoid of critical 
perspective) they conflict with one another. For example, 
Woodville Rockhill pointed out at one place, "Csoma, Sanang 
Eetsen and Sarat Chandra Das, our chief authorities, do not
5
agree on any one date," S.Yti« Bushell also commented in
his article in the Journal of the Koval Asiatic Society. "In
Georgil Alphabetic Tibetanum. Schmidt's translation of Sanang
Setsen, Csoma de Kflrfls* Tibetan Grammar and Emil Schlagint-
weit's KfiniEe von Tibet, the genealogical lists differ very
widely both from each other and from the dates of the Chinese
4
T'ang Histories,"
The discrepancies lead one gravely to doubt the Tibetan 
annals. Western writers on Tibet have, as a rule, preferred 
Chinese records, the accuracy and authenticity of which are 
generally recognized. Hone the less no one would deny that 
there are valuable historical data in Tibetan records, and it 
is not to be supposed that the Chinese records are entirely 
without error. 34
3. V.'.W. Rockhill, The Life of Buddha, p. 210, n.l. Hence­
forth cited as Rockhlllf Buaaha.
4. S.vY. Bushell, "The Early History of Tibet from Chinese 
Sources," Journal of the Rov&.l Asiatic Society. Hew Series, 
XII, (lS8o), Pt. IV, 4 3 d . h e n c e f o r t h  cited as JRA5.
8In the present chapter an attempt will be made to nar­
rate Sino-Tibetan relations from the earliest times to the 
middle of the seventeenth century, when Tibet under the 
occupation of the Koshote Mongols recognized the suzerainty 
of the Manchu court. Available Tibetan records will be 
consulted wherever possible and correlated with Chinese 
records.
The Earliest Contact
According to Chinese writers, contact was established
between China and Tibet as early as 2220 B.C., when the
Emperor Shun drove the San—meaou tribesmen into a region
called San-wei, the location of which was not indicated at 
5the time. in a decree of 1720 A.D., the learned Emperor
ShCngtsu told tho scholars of his court that after many
years of intensive study he had come to the conclusion that
6
San-wei constituted three parts of Tibet. Thero is, how-
5. Grenard. Le Tibet, le Pays et les Habitants. P. 224;
The Chinese eKssics'p'lfoI. Ill, Pt. 1, The Shoo King, trans. 
by Jamas Legge, Book 1, P. 40} "Biography of Emperor Shun" 
in the Book of History. J. Huston Edgar, in his article, 
"The Tibetan and his Environment: An Interpretation," mis­
took San-wei for a tribe. JBAS. Shanghai, LVII (1926), 30. 
Edgar wrote, "Tradition, indeed, claims that the Emperor 
Shuen drove the San-wei into Tibetan country about 2225 B.C," 
According to the Chu shu. chi nien, the date would be 
2221 B.C. The writer in the present study bases his date 
(2220 B.C.) on the Chinese Tzfu hai. and Japanese Mohan 
Saishin Sekal Hesapvo.
6. Tung-hua lu. K*ang-hai Period, Vol. IV, Chdan 106, p. 14}
or Shfengtsu SMh-lu. Chttan 290, p. 8a. '
9ever, still much doubt among Chinese scholars as «ell as 
Western Sinologists as to the accuracy of the Emperor's 
conclusion. The latter nowadays dismiss data and dates 
from Chinese literature about the third millenium B.C. as 
of almost no value. Unless written materials like bronzes 
and oracle bones, of an earlier period than those now available 
come to light, they will not, of course, accept such assert­
ions at all.
In the histories of the Chinese dynasties Ehang (ca.
1523-1028 B.C. Chinese traditional chronology assigns to
the Shang dynasty the dates 1765-1123 B.C.), Chou (ca. 1027-
256 B.C.), Han (202 B.C.-220 A.D.), Tsin (265-420) and Eui
(589-618), there are stray references to tribes named Jung
7or Ch'iang, who are identified by Chinese historians as 
peoples of Tibet. But whether they were ancestors of pres­
ent Tibetans is an open question,
Tibetan records of the corresponding periods contain
references to China or the Chinese. .Bub-thah-lei-shad sel-8
kyi melon mentioned a Chinese sage, Leg-tan-man, in the 
, 9
early years of the Bin religion. During the reign of Kamri-
7« The earliest reference to the Ch'iang is probably its trib­
ute-mission in 1765 B.C. See H.G. Creel, Birth of China, 
pp. 215-216 and also Grenard. le Tibet, p. 236; Rockhili, 
Buddha, p.204.
8. Sarat Chandra Das's translation of this Tibetan work, JASB 
(188l), L, Pfc, 1, Nos» 3#
9* Ibid, p. 196.
10
£ron-tsan, or Gaam-ri slon nch.ui* who ascended the throng 
of Tibet In the latter part of the sixth century* tha Tibet­
ans obtained their first knowledge of arithmetic and medicine»
11
from tha Chinese.
Definite Relations First Established
Definite relations* hoaaver* »ere not established until
the T’ang dynasty (6l8-90l). It was during the period of 
12
this dynasty that no fewer than one hundred missions wont
15
from one country to the other* Some were sent to anno unco 
tha death of a sovereign or to tendsr congratulations on aus­
picious occasions. others «.era either missions of tribute 
from Tibet to tha Emperor of China, or missions bearing pre3-
10
10. According to Chinese records, T*ung■tlon by Tu Yu (755- 
812) * cn. 190* ha was the founder of the' Tibetan Kingdom dur­
ing the K*ai-huang Period* 58I-0OQ A.D, * of tho Sul dynasty. 
His nana was rendered as Luntsaa Solungtsan in Chinese*
J. Bacot, F.h. Thomas, and C.H. Toussaint (trens.)* Documenta 
da Touen-llouang. rolatifa 1 lihlstdirg duTlbet. ; p. 00 a w  
95, records him as the father oí the celebra tea Tsanpu Sraft- 
bcan sgan-po (Sron-tsan) or* us rendered in Chinóse* Ch*1 
tsung lung tsan, According to J. Bacot, ("Do Marriage Chin— 
ois du roi ti bótala Cron bean Sgan po," Mil Chin, et boud. 
[19553*  H I  4 ) ,  a mission which had hoen sunt by the father 
to Inuia returned with an alphabet* 
hist texts in tho reign of tha son.
a grammar* and some Budd—
XI. Dee Rockhill, Buddha, p. 211} Das* "Contributions on the 
Religion* History 7.T o r  Tibet," Pt. 1, "Early History of 
Tibet," JAÇB. I», nos, 3, 4* 21y, Henceforth cited as Das*
" Coat ri butions • "
12, The writer of this study bases his statements upon the 
T»ang Chu* i.e., History of T*ang. The chapters dealing wit* 
Tibet were translated by S.E. Bushell* IRAS. Sew Carlos 
XII* Pt. IV. Henceforth cited as Bushell” .
15. The fir3t embassy was sent by Ch*i-tsung-lung-tsan to'th« 
Chinese emperor T*ai-1sung in o>4.
11
ents to the Tsanpu of Tibet from the Emperor. Most of them, 
however, were sent to sue for peace, renew friendly relations 
and settle boundaries, or to conclude sworn treaties or mat­
rimonial alliances. The close contact may be seen from the 
fact that in the second and eleventh months of the year 805 
two missions were sent from China to Tibat and in the seventh, 
and tenth months of the same year two missions were sent from 
Tibet to China* The Tibetan manuscripts found at Tunhuang, 
which give a very succinct year-by-year account of the great 
events from A.D. 650-747# record the receiving of Chinese 
envoys by the Tibetan King in every year from 729-37 and
14
742-44, besides the earlier references to Chinese missions. 
The two countries were often at war— one side being 
victorious at one time and the other at another— and frontier, 
conflicts were common. Once the Tibetans led by a traitor 
general named Kao Hui entered the Chinese imperial capital, 
Ch*ang-an, and occupied it for fifteen days (7&3 A.D.). One 
(?) Tibetan record reports (and this may be a later inter­
polation) that the Chinese captured the Tibetan capital. 
Lhasa, after the death of Sron-tsan Gampo (650 A.D.). It
14. See Documents de Touen-Houang,relatlfs a l*hlstolre dia 
Tibet, pp. 48-5^.
15. Bell, Tibet, p. 28j Das, "Contributions,« p.222. Rock- 
hill suspects this event was interpolated on the ground that 
T’ang Shu does not allude to it (Buddha, p.217). The Docu­
ments de Touen-Houang. p. 32# records an armed conflict with 
the Chinese under Su Ting-fang in 659» (For details see 
biography of Su Ting-fang in T*ang shu. Lleh Chuan 33, Esin 
T»ang shu. Lieh Chuan 36). The writer wonders if it was not 
to this armed conflict that the Tibetan record refers.
12
is significant that neither the Chinese historical annals
nor the highly important Tibetan manuscripts found at Tun-
huang mention a Chinese capture of Lhasa.
In spite of the frequent armed conflicts, diplomatic
relations were, more often than not, maintained between the
two countries. On the deaths of the Tsan-pus Ch’itsunglung-
16
tsan in 755, Mukhri-bcan-po in 804, name omitted in 817»
and Tamo, also known as Slang Dhama or bandanna, in 842, the
17
Chinese emperor was informed. He sent special envoys 
either to convey his condolences, or to offer sacrifices, or 
to participate in the ceremonies at funerals. Sometimes he 
went into mourning and closed the court for one to three days.
The Tibetans were likewise informed of the deaths of the 
Chinese emperors and of the accessions of their successors in 
805 and 820. Missions to offer condolences on the deaths of
16. Rockhill mistakenly declared that the Chinese chronicles 
do not mention any sovereign between the time of Hukhrl*s 
death in 804 and the commencement of the reign of Ralpachan 
(also known as Khri-ral, the Chinese Kolllotsu) in 8lo. Cf. 
Bushell, p, 512, and Rockhill, Buddha, p, 223*
17. According to the Documents de Touen-Houang. pp. 10, 34,
40, Chilip&pu (Khri-man-sion) cied in o/oj Chinushsilung 
(Khrl-* dun-sroh) died in 704. Doubtless news of a death 
took time to reach Ch*ang-an in those days. V.e find also 
that the remains of the former were kept unburied until 679 
(ibid.. p. 35), while that of the latter until 706 (ibid*, 
p. 41), and that there was in each case a revolt after the 
death of the king. Perhaps the Chinese Imperial Court was 
only informed of the funeral service. Perhaps it was the 
revolt that prevented news of a death from reaching the Chin­
ese capital at an earlier date. The Tunhuang Documents did 
not register the death of Chilisulungllehtsan; but.recorded
15
the emperors and to make sacrifices at the funerals were sent
from Tibet. The 805 mission, moreover, brought gold, silver,
robes, oxen, and horses as offerings for the mausoleum of Te-18
tsung who reigned from 780-805*
Eight treaties were solemnly and ceremoniously signed 
during this period. The first was concluded during the reign
x 19of Chung-tsung (705-710)# the second, known as the treaty
of Ch* ih-ling, in 750, the third in 756, the fourth in 765,
the fifth in 766, the sixth, known as the treaty of Ching- 
20
shui, in 783, the seventh in 784, and the eighth in 821. *1820
that in 756 "the Btsanpo [Tsangpu or king* si name was publ­
ished as Khri sron Lde brtsan" (ibid., p. 63). We may
assume that a king (Chilisulungliehtsan or Khri-Lde gcug-
brcan) died in the previous year or sometime earlier. Had
there not been a hiatus of seven years (749-754) in the text,
the death might have been registered therein.
18. The Tsanpu Chitsungluntsan offered 15 presents of gold, 
silver, pearls, and other precious objects to be deposited 
before the ancestral tablet of the late Emperor T*ai-tsung 
(reigned 627-649) and had his statue, carved in stone, erected 
below the gateway of the Imperial Mausoleum.
1
19* This treaty was mentioned in Bsln T* ang shu (New T*ang 
History, Lieh Chuan 141) but not in T«an& shu. Bee Bushell»s 
translation, p. 460.
20. Rockhill, Buddha, p. 222, n. 1, expresses some doubt about
the treaty of 703.. This doubt would have been at least partly
allayed if he had not mistaken the year in which T^-tsung 
became emperor. Rockhill assumed the date to be 799* whereas 
it was 780.
14
In addition to those, a ceremony of swearing a treaty
was treacherously broken up by the Tibetans at Ping-liang in
787« The treaty of 733* and the treaty signed in Ch*ang-an
in 821 and confirmed at Lhasa by religious ceremonies in the
following year, were inscribed on stone pillars in front of
the large temple, called by the Chinese Ta-chao-ssu, in the
city of Lhasa* Bushell made a facsimile of part of the 821
pillar. A translation from the Tibetan text was appended
21
to Sir Charles Bell1s Tibet. Shen chou kuo kuang chi
91 facsimile and the translation can be easily identi-
the first half of the eighth century. 1 iei-kuo 
it was the covenant made in 730 at Ch lk-li g. aleo
in his doctoral thesis, IdOder^ JiLorl ---- g-f ludg-
identified it as c o n c l u d e d ^  the eighth century. . But :uog
IZ Se'nLet'i? tf  Ob£ . *■ ^
VJel-tsana tune-cWh! Chdan VI. p. 123, »hi«* mentlons the n ^ e  
of Nlu slHi-ju on t o  pillar), and comparing the facsimile 
and the translation with the record In J«ang shu. one *** 
safely identify it as the treaty co^ luded in tt2l%  for go-.
ther' supporting evidence, see Das, Contri * record a
and Bodhimur in Sanang Setsen, ■ pp. 560-361. B o ^  at
treaty inscription written on a ■
Lhasa in the reign of Ralpachan, or K h r i - r ; S f ^ i t h e r  
Kolikotsu, in which it was agreed that the armies of neither 
kingdom sL u l d  ever cross the ^ n d a r y  mark or on a ^  pretext 
encroach upon the other* s territories ^  ^  
nephew were to become friends. Emil Schiagintweit*» j i ^ J ^  
jge von Tibet (A. d. Philos.— Pkilol. Cl. d. Kon. Jayorischen 
Akad. d. liss,, 1866, 10)| P* & 9 #  also records a treaty writ­
ten on a monument in the reigh of Ralpaehan.^
"Notes on Sanang Setsen* s »Geschichte der °5tCf°^olem» by 
Tschen Yinkoh," Bulletin of
Philology. Academia Sinica £193o ]» II. Pt. 1, 1*"50
I^\,illoughby in his lecture delivered before the Cen­
tral Asian Society on the subject, "Relation of T i w t  to 
China." Journal of A ntral Asian Society, henceforth citedas 
CASJ (Lonaon, 1924), II, lB9* mentionecTthe treaty recorded 
onbilingual tablets as the one signed in 821 and ratified at
(Shanghai, 1909), No. 7 reproduced tha four sides of the 
pillar in two plates accompanied by Lo Chen-ytt*s (1866- 
1940) article in which the author added in print a trans­
cript of tha entire Chinese portion of the monument, incl-22
usive of the thirty-four names so far as decipherable.
Lhasa in 822, In translating part of Sir Charles Bell*s 
book under the titlo Hsi-tsang wai chlao wen chlen (1930), 
p. 34, Dr. Wang Kuang-chi pointed out Sir Charles* mistake, 
but ha himself made an error in describing it as tha treaty 
concluded in 783. Wang Ch»in-yti, in his book on Ksl-tsang 
wen t*i (d . 21 published one year earlier, made the same 
mistake. Presumably both Wangs based their judgment upon 
Ma Chueh and Sheng Sheng-tsu, >Iei-tsang_t*u-shih (1792), 
which records: "Before Ta-chao-ssu, two stone pillars were 
erected— one recording the treaty of 733* the^ other the treaty 
of 821, At present there remains only the Te-tsung pillar 
with the inscription of the treaty of 783 and it is in an 
impaired condition,« Probably it is this wrong identific­
ation that gives rise to their mistake which is shared by 
some other Chinese scholars.
For 3 French translation of Wei-tsang t*u-shlh, see 
J.H. Klaproth. Description du Tibet, extrait au nouveau 
Journal Asiatiaue (ld^l)» P9* iky, 168. For a comparative 
study of the text of the treaty of 783 with that of 821 as a 
means of establishing further the identity, see L.A. Waddell, 
"Ancient Historical Edicts at Lhasa," JRAS. (1909) and (I9I1 J, 
in which the author took the Tibetan text on the verso as the 
"treaty edict of 783" and further advanced 9 points to claim 
the recto as an integral portion of the treaty edict of 7831 
and also Gijo Suwa, in Asiatic Studies in Honor of Toru 
Ifeneda (Eyato, 1950;, pp. 5 ^ 5 o 3 *  The lattermade a care- 
ful study of this issue and dealt with the former*s error in 
a detailed analysis. H.E. Richardson*! book on Ancient 
Historical Edicts at Lhasa and the T'u Tsung/Khrl Gtsug Lda 
Bgtsan Treaty of A.D. 821—822 from .the Inscription at Lhasa 
(1952) should allay the last possible douSt on this point.
See pp. 35-47*
22, Berthold Laufer regarded the reproduction and Lo* s art­
icle as of first importance and dealt with the material la 
"Bird Divination Among the Tibetans ••• with a Study of Tib­
etan Phonology of the Ninth Century," T*ouag Pao (1914), 
pp, 70-72, The reproduction and Lo* s article are mentioned 
also in Bulletin de 1*école française de 1*extrême Orientf
These relations were strengthened by military assist­
ance from Tibet. In 648 Tibet sent an army in collaboration 
with 7,000 cavalry from Nepal to support the Chinese envoy,
VJang HstLan-ts*e, in subduing the usurper of Magadha. The
23
latter was taken prisoner and brought to Ch’ang-an. In
784 Tibet offered its troops to help settle the difficulties
*
of the State of China. A Chinese envoy vías therefore sent 
to Tibet to devise a plan of campaign, and the joint army 
recovered the capital, Ch’ang-an, and relieved Feng-tien, in 
which the Emperor was besieged.
Matrimonial Alliances .and their Effect on the 
fleligloas_o_f Tibet
To strengthen the bond of neighbourly friendship, two 
matrimonial alliances were made. In 641 Emperor T*ai-tsung 
gave the Princess ften-ch* eng of the Imperial House in marriage
IX (1909), 573. Meng Pao, resident in Tibet from 1339 to 
1842 copied only the Chinese text of the treaty from the 
pillar in his book, h rI tsang pel wen ("Inscriptions in Tibet") 
published in 1352, pp. 26-27“
107l Vincent 
PP. 252-53. 
es missions de
22. The Cambridge Shorter History of India, ]
A. S g th , Early lilstorv of lndM , led. 1914)
For further particulars, see syivain Levi, «]________
Wang Hiuen-tze dans l ’Inde," Jour..Asiatique (Paris), neuv­
ième series, XV (mars-avril, 1900), and Feng Ch*èag-chin*s 
editing notes in Chinese (S M h t i t s i u n g  k ’ao. pp. 40-56), 
and Paul Pelliot, "Notes sur quelcues artistes des six dyn­
asties et des T*ang," T’oung Pao (1923), pp. 274-282 and 291, 
in which the author made some corrections to Levi’s article.
17
to the celebrated Tsanpu Ch*itsunglungtsan. In 705 the 
ruling Empress V.u-tse-t*ien granted the request of Tsanpu 
Chinushsilung for a matrimonial alliance, but the latter 
died during the war with Nepal and P*o lo cíen (Central India), 
and the marriage did not take place. In 710 the Emperor 
Chung-tsung gave his adopted daughter with the title of Prin­
cess Chin-ch* eng in marriage to Tsanpu Chilisutsan. Thus, 
the two courts had been united by marriages, which according 
to the treaty of 785, had, by the time of its signing, estab­
lished a nephew-unde relationship for nearly two hundred 
24
years — an exaggeration of at least fifty years,
25
The Tibetan record registered the marriage of Chit-
sungluntsan and Princess V.en-ch* eng, but gave the name of the
Tsanpu as Sron-tsan Gampo. Cliitsungluntsan was probably a
transcription of his name prior to his accession (i.e., Khri-
26
lde-Srong-btsan), The name of the princess was given as 
Hun-shin. The record also registered the marriage of the
Tsanpu Khri-lde gtsug btsan mes Agts »oms and Princess Kyim- 
shan, daughter of the Chinese Emperor tai-Jua. This must 
have been the marriage between Chlisutsan and Princess Chin­
ch* eng as the Chinese name gives a quit© correct pronuncia- 24*6
24. See text of treaty concluded at Ching-hsui-hsien in 785« 
Bushell, p, 489,
25* Das, ”Contributions,* pp. 220, 225.
26. Roekhill, Buddha, p. 211.
18
tion of the first four syllables of this Tibetan name, and
2 7
Kyim-shan is only a different rendering of Chin-ch*eng.
But the story of the engagement and marriage is very differ­
ent from the account in T*ang Shu. The Documents de Touen- 
Houang which began it3 record from 650 mentioned the earlier 
(641) arrival of the Princess V,Sn-ch*eng (the name was rend­
ered as Llun-chan) and revealed the fact that she did not liv© 
together with the King until six years of their marriage had 
elapsed. The Documents records the arrival of the Princess 
Kim-san in 710, which agrees with T*ana Shu. Other Mongol­
ian and Tibetan accounts, as those of Sanang Setsen, wBodhi- 
28 29
mur," and the Manl bkah-hbum. although they distort many
of the related facts, agree substantially with the Chinese
30
record as far as the marriage itself is concerned.
These two weddings had a remarkable effect upon the 
religions of Tibet. The two Chinese princesses and, in the 
case of Wln-ch* eng, Jointly with a Nepalese princess whom 
her husband married, exerted great influence in the propag- *28930
^7» ¡LMA* % P* 217*
28. pp. 333, 348.
29. Csoma, Tibetan Grammar, p. 19$. Wang I-nuan, Hal-tsang
t»ung rhl7 1Q4Q) (trans. from a Tibetan chronicle comp­
iled by Bsod-rgyal, tutor of Tsong-k*a-pa, in 1388), pp. 41- 
44 and 47, gives an account of the Nepalese princess* Jeal­
ousy of the Chinese princess.
30. Rockhill, Buddha, p. 213* n. 1, and p. 218, n. 1.
19
atlon of Buddhism in that country. In his book on Budd­
hism, M.V. Vassilief quotes the Tibetan historian, Euston,
as saying that "in the beginning the Chinese Kachanna were
32
the guides of the Tibetans in Buddhism." The Princess
V.en-ch* eng is regarded by the Tibetans as the incarnation of
the Divine Mother (Tara) and her image in the.famous Ta-ehao-
33
ssu is still an object of worship.
yv>P Extent of Chinese Influence
The facts related in the present and following para­
graphs show the extent of the Chinese influence in Tibet,
"As the princess disliked their custom of painting their 
faces red, Lungtsan Jjchitsungluntsanj ordered his people to 
put a stop to the practice, and it was no longer done. He 
also discarded his felt and skins, put on brocade and silk, 
and gradually copied Chinese civilization. He also sent 312
31
31. Das, "Contributions," pp. 221, 224$ Rockhlll, Buddha. 
PP. 213, 218.
32. French translation of his Le Bouddhisme (Paris, I865).
P* 320, n. 4. "Nous nous souvernons ici à propos du récit 
de Bou-Dona dans historié de la religion! au commencement les 
Rhe charma Chinois furent les guides des Tibétains dans le; 
Bouddhisme."
33, Das, "Contributions," p. 221. Sh&ng wu chi, book V,
PP« 33b-34a. throws some light on this statement, and repud­
iates the widely circulated tales about the builder of, and 
the image in, this monastery.
20
the children of his chiefs and of rich men to request admit­
tance into the national schools to he taught the classics,
and invited learned scholars from China to compose his offic-
34
ial reports to the Emperor." He later asked for silk­
worms*' eggs, mortars and presses for making w/ino, and for 
workmen to rnaaufacture ’ paper and ink, and to construct water 
mills.- All these requests were granted,-and in addition a
35 36
calendar was sent. The T*ang hul yao records that he 
asked the emperor for workmen to manufacture writing-brushes. 
In this connection it is interesting to note that the Tibetans 
actually employ for writing a wooden or bamboo stylus in the 
same manner as the ancient Chinese did prior to the invention 
of the brush.
In giving away the Princess Chin-ch*eng, the Emperor 
Chung-1sung sent as a dowry several tens of thousands of 
pieces of brodaced and plain silk, various kinds of apparatus 
with skilled workmen, and Chin-ts’& musical instruments. The 
Princess asked for a copy of the classical, works, Mao-shih.
¿1-chlf Tso-chuan. and Hsiao T*ung«s compilation known ds Wen- 3456*
34. Bushell, p. 445J see also Grenard, He Tibet, pp. 242-45,
35. Bushell, p. 446.
36. Ed. by Viang Fu (completed in 961)1 Chtian 97 (1935 ©4.),
PP* 1730-51» quoted in Barthold Laufer, "Loan-words in Tibet-
an>B TVoung Pao (1916), p. 509*
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hsuans and, in spite of the memorial of remonstrance pres­
ented by the scholar ana high official, Yh Hsiu-lieh, a dec­
ree ordered the officers in charge to make a copy of the
classics and the literature and issue them to the Princess. 
The Mongolian and Tibetan works also record that Cron-
23
tsan Introduced from China silkworms and mulberry trees,
that his Chinese Princess introduced Na3-chang, or whisky,
barley-beer and cheese, and that the people were taught how
29
to make pottery works and water-mills. The Chinese method 
of divination by means of the tortoise in which the system of 
the "pa kua» was employed, is believed to have been imported 
by the Chinese Princess ¥<en-ch*eng. According to Laufer, 
the Tibetan transcriptions of ”pa kuaw have partially pres­
erved the ancient initial sonants and the ancient finals of
Chineses they are thus well attested as coming down from the 
40
T»ang period. The great Tsanpu, Cron-tsan Gampo, though 
the stories about his literary and linguistic prowess are 
not substantiated in early literature, is said to have acqu- *40
27
27* Bushell, pp. 466-67*
23* Sanang Sstsen, Bodhimur. pp. 240-241.
29. Schlaglntwalt. Kfiniee von Tibet* pp. 840-341: Rockhill, 
Buddha f p, 215, n. lj Boll, l l l i S p . . 25.
40. ’’Loan-words in Tibetan,* op,, cit., p. 511»
22
ired a fair knowledge of Chinese, which helped him to con-
41
verse with the Chinese ambassadors.
Princess %en-ch*eng brought with her the great image of 
Buddha and several volumes of Buddhist scripture, besides a 
few treatises on medicine and astrology. At the age of 
twenty-five Sron-tsan sent his ministers to North China to 
erect one hundred and eight chapels at Ro—ro—tse—na, the 
chosen residence of Kanjusri towards the north of Peking.
He invited Hoshang Maha-tshe from China and others from Nepal 
and India for the great work of the translation of the Budd­
hist scriptures from the Sanskrit and Chinese originals into 
the newly-formed written language of Tibet.
According' to K.S. Chen, the earliest work translated 
from Chinese into Tibetan was the Pai-pai Ch*an-hui Chlng
43
which is not found in the present Chinese or Tibetan Canon.
44
Lfl Cheng in his book on Tibetan Buddhism says that the canon
41. Das, "Contributions," p* 2l8.
42. Ibid., p. 221. Except for Eei-tsangjt t_ung-chih. I. 133, 
which gives the site of the 108 chapels as Ch'ang-chn, Hsiao- 
lo, Lun-T’a, and Tui-Yang, the writer fails to find any con­
firmation of these 108 chapels. Most likely they were only 
caves like those found at Tunhuang. For the origin of Tib­
etan writing see Betthold Laufer*s article, Journ. Amer. 
Orientf (1918), pp. 34-46. '
43. "The Tibetan Tripitaka," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Stud­
i o *  ix (1945), 53.
44. LU Cheng, Hsi-tsang fo hsfteh yftan lua (Shanghai, 1933)*
P* 21,
25
then translated was the Pao-yun chlng (Ratnamegha-sutra)
45 46
and the Pao-chUeh ching. Liu Ll-ch’ien* s compilation
also mentions the translation of Pao-yun, Pao-ch’leh and 
nineteen others, hut relates the legend that the Pal-pal 
ch* an-hui chlng and the Pao c h U e h  ching liad been dropped 
from heaven during the reign of the 27th Tsanpu, five gen­
erations before the Sron-tsan Gampo. fie gives the Chinese 
name of Hoshang Uahátshe as Ean-ta-Shou-t’ien without any 
explanation.
During the reign of Dgung-Srong (or Kunishilung as he is
called in T*ang shu) tea, which afterwards became the nation-
47
al beverage, was first brought from China. The Tsanpu 
mes Ag-ts'oms (Chinese Chilisotsan) obtained the volumes of 4567
45. fiarvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index, series 
no, 11, Buddhistic Literature, p. III/02795.
46. Yin tsang fo chlao shih. published by the West China 
Frontier Research Institute (1946), p. 44,
47. Rockhill, Buddha, p. 2l7j Bell, People of Tibet, p. 12, 
and also his Tibet, p. 25. (But Dgung-Srong was the great- 
grandson, not the grandson of Sron-tsan who was succeeded by 
bis grandson Man-slon man-tsan.) Laufer, in his article on 
•Loan-words in Tibetan,* or. cit.. p. 505, takes the Tibetan 
word for tea, which is an exact reproduction of the ancient 
Chinese "Dza" and which is the only one among many Asiatic 
languages adopting this Chines© designation that has pres­
erved the ancient sonant, to ¿Justify the conclusion that the 
acquaintance of the Tibetans with tea goes as far back as the 
T ’ang period. In fact, tea was then exported to the Tibet­
ans from Chiung-chou in Szechuan, being made up into cakes
or bricks. (t *al-nUng huan ch. 75, P. 5.)
24
Buddhist scriptures, called Ser-hod-t&mpa from the province 
, 43of Kun-shi in China, besides a few treatises on medicine,
49
all of which he ordered to be translated into Tibetan, H q
had the Suvarna prabhasa sutra translated into Tibetan, the
text having been obtained from China, He also had several
Chinese works on medicine, astrology, and works concerning
50
religious ceremonies translated,
51
V.hile his son Thi-sron-de-tsan reigned, a Chinese sagQ 489501
48. Kun-shi sounds like "west of the Lung Mountain" in Chin­
ese, There was Lung-hsi Chtin in the Ch'in dynasty (B.C. 
246-207) and Lung-yu Tao— both composing part of the present- 
day Kansu province. The Documents de T 1ouen-Houang. p. 66 
(cf. p, 153, n. 3) records the place Ken-si, which is also 
mentioned in the Lhasa inscriptions and is discussed by L.A, 
Waddell, who identifies it as Kingchow (JRAS, [1910], p. 12655 
an administrative unit first set up in the V»ei dynasty (A.D, 
220-264) and adopted by T'ang, with its headquarters at the 
present-day T'ien-shui of Kansu province, H.E. Richardson
in his book Ancient Historical Edicts at Lhasa, op. cit.. 
pp. 26 and 66, Identifies it as Ch'ang-aa.
49. Das, "Contributions," p. 223»
50. Rockhill, Buddhaf pp. 218-19.
51. Ibid., p. 219, identifies him as the Chinese Chi-li-tsan. 
But T'ang Shu (Bushell, pp. 439, 473) records that Chillsot- 
san was succeeded by his son, Sohsilunglietsan, in 755, and 
mentions Chi-li-tsan as Tsanpu in connection with Wei I*un’s 
mission in 780. According to Padma Than-ylg, Ms. de Lithasu 
Chant LIV, he was the son of the Chinese Princess Chin-ch* eHg 
This has often been quoted by writers on Tibet, But as rec— * 
orded by the Documents de T’jpueftdBouang, p. 51, Ms. 103, he 
was born in 742, three years after the princess’ death (739) 
Moreover. Ms. 249 (ibid., p, 89)— an older record than the 
Ms. de Llthasl— gives the name of his mother as the lady froa 
Lna-nam, Masi-mo-rjS bzi-stesi.
25
named Eoshang-Mahayana arrived in 'i'ibet and converted the
52
ignorant classes to his tenets. Later, when the great 
teacher of India, Kamalasila, came to Lhasa upon the heels 
of the celebrated Padma Sambhava in response to the Tsanpu’s 
invitation, he met with a great deal of opposition from Mah- 
ayana and perhaps also from iloshang 2ab-Mo, author of two 
works in the Bo tan—hgyur (Edo. XXX, XXXIII). These two 
Hoshangs and the one mentioned above cannot be located in 
Chinese records. Yet it is quite possible that some Chin­
ese monks, as related in the Tibetan records, stayed in Tibet 
at a time when diplomatic relations and other contacts were
being maintained. For one thing, the Chinese monks Fa-
54 55 56 57
hsien, Hui-sheng, Hsdan-tsang, and tu-k’ung went as 5234*6
52. Das, "Contributions," p. 226; both Ld Cheng and Liu Li- 
ch’ien in their works, ot?. cit.. give the Chinese name of 
MahayAna as Ta-sheng Hoshang, being merely a literary trans­
lation of his Sanskrit name.
53. See Rockhill, Buddha, p. 220, and Sanang Setsen, Podhirnu^
PP. 356-57. ~*
54. Journey made in 399-413 A.D., see J. Legge’s trans.,
A Record of Buddhistic kingdoms (1836), also TsSn Chung-mien 
Fo yu t*len chu chi K»ao shihTln Chinese; 1954), and Adachl 
kisoku. Kasha Hokkan-dan (in Japanese; 1936).
55« Journey made in 518-522. See Ed. Chavannes, Voyage de 
Song-Yun dans l’Udyana et le G ana ha. r a (1903) •
56. Journey made in 629-645, mentioned in Markham, Tibetf 
p. xliv, and H.G. Rawlinson, Indian historical Studies, chap„ 
ter on Chinese Pilgrims in India Q1913 ed.). p p , 55-92, 
more particulars see S. Beal’s trans. from Chinese of Hsftan— 
tsang, Buddhist Records of the Western “orld (1906); T. batt­
ers, on yuan Chwang’a Travels In Andla. 029-645 A.D., 2 vols 
(1904—OS) t and S. Bealr The Life of M u e n  Tsang. new ed. with* 
a preface by L. Cranmar-Byng (1911).
far as India, though not through Tibet. Also, the Ta 
T»ang Ksi Yfl Chiu Fa Kao Seng Chuan by I-tsing (655-715) 
and the Fa Yflan Chu Lin by Tao-shih (completed in 668) rec­
orded the passages of sramanas Hsttan-chao, Tao-hsi, and
*
Hsttan-t'ai, and five others through Tibet in the T'ang dyn­
asty} and the interview of Estlan-chao with Princess Ken- 
chteng while in Lhasa. Thus it is quite possible that som© 
Chinese monks stayed in Tibet, as related in the Tibetan 
records, at a time when diplomatic relations were being 
maintained and other contacts as well.
The Tsanpu Ralpachan, or Xhri-ral (Kolikotsu in T'ang 
Shu)f not being satidfied with the translations of Sanskrit
works already in his possession, obtained fresh manuscripts
59
from China and other neighbouring countries. He had all 
the events of his reign recorded according to the Chinese 
system of chronology, and introduced standard weights and *53
57« Journey made in 751-90» Franche, History of Western 
Tibet (hereafter cited as Franche), p. 44, states that he 
reached Kashmir in 759» See S. Levi et Ed, Chavannes, 
"L'itinéraire d'Ou-hong," Journal Asiatique. VI (1895), also 
Abbot Yuan Chao, "VVu K'ung ju chu chi." For his life see 
Preface to the Chinese translation of Daeâbhüm Kasûtra Sàtr« 
and Abbot Tsan-ning, Sung kao sèna chuan. published
53. For the routes travelled, see "Trade Routes of China froia 
Ancient Times to the Age of European Expansion," by Prof. L, 
Carrington Goodrich in Labatut and Lane (ed.), Highways (l9«5o^OB-
59* Has, "Contributions," p. 227»
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6o
measures similar to those used in China.
From the above we have seen the widespread influence of 
Chinese culture on the early life of Tibet. As conceded ty 
Sir Charles Bell, "we may in fact say that the present civil­
ization of Tibet was taken mainly from China, and only in a
6l
lesser degree from India." There was indeed very early
religious contact between India and Tibet— not to mention the
legend told by those lama-authors who always liked to link
time immemorial with the land of the birth of Buddhism. But
the Tibetans, as shown by a study of the loan-words In their
language, appear to have received names and objects from the
62
Chinese prior to their contact with India.
There is very scanty information about commercial rel­
ations. It seams that Sron-tsan Gampo first established
65
such relations with China. T»ang Shu recorded in 730 the 
request of the Tibetans for the privilege of bartering horses 
at Ch'Ihling and setting up an exchange mart at Kansungling.
The latter was not granted for strategic considerations.
Later they requested the establishment of an exchange mart at; 
the Lungchou barrier, which was allowed by decree in the early
60. Ibid., p, 228; Rockhill, Buddha, p. 224.
61. Bell, Tibet, p, 25.
62, Laufer, "Loan-words in Tibetan," op. cit.. p. 502.
63, Ibid., p. 215.
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years of the ninth century,
Viith Bandarma (Taao in Chinese)* the famous "Julian the 
Apostate of Buddhism** ended the long line.of Tibetan sover­
eigns, .and his descendants henceforth ceased to exercise
65authority over the whole of the country, . -Both Chinese and
Tibetan records agree on this, -According to the history of
66
the Sung dynasty (960-1279) Tibet .bacuae weak and declined
67
in power during the later years of the T’ang dynasty, - . . The
tribes formed clans of various sisos, and tho "country..was no 
longer united. In Bus’s article wo find the partition of 
the kingdom between Lacdamafs two sons* Hedsrun and Turn ten, 
and the later subdivisions. The diagram below is designed 
to show how their possessions were subsequently divided. 64*
64
64, Ch’ ihling, the Bed Hills* are 3*0 li from the modern 
Hslning, the capital of Chinghai province, Kansungling is 
in.Szechuan* JO miles north of Sung-p&n* th© T’&ng Sungchou, 
Bungchou had its district government, at tho present-day, 
Bung-hsien, in Shensi province. The Bungchou barrier hero 
indicated must bo somewhere north of thing-shut in the pres­
ent Kansu province,
65# Franeke* p, 60| Boll* Tibet, pp, JO-Jlj Das* «Contribut­
ions** p, 2Jo,
66, See Sung shlh. Book 4 9 2,
67* See also Bushcll* pp, J2J-26,
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m m m  king of Slmn-ehda—
eizsd PursA
~--&@eltro4 J&uralf H a g  of Mai^rul
•a
*
V
Hit domtadaata spread owr Ku* gars* famg* T&yful»Xtg and %td**fei# 
— district* where they ruled as potty princes over tbslr raspsetlvs.. 
pOSSdSSlOJttU'
*gp* slso cuoceeded as master of fstdroft.
Thiohtan beoaas king of ti sad reaoved capital to far«*lunj tit 
semmth descendant* Salsyi^ go»* s great patron of Saiys Pandits f 
hie ninth descendant* Ts^sRiap«hhs9 aoooapsstod ths illustrious 
Pbagspa ©a his visit to th# Emperor of China sod obtained Issper~
isl Patents.
Thl-d# took possession of Ando sod Tsonkha.
Ph&b**dt*ge boos» »aster of Tssa^rol# ;5
His descendants made theaaalv»* meters of Cwliham* huff»!»* 
— Cbyipa» IMtee* ItetHtun* sod Ts&feor* where they severally ruled 
N  as petty chiefs*
60. Francks* in hit History of ¥#»t#ra. .Tibet. Chap. FI* gives the line of direst descendant* of 
Derigpagoa up to Ehrl^ts^lte (ea. 1375*1400) * Cf* Petech, Luciano, A r 8tafe J i f J M JitlaaHte
<1939)# Ft. I# Chap. Ill Pt. II* Chaps, I sad II,
50
Tibetan History ■-ftor L.andarmn, written, by iiag-io*»n- 
deg-lags in 1645 and translated from Slbet«n into Chinese by 
Liu Ll-chlen in 1945, supplements bus's account ano gives a 
more detailed chronology showing further sub-divisions. For j 
example, while Das’s account based upon U m M £ = i m = £ o , Chho^ j 
.1upf and others gives only a table of the genealogical succ­
ession from Yumten, hero a more detailed sub-division i3 
given, showing where his descendants subsequently established 
themselves. It also informs us of the retreat of lasl-tseg- 
pa’c descendants to La-stod and Thl Xyi-de Nimagon' s descend­
ants to Mnah-ric, both under the pressure of Yuaiten' s branch.
It further records that Isede’s fifth ¿ascendant, Btsan- 
phyug, went to Ya-tser and became king and founder of the 
Yatser House which lasted another s i x  generations. Its more 
detailed account of the sub-divisions into different tribes 
of l'asi-tsegpal's branch, especially the spread of Thichhun»s 
heirs, gives a clear picture of how Tibet was further weak­
ened politically, while its religion revived. In describing 
the genealogical development of this branch, it mentions the 
visit of the younger son of Sakya-bkrasis in Phagspa’a com­
pany to the Emperor Khublal, the founder of the Chinese Yuan 
dynasty, and the receipt of the Imperial Patents from the 
latter. The same is related in bus's account*
In the Reverend Frances Ip .stoxy.j?f „yesternj lbet is 
found a rather different version of the story. Kyi-de Hlm- 
agon and the Tasi Tsegpal were robbed of their possessions in
31
contr a  Tibet by Tumten and iled  to 'western Tibet. * »  
la t te r  became king oí the most eastern portion of Vestern 
Tibet, called  yar-lung. The former conquered Western Tibet 
completely and divided bis Kingdom among his three sons.
All records agree that the country »as mainly divided into  
too parts with th eir respective subdivisions.
The Chinese history of the Sung dynasty dealt only with
the bordering trib es of eastern and north-eastern  Tibet, pre-
, v,+ e rtf' Yumt^n. o f wtiosi scarcely a tracesumably the descendants oi
. . „rtT*ri can "bo found except some genealogic- of any systematic record Co.
.,w ve As Tibet was than divided and al tables as mentioned above.
not strong enough to endanger the security  of China in  any 
way, the Chinese who had orig in ally  neither the desire nor 
the necessity  to exploit a region economically so poor, and 
Who themselves were under attack  from the north during much 
of the Sung period, had only i t s  fro n tier closely  guarded.
They adopted a la ls se s -fu ire  policy toward what was going on 
in th at neighbouring land, whose people had once been a 
source of so ijuich trouble«
Throughout the Sung dynasty (9É0-1279), therefore, the 
w riter has been able to find nothing moro than the acceptance 
Of the submission of the native trib e s , th o lr presentation of 
tribute and occasional expeditions against rebellious trib es  
or invaders of the protected trib e s . For instan ce, there 
was one expedition against Li Chi-chien and another against 
luanha. On the whole, the Chinese Emperor then maintained
32
„ +,„.. rrc, tho Tibetan tr ib e s . He evena peaceful policy t o « ^ -
bestowed favours upon them.
In 961 Ehang-Po-Kan, chief of the Chincho* tribes, killed 
the Chinese soldiers «ho c c .  over to his region to gather 
s o «  wood. The Chinese governor arrested forty-seven of fils 
non and submitted a report to the court. The Bsperor repl­
aced the governor and sent Shang-Po-Kan a message to announce 
his pardon. That led the chief to make his submission.
Thirty-four years later the govuoor, ® 9
, . . the native tribes beyond Vlei-Pei.his success in driving m e
+Ya * time transferred  the governor to The Emperor, Tal-tsung, *bis
. u rurthpr conflicte Generous g if ts  andanother post to avoid further
, , +n n-icify the Tibetan tr ib e s . ¥.'hen-high honours were used to p<-ca.iy
.  ^ . v^ .4 +-+-pri trib u te , mostly horses butever the ch ieftains submitted tnuuw«, j
sometimes sheep and camels, the Emperor gave them cither tea,
brocade, silk, robes, or apparatus in return, or richly
, ^  . . .  Several ch ieftain s were appointedrewarded them with money. D<3,Ci
governors »1 th seals and tablets and some »ere made generals. 
Among the latter the most outstanding figure was Che-pu-Lung- 
Po, Who came to the Imperial court in 998 and was promoted to 
the rank of general-ln-chief. In 1032 the same honour was
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„ ,, w44-h his Prime Minister on the sub-
69. The Emperor* s J ; tory of the Sung dynasty, shows 
¡J3ct, recorded in the ^  v, loward Tibet, Book 492, ChUan clourly Ids peaceful policy
25, pp. 3B“6a.
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conferred upon Kuo
ile may assume
sau-lo, a descendant of Tsanpu.
that most of these chieftains presented
tribute as a comercial proposition rather than as a nark of 
allegiance. There are records of the giving of seventy-six 
kinds of Chinese medicine to the Tibetan tribes during the 
prevalence of a plague, ana presents of bona, errors, and 
other weapons— a departure from the old practice— to the 
faithful tribes. Moreover, the royal surn;jse was conferred 
on loyal and deserving chieftains, and hostages usually
sons and brothers of the chiefs »ho had submitted— »era ret-
urned as friendly gestures and proofs of confidence. All 
these benefactions were highly appreciated, and throughout 
the Sung dynasty the Chinese western frontier was generally
quiet.
_. , .,a close during the T ’ang dynastyThe religious tie, ->o CiUSB
n , , ev,. c period between Western 2ibet andand maintained during thi>> Peri
doe3 seen to have been alto- its western neighbour» aoe
gether severed between China and Eastern Tibet. In 966, 
Chl-pu-kuo-chlh, the Tibetan chief of Hsi-liung. reported to
,, , . the arrival of a group of morethe Chinese imperial court
tL uv.0 declared that they were onthan sixty Chinese iaona.s» wno
. . hlld been robbed by the natives. As their way to India, but had o ^ u
. . much attention to religiousChinese history does not p^y
^  highly probable that many more as to other matters, it 3 v 70
70. Das, «Contributions,B pp. 235-39) cf, Banang Setsen.
religious events in connection with China ana Tibet in this 
period were not recorded.
Curing the Sung dynasty, "although its troops fought 
heroically often, they never succeeded in breaking the iron 
ring forged around the imperial boundaries by the Khitan 
(until 1125), the Jurchen Tungus (until 1234), and the Mon­
gols in the north} by the Tangut ” * (ca' 990-1227) and the 
Mongols in the northwest) and by the Annum and Nan Chao in 
the southwest and south, " 7 and were, therefore, too hard 
pressed to be in a position to acquire new additions to 
China's domain from Tibet. Historians could also explain 
the non-interference of the Sung emperors in the affairs of 
a weak and divided Tibet in terms other than those of power 
politics. Perhaps thanks more to the fact that "the hist­
ory of China is the record of an expanding culture, not that 
of a conquering empire, " 71 2 than to any other factor, Tibet 
was able to maintain its secluded position. But things were 
bound to undergo a change as a result of what now occurred—  
Jenghls Khan's73 conquest and the rise of the Mongolian
Empire.
According to Das, as soon as the great and mighty warr-
„ „ lrlch « Chnrt History Of the Chinese71. L. Carrington Goodrich*
Peorle (rev. ed. 195*)» P* ,
„ A RVinrt cultural History (rev.72. C.P. Fitzgerald, Ch|B§J-^------- ~
ed. 1950), p. 1.
73. According to Tibetan c h r o n o ^ o ^
in.n|220, and died inIn 1132, ascended the throne as
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ior came, in the beginning of the thirteenth century, the
»hole of Tibet, without much resistance, succumbed to his
power. The different chieftains and petty princes became
his abject v assals . The Chinese records, however, show
that his conquest extended only as far as fisi Hsia (Tangut)
/4
known to the Chinese as Bo-hsi. ^
It was his grandson, Mflnga, .«to established, soon
after the submission of the Tibetan tribes in 1255, an admin­
istrative centre at Hochow, in the present province of Kansu 
and the pacification bureaux at Tiao-men, Ytl-t’ung, Li, Ya,
. 0*Q aa \ Chinese books usually give his
pp: ?227j but after investigation someperiod of life as 1162 122/> 1155-1227 (see Feng Ch» eng-
writers have placed it at w p~ [  Pelliot gave a Chinesecht^ , Ch» en^-chi-s^uzhaa-gl^- sho5 that he was born In 1167 
source and advanced a thesi* 13^ i ^  mentioned and commen­
ted ASittiv??^*SXS ^ K « T h Q  Secret History of the Mongols® 
m?«* v ™  r ' 476^478, n. 104.) His succession to|JAS, XIV [Dec. 195J-J » d e n i z e d  among Chinese writers as Khanship is S^erally recogrii^d ^ > Qr coronation ln u 7 9
1 463d and 432, nn. 118 and 119. The
or U 89 (see ibid»» PP* (for whose identity and connection 
record T Q b c ^ m  {¿bter ^  Rasid al-Din^a relevant 
with C h t i n - c h ^ n ^ p f ; ^ ^ ^ ^  ibid., pp. 469-471 and 
portions of. the des cSSpagnes do Gengis Kfen
f l l l l f f o r i g i n  io^his family Sul
b irth . *
74. sea H. Desmond Martin, S ’? M ™  of Chinas Khan ,aRd His. 
Conquest. nr Worth China (1950), PP- !°2» “ • 32» “ a iio-
75. Tovo reklsbl dal-tltett» VIII, 22fB,
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Ch'ang-ho-hsl, and ¡ílng-yaan, all along the border of pres- 
eat Szechuan.
When Kublai, who had commanded the forces that over-ran 
Eastern Tibet on his way in 1253 to conquer Ta-li (in Ytlnn- 
an) / 6 succeeded M n g S  as Khan In 1260, ho enforced the pac- *li
76. in spit of the assertion of Rockhlll, who says that «the 
forces of Yfian Emperors never advanced nearer Tibet than the 
western borders of Kansu, Szechuan and Ytinnan" (T'oung Pao 
[19101, p. 2) and the doubt concerning Colonel Yule’s obser­
vation that Tibet was always reckoned as a part of the Mon- 
gol-Chinese Empire, expressed by E. Bretschnoider who wonders how Tibet came into subjection to the Mongols (Medieval Res­
earches from Eastern Asiatic Sources fl838], I I , 25), the 
writer considers that there is sufficient evidence to show 
that Kublai»s forces did cross the Tibetan frontier. Shao 
Yttan-p» lne. Ytlan shih pien (1699), which relates the Ta­li campaign in more detail than other compilations of Yttan- 
Shih (History of the Yftan Dynasty) records the switching of 
a branch of the army to enter Tibet (Chüan II, p. lb), V,ei 
lüan (1704-18^61. yuan shih hein pien, Chüan V, p. 1-b and 
Chüan XVIII, pp. 8-b andlO-a, and Tseng Lien, Yttan _shn 
(1911), Chüan IV, p. 3a, also mention their passing through, 
or entering into, Tibet. On referring to the biographies 
of V.u-llang-ho-t» al (üriangkadai) the Field Commander-In- 
Chief of the western route army (Sung Lien [1310-1331], and 
others, Ytlan shih. Chüan 121, PP. 5a-8b; K»o Shao-min [I850- 
19331, Hiin"Ytlan shih. Chüan 122, pp. 5b-8bj Ittan^hihJ^ 
filen; Chüan’xlx,"pp: la-2b} füan shihjisi,n,jieri, Chüan XXXVII, pp. la-4a), one will U n a  some supporting evidence. 
Above all. th« r&rord of the campaign inscribed on a stone 
erected at Ta!liiS memory of the victory and written by 
Ch» eng Chtt-fu (1249-1318), (Kuo-ch»_ao^wen-lei , Chüan XXIII,
PP. la-3b) has the words »»passing through T»u-fan,»» which 
cannot but mean the over-running of at least a part of the 
eastern territory then under Tibet’s control, Wu Chin-ao, Rasing his remarks on knowledge of the area gained through 
travelling, gives the itinerary of this campaign in his book, 
Mmeh«ui 'hivwf.1 y^-r.hiu. p p . 30-40» which shows clearly 
the párt of the Tibetan territory over-run tv the Mongolian 
loree. Yttan shih lei v i m  (Chüan II, p. lb) and Yfl|h.„shih agin — o'", lb) record the submission oí the chief
(Tibet), So-huo-t»o. (Chüan VI.b» 7bj Chüan VII, p. 2b) and Yttan.shu Cckflan IV. p, 3a), also 
mention So-huo—t»o»s surrender*
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ificu tio n  policy of the la t te r  with even greater energy.
In 1269 he established a p acifica tio n  bureau In «.ussu-tsung, 
v.hleh »as farth er in  the In te rio r of the country and domin­
ated the two principal provinces, bbus (0) and Gtsang (Tseng). 
Later he divided the country into d is tr ic ts  (CMn and Hsien)
, „ „nri established various o ffice s  and aas in China Proper, ana e b u w «
system of lo ca l government.
The History of the m an Dynasty records the assim ilation  
of the Tibetan army under the command of a Hongollan prince 
Auluchi (whoso t i t l e  in Chinese was P 'ln g  H I  V.ang) and the 
employment of i t  in  subduing the Chien-Tu trib e  in  1272, and 
also the fu rther use of force in bringing the Tibetans in to
78submission.
ujv, rViia-ch’ ine lid., Chfilan 547177. See T a ~ c h U n g « i ^ M n g r g ^ » tcc^rry t U s  out very far. As
p. lb. But in fact administer, he may have found Ithe had such a vast empire gcheme into force, or unnec-
not worth while to rthar the secular power of theessary to consolidate any IU 
Sakya Hierarchy.
._ - Tien and others. Chtian VII, PP*78. See Yhan shih by uung . t pieri by %el Yftan, Chtlan V,
I5a-b, and also Y f t a n (1275), Prince Auluchi 
P. 21d. Kota that three y . r M e f  of a combined Mongolian 
was dispatched as Commanaer-ii ^  (Ibid., p. 27b, and Yflan 
force to subjugate the Tibet | ^ de^5££tioning Auluchi’s 
¿hlh, Chtlan VIII, p. 20b). entering T ’u-fan in 1254 (?),
expedition in 1 2 7 5 . ^  Ytian shih that sub anno 1251
E. Bretschneider cited also with the command of the troops 
^dnga Khan entrusted go-11 . Q 1268 Kublai Khan ordered 
against T ’u-fan and that sub anno Q And Bretschnei-
Meng-gu-dai to invade S i - t i o n  of thQSQ passages from 
der remarked that with the p is sald of thQ warlike ent- 
the Chinese annals, nothing ^  hot.. (Medieval Researches,erprlses of the Mongols against a* v-----—
II, 23-25).
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5 Apparently Kublai Klun found tha warliko Tibetans a 
difficult people to rule, and resolved to reduce them to a'
condition of docility through the influence of religion*
. . 79 ■■ ■
Buddhism was selected as the religion best calculated to
tame.the wild tribesmen of Tibet*.and as it had already
. . ■■ 80 '
secured a firm'foothold there* the project was by ho means' 
an impractical one. The policy wa3 effectively enforced, 
and the cooperation of Sakya Panditta of the large monastery 
at Sakya was secured by his being invited.to the Mongolian
79» I*. Austins Waddell, Lhasa and Its Mysteries« p* 26, tells 
a story of how Buddhism was chosen in the presence of Christ* 
lan missionaries. - They were unable to comply with Kublal*s 
demand to perform a miracle* while the Lamas caused his wine- 
cup to rise miraculously to his lips. (Waddell mistook Kub- 
lai for the son of Jenghis Khan. Ha was the fourth son of 
Tului, brother of HSnga, grandson of Jenghis Khan.) Huang 
Cht&n-hua, Chunit kuo fo chl&o shtfa (1940), p. 340, mentions 
the debate between Phagspa, who took part In the debate by 
tha Bmperor* s command, and the Taoists, who failed at last to 
answer the questions put to thorn.
80* This might have been the reason for Kublai Khaa*s embrac­
ing Buddhism, As he had Marco Polo in M s  service and as th© Mas tori an church and Islam wore much more powerful in his Umpire, ho might Just as well fa& m  gone over to either on#. But it must not bo assumed that ho adopted Buddhism merely as 4 sattcr of expediency. Ho may have done so from religious conviction, - He had as tutor the Abbot Yia-chien (a Chinese . Jonk from Bhansl province, who died in 1257)* This monk was hold in high respect by Kubl&t1» two grandmothers and hat 
bean appointed to have charge of all monastic affairs by Kub* 
iai*s predecessors, Kwei-yu and Manga*
Kublai had also in his service as a high ranking member 
7* his staff Liu Ping-ebung, who had been a Buddhist hermit h^d who was present#«* to his by fis-Chien, • •
court.
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Tibet as a Theocracy
According to the,Chinsso records,.Sakya Panditta*s
nephew Phagspa vient: to see. KuhLal in 1255. This young '
82
visitor- pleased him so much that as soon as he was made
Khan ho ashed Pliagspa to 'too his - spiritual; guide, 1 or national
mentor. As a reward for his adaptation of the Tibetan and
85
Braimlc scripts to tho existing spoken Mongolian language, 
Phagspa .was. .raised to tho rank of priest-king and constituted 
the ruler of (1) Tibet proper, comprising the thirteen dis­
tricts of II and Tseng, (2) Xhaa, and (5) Ando. - Prom that 
time Tibet was ruled by the Sakyapa Lamas as a theocracy.
In 1275 Phagspa, who had remained at ■ the Mongolian 
court except for a short visit to his home in 1264 and & *19
81. Bell, Tlbat, p. Jlj Das, «Contributions,v p* 240*
«2, Ibid. He was 19 years of agej but Chinese records place kirn:.at 1 5 * According ■ to Liu Li-chien* s , translation of Tib- ,~= Min History after Landarma (p, 14), Phagspa, at the ago of 
I l i a c  coap&ni e a"his uncle, Cakya p&nditta, to visit Godan • vsonof iGagan, - grandson of longhis Khan) at Hsl-Liang* • Here 
Jho uncle remained for 7 years, dying in 1251* Phagspa was
19 when KuhLai sent for him* According to Kenneth fUS, Chen, 
Jhuddhist-Taoist Mixtures in Pa-shih-i-hua-t*u,» HI AS. XIX, 5, 
oe was born c&. 1259 and died in 1280.
^5* The Mongols under Jcngbls Khan borrowed the Uigur writ» 
x5Jgs* In 1269, Kubl&i ordered Phagspa to compose a system 
°f writing for official use. According to Pelliot there Is 
nothing original in Phagspa»s adaptation, I, Asiafclooe, 
U927), OCX, 572. ■.
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brief Journey a few months before, asked for a long leave to 
return to Tibet* Permission was only reluctantly granted.
He left his half-brother, Ling-ching (rim-rgyal in Tibetan) 
to take his place at the court. Ee died fivo years later. 
Phagspa had been granted the right to make the succession to 
the throne hereditary in his family and had received all the 
highest honours that could be conferred on a lama, Ee had a
85
seat in Ulterior Tibet called Sukya-Jong.
The Institution of a national mentor was maintained
. . '. 86
throughout the period of the laim dynasty. Unusual res­
pect was paid to the holder of the office, who enjoyed imp-, 
ortant privileges, Som  of the privileges were extended even 
to his relatives. The national mentor ana high lumas did 
hot, however, always live up to the requirements of their off-
84, Das* article, op. cit.. states that after a residence of 
twelve years in China with the Emperor, ha returned to Sakya. 
Eanang Sotsm  (p* 115) gives his birth as 1255 &nd (p# 119) 
records his roturn in 1280 at the age of 46.
85, iiarkhaa, XXVIII.
86, 1277-1567* Xubl&i became virtually emperor of tha whole 
©f China in 1277# though he-ascended to-the Kh&nship "in -1260 
and entered Peking in 1264, The YU.an fihih gives a list of 
©ho names of the national mentors, olteiof thair appointment, 
hnd the dates of their deaths* On the control exercised by 
©ha national mentor and on the national mentor as .air ins tit- r 
utlon, see Chun jo Eagami, /viatic Studies in Honor of Torn 
«2aa2a (1950), pp. 779-795.
leas, and Soso of then grossly abused the indulgence of the 
emperors. They misappropriated money, accepted bribes, 
desecrated graves and were guilty of seduction, oppression , 
and even murder. Lioreover, they used their influence to 
help their friends to avoid the payment of taxes-and obst­
ructed the course of Justice.
There is a wealth of evidence concerning the high­
handedness of the highly placed lamas, Yang-1 ien-chen-chia,
the Pontiff of Buddhists in south-eastern China appointed by 
ICubl&i, rifled the royal cemeteries of the Sung dynasty and 
made a very large fortune by unlawful means. - In IjoB some 
Tibetan lamas stole a stock of fuel from a civilian. When 
the case was brought up in court they nearly lynched the 
plaintiff, and yet the culprits were paruoned. In 1309 a 
group of eighteen lamas assaulted a princess, while she was 
travelling. They were arrested but released. In later 
years even the national mentor became corrupt. It was rec­
orded that the last occupant of this office during the Yft&n 
dynasty supplied the emperor with aphrodisiacs and encouraged 
him in vice in order to win Ids favour.
The extraordinary tolerance that the court extended to 
lamas had the effect of enabling the latter to sap the
Q7*  The writer of this study has drawn some of the material
*rom tho Yfi.an shih. especially Chtom 202.
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resistance of the bellicose Tibetans, Eventually Tibetan 
bloodthirstiness was converted into a passion for spiritual 
satisfaction. Thus, through the religious link between China 
and Tibet, China was able to exercise a dominant influence 
over her vassal state or, in terns of Buddhist statecraft, 
her »patronized state,* without using force or establishing 
colonies in the country.
In Tibet the Sakya lamas were no better^if not worse, 
than the Sakya lamas in China, The regents who held the 
real power under the puppet Sakya hierarchy waged war against 
each other. The country became u hotbed of conspiracies and 
assassinations. The emperors at Peking do not seem to have 
siade any attempt to alter this state of affairs, Co long as 
their own authority was not threatened they left the rise and 
fall of Tibetan rival monasteries to take their own course.
From the Tibetan records we find that one Mongol emperor 
preferred one sect, while his successor showed favours to a 
different sect, usually by means of giving land together with 
thousands of families for the maintenance of the monasteries 
^der^lts charge, and numerous feudal chiefs were thus créa- 
ted, The regents received patents and seals directly
P *  A genealogical table of the Sakya regents is given by 
nas, «Contributions,» p, 240*
P *  Liu*a Translation, p, 25* ' . -
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from the-Court'of .Peking* One.-regent, or ppoa-chen.:;as .
the-officewas.called In Tibetan, abused his power.to such
an extent:that the disciples of Phagspa petitioned to t h e ;
emperor who then sent troops to Dya-rog-rdoa.&nd put him to 
91
death*. During a lator, feud ■ (about 1290) - bo tween Sakya-.
and Hbri-gun sects, the regent named.A-na-l&a suppressed th©
■ ■ ■ - 92
latter sect with the aid of Mongolian military forces* - 
: The figurehead Sakya Priest-Kings always maintained 
close relations with the emperors at Pelting by sending their 
'brothers or sons to be national mentors and reside near the 
court. Carla, who succeeded his brother Phagspa and whose 
son Dharaa-Palarak-slta, a former national mentor, succeeded 
him as priest-king, married a Mongolian princess. The dis­
pute on the succession of Carla was brought to the emperor, 
who upheld his son and banished a claimant* at the death of 
Dhaxm-Palar&k-slta, the installation of priest-king was
held up for years because of the emperor*s disapproval of 
95
the choice* . Apparently it was by the emperor’s authority
that the Siky&pa hierarchs wore maintained till the middle - -
90. Das, «Contributions,* p* 241j Dlu’s Translation*
PP* 20-21,
91* Ibid*, p. 16*
92* I M d ,f p, 20*
95* Ibid., pp, 16-lS.
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of the fourteenth century, ' at which time the fitya regime 
was established*
The founder of the new regime, Cbyan-Chhub-Gydt-shan, • 
batter known by his name of Phagno-du, was a member of the
■ ■■' ■■■ 95 . ■ ' ■ ■
famous Bkah-brgyud-pa sect,., although ha visited the Cakya 
monastery at the age of fourteen and stayed there.for some 
time* His ancestors had received patents from the Peking
■ 96
court, and he himself was appointed at tho age of eighteen 
to tho command of 10,000 families by patent from.the emperor
97
and entrusted with a seal for his own use.
During a dispute with the chiefs, nobles and laaas of 94
94 ;
94. Ibid., p . 21 places the Sakya dynasty at 1255*15491 
according to Das, «Contributions,« p. 240, the Sakya Hier­
archy lasted from 1270 to 1540. The yttnn shih records that 
Phagspa,-though made national mentor in 126o7 was not appoin­ted the first priest-king until after his composition of a system of Mongol writing, which was adopted in 1269, but 
Jhich is not now in use as some Chinese%writers have asserted* 
Polliot gay® ia his article, «Des Mots a H Initiale, Aujour­
d'hui- ¿sole dans;le Mongol des XIII** ©t XI? Slides,« J. Asia- 
j&SM, CCVI (1925) 198, that Phagspa*s system of writing was 
haraly in real use for more than a period of some fifty years*he said at.the meetingofthe Société Asiatique on Mar- 
çh U .  1927, (J. Asiatique. CCX,fl9271, 372) that It tad taen «Jed in central Asia at least till the sixteenth century.
Translation (p, 14) also records that Phagspa*s poilt- 
icai power was given as a reward for his composition of the 
Mongolian script* - So 1270 is about the right year to mark 
the beginning of the Sakya rule*
Pp* sec* s m  Yin tsang fo chlao shih.
Iilu*s Translation* pp* 5^-58*
^ * IMâ*, p. 39| Das, * Contributions," p.245*
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U and Tsang, .the emporor decided in his favour, furnished him 
with renewed patents and seals and bestowed on'him, to bo 
enjoyed as hereditary possessions, the province of 0, leaving 
Tsang to the Sakyapas. Five years later,., after having 
defeated the Sakyapas and other rivals on the battlefield, 
Cfayan-Cfahub presented to the court of Peking charges of imbec­
ility and dissension among the Stkyapa authorities and the 
local chiefs to Justify this action, and the emperor permit­
ted him to annex the remaining parts of Tibet and Kham to his
■ 99
possessions« He assumed the title of King of Situ and
became the undisputed master of the whole of Tibet.
There was hardly any change in the relations between
Cliina and Tibet as a result of the change of regime. Tho
close relation between the Court of Peking and the Citya
100
regime may be gathered from Das* account* He states that
93* Liu* s Translation placed his appointment as hereditary 
chierefll ■ his assumption of the control" of the
^hol© of Tibet in 1554 (pp. 21, 41).
99* Las, "Contributions,* p* 245* For the origin of Pbagmodu 
governorship and .'details concerning Clyah-Chhub-Gyait-sban 
himself.for further evidence of the Mongol emperor*s influ* - 
cnee on Tibetan politics (in this case, to effect tho change 
df a governor and to install one with the emperor* a sanction), 
JJid also.for:Cbyun-Ghhub*s successors, sea *A Short History of 
Jho House of Phagdu, which ruled over Tibet on tho decline of 
$**3ra till 1452 A*£}««* by Rai Carat Chandra Las* JASB* Kow 
^e?iea, X (August, 1905)# 202-207# henceforth citeu as Las, 1 
history of Fh&gdu."
|?0. Las, »Contributions," p* 244, and Las, «History of 
«*gdu,« p. 206, #
Sakya Rin-Chhen, the fourth in descent from Phagso-du, 
became a favourite minister of Togon-Hsaur (r# 1555-1568), 
the last emperor of the Yttan cynasty. At first entrusted 
with guarding the palace, Sakya Ein-Chhen was later given 
the office of collector of the revenue from one of the great 
provinces of China*
; : îhe.. ImmâtMKJïf. the ling Jaroa 
Its Relation to Tibet
Y.hen Chu YtLan-chang (titled King T ’ai-tsu) overthrew 101
the llongolian regime and founded the King aynasty in 1568, 
ho was greatly impressed by the extent of the religious infl­
uence in Tibet so successfully exploited by his predecessors* 
Having himself once been a Buddhist monk in Huang-Chüoh Mon­
astery, he was only to glad to further the Buddhist cause.
In the second year of his reign the Chinese emperor 
issued a decree inviting the loading Tibetan lamas to come 
lo him for the renewal of their appointments and the changing 
their tablets of authority* There was apparently little 
response to the decree* He then sent a high official, list '
ïûn-te, to Tibet on a mission to explain the continued pro- -
102
^ddhist policy of the new regime# As a result, the
3?î\ distorted accounts of Das and fíanang Setsen (pp, 125- 
in regard to the establishment of the King dynasty must 
«holly rejected#
o?2* fíe® King T*at-t8U  shih-ltu Chtl&n 41, p, la, for the text 
the decree*
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acting national mentor of the previous'cynasty/Nan-Chia-Pal-
tsang-po, sent an envoy.to:the 'emperor and; three years-later Vi. 
himself came to tho Chinese court. 'He was-warmly received- 
and generously rewarded. His sixty subordinate officials, 
whose re-appointment ho recommended, w?re confirmed in their
posts, and-he himself received-a 4&de: -seal' and a.new title.'
■■■■■ 103 ■ -
After that precedent, many ©f the leading lamas, including
the descendants of Phagspa,, sent their representatives to askv:-;
*■ , ’ Jl ;' •
for the r©»appointment’ of their subordinates, and the raq-
104 '
uests were always granted.
As a precautionary measure against the failure of his 
peaceful overtures, the emperor appointed in 1372 General 
¿eng YU as comiaander-in-chief to make preparations for a 
military campaign In Tibet, and the latter did score & deci­
sive victory over those Tibetan tribes who blocked the pass-
105®ge of tribute from fhissutsang. ■ , Afterwards,-when the ■-
... i
103, According to Chinese records, among thorn one who called 
himself head of the lamas was given the title of national 
*entor in 1372| the brother of his successor was made Shan- 
hua-wang In 140$. pp* 43, a, 1, and 44,
«• 1, Identifies the former as the second priest-king of the ^itya regime, and the latter as his nephew, Pbo&-grags-p&- 
J*6yal~mtshaa who, succeeding his cousin, became the fifth ' 
Jdler in the Bitya hierarchy. Das, «History of Phagdu,*I* 205^ identifies the latter as Tagpa Gyal-tshan (son of Oakya 
ltlncheh and nephew of Chy&n-Chhub), who succeeded his-younger 
^dcle Tagrin to the throne in the year Tree-bird,
CbF 1^  T’ inc-ytt (1672-1755) (U A% o m ^ .Jbj±JilngFor details see ChUan 330 and 351»
^°5* Ibid,, Chftan 2, pp. 10a and 14a.
missions were found to be successful* tho emperor sot up
' . 106.. ■'
command posts at,fussutsang and To-kan*sze for tho super- : 
vision of a number of pacification bureaux and offices*
Most o f t h e  offices wore hereditary under tho Itan dynasty. 
Their occupants* in command of one thousand or ten thousand 
families* were re-appointed .with n m  patents*-.■
In the reign of Chf eng-tsu (son of T fai-tsu)* who usurped 
the throne from the legitimate successor* Ytin-won* generally 
known as fiui-ti (son of the crown prince), Budahism gained 
oven greater importance* The emperor invited the famous
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Halima to come from Tibet to China, He arrived in the 
winter of 1406 and is reported to have performed many miracles 
in the presence of the emperor. He was made a prince of tho 
holy law* Ta-pao-fa-wang in Chinase— a title previously bald 
by Phagspa— and his three disciples received titles of honour 
and tablets* Titles of different grades wore also conferred *•
*•06, U u  Chtln-jen* dictionary of Chinese Geographical Wasies, 
b» 446, identifies To-kan-sxe as the region southeast of the Present-day Ho-ytaa In Ch* inghal to the borderland of the 
Sï°Iillc® ^ f-'Sg€Chttao* ■ ^sS^bllM s i s ï m g s â ù h s , gives. the nasa 
°* To-car-mo instead of To-kan-sse,
J^7* ^el-tsang t*u-ahih (Chtan I* p, 16b) gives the name Ker- 
JfP* ana iaentlfies itKith Halima, The author of ftel-tsang- 
llM g » c M h f in his note on p* 16 of Chtan I also mentions her* 
5aPa a3 lialiaa and identifies his as.of the Black Sect, 
adckhill* "Tibet— A Geographical* Ethnographical and Histor- 
JCal Sketch Derived from Chinese Sources," henceforth cited at 
ckhill* "Tibet.» JPJS* M&  Series (I89I)* p, 199# gives the 
«as® as Karmaka (Ha^Ti-ma), - • . '
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on. a large number of lamas of various monasteries*. .
■ As .Emperor Ch»eng-tsu sad©, an extensive search, for lear- .
ned lamas, he could not have missed the great reformer Tsong-
k»a-p& who founded tho Yellow Cect during his reign. Ytt Tao-
ch’Gan discovered from Tibetan sources the record of the
missions sent by the Emperor to invito him to/his court and
the letter sent in reply by the latter in which Tsong-k»a-pa
gave illness as the reason for declining the Emperor^ invit-
108
ation* In 1415 the Emperor again sent an envoy with a
letter asking the great reformer to despatch a disciple on
his behalf, if he himself could not come in person. V-ith
this Tsong-k»a-pa complied, and ho sent one of his outstanding
disciples, Ckaya Yeces, whom Ytl Tao-ch» turn, using a Mongolian
source, identified as tho Ta-tz» u-fa-wang mentioned in the 
109
&M k shlh* 4
lo3. Gee Ytl Tao-chfaon* s article on **I chn Ming Ch» eng-tsu 
ch»ien shlh chao Tsong-k* a-pa chi shih chi Tsong-k»a-pa fu 
Ch» eng-tsu shu» in Academia Sinica’s Tsai Ytian-p»el. Anni­versary II, 959-962. ' ' 109
109. Ibid*, pp, 965-966» Das, «The Monasteries of Tibet,»» 
JAs b # iiw lories I (April, 1905)» 112, states .that'«Emperor
¿ u n d o  of tho Taming dynasty haa sent an invitation to Tsong- 
5*a-pa to visit Peking, but the great reformer ... sent t o y s  
Xeces as his representative.* Emperor Yuaglo can doubtless 
identified as Ch*eng-tsu whose reigning years (14QJ-1424)
V!er@ titled Yunglo. b ei-tsan g -t*ung-chlhf 1 , Chap, 0»
B* 135* attributing tho bulluing of tier a Monastory to *ecos 
after his return from the tling Court, tallies with Das» 
Recount. Bit Ta-ts*u-fa-wang (Ming shlhP Chttan 351. pp, 7a- 
'¡¡) vas identified by the noted historian bel Ytan (Shena wu 
Book V, pp. 2 a-b) as a lama of the Red Sect, The 
writer has wondered why no mention was made of laces la the 
jjiSg-Shlh sine® ha first (in 1955) came across the above cited 
Passages in Das» article and in the bel-tsang t>tag-chift. 
shanks to YU lao-eh» ttan* a re-identification or - f t K t a - w a n g
As a result of the high favours shown by tho Emperor
toward Buddhism, the highways were filled with lamas coming
and.- going^ ’' The Ming shf Comments that their missions or
envoys caused congestion and inconvenience on the official
postal route and their reception and reward was a great drain110
on the treasury and a source of resentment among the people.
At first they were sent back as soon us their mission 
was accomplished, luring the reign of Bstlan-tsung (1426- 
1455) they began tho practice of staying in tho capital for 
long periods, and the expenses of their entertainment became 
a groat burden to the treasury. To combat this evil the 
kmperor was compelled to issue stringent regulations.
There was always feeling against the lamas at court, 
and tho position of the lamas in Cidna fluctuated with the 
moods of the emperors* For example, ling-tsung, after his 
restoration In 1457*"Changed Ms'attitude' towards-the-Tito tan-" 
lamas, end many regents and pontiffs were degraded. It was ' 
hot a change in tha traditional policy towards tho Buddhist 
Priesthood of Tibet. His action was only motivated by a 
desire to enforce measures which would show contrast to the
hhd his discovery of TsQng*k*a~p&*g reply to Ch< eng-tsu, we 
c&n safely affirm the early contact of tha Yellow Sect with * - 
-«0 hing court.
Hltig shih* Chtaa JJl, pp. 7&~3&« ■
acts of his half brother, Ching-tsung, who hah occupied the
throne during his absence as a prisoner of war in the hands
111 '
of the V.ala (Oirat) Mongols*
ling-tsung1s son and heir, Hsien-tsung, who reigned 
from 1465 to 1436, was in favour of the lamas and showered 
titles and honours upon them. In contrast, his son, Esi&o- 
tsung, who reigned from 1483 to 1505,.treated the Tibetan 
lamas with severity* In his later years, however, he went 
to the other extreme and indulged them* Yni-tsung (reigned 
1506-1522), son of Hsiao-tsung, was originally uninterested 
in hamaiso. Three pontiffs were degraded when he .ascended 
the throne, but he coon became very indulgent towards lamas.
Ho studied the Tibetan language and the Buddhist canons, ar.a 
it is said that he gave himself a title equivalent to that of 
thanaa Faja, and conferred now titles upon his favourite high 
lamas* It mas he who sent. a.very costly.but fruitless 
mission to Tibet to invito to the court a m m  who* he was 
told, was a living Eudaha. The mission with a large retinue 
&hd many extravagant presents was raided and robbed by 
libotsns en route and never arrived at its o@stlna.tion.
Ill* For details about the capture and the release of ¥lng-
t K a!f H . . Pokotilov#
fflJlins Dynasty..from ,1a m  l & M . trans* f ^
rj Huoolf loewenthal, pp* 4d-5b v^^ceforth cited as Etstorr
fiLlhe Eastern Mongols) and also E.B, Parker, »Eongoliaafter 
Henghiside s'" anali» f0re the Hanchus,* JMS* fforth China
branch, XUV (1915)# 85- 86,  (henceforth c l tad as Park«?, »‘Ion-
Eis cousin*  Shih»tsungf (reigned 1522~1566).was.the 
first real enemy the lamas encountered among the emperors.
He degraded and sent hack to Tibet many of the lamas. He 
embraced Taoism and strove to suppress Buddhism. From his 
day till the end of the King dynasty in 1644 lamas seldom 
went to China, Nevertheless, Budahisa continued to serve 
this dynasty-like the preceding -one by preserving peace bet­
ween China and Tibet,
It must not be supposed that force was not employed by
the Chinese in maintaining their hold upon Tibet. Military
expeditions supported pacification through religion in the
early years of this period. Several expeditions were sent
against turbulent tribes. In 1425 a Chinese army pursued
tribesmen far beyond the Kuenlun Mountains. Since 1509
Mongolian tribesmen had been moving down to Kokonor and soon
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occupied this vast fertile region. The state of affairs
in Tibet resembled the dark days which had followed the succ-
115
0 3 s i o n  o f  t h e  a p o s t a t e  t& ndarm a t o  t h e  t h r o n e ,  and a s  s u c h  
T i b e t  was n o t  i n  a  p o s i t i o n  t o  l e n d  a  h e l p i n g  hand t o  i t s
XX2* Refer to' Hi story. PP. 99-100,
115. Tsang was then under the control of Elnpung, only nom-*hally acknowledging the supremacy of the Phagmodu chiefj 
Jba latter had to contend with internal dissensions both in ■ 
and south of U, Das, "Tibet under her Last Kings 
A.D.)f» JASB, New Series I (June, 1905) all
north
U 4 M - 1 6 4 2
people In the north. The native Tibetans, deprived of 
their possessions and livelihood, were obliged to knock on 
the doors of Sining and Kansu and try to enter them even by- 
force. Thus peace was no longer maintained along the north­
western borderland and fighting between the Chinese garrison 
forces and Tartar hordes or native Tibetans was common.
These operations were, however, of a local character. There 
was no general war and force was never employed on a large 
scale.
Nor must it be supposed that Buddhism was the only fac­
tor responsible for the preservation of peace between China 
and Tibet. Economic factors were also operations. One 
was the benefit derived from missions sent to the Chinese 
court, as' they were lavishly rewarded by the emperor# It 
is recorded that native monks of the Tao and Ming districts
in present-day Kansu made handsome profits by sending fraud- 
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blent and spurious tributes in the name of missions,
lha bartering of horses, Tibet1s staple product, for tea,
which was what its people wanted most from abroad, was highly
P r o f i t a b l e ,  and i t  was o f t e n  t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  of r e s t r i c t i o n s
u Pon this traffic that led to uprisings of the Tibetan tri-
^ing shth. Chttan 550, p.$a. See also J*K, Fairbank aha jeng, «The Chin« Tributary System.* EJAS* 1941# 
ip. 139-40, 143-49, 154-5?.
bas. Finally, hereditary titles tended to consolidate
Chinese power by their psychological effect upon the Tibetan 
mind, . .
The Yellow Sect and the Ming Dynasty
It now remains to define, as far as is possible, tho 
relationship which existed between the newly established 
Yelow Sect and the Ming dynasty. As mentioned above, Emp­
eror Ch*eng-tsu did got in touch with its founder Tsong-k* a- 
pa. But throughout the Minn shlh and tho Ming fhih lu no
S 5
mention was made of tho latter. Just when this Luther of 
Tibet lived is a natter of dispute among writers. According 
to Csosa, ha lived from 1355 to I4l7j according to Liu 11- 
chien, Eugène 0bemiller and Hue, from 1357 to 1419 f according 
to Rockhill from lj6o to 1422 (?) j and according to Grflnwedel 
and pander1 s Pantheon, from 1373 to 1441, Sir Charles Ball 
Placed his birth at 1353. Backin placed his death at 1417J 
v»hlle Pelllot seems to be quite certain that he died in 1419.
*15..Ibid.. pp, 8b, 9a, and lQaj Chüaa 331, p, 12b, records 
j-nat profit-making tribute missions came more frequently and “1th increasing numbers of members* in X$69 the court found 
Jt necessary to restrict these missions to one every threeyears and their members to not more than one thousand each, '
Ytk Tao-ch'tian, «I chu Ming Ch*£ng-tsu ch’iea shih cfcao 
^'•'Ong-kU-pa fu Cheng-tsu shu,R op, clt.f p. 950, n. 1,
115
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Georg! gives his life period as 1232-1312 which is prima
*17
facie incorrect because of its apparent 'anachronism*'
Chinese sources which did not record anything about Tsong-
k*a-pa until the Chflng dynasty, give.the life period of
this great religious reformer of Tibet as 1417-1478* 1478
as the year of his death was mentioned by Bmperor Kao-tsung
118
in an imperial edict issued in 1792# Parker, basing his
Information on a Chinese source, gives the life period of
117* Csoma, Tibetan Grammar* pp* 186-187} Un» s Translation* 
Appendix, pp7.-4^ 5i'--¥?ri8u^ei Chinois et BudaSigïïëo^
1935) "îson-kha-pa le Fand£ttt par hugène Oborjaiîler, pp* 321 
and 337 basing mainly on a biography written by Tsong-k*a- 
pa*s disciple. Khai-dubj Hue,: Souvenir» d1un Vovam * tome II« 
PP* 105 and 109} Rockhill, »ÏÏKiJ« p p T 2B|^2§0|Jïranekô,.... -  - ,  - —  - * * '• u i  atic Mythology (London,
, *y**jj$ . P» 639 
von. Stall-Hoi-v-, the .Sexagenary;.:: Cycle of : 'the,Tibet-::;.; 
312 and.314, n. ■ .7)};Goorgi, : Alnh-:.
P* 74i Bell*- Tibet* p. - 33i Hacking Asiatic Mythology (London
1932)! p. l f o i f i r l i S t .  j ! AaiatiSuF- r s s g m r - ' ^
(Ilackin and Pelliot were quoted ty baron A. i 
stein in his article, «On ■" 
snstw ifonumonta Series, I,
db g , p 7 ^ l 9  *
Jl8. Wei Yfian, Sheng m  chi« Book V, p. 2b gives 1417-1478}
Ä gk M 4 t § B r  . . . . . .  ‘  "
Invitation and Tsong-k*a-pa* s Reply,« o p » eit
n*, also places the year 
«Ming Ch* eng-tsu* s
--■’« . « w y u « ivv?v*jr  ■ , P* 950, H. 1,states that to his knowledge Wei YUan* ehing wu chi (1Ü42) is the earliest Chinese record of Tsong-k»&-paj apparently it is 
J°t* This writer thinks that Wei Xdan must have based his 
information on the imperial edict of 1792 which is engraved 
a stona erected in the Young-Ho-kung lamasery of Peking* - 
f facsimile of the edict edited by Francke and Laufer in
» Johol,m l J L 1-B£gf|
5 $
Tso'ng-k*a-pa as 1417-1469. ' Eat judging by the year in
120
w M c h  ha built the ' famous sonastery of Gab-Dan anà also
by the life period of his disciple and successor, Gandsn-
Truppa, known as the first Dalai Lana (1391*1474), this
source is obviously unreliable.
this error in Chinese sources as nell as the wrong Ìden-
121
tification of Ta-t^u-fu-wang as a lana of the Red Sect 
were probably the result of the suppression of information in 
connection with Tsong-k*a-pa and the Yellow Sect by the hist­
orians of the ¡ling dynasty* In China not only the emperor 
could do no wrong, but also his prestige and dignity had to
119
119. Parker, "Manchu Relations with Tibet or Ditsang," JRAS, 
China Branch, New Series III (1836), henceforth cited as Par­
ser# "Manchu Relations,« p* 290*
120. Das, "The Monasteries of Tibet," on, cit*. pp. 103-109# 
states that Tsong-k*a-pa started the builaihg of this monas- ;QlT ^  1408| hints Translation* p. 44, and Appendix, p. % A 
records his miildiai of Gah-baa in 1409 with the aid of Dban- 
ferags-rgyal-atshanj Rackhill, "Tibet," p* 290# states that In 
1410 he founded the Gab-Dan monastery which was finished in 
1422* on p* 109# Das states that in the 64th year of his 
Jse# Tsong-kta-pa erected the principal chapel in the conas- 
pOI7*- But among'the sources quoted above, no one except 
«corgi («hose date has been discredited) gives his period of • 
il*® as long as 64 years* ■ In M s  account of the monastory 
or Sera, p* 112, Das mentions 1418 as the year of Tsong-k* a-death* It is amaxing to note that in m  earlier article C^ontributions#* JASB. VI (1882), 53-56)# Dus relates that 
f50aS-k» a-pa was bora in 1373# was 53 in 1429# and died in the 6jrd year of his age*
12 1. £m m » n. 109.
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be upheld at any cost» Had the fact been made known to the 
public that Ch’lng-tsu’s repeated invitations extended to 
Tsong-k’a-pa were declined, the emperor’s prestige and dignity 
would have been considered as lowered to a contemptible degree 
especially at a time when his policy to show high favours
toward lamas was hy no means popular and had already caused
122 -w..,,
resentment among tho people. This explains why no mention
of Tsong-k’a-pa and the Yellow Sect was made in the Ming shih
12J
and Ming shih lu.
Some Chinese writers prior to YtL Tao-ch’tlan’s discovery,
advanced a thesis that knowledge of the Tibetan religious
reform did not reach the Chinese until the time of the Ch'ing
dynasty, as during the life time of Tsong-k’a-pa and the early
years of tho new sect its influence was then confined to part
124
of central and western Tibet* But western writers had
long maintained that there was early contact between the Yell- 
°w Beet and the Ming court and Grenaru even says that tho
122, Bupra. n. 110.
123, Yt Tao-ch’flan. "I chu Ming Ch* eng-tsu ch’ien shih chao '
^song-k* a-pa chi shih chi Tsong-k* a-pa fu Ch’eng-tsu shu,” 
«JUjEU.f p. 940.
124, An account of the introduction of the follow Soct into 
western Tibet and the way Ming Ida received it is given by : ■
fjaneke, pp. 77*80j see also Fetech, A Study on the Chronicles
atiEdasja, p. xu.
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Yellow Beet triumphed with the iling dynasty. :
The'historians of.:the Ming dynasty could not*/however*.
suppress altogether an outstanding historical fact for very
lofts«Instead of disclosing the nrsse of the Yellow feet
which would maKo the public inquisitive of its origin and its
early contact with the emperor, they later mentioned only the
existence of a living Buddha or lama prophet. The abortive
126
mission sent by lisperor hu-tsuag to invite a living Buddiia
Was presumably intended for Gunden Gyatso, the second Dalai
lama. In the reign of Chcn-tsung (157>l6l9) the Chinese
heard of a lama prophet named Bonus Gyatso, At the suggest* -
Ion of Alton Khan, the chieftain of a Mongolian tribe, now 
, ‘ 127
Known as Turned, a great patron of the Yellow Sect, - the.lama
Prophet sent a letter together with presents to the minister,
Chang Chu-tseng, who accepted then with the Imperial assent.
125. Grenard, M - H M *  P* 245.
l26* IllEia# P* 511 King j:/hih, Chttan 3JX, p. 4b-5a,
127* little wonder that Altan Khan should have sad® such a d^gg®st^ on| aa himself paid allegiance to ' the Chines©'enp* .^ ror ..ana .was sad® -Shun»i*h'aag (equivalent to the runic of. a Prince) In-1571*•. For details of the peace which Allan Khan concluded with the Chines® emperor, soo History of the F,ast- ^ ^ Jlangols, pp* 1 1 5 * 1 6  and 1*6*55# and also ParEer/ ’hong- PP# §5*9d. - As to the influence of the Tibetan lamas
» a t ™  Khan, see History of tbs Eastern MongolsP pp,.-112,
j*^ 5*36, and 139«
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The lama* s request to make presents'in'the future was gran- 
' 128
ted* Later the emperor sent to the lama an invitation
delivered by a special envoy who arrived only to witness the
: 129
lama*s passing into silence* Conan Cyatso can be unhes­
itatingly identified with the name of the third Dalai Lama*
The introduction of the fellow Sect of lauaism into 
Mongolia through the efforts of ,,the third Dalai. Lama has a 
bearing not only upon Sino-Tibetan relations but also upon the
thole picture of that part of the world* Thu occupation of 
v 130
Kckonor as mentioned above had its natural consequences.
It had always been the high policy of the Chinese government 
to prevent the Iliung-Iu and the Ch*iang (the Tibetans) from 
Joining hands* The policy had been inaugurated by Han-wu-tl . 
(reigned 140-88 D,C.) when he set up command posts and garr­
ison forts in Kansu to drive a weage between these two war­
like neighbours* kith their presence at Kokonor, the Don- 
Sols soon became involved in the political affairs in Tibet.
i^fta shih. Chftan 351# p* 5b* S*il, Parker, »¿t&nchu 
y®IgtionS|»» p . 295# says that during the reign of ban-11 
\1573-I6i9) he was made Great national Instructor. 1 Parker* s 
statement is apparently based on wu chi. Book Yj **K*ang-
™  chi hsing,» p. 13b.
p 9 ;  W a . Book Yj Appendix, »Abridged l£eng-ku yf&n-liu,**
150 gdbra.n. 112.
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During the civil strife the Tallow Sect at first met 
with reverses in their struggle for power on account of the 
powerful help which the Chief of Isang had given to the Bed 
Sect. ■; - The reformers then invited the help of the Mongolian 
hordes, who succeeded in restoring to them their lost ter­
ritorial endowments and their beloved monasteries. The Chief 
of Tseng and the Karma hierarch of the Rea Sect, failing in 
their military enterprise, also sought help from Mongolian 
chiefs. Such a situation, occurring as it did at a tine 
when China was facing serious rebellions in Manchuria and in
China Proper and the weakened Ming government was itself in a 
v 132
helpless condition, could lead only to making Tibet the 
occupied territory of the Koshote Mongols.
131. Das, •Tibet under her hast Kings,» on. elt.f pp. 1
132. Das, «Contributions,» p. 244, only mentions the fact that 
dagpa Gyal-Tshan was succeeded by M s  son Van-Jun-ne who was 
Recognised by the Chinese emperor, and hl3 grandson Kin-Dorjo 
vjhe eighth in the table of the genealogical succession of the 
£itya dynasty on p. 242) also obatlned the title of yang from
* na*  Liu’ g Translation, pp. 44-47, mentions the granting 
°f the title Vang to Dban-grags-pa-ro,al-atshan* a descendants 
S? 1° successor and also brother’s great grandson1 Hag-■ 
dbaft-hkra-cis-grags-pa (a contemporary and « patron of the 
Jhird Dalai Lama)* Liu identifies tno latter with the one 
"bd, according to Miny shift. sent a tribute mission to the 
emperoj* in 1579 to ask forpermission to inherit his father’s 
vR^le# ' But Minn shift records that at the death of this one, 
son’s request for succession was again granted* . From 
on the vestige of the authority of the Citya dynasty was 
^ying out and the Ming government was no longer in a position 1 
0 exercise any measurable influence#
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As a result of further bloodshed, the new dynasty found-
133
ed by K a m a  of Tseng province to replace the Sitya was 
overthrown by the Mongolian army under Gush! Khan who, at the 
earnest entreaties of the representatives of the'fallow Sect, 
marched into Tibet to punish their enemies. Having crushed 
the army of 40,000 Tartars of/the Cbog-thu Kh&n ,of Kokonor, 
who espoused tho cause of tho Rod feet, and having further led 
his army to defeat the king, Beri, of Xham, who followed the 
Bon religion and who, like Landarma, had destroyed all the 
Buddhist institutions of Khan belonging to the Red and tho 
fellow Beets, Gushi Khan had little difficulty in overcoming 
the resistance of Tstng and he put the fallen monarch to 
death. He then proclaimed his authority over the whole 
country and made the fifth Dalai Lama the undisputed spiritual
, m  . • '
ruler of Tibet,
It was only natural that the fellow Sect should have 
appealed to Mongolians for help. In 1580 the third Dalai *32
Both Das ("Contributions," p, 242) and Bell
32 and 86) say that the Sitya dynasty ruled tiUTToJj«' . 
but according to Liu*s Translation, pp, y4~75# tho new dyn-
4§ty was founded Ini and overthrown in 1642,
lj4, For details see Das, "Tibet, a Dependency of Mongolia 
U643~1716),W JABB, Hew Series, 1 (May, 1905)# l$2-54*
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Lama. Sonam Gyatso, at the invitation, of AX tan Khan, went \
- " " ' 155 -
to Mongolia where:he hied after-eight years residence* :
As a result of his effort, Buddhism as interpreted fcy tho
Yellow Sect spread there far and wide,
Tibet’s connection with Mongolia was farther cemented
ty the hirth of the fourth Dalai Lama in' the princely Mongol V.
family— »being reincarnated in the person of no other than
Altan Khan* s; great grandson* During the lifetime of tho
fourth Dal&i Lama the teachings of the Yellow Sect had already
taken such a firm root in Mongolia that the Khalka Mongols
asked for the establishment of a special and permanent pat-.. ...
riarch in Khalka to take charge of the ecclesiastical affairs
of their vast land. It was the fourth Dalai Lusa who gave
sanction to their request and chose tho reincarnated liutuktu
156
of tho third disciple of Tsong-k’a-pa as the occupant of 
this new and responsible post. From that time onward Tibet
J35* Boll, Tibet* p, 54# says that he received from Alton 
Jhan tho title of Dalai Lama Vajradhara, »The All-Cmbracing 
Diaaa, the Holder of tho Thunderbolt.» Actually, they both 
^changed titles, and Altan Khan got in return the title of 
’’Defender of Faith,«
J36, Dalai is considered as tho reincarnation of tho first i^scipl©, Panchen of Tashi-lhunpo as that of the second dis­
ciple, This new creation later became the Gr^nd Lama of 
ybga. Bell (Tibet, p. 225) said of him in 19241 »The Grandlama of Urga* the immediate bead of the Mongolian Church, 
has invariably bean & Tlbat&nj tha present incumbent was born 
uhdcr the walls of the Potala.«
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and Mongolia not only joined hands because of geographical 
propinquity but' also had'a meeting of minds-by'means' of ■ 
religion* The Mongols «ere asked to come as defenders of 
a common faith* ^
The Status of Tibet
From the above account te have seen that Tibet became 
a vassal state in its relation to China from the time of 
Kublai Khan and remained in such a status throughout the Yftan 
and Ming dynasties. At one time the emperor at Peking exer­
cised his authority over local administration in Tibet; for 
example, in effecting the change of a governor or in issuing 
patents to local officers in command of one thousand or ton 
thousand families. At other times he left the Tibetans alone 
to manage their affairs so long as his own authority was not 
challenged or as long as both parties of a civil strife paid 
allegiance or even lip-service to him. The writer wonders 
^hy Rockhill states so dogmatically that there is not a single 
Reference in the histories of the Xttrn and Ming dynasties to . 
Political relations having been established at any time with
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temporal rulers of Tibet. As mentioned above, The
JJ7. Rockhill, The T'alai Lamas if Lhasa and 
citeq as Hockhlllr balal L^mas).
, p. > (hence!orth
H istory of Yflan Dynasty. records the assimilation of the 
Tibetan army under the command of a Mongolian, prince and the
employment of it in a military campaign, : At least, Kublai»s
relationwith phagspa,as recorded in The History of Yflari
Dynasty, cannot-be dismissed as non-political, even if we do
. Ij8 • r
not agree with Das that *achange of official seals [as
recorded in the generally s i c n m e *
a change- of Vassalage,» and even if w# dismiss all tribute 
missions sent from Tibet to the Titan and Ming emperors as 
nothing but profit-making business. The Tibetan sources 
alone as quoted in this chapter bear sufficient evidence to 
show what political relations of Tibet were established with 
China..during: the,X'ftan and Ming dynasties*...
.. . . .
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' DUHIMG TUB CmiNG fOR MINCHUV PTNASTT
From Occupation tar the Khoshate-Iiongols to the BOcog- ' 
nltlon of the'Suzerainty of•the Mancha .Court'•
Tibet be cast 3 the occupied territory of the Khoshutc- 
1
Mongols in 1642 and two years later China Proper was lost to 
-the Manchus* : For some time there had been a straggle for 
supremacy between the Mongols and the Manchus. According to 
Parker* •■•in; 1642 the Maacbas defeated tho Genghlzide Mongols, 
half of whoa went over to the Chahars ... by 1632 the Manchus 
had practically conquered the Chahar3, and had even succeeded 
In wringing from China official recognition of Manchu super­
iority over the Mongols in rankj subject, however, to the2
suzerainty of China,* In 1653 the Manchua started, a cont­
inuous southward movement* All the Mongol tribes, nomads in 
the eastern regions of China, one after another yielded to 
the terrible conquerors or fled before them, Hu-tun-t’u
(lindan Khan) with his Chahar people mad® a last effort to
5
Resist, lie suffered defeat and died in 1634,
«I pBlEIb n, 1J4, has, in his article «Tibet a Dependency 
r Mongolia,* on, cit.* gives the period as 1645*1716*
Mongolia,» p* 99*
3* fetory of Eastern.Mongols.» p. 143,
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, ■ then therefor© Shih-tcu under the ..regency of Ids . uncle 
ascended the thron©.of,China in Peking, he had only .the Outer 
Mongols north of the desert and the 061ots, or Elouths, rest 
of,it to deal:with. let.this regaining task was still so 
formidable and ho was,so occupied with it,that he was not in 
a position to use force against libet# He was# however, not 
prevented from employing diplomatic means■to come to an under­
standing with the Tibetan authorities.
Contact bad already been established with the Lamaist 
hierarchy in Tibet* In 16*9, following a suggestion made t?*o 
years before by the three Khans of the Kh&lka Mongols, the 
Manchurian emperor Tfai-tsung (Shih-tsu* s father) scat m
envoy,with a message to the Khan of Tibet, the temporal ruler.,'
' . ' , ' 4'&t Shigtse, inviting the Holy Priest to come to his court* 
Another invitation was addressed to the Dalai Lama direct.
In response to the invitations, the Dalai Lama, the Punch* en 
(or Taahi) Lama, Tsangpa Khan, and Gushi Khan sent represent*
4* Camiaatm (p. 12, n* 55) points out that the Ch*lni>shih Kao jnd the Sheng wu chi disagree as to who mad© tHeTirst over-* 
Actually not only ghltnErgMh K eg (Chap* 525# t m  8, 
£« 2b), but Sheng wu chi (book 5, p* 4a), also records the 
Message sent by T^a^tsung in I039* The latter1® wording 
clearly Indicates that the Tibetan mission was sent upon the 
Receipt of this message* Cf* Hockhill, Dalai Lamas, p* 9* 
la®mann also remarks that the message was sent to w,**tho 
temporal king of Tibet (Gushi Khan* s son) in 1639.« but in 
that year Gushi Khan*s son was not yet established in Tibet* 
h© was mad© only a garrison commander three years later* 
a. 19*
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atlves to Mukden to offer presents in 1642.
?*hen Shih-tsu at the invitation of fu Sun-kuei entered
Peking in 1644 and replaced the Ming Dynasty which he was
supposed to be cosing to rescue, ho promptly sent an envoy to
invite the.Dalai lama, who despatched return missions in 1646
and 1647. Desiring to establish personal contact when ha
took over the reins of government, Shih-tsu sent another envoy
7to the Dalai Lama in 16 51, urging him to come. The invit­
ation was accepted, and in the following year the Dalai Lana 
casa to Peking, bringing tribute. He was warmly received,
&ud. the l&aperor. treated him with great respect and 'Courtesy# . - . ■
in fact, the Emperor would have set ilia at the frontier had ho8hot been dissuaded by his ministers* The Dalai Lama remained
?• iei-kuo. p. 8 3, citingincorrectly ChH^^^siiSI^I^Ul5l5y7 ch»ao fan pu
v-*^  /m*-~ n— " ^  —  - — - ~ — " ' - ^ ^oTr;,
<*Jk J Wt* '- im vmmmr ft«? «¿•at* f  ^ i 41 ,H **% '
iys, "...the Dalai and the Fanch’en Lamas case to Muk-
ia<
P» says . .   ----------- ----- —and tendered allegiance to the ilancfcu emperor. That was in the year 1642,.,w Ch*l makes no mention of this, and in r^ ct neither ever came to Mukden in person.
fln.g-shlh kao docs not mention the Tibetan mission of iWm  
it i"g recoroed-ln Shih-tsu shih-1% Chap, 27# p* 23b^;:d
?! iMS«# Chap, 5 5 , p, 7a, According to ChUng-shlh kao 
Jhothor massage was sent-in 1648 to invite the DalaX Lama who, 
Jh reply, promised to come in the year of 1652, Wing-shlh
does not mention the mission seat in 1651,
IMh-tsu shlh-lu. Chap, 68, pp. 2a-Ja, Jlb-32b,
m' in Peking until the next spring, V.hen ha left he took away ;
. . ■ 9
with him a golden tablet, agolden seal and a new .title.
The friendly relations between the.Emperors:and the , 
Dalai, lamas established an unwritten. concordat.-v The Dalai . 
Lama gave powerful aid to the Chinese . -government by lending . ■
: the weight of his great name and authority to its administ­
ration in Mongolia, where, as we have seen in the preceding
chapter, the Xellow Sect had secured a firm footing since the
10
days of the third Dalai Lama, The Dalai Lama had equally 
good reasons for cultivating the friendship of the Emperors, 
The recognition of the Dalai Lama as the head of the Eudahist 
world naturally added enormously to the strength of Ills posit­
ion and enhanced its prestige, That was important, in view, 
of the fact that the leading lama of the Had Sect whoso waning 
authority had still to bo reckoned with, had sent envoys to 
the Manchu court to submit declarations of loyalty and respect
9* P&l** Chap, 72, pp, 10b and 12a-bj Chap, 7d, P* iBa;
5 2 5# fan 8, p, Jai m&MJElLJSm* Look $,
In an edict by Chih-tsu issued to the princes of various
£jhks and the officials of the Imperial Court (Tuag-him lu. 
whun-chih period, xlx, p, - ©a, Shlh-tsu shth-lu. w a f T w i  
l* lb, trans. by Rockhill, it is written*
♦«•considering the fact that all tho Tibstans sad Mongols 
obeyed tho words of the Lamas, the Dalai Lama was sent for.••*
and had received patents from the Emperor.
This unwritten concordat worked to .the great advantage 
of the Emperor, : It bor® fruit'especially-during'the reign. 
o f :his'son, Cheng-tsu, when.,the:Ihalka-hongols•deliberated 
whether to seek Russian or Chinese protection. It was only 
through the influence of the. Grand Lama Cheptsundampa, :■ hier­
arch of the Yellow Sect In Mongolia, that they decided for 12
China.
Sir Charles Bell in his latest work gives full endorse­
ment to Rockhill’s conclusion (sic) about the fifth Dalai 
Lama's visit to Peking in 1652, although elsowhore in the 
Look he speaks of his observation as seriously in error*
Here are his words1 «K.W. Rockhill dealt with the quest­
ion of Tibetan independence of China, and obatined his 
Information for tho most part from Chinese sources. As a 
result of his enquiries, ho came to tho conclusion that the 
fifth Dalai Lama, when visiting Peking in A.D. 1652, came 
they© as an independent monarch, being at that time neither .■
* ^ l i n g - $ M h  kap, 52$# fan 8, pp. 2b-$a. IlajbiSHM 
^SlflrlUf Chap. 64, pp. 2lb-22a records a message sent from 
rai-tsung to Lama Sanaa of the Red Beet,‘ Among those'who 
received patents. wo find Chan-hua Wang* supra, n. 103. and 
51=0 BockhUl, "likct," p. 20-1.
!?• Parker. "Mancha Relations,* p. kOSl Ch’lng-sMh kao. ■
^ 5 ,  fan 8, p. 4a.
11 ■
7o
under China nor unu^r any other nation.
But from, the contents, of the mossagos sent from I’ai-
tsung to the Khan of Tibet ana to the Dalai Lima, which wore
confined to religious natters and v.ero devoid of any polit-
14 :
ical references, and also from the facta (1 ) that the invit­
ation was first sent through the Khan, and (2) that tho first 
Tibetan mission to Bukden was originally suggested by Gushi 
Khan and sent in collaboration with Tsangpa Khan, we can 
safely draw the inference that tho Dalai lama at the time had 
only very limited, if any, temporal power.
At first, the Dalai lama1a temporal power, if any, must
have been confined to U, while Tsang was dominated by tho Red
: 15
Sect and ruled ty Tsangpa Khan (Khan or Chief of tsang)*
 ^ 16 
la 1641 Diba G&ng-kieh (Best Gaoggye-gy&ls*©) ■ who acted -
13
•^3* Sir Charles Boll* Portrait of the Dalai Laaa (1946),5« 352* But Rockhillf bS'al lamas, .’ii»"HTpsiys only-that wie Dalai hama «had been treatin' with all the ceremony which ' e°uld have boon accorded to any independent sovereign* and 
do tiling can be found in Chinese works to indicate that he. was 
looked upon in any other light.«
ii* 525# *«* 8, p* 2ajGhap, 49, pp. 5a-4a* .
J5* Parker, «Sanehm Relations#11 p* 292j Rockhill, Dalai lamas, 
P* 8,
Waddell (p* 52) describes Sang-kieh as son of the Dalai -
VI soe also Rockhill, Dalai Lamas, p* 19, fiarklma,
^ n i t § and Bell, Tibet, p. ;57T^
nas a regent for the Dalai Lasa to relieve M u  of much, of the 
responsibility for mundane affairs,called on Gushi' Khan for
help to crush the Red Sect* The latter, as mentioned in the 
preceding chapter,1 responded to the appeal and marched his ■
army against Tsangpa Khan, whom he killed in the following
-'17 ■year* Gushi Khan donated the conquered territories to
the Dalai lama, who, in turn, constituted his old preceptor,
the fourth Ranch1 en, the Grand Lama of Tashi-lhunpo, with
theoretical control over Tsang, otherwise known as Ulterior18
Tibet* It was only then that the Dalai Lama was made the
Gushi Khan, came to tho
164l| Rackhill,
17. According to Bell. Tibet, p, 3$,
assistance of the. fellow beet in.l& _, __
P* 8, n, 2, places the conquest between 1641 and
official.document,.Tt at-tying shth-Xu. Chap. 64, pp, 22b~23a,
records:that thrManchu tisperor T»ai«*tsung as shown in his 
messages/gent:to:?saagpa Khan and Gushi Khan in 1643, on tho 
occasion of their representatives1 return to Tibet, knew of 
iho ..defeat .of the former and,.the role played in Tibet ty tho 
latter*.: . . The ^ conquest wist...have therefor© taken place ..before 
Jhat year.y ..B m m  wu chi. Book 5, p* $a, places the event in 
the 10th year Chuag*teh* Since there is m  such year, Chung- 
t©h.having/only., eight years, the 10th year must be a mistake 
*®r'the yth year (1642), as.the Chinese characters 10 and 7 • 
Jbe liable to be misread because of their resemblance* . Das, 
Contributions," p* 245, aid not place this conquest in 1645 
I f  Rockhill remarked* m a . V  p. 73, LI (1882), clearly 
5tates that «afterwards, ©amade a present of the whole of
**htt proper to the fifth Dalai Lama in the year 1645* *
Chap. II, n* 133. - -
18* Par a fairly clear account of Gushi Khan1 s unification of
ijeot see Arthur W. Hummel (ed.), IM!mn.t,Chinese e.f_lhg
Ruling Period, p. 265, (henceforth cited as KCCPJ (article ©a 
|Jloan)% The terns of Gushi Khan1»donation wore net clear* 
apparently he made the donation as a gesture to show Ills 
QVotion to the follow Sect* Ch1lng«shth kao* 525» fan 8,
*a» records that it was Gushi Khan who gave the ranch1 m  
nt province of Tsang. \ Oaa also Camaann, p* 11$ tot Boll, 
§*«§$* p* 84, states that the Ranch*en Lama had only temporal' 
over three districts, of which CMgatso was not om *
spiritual ruler of the whole of Tibet,
Gush! Khan withdrew after the victory, leaving one of 
his sons as commander of the garrison and another as the
19assistant commander. V*e can well imagine what military 
commanders with foreign garrison forces could do in those 
days. They were in absolute control of the armed forces and 
everything connected with them, Petech says they were nom­
inal heads of the civil government and quotas Tucci to the
effect that tho regent to whoa the executive power was at
20first delegated was a nominee of the Khan. It Is no won­
der that Pas, who made a profound study of Tibetan history 
from Tibetan sources, should call Tibet from 1645 on a depend- 
ency of Mongolia. The writer of this study fails to find any 
evidence to support Sir Charles* words referred to above, and 
wonders if Rockhill ever came to such a dogmatic conclusion 
&s Sir Charles asserts.
Rockhill was correct in saying that tho Dalai lama had 
been treated with all the ceremony which could have been 
accorded to any independent sovereign. Indeed, the Emperor 
Seated him well, and took every precaution not to offend him»
^3* kaddell, p. 2 7 $ Pas, «Contributions, * (1832), p. 7 3 1
« s c k h il l ,  D alai P r la s . p . 8 .  . ' : . ■ ’
/?* 1, Petech, China and Tib^t in the Early 18th Century.
p. 8 (henceforth cl tea as PetechJTj fuccl, Tibetan - 
^ i Sted Scroll a r p. 67*
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Though ha did not Best the LaiBa\’at':thd; frontier^, he "sent a
royal prince as his representative with a letter to notify
his guest of his pretext for not having met hin at Tai-ka as
21
previously arranged, Ee did not ask him about the state 
of affairs nor for his advisory opinion, lest the Lasa feel 
hurt -if Ms' opinion were hot adopted,
But as Cammann points out, tho manner of the Dalai
Lama»s reception alone is not sufficient evidence that he was
22
considered an independent sovereign. Beyond any doubt, 
the ceremony was full of pomp, But nothing can be found in 
Chinese works to indicate that the Lama was looked upon as 
Ban independent monarch, being at that time neither under 
China nor under any other nation,« From the wording of tho 
latter sent from T’ai-tsung to the Dalai Lama and especially 
the citation issued by Shih-tsu in conferring o n  the Lama a 
hew title, wo find rather some implications to tho contrary.
21* Shih-tsu shlh-lu. Chap, 68, p. 5»J IMS*# Chap, 69,
$P* Bb29a,
22* Camann, p, 13* Fang Chao-ying in ECqP* p, 2$6, says Jho Lama cm® in person to recognise the suzerainty sf tho JQw empire, H,B* Lilloughty wrote these'words in a paper 
*®dd before the Royal Central Asian Society in 1924* »In
the Dalai and Punch’ on Lamas were inaneed by the Mongol 
chia|- GusM Khan'to send an embassy tendering allegiance to F1*3 M&nchu sovereign on the ova of ejecting the-Ming Dynasty 
*?om the throne of China, The Msnchn throne thereupon 
assumed, sovereignty over Tibet,» CASJ, H ,  F t . Ill, p, I89,""
A lack of respect for the Lama’s opinion underlies the dis­
cussion between Shih-tsu and his court ministers on the 
question whether the Lama should bo asked for any advisory 
opinion, as does the ruling of the Emperor that there was 
wno need to ask, " in spite of the memorial of remonstrance
of those who held that the Lama might be just as offended if
' 23. .
not asked at all.
Even the ceremony itself does not bear full evidence
that he was regarded as an independent monarch. During the
audience with the Emperor, the Lama had knelt before he was 
. 24
given a seat. Even so he was considered as having been 
shown a special courtesy, since he was exempted from touching 
the ground with his forehead, a formality known as "kowtow." 
But, after all, no independent monarch would be required to 
touch the ground with his right knee on meeting the chief of 
another state, especially when the latter does not return the 
courtesy in the same way. '
The Emperor1s treatment of the Lama was necessarily tact- 
As Hockhlll correctly says, "at this period of China’s 
delations with Tibet, the temporal power of the Lama, backed.
II*  64, pp* 2lb~22tti
Chap. 74, pp* lBtt-19«! Chap. 71, pp, 20&-O.
*4. Parker, "Mancha Relations," p, 299.
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by the arms of Gushi Khan and the devotion of all Mongolia, 
was not a thing for the emperor of China to question.« As 
explained above, the Emperor was too occupied with the prob­
lems of Mongolia and, in tha meantime, Ids position in China 
Proper-was not yet consolidated. He and his Inmediato suc­
cessor, Sheng-tsu, could only adopt towards Tibet a policy 
of marking time, even whilo the Tibetan authorities were 
giving ShSng-tsu repeated provocation by intriguing with VJii
S&n-kuei and later with V¡u*s grandson IVu £hih-p*an and still 
. . 2' 
later with Galdan, the usurping Khan of tha Dsungar-Mongols.
As Lord Grey of Falloden wrote, «In great affairs there 
is much more in the mind of the events than in the mind of 
the chief actors,* It is the march of events rather than 
the designs of some individuals that brings Sino-Tibetan 
relations into a new phase. Because of the reasons expl&in- 
®d above, the Court of Peking could so far exercise only a 
general suzerainty over Tibet or fill the role of patron of 
Tibetan Lamalsm, Several successful military expeditions, 
however, enabled the Ch»ing dynasty to strengthen its hold
25.HockhlU,
^•lâL-Lama, pp
ff* Parker, «Manchu Relations,* pp, 292-293| Rockhlll, Paled 
4§5gjb pp. 19-20, 2J-24, Both Parker and Rockhill mistook
°hih-p*an for Wu San-kuci* s son.
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o n .Tibet, and eventually it went so far as to depose 'the ^ 
Dalai Lama.: - ■ For a time ; the. Imperial governmentnot. only 
exercised sovereignty over Tibet hut also ruled it through 
the -Lhasa government which had been : brought under.Chines© 
control.
Events Leading to the First Campaign
In 1632 the fifth Dalai Lana died, , The ragent gang 
Kieh suppressed tho news of his death and ruled in his noma. 
Ho instigated his protege, tho above-mentioned Guldan, whom 
he had made Dsungdsn Khan ty usurpation, to go to war with 
Khalka. 1'hea Galdaa defeated tho Ihalka and then invad­
ed Inner Mongolia, tho Chinese Emperor led an arny against
Him and inflicted a severe defeat upon him in 1696. Tho
27
Emperor, who had long suspected that the Dalai Lama was
dead, had his suspicions confirmed by prisoners he had taken,
*Ho informed him tho Dalai Lama had clod fourteen years 
29
before,
Tho Emperor called upon Sang-kieh for an immediate dec­
laration of the facts. The latter confessed in the follow-
^Hc-ng wu chif Book 5, pp. 6a-b.
£H3ftg-t9U shlh-lu. Chap, 174, p, 14b. '
Markham, p, xlviii.
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tng year ,that. the Dalai was. dead and that,: M s  re-embodiment
50
was now fifteen years of a g e . ■. In a .tumble, apology for 
his conduct-the.Regent begged the Emperor to keep .the.revel» - 
ation a secret.until,the enthronement.o f .the new Dalai Daaa
so as to avert the danger of an outbreak .'among the rank and
^  ' 5.file of his own followers* , :The Emperor granted his request,
but soon discovered that Oang-kieh was engaged in-fresh’intri­
gues. - -
On the question of the enthronement of the new Dalai
. vv32 '
Cana, gang-kieh and - L&tsaag. Khan, the' great / grandson - :: of;;:-
50; Sheng-tsu shlh-lu; Chap. iBl, p. 15b, and Chap. XBi,
Pi 2a.
31* Ibid;, Chap; 181* p. 15a, and Chap. 182, p; lb.
32; Waddell, p. J2f Parker, »Kanchu Relations, * p. 293t 
Coworth, Eistsj^fKongoM, I, p, 5l8j and ££€£, p. 205, all 
mention Latsang as (iushi Khan* s great grandson. ■ Chinese off- 
icial records, Ta ChVlngJiUi..tien, Chap. 66, p. 5a, and |a 
W M m hui p. 46. register Datsangaa - - “randson. It is likewise mentioned in >
_  Intro. Ill, p, 166, a.) and M r M p s  
—  U ,  f«u-kao b, pp. 2b-Ja. .
p* 15a, p* 217, relates that Datsang«» lather and pro-
5f uushi Khan* s great g 
Ctd-Ifleh l1* U—s
decessor, DalairKhani#was Gush! Khan*s grandson*, jkt 
Jhan was recorded in ChUafesMlUcao.» 525# fan 8, p. 2b, and 
!MaiLwu~£M* book V, p. bb, as CusEi £hanls son* -Presumably 
i°r this reason Chinese writers on Tibet like lang Ch’in-yt
Pi 7 ) $  Hsieh Pin l2»d
g
7 p 5 f p * T W #  end Hung Ti-ch<#ntShanghai ed«, 19471 P# 150) mistake ¿atsang as dush£
A ’s grandson* . Hua Ch’l-ydn (
made
97)# basing his account apparently on 
a similar sistake*
(Hal tsang w$n,tfl £2nd ed*# 
r e n U i m ^ E - I l L e i S #
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Gushi Khan and commander of "the Lhasa garrison, were divided,
and the dispute made then bitter enemies. Eang-kieh failed
in an attempt to poison Latsang Khan and was killed ter bin in
33
1705*  Latsang reported the facts to the Imperial court and
34
was given a title equivalent to that of a king.
In compliance with the repeated orders of the Emperor, 
but in defiance of the request of Galdan*s successor Chewan- 
laputan (fsawang Araptan) — a no less deadly enemy of the 
Emperor— Latsang sent Tsang-yang Gyatso, the romantic sixth 
Dal&i Lama installed by Sung-kieh, to Peking. The latter
■ 36
^ied on the way in Kokonor in 1707»
33. P»lng ting Chun-ko-erh fang lttehf In tro ,. Chap. 1, p, 7* 
tor a Tibetan account ofthe enaof Gang-kien, see Petech.
P. 10.
??• ShenK-tsu shih-lu. Chap, 227* p# 24b,' 0a»g-kieh was made 
king by the Emperor in 1693 on his own application in the name 
of the dead Dalai Lama. StelnfC-tsu shih-luf Chap, l6l, pp, 
>b*iob,
35* After Galdanto defeat, his people at home made his nephew
thewanlaputan (Gtong-tfU oMh-lu. Chap, 189, p. 13a, mentions 
Jordan as Chew&nlaputan* s undo) ruler of the Dsungar tribes, 
toia&n then committed suicide» (ShGnr-tsu $hlh-lu. Chap». 183
I* 7h), ShSng-tsu shih-lu, Chap, 2*7$ V* 9a, records the ®ords of the Emperor stowing the reason why ha needed to got 
told of Ts&ng-yaag and the serious consequences if the latter 
toll into the hands of Chewanlaputan, See also P!in.g ting
*uSttwko~erh fang Itteh, Intro.. Chap 1, p, 8»
fitfo«-t»u shlh In. Chap, 227, P. 2Bhj hit Roekhill, M a i  
jgc&s# p, 3d, ana fc&aaell, p. 32» believe th&t ha was mrdirid, 
tog Chao-ylng in ECCP, p» yoO also says he was murderedj ho
s*V@s the date as ffo©» Petoch, p« 13, says* «The o ff ic ia l  - 
»Ftount both Chinese and Tibetan maintains that ha died of 
j-j-Uiesa, and I think' thars is  no sufficient reason for doubt- . 
that this la  tru e ,*
nThe question of the enthronement had still not been sett- 
led* Latsang then collaborated with the P&nch’en Lama and 
apparently with the consent of the priesthood in Lhasa produc­
ed a lama named Xeshea as the true incarnation of tho fifth
Dalai Lama and enthroned him in the Potala. The election was
3&
confirmed by the Emperor* but the Mongols and the Kokonor
tribes refused to recognise the new occupant of the pontifical
v. * 39chair and brought forward a child* who had been born at 37*9
37. The Emperor*® envoy asked the Panch*en Lama for his opin­
ion about the succession dispute*. The'-Panch*cn supported the 
view of Latsang* ' (DhSng-tsu shlh-lu. Chap* 2 5 6,-p.17b, and 
also Hockhill. Dalai' Bell* Tibatf p. 40* ass­
orts that Yeshes was the selection of the Chinese. This 
statement:is without foundation. Although the Emperor start­
ed in 1700 to consolidate his hold at Tach’ienlu (Eockhill* 
Tibet** pp. 54-5), he was still not in a position to make a 
choice of Dalai Lama at Lhasa* Tibet proper being garrisoned 
by Mongolian forces under Latsang and more influence from 
aomonor being felt.in Tibet proper than from Poking* It is 
interesting ±0 note Hockhill* s words (Dalai Lamas, p, 35)» 
...another long minority of the Dalai Lama ••• would brer ser­
iously prejudicial to tho maintenance and the hoped for exten­
sion of Chinese influence in Tibet. The memory of the regent 
L^ang-kieh] was fresh in their minds. Chinese policy requir­
ed not only an adult in tho pontifical chair* but one who owed 
nis position to China and whose chief support was Chinese** as 
"Astern writers often accuse the Imperial government of having 
«urdered the Dalai Lamas and kept the pontifical chair from 
D<3lng occupied by an adult.
58 * M n g - t s u  shlh-lu* Chap. 241* pp. 14b-15a*
39. Tho Mongol chiefs of Kokonor at a meeting decided to apply 
¿T the emperor at Peking for recognition of the new claimant* 
“Je ?®tech,- pp. 17-18. This shows the position of the omper- 
.In this dispute of succession and his influence being ext- 
uded over that region.
So
. ' 40 ' .Li* tf£ng, as tho incarnation of 'the' sixth Dalai Lama, . , The -;
ï&paror, fearing the situation might lead to war, sent in 1709
41
a special envoy to effect a compromise and as the attempt 
failed* he finally ordered the ne* claimant to be moved to
40. Wei XUan, author of fheni wu chi. Book 5» 9* 8b, and Par* 
ker, "Xanchu Relations,* p. 295* both seriously erred in say­
ing that the claimant from Li*t»sng, Blo-bsang Bgyaats’o. «as 
then 20 years old, b o m  in '.1683* In fact, he «as b o m  in 
*703, as recorded in ChfIng-shih kao. 525, fan 8, p. 5a*
They apparently confused m i  w t h  Ts«if*yang v,ho «as born In 
*085,' ChMng*shih"kao mentions him,as’ tho sixth Dalai lama 
because Tsang-yang.did not receive any, formal recognition from 
the Emperor.and «as therefore omitted from tho official list 
of Dalai lamas* Cf, Petech, pp. 59*60, who wrote that Tseng* 
yang had been recognised by the llaperorf ana also RockbJ.ll, 
Bfllal Lamas. n. 27. relates a...Tibetan story that the Emperor
*as represented by the Changchia fiutukhtu of Peking when Tseng* 
yang was installed. Wo official records can be found to this 
Effect, €h*ing*shlh k&o is not consistent in eliminating '
Tsang-yangi: it. jumps from.the .tenth Dalai lama to the twelfth 
^nd addresses tho same pontiff as-the tenth arid eleventh (pp.
and 14a)* as if it suddenly takes Ts&ng-yang into account 
Without any explanation#
41* . A high official named fio-shou m a  sent to Lhasa for this 
Purpose, £h£ng-t3U ,ghth*iu. Chap, 256, p, 18&J Rockhill,
4¿§lal lamas, p. ^7- calls this step the beginning of. direct 
intervention in Tine tan affairs, Actually, this step rather 
»arks the beginning of the declin© in power of the Mongols in 
iibot as a result of their own dissensions. He was sent to 
asEigS'lstsang* who, according to the official record, was on 
Dea tenas with the Kokonor chiefs and it was therefore thought 
not advisable to leave the reins of the Tibetan government in 
tT s tends alone* Rockhili, Dalai taaasf p* 4 2 ,, asamos that..,,,. 
*ne agency established at Lhasa in 1709 »as kept open from that 
í~a®# but Ko-shou was definitely recalled in the next year and - 
¿*5fdsferred to a post la ch&rg© of the inland water transport*' 
Sn$=$P-MitelS. Chap. 244, p. 21a. Kan-choa HÍng-ch’.n 
t*S¿IIb Chap. 25, p. 52b. » Biography of Ho*afoou records that - 
¿É **s ordered to proceed to Tibet in the first m m n  of 1709 
rra transferred to the above-mentioned new post in the, twelfth. 
10014 of the next year, -
lisin-ning. -‘Meanwhile, /the dissension gave rise, to an 
invasion.
; Chewanlaputan was not forgetful of Latsang1« refusal to 
send fsang-yang,' the dopossd lama, to him. At first ho 
lulled Latsang into.a false sense of security; by offering him - 
a matrimonial alliance. In 1716, two years after 'the marriage 
of his daughter to Latsang’s eldest son, Chawanlsputan took 
advantage of the internal strife to sond M s  crack army of 
6*000 men to invade Tibet under the pretext that he was rep­
lacing on the throne of tho.Potala the true incarnation of the 
Dalai Lama. His army crossed the desert and arrived at the 
frontier the next autumn. Tha aged Latsang, relying on his 
relationship by marriage to the invader rather than on the 
national forces# and against the warnings of the Emperor, left
tho strategic points unguarded. Ha was taken by surprise and
43
killed in action. The Tibetan capital was then pillaged*
The Dalai Lama, Yeshes, who was the subject of the dispute* 
feaa imprisoned in a temple* The regime sat up by Guahi Khan 
in 1642 now came to an end.
42
42* for details see Patech, pp. 13-19*
ih ihing-tou shlh-lu* Chap* 278, pp# 19b-20a. The Emperor ®r4ered Ho-shou wo write a letter to Lats&ng. warning him of' 
l«S28siM e  Dzmigar invasion. (Fling ting qhitn*ko-orh fang 
Intro*. Chap, 4, pp. l o a - 1 9 a 7 * T h e  dmperor was then
v°J sure of Latsang1« stand and inspected & collaboration - »«tween Latsang ana the Drungar chief. for m  account of the ®«ck of Lhasa. ««#,Waddell. Appendix Y, who siataktnly .bolievod tnat the sack had taken place in 1710* For details about the W£nng&r invasion and occupation, set Fetoch, pp* 25-54» - :
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The First Tibetan Campaign and Its
' . Consequences .
The sudden and complete success of the Dzungar exped­
ition to Tibet created a situation fraught with great dan­
ger for the Emperor. It Bight have been the prelude to the 
successful founding of a Mongol empire including Tibet under 
a common religion— a fear that had long haunted him. Ho 
could not look on with folded arms.
At the critical moment, Lats&ng appealed to the Emperor 
, 4 4
IQr help* On receiving his message, the Emperor dispatched 
&n army of several thousand men to the aid of Tibet, The 
army «as attacked by the Dzuagars when it crossed tho Katawusu
river in the autumn of the year, (1718), and annihilated after
. - 4 5
a resistance of over one month.
In 1720 the Emperor, against the remonstrance of his
^ ■ . 48
court ministers, sent two armies, one from Kokonor and the 
other from Tach!ienlu under the command of his 14th son, A
J77, pp. 2Ja-b)
M i  PP* 45a-b.
?.?* Bh^ng-tsu shi 
sustained in a 
A3ti Placing it in 1
u, Chap 281. pp, 13b-14a, ■ The defeat - - d, Roekhlil, Palftl-itamagp p* 40, erred 
9*
I « W  ¿hap. p, I6bj rtl ^
239, 'Uj a?d c m n t -
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third aray was dispatched to raid Urumchi and Turf&n with'the
... 47object of attacking the enemy■in ■ the rear* - After a series 
of victories on all fronts, the Chinese troops toy way "of 
TachUenlu entered Lhasa first, the Daungars withdrawing to 
111 after sustaining heavy losses*
The new claimant, who had been proclaimed (officially 
the sixth, tout actually-'the seventh) Dalai Lama, at the beg­
inning of this campaign, and who had accompanied the army all
43 49
the way through Kokonor, was now installed at the Potala
and giy#n:a new title* Toshes was deposed and brought a
50- •
prisoners to Piking* • two ministers of Lats&ng known as 
Sonamyapo of Khang-ch*en (K,an-c|en-nas) and Sonau-Stob-gyal 
Polhara (Pfo-lha-nas), who rendered valuable assistance in 
campaign^ were entrusted with the administration of 
temporal affairs of anterior and ulterior Tibet respectively.51
Chap. - 236, pp. 24b~25â| Chap, 287, 
-5*000-.ïtonaa troops were dispatched to.taka
43.
Pp* ü s s u ühlh-m* ca-b) C h a p V W ^ P *
u, Chap* 2S5, pp* l6a-l8aj Chap. 236,
12a,
installation took place on October 16. 1720 according 
*°rl££P, p. 9081 cf. Potech, p; 65. " " # ,
Sklng-tsu „shihriu* Chap, 2-39, p. 17a.
51, O ll-lPE-shlh kr.o. 525, fan 8, p. ?..
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The head of the puppet government, sTag-rtse-pa, and his two 
ministers were found by a Chinese ¡military court guilty of 
cooperation with the Dzungars and put to death in spite of
the entreaty of tho Dalai Lama to spare sTag-rtse-pa*s life,
53
A garrison force of 3*000, composed of Mongol, Szechuan,
and Yftnnan soldiers, was left behind and the road between
Tach’ienlu and Lhasa was kept open ty patrols of troops, A
large inscribed stone in commemoration of the victory was
54
erected below the Potala,
The victory in this campaign, as remarked ty the eye­
witness Father Besidtri, »insured Chinese suzerainty over tha
55
whole of Tibet including Bhutan*» In making preparations 52*4
52
52, petech, p, 63,
53* FMng-tsu shlh-lu. Chap, 291, p* lib. It was intended to 
reinforce with another thousand, but the plan did not material- 
iEo* IMd., Chap. 291, PP. 30a-31b.
54, The text Inscribed on the stone, written by the emperor, :
given on pp, 3-4 of Vol# I of Wei tsang t*ung-chlh, v.hich ■
®lso records the text inscribed on another stone erected and 
"bitten ty General Ko-le-pi, who led tho army frost Tach'ionlu 
conquer Lhasa, and M s  report to the throne on the success- 1 
lie c°hclusion of the .campaign in Ibid,, Vol. XI, XHXa, pp* 
**c-221j see also fih^ng-tsu shih-lu, -Ch«n,~.s89f pp, IJb-lSa, for 
the report of General ¿ o - l e - p i * j F o r  other details see the 
Rotes of Father Desidiri, who was a witness of those events and • 
j«o tells us that on the whole the Chinese behaved with great ; 
oderation, (quoted in Rockhill, Dalai Lama3f p, 41),
I5'.IMS., and cf. Desldlrl. of H h t . -cd. ty
• 4a n X i p p l  (1932) , P. 1707 - t
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for the campaign, the Imperial ■■army in 1719 occupied r:a-t’ang
and Li-t'ang, two strategic'areas connecting Tach* ienlu with56 57
Tibet proper, and recovered in the next year Chungtiea
^hich Wu Shlh-p^&n in rebellion had ceded to the Kokonor Mon­
gols as the prive'or their promised aid*- - After- the victory, 
Lhasa and the-other-strategic points-were garrisoned by imp­
erial forces, The temporal rulers of both anterior and
59
ulterior Tibet together with three'-councillors of state who 
formed a bkaJ-tlon, or cabinet with Conamyapo of Khang-ch* en 
as their head, were all selected and appointed by the Emperor*
all, it is especially significant that in a nation like' ■ 60 - -
^lbet, the spiritual ruler, the Dalai Lama, was installed *53
56, Sh£ng-tstt shlh-ln. Chap, 285, pp, 17a-l8af Chap, 284,
PP, 22a-b,
5?* Ibid., Chap* 287# p, 14a,
53, Parker, **hanchu Relations,* p, 292*
59* The three councillors of state were !Ia-pf od-pa, tun-pa-nas, 
®hrar-ra-ba, with K*&n-c*en-aas as Chairman, P*o-lha-nas 'and 
gie father of tha Dalai Lama were not members of the cabinet 
rjt they gradually became a kind of unofficial members; accord- 
“g to tho Tibetan source quoted by peteeh, p, 81, P» o-lha- 
“js wss admitted at tha suggestion of the emperor to the cab- 
hot as a full member in 1725* (Putsch, p, 67*)
¿9* Pctoch, p, 69, remarks that tho young Dalai Lama*s «posit- 
under the new form of government was that of an honoured 
prJUr®head, with no power whatsoever. But his spiritual 
ti*A I gava k*81 & f,0ai importance, and he was therefore always 
©ated with punctilious deference by the Chinese,*
on the throne at '-the. Potala by the Imperial army'which
brought him. all the- way from Esl-ning*
The Emperor was, however, not exercising direct control
of political affairs in Ubet. Ills-primary concern was the
Mongolian problem* making; every, endeavour to prevent the ••
6l
Mho shat es from Joining the Bzungars. For the dual purpose
of showing favours to the Khoshatos* whose power in Tibet had
been destroyed by tho Dzungar invasion, but whose strength In
Kokonor was still considerable, and of giving the Tibetans to
understand that M s  armies were sent as defenders of their
faith, not for his own self-aggrandisement, he chose to leave
the administration in the hands of soma Tibetans, who were
officials of the last regime and who had rendered appreciable
service to tho campaign, rather than to set up a residency in
62
this remote region and in the midst of'this unruly people.
In 1725 whan Emperor CMh-tsung succeeded to tho throne 
°f China he ordered the evacuation of the Imperial troops
For Mongolian divisions and alliances, see Ren^ Grousset,
C1929), ii, 551-32.
I2* laddell, p. 34,;imd:lsrkham, p, XIVIII say that the- ' 
^Peror in 1720 placed two Chinese mandarins at hhasa as . -
jJUtleal residents or M b s n s  with largo powers or with an 
E q u a t e  force* This Is an error* See also ? m m *  ». 41.
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from Tibet, and they leftimmediately in spite of the.request
6}
made by the Tibetan¡ authorities for them :to stay. 1 A garsv
■ 64' ■:
1 son' was then set. up atCh* amdo : to secure coamunlcations. .
A s :the Dzungar menace was by no means.over, and the condition 
of Tibet was still turbulent, the Emperor found it necessary 
to make some sort of provision for-the continuance of Imperial 
supervision and sent;O-lai -(orai)* there *to: supervise its 
'.affairs#*' ; r V
Two years later when the rebellion of some Kokonor 
chiefs headed by Cing-wang Elo-bzan-bs tan-ad sin was completely 
crushed, the Emperor proceeded to reorganize the Imperial 
administration in the frontier districts of Tibet*, As a new 
favour shown to the Dalai Lama ha gave back to the government 
°f Lhasa all the country between Ba»t*ang, Li«t*ang and U, 
mainly the region of Lho*ron-rdson* K*on*c*en»nas and Ha-
P*od-pa were formally appointed as Prime Minister (tsung-li) 
^nd Deputy Prime Minlster^(hslehrli) respectively, under 
Imperial letters patent* *65
^3* See patech, p* Bo, which furnishes us with this inform» 
4cion from Tibetan sources.
-8hlh~t«mng nhtb-lu* Chap* 5, pp* 2b»3b.
65 • IM A * #  Chap* 5, p. 18b.
I M A * # Chap* 53, pp. 2a-3b.
83
. For a,brief period'after - the first - expedition,■Tibet 
appears to have enjoyed peace, '-hut. it .was not long, before ser­
ious dissension - arose . between, the .newly' created Tibetan minis­
ters, The:prise minister and his three colleagues were at 
■loggerheads, fomlng two hostile eexaps with the father of the 
balai Lana behind the scene who, bound to Lumi-pa-nas by 
Carriage, was in favour of E^n-ch’n-nas* opposition. This 
®ay be said to have been a clash of personalities, 33ut act­
ually the very composition of the cabinet carried in itself the 
seeds of strife* .As-the ministers were at the same time 
governors of provinces* the cabinet gradually became a desul­
tory meeting-'of "powerful region'll rulers, rather than an admin­
istrative body.
The naperor sent through one of ills envoys (either 0-chi
or Panti) a message of stem warning which had some effect, but 
. 67w«lch did not produce any lasting consequence# O-chi, on
^1® return to Peking, presented a report on the situation*
s®ng-ko and Mala were then sent to Tibet with a rescript
ordering the cabinet to cooperate with them, but without clear
l 69•instructions as to what definite measures were to be taken,
Petech, Chap, 53# pp, 2a-5b,
Shlh-tsung shih-lu. Chap* 52, pp* 29b-50a*
^  Ibid*, p. 50b*
. The news of the appointment of -these.officials sat ;the. 
.opposition In action* -. .They .were .afraid-that t h e .Emperor was-f 
backing K fan-c*en~nas to the full and that the arrival of tho 
Imperial mission inuld .discourage...their partisans and propor­
tionally, .increase the following of th© prise sinister. At a
■70
cabinet meeting on August 5# 17%7$ they murdered K * an-c*On-
maS, :■
The Emperor*, on receiving P*olha-nas* report, of the out-
» ■ . 7 i , ■. , .
creak and his request for armed help, was afraid that the . -
i>2ungars might have been involved. Ho mobilised m  expedit-
ionary fore© consisting of 400 lianchu soldiers from Btan-fu -
and 15,000 Chinese troops from Shensi, Szechuan and X Hunan*
B’dt. ho soon found the outbreak was only a quarrel between the
Tibetan ministers— a matter of little lmoortance* Ho inraed-
* 7 2
lately ordered the mobilization to halt, • After some beslt-
atlon, however, the expeditionary forces were.dispatched-under
ti, 73tua command of Jalangga* *7
t*Ç T " Foral^ -ttohâ^caaiÎ^S^ S S r ^ ^  r ^ ¿ » tan ^  tos ..ns - identical
coi^tiïFomT^ ‘«^contes études, tibétaines,*,nth the Chinese .see ».A* Htein^  . Eaccax. .
¿a^ AaiatiflUfl* ■ CCTh (193?)* P* ... .
7l, MH.h-t-.ung rhih-lu, Chap* 59* PP* 22&-b. .
.7,2* Ibid., Chap* 6l, PP* ^1-b,
73* Ibid,» Chap* 63, PP* la*3a*
" In the. meantime civil, war .'.was being waged.-..between lla— 
p1od-pa, Lum-pa-ras.and sEyar-ra-ba'on • the;one band, who for­
med a-’triumvirate. after their successful, coup, and .pto-lha-ims
on the other# who# known -.by1- the .name. of Il-dbam, ■ i, e., rulor 
of. men# skillfully . organised a .resistance movement in a!ia»-ris 
and Isaag. -
It is interesting to note that notwithstanding the out­
break of civil war, the Imperial mission succeeded In reaching 
■thasa without being opposed by the n m  rulersj they war© rec­
eived by the Dalai lama and remained undisturbed in Lhasa dur­
ing the whole war. Soso officials of the mission could.even 
cross the theatre of war and reach Tashi-lfcunpo where they
iaid before the Punch1 en Lama the complimentary presents of ' 
74 73
the Emperor. According to Fr. Giochino, both sides had
s°ht envoys to the Eaperor. . The defeated triumvirate enter­
tained the hopo that if they could hold the palace for two or 
thre$ months, the Imperial troops would arrive and rescue 
the®* % ~hm they submitted to P*o-lha-nas through tha good
°ffices of the Dalai Lama, they were told by the victor that 
nri final Judgment belonged to the envoys of the Emperor*
But in fact the Emperor1 had long since decided in favour
Peteeb, p. 102.
?5* Ibia., p. 127.
76« IU4., p. 123.
. . ;VvV,:90. ;,
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of pto-lha-nas. Ha-passed'orders to send■-'sord«secretly .and 
by trusted men,. to Seng«ko' and- Mala, who- were then in Lhasa,- . 77
not to do anything that sight Jeopardise. P*o-lha-imst action, ■ 
Ha did this at a time when P*o-lha-nasf situation was fraught 
with danger and difficulty* Apparently ha did not wait for 
the dust to settle*
The Changes Introduced after the Second Campaign
The Chinese expeditionary forces reached Lhasa in fiept- 
ember, 1728— two months after the surrender of the triumvir- 
ftte* Jalangga and lailu, the second In command, togather 
^lth Seng-ko and Mala, constituted themselves as a high court 
Justice and indicted the three ministers on the charge of 
having acted against the orders of the Emperor. - After a long- 
Protracted trial, the two ministers, Ka-p*od-pa and Lum-pa-nas, 
were put to death by the »slicing process» together with four-
l«en other sentenced men who wore either strangled or decaplt- -78
& tad.
As the father of the Dalai Lama was involved In the out-
hreak. and. the court of the young-Pontiff-was the centra of all 
*atrlgii@ and mischief, the Imperial high command decided to 
r«®ove the Dalai Lama from Lhasa, and eventually seat-him.to ,I*»
a**ta# notwithstanding the supplications of the Punch*en
HMh-tstmg ahih-lu, Chap, 62, pp* 21b-22b,
Chap. 73, pp, 26a-27a,
Lama. P'o-lha-nas. and all the foremost algnituries of the
■ . 79 -r
church* Later it was explained in Chines® official docu­
ments that the Dalai Lama was brought thore in order to prot-
\ 8q
ect him against the threatened Dzungar raid.
The Emperor now fully realised that his well meant policy 
of withdrawing the troops and leaving the Tibetan government 
without control had turned out to be a complete failure. Ho 
decided to entrust all temporal authority'to P'o-lha-nas, who 
*as appointed provisionally to supervise both U and Tsang with 
t*o cabinet members recommended by him, and who was given the 
title of "boise" by a most gracious rescript* The punch1 on 
Lama was asked to come to Lhasa, According to Tibetan sources, 
ha was presented with an Imperial edict granting to him theo­
cratic control over Tsang and western Tibet as far as the Kal- 
L&sa, of which ho accepted only three districts, namely, Lha- 
rcse, P*un-ts*ogs-glid, and Ham-rins, This marks the crea­
tion of the Panch*en Lama's political importance as some sort 
balance against that of the Dalai Lama*
In the matter of Imperial supervision of the Tibetan gov- 
ernm^nt, there was a return to the administrative ideas of 
^Peror Bheng-tsu. Seng-ko and Mailu were appointed as Aiabaa 
0r Residents at Lhasa and Shigatse, each with one thousand *8
Patech, pp. 136-157.
EMh-tsung rhih-lu* Chap* 145* p* 8b, - • .
8l* Adtech, p, 1 J9I .gupra, n. 18 ,
troops:drawn from-tho Szechuan and Shensi provinces. It 
was later stipulated that the Residency thus created should 
in principle have Its occupants 'changed every three years.
The institution lasted until the end of the Ch* ing Dynasty
except for n minor change in its organization in the beginning
84
of 1911, A strong garrison of one thousand men from Ytonan
■ , 85
was'left at Ch*amdo ■ to secure the communications» Ba-t1ang
and Li»t*ang were fomally placed under the administration of
Szechuan while Chung-tien and V.ei-hsi were placed under that
86
of Iflanan.
82
85
82, Tho Chinese garrison strength was first determined as 
||000 aen," and was reduced. to 2>000 because of the expected 
difficulties of supply as a result of bad harvests. See 
Ihih-tsung shih-lu. Chap* 72* W *  I8a-b.
8|* Petech* p, 256. considers Eb-shou
tibet (Chn-tsang ta cHTen) was not established
a permanent represeat- 
n. 41*) The office
uhtil:i7 2 8# at which time Seng-ko and-E,ala became its first 
occupants* . . Book 17* n*. 2 1b*
folates that the Residency was first set up in 1726* when the 
"JPerorsent Seng-ko and Mala to Tibet. But the writer is of 
JJ® opinion that' the state of affairs in 1726 did not warrant • Jilt establishment of a Residency* It was only after the out- 
rr®sk of 1727 and its subsequent civil war that tho Emperor 
lound it necessary to have permanent representatives stationed 
°n the spot. See fiheng wu chi. Book V* pp* 17a-l3a* which 
wUPports tills view.
tto* h^o; office  .of:. Assistant Resident was then aboil shed*... and / 
councillor» were established instead* one to bo posted at ;rja and tho other at Shigatse, See Rsftan-t«ung cheng chi 
1 IfL..Chf Imt fhi lu. Chap* 47* p* 44,
I M h - t s u n g  s h f h - l u *  Chap, 75* p p , l 8 a - 1 9 a *
S M i n g - g h i h  k a o *  5 2 5 * f a n  8 ,  p .  7 b ,
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The two Residents set to work on the military organ­
ization of the country and ordered the training of an effic­
ient and reliable army which in duo course would be able to 
take over most of the duties now imposed on the Chinese occu­
pation troops* P*o-lha-nas gladly supported their effort in 
this direction* He soon re-established law and order and 
reorganized the postal stage system on a sound basis* l'y 
cleverly exploiting the dissensions in Bhutan, he succeeded 
*tth a minimum of effort in imposing his suzerainty on that 
country* Because of this success he was promoted to the rank
87
°f bolse and his elder son was granted the title of duke#
Ihe suzerainty over Bhutan was formally assumed by the Emperor 
. 88 
himself,
89
In l7>l-52 there was a threat from, tho Dzmgars* They,
having recovered under the able leadership of Chewanlaputan* 2
s°n, Ts*e-rin, defeated a combined army undo? Marshall furd&a
In July 1 7 5 1# it was feared they would make trouble in Tibet*
Q~lha-.ru s demonstrated his loyalty to the Emperor and earned R 90
new favour, the granting of full judicial power in Tibet*
***** a seal of office confirming the functions entrusted to him
ghth-tsung shih-lu* Chap* 103# P* ^h*
Ibid., Chip* 105# PP* 8b-9h*
l 9% Jhid*. Chap* 109# PP* I$b-I7a," 24a-bf Chsp;.- :XIX
*P«,Xrb-l2a* - ' ■ ■' ' ■ ■ ■ '
90* Peteeh, p* 1$1# based upon a Tibetan account#
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provisionally in 1723.
In 1754 the Dzungars, altar being defeated by Ts*e-r?ng,
Captain-General of the League of the Sain-noin Khanate, sent
a  mission to the Peking court to ask for peace, which was
granted*Thé Dzungar menace was for the moment removed.
The Dalai Lamars father who had been summoned to Peking and
who had given to the Emperor assurance never again to meddle
92with Tibstan politics, was no longer an element of disturb- 
ance. The Emperor then issued a rescript and dispatched the 
seventeenth son of the late Emperor Ehlng-tsu, named Yfln-li 
snd known also as Prince Kuo, to Ka-ta to notify tho Dalai 
Lama of the Emperor*s assent to ids raturn to Tibet. After 
having received the rescript, tho Dalai Lama replied with an 
address of heartfelt thabks and of full submission to his
Imperial protector* In September, 17.55* escorted by 500
* . 94.Chinese soldiers, ha returned to the Potcla,
Tibet, under P*o-lha-nas* efficient administration, was 
Peaceful and prosperous* His small cabinet underwent an 
Mansion. pand!ta, nephew of X*&n«c*en-nas, and Pu-lung-
g&lh-tsunic shlh-lu* Chap 112, pp* 26b-27&* 
92* Potech, pp. 155, 153*
9 3 * P e t e c h  ( p .  1 5 7 )  m is to o k  Y O n - l i  f o r  "a « o a  o f  ' th a  r a i g t i i n j  ' 
■ a« *  Ch»i n f i - s h i h  7# PP*the ideititv coloring
fia* W  p u b U Sh9a *
.^ k u u g - h s a e h - h u i  In 1957* ■ > ■ ■ 1 ■
?m  *et«ch, pp* i57-53| Chap* 1
t*ung~chih. II, cHap. XXXla, pp, 224-25*55* PP* la-2m|
tsaa'wero appointed by ilia Sparar &s ministers,'or tiiaf-blon. -j• ■ _ ' r!
E® hisself was':skoim a’ high'-mark :of favour' hy/the Esparor, 1 
Kao-tsung, who succeeded to; thèr tfcroae; In '1736, by the grant-:;j 
ing of the title ofCfcla-iaag, or ''prince of the/.second class, J
in-dimmry, :1740* T h i s , aeroly a rank in thè luparia! poor- -
ago,' was taken by tha Tibetans to m m  »king,» and ha bacasse
, 95 . ./known in Tibet as Mi-taag, or XSowaa us written ty Bogle*- 
"Since his power mas practically absolute and tha authority of / 
■tha'baiai Essa was in 'aboy&mco, feteeb calls hi» the first ' / 
libetan king after tha tragic end of the last Tsang ruler 
ih 1642*
The Boeidents, wte played an active role is tha first
years of their installation, apparently bucano aero infornerà :
tha Emperor on the do tags of the «king8» !ho ■ declino In
authority of this office »as due partly to the frequent eiiang-
iEl2# if not the deteriorating quality, of the occupants, and
partly to the fact that from 1731 one post remained vacant
thus there was only one Bosident stationed at hhasa dur-
*a2 the following years* mother fact that nust have some
be&riag also »us the withdrawal of three-fourths of tha garr- 
t 96*s°h forces* In the autumn of 1733# leaving only 5^ 0 mm
5^* quoted in Rockhlll, Paini hanas» p* 44#
Ml-tsam ttuns-chlfu II, .Chap* .XXH&, . p# 224*,.,'
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&V-the'disposal'of.'theVResident* -
/.The Emperor, - however, was quite content..with P*o~lha»nas. \ 
who repeatedly demonstrated his full loyalty to his protect-,
97 ■or* The court of Peking had another channel for keeping
itself 'informed of «hat had been going on in 11 bet, i.e», :.\
through. the ■ tribute missions sent by the; Dalai X»ama. • and. the ;
Panch*en lama on-alternate years and the envoys of P»o-lha-nas
98 ■sent along with those of .'the Dalai lama. Imperial-control 
®n the spot may have slackened, bat the shadow of supervision
' 99 'was always:there* As described by Petech, out of political
necessity pto-llxa-nas made himself the tool of the court of 
Peking, It was absolutely out of the question for Tibet to 
nave a policy of Its own. Imperial supervision was too close, 
and Tibet had no material force of its own to throw on the 
scaleg# except for the groat religious influence of the Yellow 
Kect, which was not under P*o-lha-nas* control,
then P*o-lha-nas was approaching the end of his life, the 
^nperor ordered him to recommend one of his two sons to inherit 
^*s title and his ruling powers* He chose the younger son, 
^yuraed-naagyal, and passed over the heir-apparent, the duko 
°f 2iKa*-ris, because of his bad health* At least this is the
97.
Pp. Kao-tsung shih-lu*..Chap* 208, pp* llb-ljhj Chap* 2a-4a. ,
210,
fj»_Xbld.f Chap* 153, PP* 
.'•n* IHg^irlbitary By stem#n
^5* Petach, pp* 177*178«
4b— JJb, nxi
v on* cit**
and Fairbank and Teng, *Tho
PP.,161, ,.i77-wid.:i53*,,,,-,.
reason he reported .'to the Emperorj actually; he made, the dec-
2.00
ision out of stronger affection for his younger ion*
Events Leading to the Third Expedition
P »o-lha-nas died on March 12, 1747* The Emperor when
informed wrote at once to Fuch*ing, the Resident at Lhasa.
■ ■ 10 1- ■
approving of Gyurmed-namgyal* s succession but expressing
his doubts on the latter*s ability to maintain the strong
government of his father. lie told Fuch*ing to watch the new
102
ruler and report on his capabilities and intentions.
This ambitious young man soon felt the inconvenience 
caused by the presence of the Imperial garrison force and the 
Resident. He appealed to the Emperor for the withdrawal of 
the Imperial troops, assuring him of his loyalty and of his 
aEility to maintain order. His request was granted) 400 
s°ldlers were recalled to China, and only a small personal
m
escort of 100 men remained with the Resident.
Gyuraed-namgy&l was on bad terms with his minister and 
Mother-in-law Pandita. His relations with the Dalai lama, 
rather strained during P*o-lha-nas* last months, now went *02
lQ°* -Ch*lng-3hth kao. 525, fan 3, p. 8a.
Kao-1sung sMh-lu. Chap. 236, pp, 25&-26s.
l02* Ibid*, Chap. 286, pp. 26a-28s.
Chap. 577* P. 2s| Ch*Ing-shlh_Mo * 525, t m  8,
P BbF lElag,„lu.c M i  hook Y, p. Apa,
93 ■;
from . bad'.to,worse» - His .petition:for permission to seat!
some lasas, to • those regions which had beta taken ..under; direct
Imperial, administration-during, the K*Sng»hsl'period > of rule
(the reign of Shing-tsu) aroused the suspicions of the Peking 
105court#- let the isperor-decided.to overlook.Cyuratd-jMS-
gyal*s inconsiderate behaviour on account of his youth and
106
inexperience# and of his fatherfs merits*-. , ,. He-appointed-
mother Resident to fill the long-open vacancy so as to re- 
. - 107enforce his observation posts.
The situation worsened step by step# Cyuraed-nangyal
hurdored his elder brother without letting him receive the
Emperor»s summons to Lhasa to be judged by an Imperial arb- • 
,, 103
*trator* He then intrigued with the Dzungars and planned
» 109ftn uprising to overthrow the Imperial authority*
The Residents reported the preparations for revolt to
the Emperor who at first did not believe the report as he
104
104, Kso-tsung shlh-lu» .Chap•, 351» PP*; 3b~7a*
Ibid.* Chap* 343» PP» I9a-20b#
1Q€* Ibid.# Chap. 351» PP» 10b-13a*
lQ7. Ibid., Chap, 551, PP* 7b-3a.
lQ3* Kao-tsung shlh-lu». Chap *. 35V PP* I7b»20a,
iS?* m i * »  Chap, 333# PP* 7^3b| Chap. 336# pp. 23*-*I. 
M .shin kao» 525» fan . 8# p.. 9*» ,
no
thought there was no cause for m  open rebellion, : and -
therefore he denied M s  approval-to a proposal to increase111
the Lhasa garrison* - - - Later the Residents were told to
investigate the matter carefully and exercise great prud- 
112
once,. - Permission was at last reluctantly given them 
, 113 .
to act as circufstances■required*■
, ; Before the. arrival ' of the Emperor* s final - answer, the
situation became so serious that the two Residents took tho
responsibility of killing the conspirator at the Residence
to which Gyurmed-naagyal had gone at their invitation* They
fcere themselves soon murdered by the dead nan«g followers*
JJ-0* Kao-tflung shlh-lu. Chap* 564, pp* 6a-8b. The Raporor 
Jhought Uyurmea«namgyal - could gain no-.benefit should he rebel* 
“Jr could the Emperor see"any immediate danger that would drive 
him to open rebellion* «The existence of the Residents,” 
according to the'Baperor, «does not constitute any restraint 
hr inconvenience on M s  part* The Residents neither supervise 
yt® conduct, nor share or minimise hi3 influence or prestige,” 
Chap. 564, p. 7s)* be can see from M s  own words the 
reluctance of the Emperor to employ force in Tibet, He told 
«is court ministers that ”to use the useful in a non-beneficial 
Place is not necessary* Even though we know pretty well that 
rj &re boing fooled, we would rather leave the matter to taka 
its own course and pay no attention to it.” (Ibid*, chap. *- 
y  9s)• Later he said to them, «Unless we are absolutely 
~jrced by that eventuality [pzungar invasion of Tibet] , we 
®hould not light-heartedly taka any military step in that 
Te®ote region.” - (Ibid*, Chap, 566, p, 13&),
Ibid., Chap 559# PP* 15^-b*
Xl2* Ibid,, Chap. 566, pp. llb-15b*
Ibid., Chap, 574, pp. 10a«llaj Chap, 575, pp, lOa-b.
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ill. this occurred;on Sovember 1 1 »-1750.
i 11, i s noteworthy : that - curing the rlo t : theDalai Dana .. 
first sent his secretaries to,the spot to■arguav*lth the soh 
and'to dissuade it from violenco. He- then caused ''a proclam­
ation to he posted-on the walls: a M  pillars:of,.Lhasa, : in which 
ha announced that • Gyuraed-naagyal had been justly executed for 
fcts crimes, and : threatened with 'punishment ty. the'.Emperor any-« 
one who dared lay hands on the Residents* At last the Dalai 
Lama himself case out of the Potala and addressed the mob#
Lut the mob, : instigated by- the -followers1,of Gyurmed-n&mgyal, 
shouted down the Dalai Dana, tore away the posters of his 
Proclamation, and wont so far as to turn their weapons against 
his sacred person, compelling him to take refuge in the Pot- 
ïha Residence was then surrounded and set on fire, and 
the two Residents, Fueling and Dabdon, defended themselves to 
the bitter end* Forty-nine out of the 100 guards wore kill- 
6d# together with their commanding officers and seventy-seven
^ n e s e  civilians. the military paymaster*« office was 
. 114
Looted with the lossof 85,000 taels.
The Emperor was enraged and ordered the Governor-General 
Szechuan, Is*e-rin, to proceed with a large force and quell
rev olt. In tho meantime order was restored through the
,Xl4r Potech, pp. 200-01.
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3olnt efforts of'the Dalai Daaa and'Pandlta, ■ The; latter 
soon : succeeded:in hunting down■the rebel leader-. j&o-bsan-bKra- 
s*is and his accomplices* who fled from the-town trying to 
effect .their escape.to Dzungaria,; The greater: part of .-'the:1'-- 
treasure looted-from the':military "paymaster's office .was re-» ’■ 
covered* . -■ Ihe Emperor ■ then - ordered Ts1 e-rin . to .march' to Lhasa, 
^ith only ,800 men who reached their destination after what was 
actually only- a'military,promenade- like.the previous 1728- ex­
pedition. Before his arrival the newly appointed Besident* : 
band!, took over from Pandita the persons of Elo-bsan-hKra-
s*ia and twelve other rebel leaders, questioned them and
e: : . ...... 115
sentenced them to death. :
Measures for Securing the Pacification and.
Dubaig»Ion o f 'Tibet' after the Third Expedition
Advantage was taken of the presence of the punitive
troops to secure the final pacification and submission of
libet. The Emperor adopted the policy of a wide distribution
of administrative authority and, considered the time opportune 
t lid
ro? a new approach. He abolished the office of temporal
*“*3, Ki-o-t^un?* rhtb-lu, Chap. 379# PP* 22b-24a,
Il<5* Ibid., Chap, 376* p. 35&I Chap. 377* p. 4b,
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ruler and invested secular power in the hands of four minis­
ters who constituted a reorganized Ufat-blon under the lead­
ership of the Dalai hama'who thus'became for-the first time 
a temporal ruler» : Provincial.governors were to bo appointed 
by the Dalai Lama acting on the advice-of lhe:ministers in . 
agreement with:.the,Resident# /".. The provincial commanders 
responsible for military defence and the maintenance of law
were to.be appointed by the -bion, but they were to hold
■ 117an lmpsrial commission*.- .-:
Petech thinks that in all these proceedings the sover­
eignty of the Dalai Lama was always understood^ but nowhere 
expressly affirmed in the Chinese documents. ' He tells us 
the complete eclipse-of .the Dalai.-Xaaa. from- 17o6. to.1720# > 
**8'exile to la-ta and deprivation of all temporal authority ; 
fthd that after M s  return in 1735# up to the eve of tho 1750 ? 
incident, he had absolutely no political power and was strict 
l 7  limited to his religious functions. He also informs
hs from Tibetan sources that at the end of the civil war of 
l f t 7 - 2 S  .the..Dalai -Lama -had to ask. P*o-lha-nas for permission 
*h«n'"h6:;,wighed to retire fren the Potala to aBras-spuns *9
Xx?* I M d , ,  Chap, J35# pp. 15b-19b.
Xl8‘ Petech, p. 213.
Il9* IMd.# PP* 213-219*
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monastery and it was agresd that he should leave with four
attendants and his father with three, accompanied on the way
120."' . .
by 2,000 monks, . At the. same time he tells us that "the 
year 1710 saw the formal proclamation of the'Chinese protect­
orate« over Tibet, by granting the Dalai Lama a sealed docu-
' 1 2 1 ,. /■
ment of investiture, - and that «when t h e •Chinese installed
the seventh Dalai Lama in Lhasa (1720)» they completely ig-
, 12 2.:.;,
nored his theoretical rights,« The writer wonders where 
Petech draws the inference that the sovereignty of the Dalai 
Lama was always understood.
After all, the Dalai Lana’s authority, even if it resem­
bled or suggested sovereignty, was given by the Emperor,
^breo ministers were chosen by Ts’e-rin and his colleagues; 
they already held their ranks of t&a’-bloa and duke, or Taiji, 
^  Imperial grants. The fourth member representing the i at­
tests of the Yellow Sect was recommended by the Dalai Lama 
_  125
according to Ts’e-rin’s report, while the Tibetan sources 
h  124
glv®n by Petech record that ha was selected ly common
X;Q. Xbld.. Pi). xa.7-»8. ■■ . .
p ,  u u . .  » .
K t i a  » • »■-»■> **■■ '• “ *h ’ ■ ^
•^^ 2, petech, p# 219*
I î3 . K«o-t.«Ung rh lfela .  chap. 536, pp. I7b -l8a.
124, Petech, p* 212# ■;
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agreement .of., the three tKa*-blon, on the proposal of the 
Dalai.lama* ■: They were all, however, subject to the sanction 
of the Emperor* In his edict to .the ^a*-hlon the-Smp.erpr 
told them to obey and honour the Dalai lama and whenever imp­
ortant questions arose to inform the Dalai lama.and the Itssld-
onts, follow their directions, and act accordingly. Here
see clearly where the power lies that-determines and cont­
rols the government in tóe.finíüf..w»37#i*.v;.-h-;''.'.:,:
The non-existence of the so-called Dalai lama*s sover­
eignty can be further attested from the Emperor*s refusal to 
grant the lama*s request to appoint Pandita as Chftn-wang, or 
ruler, Pandita was ordered by the Residents, Euch*ing and 
lebdon, immediately after thoy had killed Gyurmed-namgyal at 
■their Residence, to taka the reins of government, Apparent­
ly he failed to rise to the occasion. Two days öfter the 
riot the Dalai lama appointed him administrator of the realm,
to carry on the government until the arrival of Imperial off- 
* . 126
ACial8 and troops* - - But the Emperor, who was displeased - 
*tth Pandita*s failure to rescue the Residents, and who had 
*°r a moment even the intention of killing him in cage ho
125
lo 6
should show any sign of being unruly, . ...turned down the . ■
Calai Lama1 *s re-quest and firmly refused to sanction his p r o - : 
128
notion. The Emperor later decided to retain Pandtta in -
the.new tfa»-blon, ■ but ordered Tsr e-rin■and Band! not to allow
him any influence in the choice of other members of the taca*-
v, 129&lon* -Had the,Dalai Lama possessed any «understood« sov­
ereignty, the Emperor, would have gracefully yielded to this ' 
felt accompli in tho form of a reward for Pandita» s quick arr­
est of the rebel leaders*
Aside from the reorganisation of th© administrative nach- 
taary, tho Emperor paid special attention to tho establishment 
°f w permanent garrison in Lhasa and a dispatch service under 
direct Imperial management* Tho strength of tho garrison was 
fixed at 1500* A  now schedule was approved for tho distrib­
ution of the Imperial garrison in the troubled and strategic­
a l  1 J0
ajdy important borderland between Tibet and Eaechuan* Tho
127
Kao-tsunr ghih-lu. Chap. 377# P. 9b*
1?^! Ibid.# Chap, 377# PP* da-b. X6b-17a* Bockhill errs in
“jying tnat P&ndita had been «King of Tibet,« *».,,He was put
co if9 head of tho Tibetan government by the Dalai Lama and
.^firmed in the office by the Chinese government*« (Dalai 
frfflh P. 56# n* 1) The very document he quotes (Tung-hue 
^ M ^ a i-Xu, Ch» ien-lung period, xxxii, p, 13) addresses panoita 
jjv and pandita was told by the Emperor in a decree (ibid
e i i * *  1° servo in tho new bSa*-blon in the capacity of his"
‘■‘■gin&l rank of duke, denying his promotion,
fea-tsunc shlh-lu* Chap, 577# PP* 19*-20a,
l3°* IM l . #  Chap, 333# PP. 23b-24b,
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Tibetan authorities were ordered to sever all' communications
with: the Bmngars,' . The.periodic, tribute missions of the
Dalai lama and .of the Punch* en lama to Peking were regulated.
ljlaccording tp the old practice, ,
The position of the Residents was consolidated, Besides
commanding .the'garrison''and having exclusivecharge of the
wail'service, their advice had to be taken by.the b&a»-blon on
v^ery important .affair* , This; gave., then'a-broad right of
supervision* ."But they «ero ordered by tho Emperor to leave
the routine and trivial matters in the hand3 of tho hKa'-hlon 
132.
usual* and fcere given only "limited right to take part 
1h tho government#* In fact, as stated by George Bogle 
°n December 5 , 1774, they seldom interfered in the management 
°T the country, Bogle*s general report written in the next 
year has this to say*
The Emperor of China is., acknowledged as the sovcr- 
aign 'of-the.country| the appointment to the first off­
ices in the state is made by his order, and la all meas­
ures of consequence reference is first had to the Court 
of Peking,:but the internal government of tho country is 
committed to natives, The Chinese in general are con­
fined to the capital, no tribate is exacted, and the 
people of Tibet, exggpt at Lhasa, hardly feel the weight ■ 
of a foreign yoke ,*^4
*31 , Ibi d .* Chap, 337, pp. 4b~5&*
*32. Ibid., Chap. 27?, p. i7b.
J33. r.hfai> t o chi. Book V, p. 19b, quoted but not literally 
^hnsIStiTtTRSekhill. Dalai Lamas* p, 46,
*^4^^^£lglj^^ba^3y^oETibot, (Daskalkar, 1933)# P* 424j
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■ Mot all the 'above mentioned measures proved a success*
The bKa’-blon abused Its power and its administration was 
corrupt, 'child the. Dalai Lama spent his time in meditation or 
In the performance of religious ceremonies, leaving his bro­
ther and retinue & free hand to do whatever they wished for 
. ■ 1 3 5
their o®n benefit* The Residency as noted by Emperor Kao-
tsung, ' «eventually became non-existent.* As before, reform 
had to wait for another military campaign to create mi opport­
unity fgr it* Cuch an opportunity was afforded by the Gurkha 
invasion.
; ■ £vgnts_ljeadlnR in _ t M , Conguftst of Nepal
In 1780 the Punch* en Lama went to Peking to taka part la 
the festivities on the Emperor Kao-tsung*s seventieth birth-' 
day> and did an unprecedented thing— kowtowing instead of 
kneeling on coming into the presence of the Emperor, thus
..130
signifying hi3 deference to the throne, luring his stay
kc contracted smallpox— a disease which Is dreaded to this day 
Tibet— and, in tho language of Buddhism, «entered upon the 
Perfection of repose,* bhea his remains were solemnly taken
l 55.  K a i M f c - l u t  Chap, 1417, p. 13*1 iMlMt »* 157*
136, y0p details, see 2, Ludwig, Visit of the Tashoo Lama to
2 a m « £ l pp* iff-
'¿I &nd Cammann, bihe Psneh,en Lama»3 Visit to Cirdna in ITbOl 
*** Episode .in AUKlo-Tibetan Relations,* The Far Eastern Cuar-
¿ m z ,  ix  ( m m  3- 19. - —  — ~
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back, on® of M s  brothers, Chunba' Kutnkhtu, ■ »ho was In charge 
of the treasury (Chang-shang) , appropriated all the precious 
gifts presented by the Emperor'and other patrons to the dec­
eased without sharing them Tilth another brother, Dza-marpa, who, 
strange to say, was a lama of the Red Sect, The latter was so 
infuriated that he went to Gurkha (tiepal, under Gurkha rule 
since 1769) and instigated the Gurkhas to Invade Tibet,
137 •
In 1788 a Gurkha army entered Tibet and occupied three 
districts under the pretext of protesting against frauds by tha 
Tibetans, who had, they alleged, mixed their exports of salt 
M t h  earth, and also against the excessive duties levied on
„ . 133
«nrkha goods* The native forces proved no match for the
invaders. The Emperor sent M s  aide-de-camp, Pachung, who was
ablQ <£0 Sp3aj£ Tibetan, and two other generals to reinforce the
Tibetan armies. Instead of fighting the Gurkhas, the Imperial
Senerals induced the Tibetans to make a secret arrangement with
bhe Gurkhas, promising to pay them annualy a big sum and thus
v v 139
^Ting them off. They then reported to the Emperor that
tha Gurkha chief wished only to send a tribute mission to China
v?£* host China so books on Tibet place the event in 1730. The 
swii is given, based upon tho Imperial edict (kao-tsung 
Chap, 1411, p, 8b}* Further evidence supporting the 
a * ?  aa 1783 is contained in Kt.uo-erh-k1» chi-lgeh, Vol, 6,
P* Vol. 15, p, 5a? Vol* 3 3 7 * 7 9 $ ;
Cf. Markham, p. Ixxvi.
Ss.o«t5ung shlh-lu. Chap* 1391# PP* 8b-9a*
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arid that they, had settled .the little frontier incident, without
the loss of a single soldier.
But :the failure of the Tibetans to pay the money brought .
the Gurkhas hack, and there was. another war in, 1791* The
tiaid. Resident,-Pao-Vai, moved the Ranch1en lama, .then a
child of ten, to .¿Interior Tibet and even.suggested moving the
140
Dalai- Laaa. to .Si-ning* .• . Cfcuaba, the-treasurer,.fled with
hts fortune, and souq loading lamas of Tashi-lhunpo nude a
false statement to the effect that the goddess, appealed to,
had advised non-resistance. That shattered the morale of the
Natives, and the invaders easily captured Shigatse and looted 
141l^ shi»lhunpo.
The Imperial government, kept in ignorance of what had 
loon happening, received information of the situation after the 
Gdrkhas were masters of Ulterior Tibet. It organised an ex­
peditionary force immediately* Meanwhile, the Gurkhas had
£ent their booty home and. retreated slowly towards Rieh-la-nu 
/„ 142
vu@iiauj and Ting-chi eh having learned of the approach of 
^ i3 Chinese army. The latter, under the able command of the
rn* Pao«t’ai did not, however, carry of the falai t o »  to a 
of safety, as Cammann (p* 121) alleges#
I?* iMd., Chap, 1388, pp# l6a-b, . Kfuo-erh-k1«*..chi-lftth.
* Pp7oa-$b, 20a-b| £tV, pp. la-, 2b.
Elo-tcung shih-lu. Chap# 1590, pp# 31a, 20a#
Manchu general, Fu-k’ang-an, hurried to Tibet by way of Kok- 
oaor in the depths of winter* In the battle that followed 
the Gurkhas were badly defeated* After several further ■ 
sharp engagements the Imperial forces reached within one day»s 
march of the enemy*s capital.
Fearing the loss of the seat of the government, apprehen­
sive that his neighbours, Sikkim and Bhutan, aroused by Chin­
e e  agents, night fall upon him to revenge his former invas- 
^■ons, and failing help from the British the Gurkha ruler
sued repeatedly for peace, which was granted on rather humil­
iating terms. The Gurkhas undertook to restore all their 
Plunder and to send a tribute mission every five years to Fek- 
inS* It was stipulated that Nepal* s tribute status was to bo
iik© that of various other dependencies of China, such as Kor-144
e&* Ann&m, Siam, and Burma, Nepal faithfully observed
this obligation until 1903, only three years before the fall 
ne 145or the Ch* ing dynasty. An inscribed stone slab was erect-
¿sx n i  j o i n t s  o u t  t h a t  t h eu 3. RockhlU, i L  M *  °kSa5 ± naencHrtext of Lord Cornwallis1 to Tibet .as the.aep sn & sn cy ^ o *,:
« 5  S e p te m b e r  15*  m  c a n to n  and o f f ^ r i n g
C h in a , t o  . t h e . Company18 H f !  ■ a g r e e s  w i th  t h e  s t a t e m e n t s  in 
^ Q d ia tio n  b u t  declining .5fte -Ifehy 11*-'PP» *th e  C h in e s e  . v e r s i o n =
» o r  v t e x t  of-, t h i . l e t t e f # ~  ■ *
&£CQunt o f  t
e hservatXons . »a»® uui’- Year 1793, PP* .3^ 9
^fgaat^ he Kingdom of J&paul, being the substance of' the
r a t i o n s s d# c ring a mission to that country in the
4^4* shlh-lu, Chap, 1411, p, 14b,
hockhilli -Dalai -Lamas,- ;p , -52, a, 2, - But Ko Cui-eh*eng,
' P* 2 0 8, says they
■nor mission in 1924,
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ed in Lhasa in memory of the conquest. Its Inscription is 
given in the appendix to Sir Charles Bell*s book, Tibet»., JP_as& 
and Present, .
■ ' Exercise of Full Chinese Sovereignty in Jgibet ■
After rescuing 11 bat from the Gurkhas, the Emperor found 
the time was ripe to reform the whole administration of Tibet 
&hd to take effective control of the reins of government in 
order to preclude the need of further repetition of expensive
expeditions. On the recommendation of Fu-k’ ang-an, the Res-. : 146.. •
Idents, one stationed at Lhasa, the other at Chigatso, were 
Elven the same rank as the Dalai Lama and the Panch’ea Lama, 
the bKa*-blon, which was largely responsible for the corrupt 
state of affairs, was deprived of most of its power, and the 
Tibetan officials, both lay and ecclesiastical, were ordered 
to submit to the Residents* decision in all questions of imp­
ortance, The Dalai and Punch*en were not given the right to 
Memorialize the throne, but were authorized only to »report to 
Residents and ask their orders,**
Kso-tsung shlh-lu. Chap, 1411, p, 15a*
Hockhill, Dalai Lamas, p, 55« From the source cited byekhiix the writer caji find no reference to this effect,'  .. ,
'*•« wno throne, ■ - The only rererencc which way he quo tea to 
report RocltM.ll*s view Is a later edict fcjr Bararor Kao-tsung, 
jssu?4 tn t(la a u t u m  or 1754 (1M4;* „Chap. 145», pp. J4b-J5a), 
Jr ^hich the Emperor expressea sa ti»faction over the report 
¿“J* H h a  Resident flo-lia did.not kneel before the Dalai Lnma latter took the /Resident* s- order :• faithfully,
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Formerly, the Residents— to use th©' words of Emperor - Kao- 
tsung— had been sen'of mediocre abilities and contented them­
selves with being figure-heads* - They had considered the off-,143' •
ice as merely a stepping stone to promotion or as a miser­
able post to b© lived through somehow.' ' low that the Residents 
w©r© placed upon a footing of equality with the governor-gen- 
©ral of the'adjacent province of Szechuan, more care was taken
in selecting then, Moreover, a much larger staff with corn-
149
issioners and agents was set up.
The Residents wore made responsible also for frontier 
^©fences and the efficiency of native levies, A regular 
indigenous army of 3#0Q0 men was established under Imperial
command and given regular pay. Besides, 1,000 Mongolian and
1 a *50■*■*000 Chinese troops were stationed in Tibet, From this
time on »the Manchou Minister Resident at Lhasa ,»1 as Sir John
^ayis, first British Minister to China, remarked
rul©s Tibet on the part of . the Chines© Emperor*» .
^Peror ordered the newly appointed successor to Ilo-lin, named 
^nng-ytin, a Mongol of the Kherein clan, who had the highest 
,®sPect for the Yellow Sect, not to kneel to the Dalai Lama as 
0IXS as he was there as the Imperial Resident*
Kao-tsimg shlh-lu, Chap. 1393# PP* I2a-bj Chap, 1411,
Pp* CiSp. I4i4, p, 22b*
Chap* 1393# P* 13»! Chap, 1417, p* 3b, For
Ta cM. i n g M l  JA.fl» Chap, 67, p* 3*
Iking wu chi. Bosk V, pp* 22a, 46a,
fir J,F, Davis, China during the far and sine# the Peac*' i# p, 1 4 9 ,
d!?* Ibid«©tailor,see
fox
«♦..in fact
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Looking at the status of. Tibet from. the Judicial.. angle, :
we find Imperial Justice was .-once again .exercised'right'after
the military - campaign as on the. three previous occasions*
Sandsin-panyur, a member of the. bKa*~blon and a son. of Duke :
Pandita,:had arranged the peace terns-with the Gurkhas at the
time of the latter’s first invasion, without the sanction of
the Imperial government,; Captured by the Gurkhas in 1791
and released only:after military pressure had been exercised
V  the Imperial','axngr,-.he.vas.::sent under custody;to Peking for: 152v^ial and subsequently dismissed:from his cabinet post*
Ihe property of Sonomuwangchale, another member of the tKa*- 
whose corruption in charging high commissions and extra 
levies in trade with the Gurkhas was responsible for the 
Gurkha-Ilbotan conflict and who committed suicide when his 
Misdeed was made known to the Bnperor, was confiscated by an 
^wperial order and his heir was deprived of the right to in- 
herit his title. Also confiscated and given to tho treasury 
^0I> the expenses of the newly established native army were tho 
Properties of Dsa-marpa and Chumba, Tho former escaped cap- 
punishment as he had died of illness in Hepal before the 
inclusion of the campaign*
Ifcao-tsung sfalh~ltju chap, 1417* p* l&a*
IMl.i Chap* 1418, pp. 8b-9a* C&maanm, p* 131, asserts 
tha ^^®*“aarPa took poison to avoid falling into the hands of 
¿5® Chines© alive* To determine whether ha committed suicide
*>; -$Ud of .-iiinassj ■ refer to .1  ».uo^erh*k« a chi.M £k> Vol* 35,..
pp* 22b-23a| Yol* 37, pp. lb-fb, 16a-SflloI7T9, P* 30a| Vol*
115
Measures were adopted, to improve the economic condition 
of the people— a necessity that the Buddhist no rid had very 
often neglected* The money coined by tho Gurkhas, which had
been a source of trouble between Nepal and Tibet, was declared
154 .■ • ■
illegal and suppressed} a new uniform currency bearing the .
title of the Emperor was issued by the Tibetan treasury and a
155
mint with Chines© experts was established.
As to foreign trade, regulations were Issued to fix the 
period during which transactions should be carried out, the 
number of merchants who were to enjoy the right to trade and 
the routes that the caravans wero to take. Everyone engaged 
in foreign trade was required to produce a passport and submit 
to examination by the frontier guards, who reported to tho 
Residents. Import duties in kind wore regulated and attempts 
at evading the payment of the duties wero to moot with heavy *154
40, p, 10b. Caramaim apparently overlooked the Chinese word 
for »even if0 in the reference» he cited. As for Chumba, ho 
was later taken to Peking and also spared from capital punish­
ment. (ibid.. Vol. 5, pp* 26b-27aj Vol. 14, pp. 4a-b.)
154. Kao-tsung shih-lu. Chap. 1415, pp* 15a~b* From the • 
Chinese official record. it-was the old Tibetan silver coins 
that were debased and mixed with copper} the Gurkhas had there* 
fore asked for a bettor rate of exchange of their own coins. 
Cf. - Jtockhill, Dalai i»amasf p. 50# which says that th© ■ Gurkhas ' 
made high-handed attempts to force _ their debased silver coins 
upon Tibet. A fuller explanation on this point is given by 
Ca&mann, pp. 108-11, based mainly upon Colonel Kirkpatrick» a 
Account of the Kingdom of Heoaul. '
155* For details and subsequent modifications, see reports to 
the Emperor in Wel-tsani.Jlmg-cMfa* I# Chap, 10, pp* 191*95*
punishment«;..
Taxation was reorganized and:the: financial administration 
reformed with a, view to establishing equilibrium i n .the finan­
ces .and suppressing corrupt practices« ..The Residents . were 
.invested.with,the.power.to examine the revenue'and expendit­
ure. -.'The .treasuries of ...the Potala: and..Tashi-lhunpo;. were
' 1 57both placed under the supervisionof the Residents,. but the 
latter were forbidden to interfere with the funds assigned to 
the Dalai and Panch* en Lamas for their personal and official 
use,
‘A general reform of the administration was carried out. 
The number and pay of both lay and ecclesiastical officials 
V;©re put upon a regular basis. The duties of each official 
Vs'ere defined. Excepting those of minor rank, all wore to be 
selected by the Dalai or Punch* en Lamas in conjunction with
tK 158tne Residents,
^56. Ibid.. Chap. 11, pp, 197-200,
}57. To quote Emperor K&o-tsung*s words, «Heretofore the Rea- 
laents had nothing to do with these two treasuries. Their 
Jccuanlat<td:,funds.were subject to misappropriation and usurp- 
aJion by the members of the b^a«-bio» and.high officials in 
charge,« (Kao-tsung_.shlh^iu, Chap, 1411. p, 24a). For now 
insures and^inSncSirtotamemorialized .to the throat by 
J^-^ang-an and others, see Wei-tsang t*ung-chlh. I, Chap, 9,
Kao-tsung,shih-lu, Chap, 1537, PP, lOb-llaj Chap, 1411, 
f* *4o, For detailsof the new administrative system, see -
®kJLm nu tze I t . Chap, 62, : ■
u  7
m
As foreign .elements hid been responsible fop trouble In the 
P&st, measures were taken to limit Intercourse between Tibetans 
®nd foreign peoples* ; /All communications with. neighbouring - 
states such\&s:Nepal, Ehutan, 'and Sikkim.wera: to be through the 
Residents* Even communications addressed .to. the Dalai and * 
P&nch*ea lamas-were to be made known to the Imperial represent­
atives* -In fact, replies to the chief of Nepal when he sent a 
mission to tender his apology to the Dalai and Pinch* en Lamas 
were drafted by the Residents, ana Resident Ilo-lin told tho 
young Dalai Lama what to say when receiving the Nepal envoy.
«or were members of the b&a^blon allowed to communicate dir-
ecU y  with the outside world* Letters addressed to them were« :
to be submitted to the Residents and the Dalai Lama; end replies 
wore to be sent only with their approval* Even the missions 
ser*t by the princes of Mongolia and Kokonor in ccnnectlon with 
reU g i c n  were to be sanctioned by the Residents in advance, 
foreigners crossing the frontier were to be subjected to care- 
^  examination by tho outposts and could enter Tibet only after 
8ocuring a permit* ■ Lamas and pilgrims leaving tho territory
u . 160
to carry passports. The boundaries with Nepal, Cikkin, 
8hd Bhutan were clearly demarcated* Damaged frontier marks
Mo-1sung _shih-l'uf Chap. 1414, p. 23b,
' u* Ml.tganip I, Chap, Q y pp, 182-83*
11$
were rebuilt and those that had been obliterated replaced.
Finally, special narks of favour were conferred on the 
Dalai and'Punch» en Lamas, though stern measures were taken to
rid the >JSa»-blon of the Influence of the Dalai Lama» s relat-
■. 162 ■ ■.
ives and retinue, and a decree mas Issued to discontinue 
the practice of selecting a lama to represent the interests of
the 'church In this highest administrative organ.' Instead,
. ■ : 163 :
the vacancy mas to be filled by a layman. Immense quant­
ities of grain and hugo sums of money mere sent to Anterior 
libat to relieve the poor. All demolished houses were rebuilt 
for them by the government. All refugees «ere moved back to 
their rebuilt homos and assured of peaceful occupation. The 
taxes of the «hole of Tibet «ere cither exempted'or reduced by 
half for one year, and the compulsory transport service which
^ d e  thousands of people abandon their homes was regulated,
164
greatly reducing the burden of the masses.
llow far these regulations «ere to be put into practice
161
^ 1 *  Ibid., X, Chap. 2, pp. 19-31*
Kao-tsun« shlh-lu. Chap* 1416, p, l$aj supra, n* 1J$ and : 
v* *5/ • . The brother of the Dalai Lama was summoned to Peking 
•^cause of ids part in the corruption. Ibid., Chap. 1337# 
p* 13a.
^ 3 .  Ibid,, Chap, 1417# pp* 14a-15a.
K&o-tsunp shlh-lu. Chap, 1472# pp. 19a-20bj Chap, 1473, 
i! 9b] Chap. I4bl. p p . I8a-19bi for more details, see hel-tsan«
< 3 M-chih: II, Chap. 14, pp. 329-78.
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depended upon the ability and honesty of the Resident and his 
subordinates. They were calculated to remove the causes of 
unrest. By the measures that were introduced the Imperial
government .secured control of the key positions in Tibet with­
out attempting to interfere with the daily life of the people* 
VJ.W, Rockhill, who had the unique fortune of being a 
scholar of Tibetan and serving as United States Minister to 
China, on concluding his study of Tibet*s relations with China 
from 1644 to 1903, made the following remark*
The preceding study ... has, I trust, made clear the 
real nature and the extent of the autonomy 'enjoyed by 
. Tibet for the last hundred and fifty years, and with 
■ which the Tibetans«are,.X believe, perfectly satisfied. 
There has been no claim raised by them for total or even 
: greater independence of China, no'wish to deprive them- ■
selves of the aid and guidance of China, no dissatisfact­
ion with the 'reforms■of, 1793# which were well suited to 
the requirements of the country and the custom of the 
people.*^
1 66
Sir Charles Dell, referring to present-day Tibet, said, 
"Among the peasantry too we hear from time to time of those 
who express a wish that the Chinese would return.n It may bo 
inferred from that statement that the Tibetans cherish the
Memory of, the above-described measures. It was due only to 
ihe folly and arrogance of the Uanchus in later times, the 
Weakness of their military forces, and the intrigues of foreign 
Powers that Tibet drifted gradually away from its traditional
^^5« Rockhill, Dalai Lamas, p. 90* 
Dell, Tibet, p. 214.
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position in the polity of China,
167
Chfing~shlh-kao, in describing the now statas of tho
Hosldents .who /wore' given direct participation in the Tibetan 
government* and the. measures: putting the native army-.. under 
Imperial command and creating a uniform currency under Chinese 
supervision# called forth the remark that full Chinese .sover­
eignty had. been established over Tibet, ...'The:writer of this 
study thinks that another.innovation* vis,* the change in the 
method of choosing the Dalai and Punch1en Lamas and other 
great ecclesiastical dignitaries of Tibet and Mongolia, as 
stipulated in an edict of the Emperor* demonstrated even more 
clearly where lay the supreme political power in the final 
analysis.
Hitherto the succession to these high ecclesiastical 
offices had been decided according to the'belief that*, on the 
^cath of a high lama, his soul took life again in the body of 
an infant born soon after. This system had apparently been 
honestly worked in the earlier years of Lamaism* as tho first 
^Ivq Dalai Lamas had been found in different districts and 
3°me of them belonged-to poor and obscure families, Tha sel­
ection of the infant was in the hands of the invokers of orac­
hes* and an ambitious family was naturally, tempted to bribe
ChUnn-shlh Kao, 525* fan 8* p. 10b.
the invokers of oracles to select an Infant that had been born 
to it*  ; , That - corruption eventually developed ..under the system 
.was ■sufficiently, proved'..by the fact that successive occupants 
of the high offices (Dalai* Punch* ea and ■ Hutuhhtu) had boon 
selected.from,ruling or aristocratic.families. In fact, sev­
eral -holders-of; the ..'-offices even cane .•■from one family» . The
eighth Dalai Lana and the Seventh Punch’ea Lama-were said to bo 168
first cousins* . .The. sixth.PanchVen-Lama .and-Chuaba Hutufchtu
were brothers# Facts like these, coupled with the Gurkha in­
vasion, constituted the case for reform.
The system was finally discredited on tho death of the 
Grand Lama.Cbeptsundampa.(Jebtsiu-dsmba Hatukhtu), tho Patri­
arch of Urge. it was then announced that the soul of the 
deceased lama had taken refuge in tho womb of Princess T ’ush- 
*tfu Khanate, who was enceinte at the- time* It so happened 
that tho princess gave birth to a female child, who was, of■ 1 6 9 . ■
course, disqualified from succeeding to the office.
Following upon tho victory over tho Gurkhas, the Emperor
. 1 7 0
I792 ordered that the successors of the Dalai and punch*- 
Gxi Lumas and other high ecclesiastical dignitaries wore to be
163* Turner, Embassy, pp. 250, 249, relates,that their fathers 
«ere brothers*
Ch*tnir~ shift k m .  52$, fan 8, p. 11a.
• ,gag-tsung shih-lU. Chap. 1411. pp. 22b-2Jb| Chap, 1412, 2oa-bj and Chap. 1417, pp. 4a-$b.
. 121.- : ■
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selected by the dravdng of lots, should there he more than one 
claimant. &ext year ho h*d a golden urn made for this purpose 
&nd sent It to Lhasa under the custody of a high officer of the 
Imperial Guards. ; He proclaimed that henceforth selection 
should he made ■ among the children reported as likely to he the 
ro-embodiaent, and that the name and the date of birth of each 
should he written upon a slip which eliould he placed in the 
drn. Tho Dalai Lana in company with the Resident was to draw 
& slip in th©'presence of all the people and thè one thus drawn 
was to receive patents of investiture from the Imperial govern­
ment.- -
home western writers iuvo interpreted the reform as only 
d device by which the Baperor was ambled to prevent the sei- 
action of men who were distasteful to him or inimical to Cfcir*- 
csq authority in 11 hat. Tho insinuation is not warranted
because the drawing of lots was resorted to only when the succ­
ession was disputed. Tor instance, in the case of the ninth 
^nd thirteenth Dalai Lamas, the Baperor, by special decree,
Upended the drawing of lots, because there was but one clal-
, 171iaaiit.
Jen-tsung shih-lu.• Chap. 192, pp, lla«l2a, - The orders 
the Baperor were embodied in a long inscription in Tibetan, 
wia translation of vhich was made by L.A. IVaddell, «Chinese 
JaPariaX hdict of l3o3, on the Origin and Transmigrations of 
gSuhd Lamas of Tibet,» J/U8 (1910), pp. 75-36* The present
*f4lai Lama was also exempted from the lots-drawing process, 
Infra, Chap, III*
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Had the Emperor been actuated by dishonest motives in 
imposing the reform, ha would have retained the old system, 
because by the simple device of bribing or intimidating the 
invokers of oracles, he could have secured the selection of 
bis own nominees to the offices. The drawing of lots was, to 
say the least, less liable to be controlled or influenced by 
the Emperor*
Moreover, the real motive of the Emperor can be easily 
seen. The new system added to the moral authority of the 
Emperor in libet and deprived the offices of Dalai Lama and 
Panch’en Lama of their character of self-regulating autonomies, 
S'be change also implies a subordination of church to state and 
shows the source of supreme political power.
Imperial Authority on the Decline
After the abdication of the great Emperor Chfien-lung 
(posthumously known as Kao-tsung) in 179&# his death in. ■ i
*?99, the Manchu dynasty gradually declined in power under a 
Accession of weak emperors. The editors of the Ch*tng-ghlh 
blamed Ch’i-shan (Ki-shen), the Resident from 1843 to 
^ 4 7 for the loss of the power to control the purse of Tibet 
ahd its army, as he submitted to the throne and secured its
Cb^ing-shih kao, Vol, 70, table 11, p, 40b, gives the 
Jbupe■¿f Chfi-ihan'as 1845-1846j but be was ordered to stay-on 
r* he remained;in o f f ic e :t i l l "  the autumn of 1847« His «ucc- 
^®£or, pin-liang, did not arrive at the post until August, 1847 
flsian-tsung shih-lu. Chap, 445; P* 8b and Chap, 44.6, p, loo
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approval of a new regulation of 28 articles, which suspended
the supervision of the treasury and did away with the practice
175
of training the native troops by Manehu or Chinese officers. 
Indeed, his policy must have hastened the deterioration of the 
Imperial position in libet. But the latter could not have 
been avoided when the court found itself in the situation des­
cribed in the following paragraphs.
Imperial authority in Tibet, despite the weakening effect
on the prestige of the office of the Resident caused by the
- ' 1 7 4
aisconduct of its earlier occupants Is’e-pa-k*© (1804-1805)
175
ahd Y,'en-kan (1820-1825)# was still maintained up to 1840
*■73« CWing-shlh kao. 525, fan 8, p. 14a,
174. Ts'e -pa-k’e and his deputy accused each other of miscond­
uct and both were cashiered. Bill3, written in Tibetan wore 
jound posted on the walls in Lhasa accusing Tsf#-pa-kfe of tak-*hg bribe»' In choosing :^a*-blons and ;other high -officials*
^bis accusation, though made anonymously, was brought to the 
J^tention of the Emperor who, realising that the Tibetans had 
“Ccoae less docile, ordered a thorough investigation of the 
rjjter, : Sea Jea-tsung shlh-lu. Chap, 150, pp, 9a-10bj Chap* - 
r51# pp* 9a-12i Chap, 159, PP» 27b-29bj and also.Ch!ina-shlh 
525# fan 8# p* lib, .
X 5 ' ; [hid.# p, 12b. blames wen-kan for having sided with the 
ahasa authorities in their quarrel with the Tashi-lhunpo admin­
istration# and points out his irresponsible way of handling the 
¡^Ikkimes© request wlch had the effect of alienating the Sikkim 
vassal state from its suzerain power, and thus facilitating the 
^ t e r  British penetration. See Hsttan-tsung shih-lu. Chap, 26, 
*Pv,34b..35bf
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as shown in the record of the punishment of a tKa'-blon and a 
high ecclesiastical official in that year t ^ a  decree of the 
Emperor at the suggestion of the Resident, But as soon as 
the first Anglo-Chinese war, otherwise known as the Opium VJar, 
broke out, the Imperial position in Tibet, as a result of being 
deprived of the usual facility to get reinforcements from 
Szechuan and other neighbouring provinces, became so weakened 
and so exposed to danger that more reliance had to be placed 
on the Tibetan troops who were consequently given batter weap-17 7  ■ons.
In 1841, while the Anglo-Chinese war was going on, the
tribesmen of La~ta-k»e in collaboration with the *Sen-pa sav-
ag@§a invaded Tibet and occupied sore than one thousand seven 
v, . 178
hundred li of the Tibetan territory. As the Manehu court
179
Was then utterly ignorant of the geography of India, the 
source and the location of the invading force given by Shlh-lu 
cannot be taken for granted. What it meant by "Sen-pa savages" 
Is presumably the JDorga force of5,000 men under 2orawar Singh
Ibid., Chap. 341, pp, 3i>b-37a.
*77, Ibid.f Chap. 359# PP« 26b-27a,
^ 8* Ibid.f Chap, 363, pp. 20a-b,
■^79. Ibid., Chap. 345# PP* 2Qa-bj Chap, 348, pp. 15a-l6a,
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who Invaded Vie s t e m  Tibet from Kashmir. The Emperor dis­
patched 1,000 soldiers from Ulterior Tibet and 200 soldiers 
together with 1,000 militia from Lhasa and its vicinities to
. . 181. - v
engage the enemy, and further*reinforeed this army with 
■■ 1 8 2 .
500 soldiers. Though the Resident and his deputy got the
133
credit for the ensuing victory, it was the Tibetan troops 
under the command of a bKa»-blon who inflicted a crushing
184
defeat on the invaders and recovered all the lost territory.
While the Tibetan troops were gaining in strength, the 
Imperial garrison force deteriorated both in quality and in 
discipline. Its soldiers were sent mostly from Szechuan to 
serve garrison duty of three years. While they were in Tibet, 
&any cohabited with Tibetan women and then left behind children 
who had to live on the army. The payroll of the garrison 
force made no provision for these sons of illegitimate birth.
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Bell, Tibet, p. 46. ■ Cf* A Collection of Treaties.- Eng-
compiled ty c.y, a 1tchlson, Vol. XIV, p. 15. A b a t e r  impart 1 
lal edict (Hsttan-tsung shlh-lu. Chap. 439, p. 9b) identified 
sen-pa« as "what the Carmans call »si-k1©* singh or slkh .«
^1» flsflan-tsung shih-lu. Chap. 356, pp. 26a-b.
182. Ibid.. Chap. 357, pp. 44a-45b.
183. Ibid.f Chap. 372, p. 22b.
Chap. 261, pp. lb-2a) Chap. 366, pp. lOb-llbj164.
Chap, 370,'pp. 29a-30i|" Chap, 371, pp. 20a-2lV, The fighting 
pasted till the early summer of 1042, For soma details about 
origin and development of the armed conflict see Fh n^.g wu 
Book V, "K’ang ytt chi hsing," pp, 5Qb-51b,
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The only way open to the garrison command was to enlist the 
boys In the army and have their names on the payroll, even if 
they were unfit for military service. In 1844 the Emperor 
was'surprised to find from Resident Ch»i-shanf s report that 
almost thirty per cent of the garrison forces were these fath­
erless boys whose mother tongue was Tibetan. He proclaimed 
some restrictions on future recruitment, but nothing was rec­
orded in ghlh-lu that showed any real improvement of the sit-
■ 185
nation. .
The Chinese defeat in her first war with a western power 
cost the Manchu regime even more heavily in prestige than In 
material losses, including the cession of Hongkong and an ind­
emnity amounting to a total of twenty-one million dollars.
The Emperor soon realised his precarious position in Tibet for 
whose hold he had relied more on h!s inherited prestige than 
on his actual forces on the spot. He saw, however, no immed­
iate» danger of an open revolt from within, though there had 
been demonstrations of disobedience by lamas of a leading mon­
astery toward his incapable, if not grasping, Resident, Meng 
**&o (1859-1842)* It was rather a possible Invasion from 
without that gave him cause for anxiety. Indeed, he demonst­
*85. Hsdan-tsun.p; shlh-lu. Chap. 407# PP. lb-2b.
J86* Ibid., Chap. 407# P* 26b-2'3b, and also Chap. 411, pp* Ja- 
®# 5a-6bjf Chap. 414, pp. 2b, llaj Chap, 419, PP< 4b~5a.
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rated one© sore his authority in depriving the powerful Ho- 
msn-han, A-wang-eha-mu-pa-lo-ts’u-lo-ch’i~mu, who acted as
regent during the Dalai Lana1s minority, of his titles and in
• ■ 187
confiscating all his property. But even in taking this 
action he was afraid that the followers of the No-men-han 
wight entice foreigners to make trouble, and cautioned the 
Resident to restrain them and to adopt preventive measures. 
The Emperor’s fear of trouble from without was more pro-
188
bounced in his instructions to the Resident regarding the
" 139
treatment of Nepal. He must have seen the writing on the
W&11 when the English raised the issue of fixing the boundary
of, and establishing trade with, Tibet in the January of 
1$0
lo47* Y«e shall see in Part II how this issue unfolded it­
self and led to the dispatching of an armed British mission 
*Rich forced its way to Lhasa. Even in this early stage, we 
ftnd that the Emperor was already worried about the non-coinpl- 18
187. Ibid..Chan. 406. pp. 5a-b. Mote that it was the fanch’- 
en Lama who accused the Mo-men-han. for details of the case 
?es IMi'i Chap, 410, pp. 5a-7aj Chap, 414, pp. 2a-bj Chap, 415, 
PP* llk»12b, I4a-15aj Chap* 416, pp, 9a-bj Chap. 421, pp. 9^~
^ 8 *  Ibid., Chap, 412, pp, l^a-b.
1^3* Ibid«. Chap. 402, pp. 10a, 29a-b; Chap, 405, P* 12aj 
C^ P .  440, p. 17a.
j-90. Ibid,, Chap. 457» PP* 24b-25b, pp. 32a-34bj Chap. 438,
9b-l0a, 10b-llbt Chap, 440, pp. 15a-16aj Chap, 442, pp. 17b- 
Adbl Chap. 444, p. 19a.
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lane© of the Tibetans on the frostier whenhe....ordered the
hKa*-blon to urge then to move inward in order to avoid a
■ ■ 191
clash with the penetrating Eritish power* The Emperor* s
^ords in the Imperial edict show unmistakable signs of the
‘ . : 192 . :
weakness of his position in Tibet. ■
Before long, trouble did cose from Nepal, whose peace 
with Tibet had been maintained only by a strong intervening 
Imperial power* In 1855#' Gurkhas Invaded Tibet again under 
the pretext of alleged ill-treatment of their subjects. The 
Tibetan army.was repeatedly.defeated. , The Imperial govern­
ment, therefore, ordered the general stationed in Szechuan to 
Proceed■with his a n ^  to the aid of - the Tibetans. The throat 
of armed intervention by the Emperor led Nepal to come to 
terms with Tibet in 1856, Tibet agreed to pay annually a sum 
of money to the Gurkhas and to grant them free trade. The 
Gurkhas, in return, agreed to restore the occupied territory 
evacuate their troops. Apparently neither the Nepalese 
nor the Tibotans were fully aware of the weakened position of 
the Peking court! both agreed to acknowledge allegiance to the
ft ■ -- '193
ureat Emperor of China.
191. Ibid.f Chap. 445, p. 8a.
192, Ibid.. Chap, 441, pp. 8b-9k*
195. Article II of the Treaty, the translation of the text of
which is given by Cir Charles Bell, Tibet. Past and Present
130.:
■ Meanwhile the Taiping Rebellion was .in full swing. Four. 
years later China was again humiliated in a war with England 
and France, and Peking was Invaded by the combined forces of 
the two countries. Attacked from without, and torn by inter­
nal dissension, China was no longer able to maintain a firm 
hold upon affairs in Tibet, During the Nepal affair, we see 
already the weakness of the Imperial position, although it was 
hot known to the Nepalese. In a report to the Emperor, the
Resident informed him that the native troops remained unmob- 
. 194
llized in spite of his repeated orders* In two edicts the
Smperor told his representative on the spot that he could hard­
ly afford the expense of sending troops from China Proper, and
that he was short of both manpower and money to cope with hose 
195
rebellions.
Later, in 1864, when the rebellion of the chief of Nyarong 
broke out, the Imperial government had to rely upon native 
troops to suppress it. M t h  both hands full of trouble at 
borne, the Emperor wished only to see a compromise reached among 
the native tribe3 so that the interrupted dispatch service 
°ould be resumed. At first he ordered the Tibetan native army
. 19 6 ' " ■
to withdraw and then he learned from the Resident that these
Vten-tsung shih-lu. Chap* 168, p. 3b*
Ibid.f Chap. 186, pp, 8b-9aj Chap, I89, p. 22b,
_Iu-tsuag.^gMh-la, chap, 1 2 3 , pp* 32~24| Ch&:
£00.
1
m  /
troops were suecassfully engaging the rebels and that M s
m
order could not be executed« This shows that he ras poor­
ly -informed' and not in a position to control the situation, 
Under these circumstances, he could only leave the Tibetan nat-
.198 :
ive troops and tho local tribes to fight among themselves
and to express his sanction ’¿hen the former had repeatedly ron
■. • 199 ■-
soné decisive battles. Some Chinese troops from Esechuan 
Joined in the final'stage, and throughout'the »hole campaign 
the Chinese commissioner at Ta-ch*ien-lu, Ehih Chih-k’ang, 
rendered valuable service in bringing about the victory, But 
tho brunt of the campaign »as borne by the Tibetans and the
reconquered territory ras therefore handed over to the Dalai
■ . ■ ■ ■■ '2oo , . .
bama as a favour in 1865* In other words the Imperial
court confirmed the actualities of the situation— that tho 
real power had passed into the Dalai Lama» s hands.
By 1864 tho Xaiping Rebellion had boon suppressed after 
fourteen years of hard fighting. As contemporary symptoms 
°f a political breakdown, tho Mohammedan subjects in Einkiang, 
Kensu, and Yttnnan rose in revolt. Order was restored only
*97« Ibid.. Chap, 147# PP* JQa-31&,
*93, Ibid,f Chap. 15 1, pp, J5b-6a,
•^99, Ibid,, Chap, 152, pp, l8s*b, 45b-4.6a,
¿00. Ibid,. Chap, 163, pp, 8b-10b* 8ee also Eir Eric Telch-
■ .Travels in Eastern Tibet, p, 5, and Bell, -Tibet.--». .47, ...
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after years of patient and energetic military operations which, 
In the case of Kansu-and Sinki&ng, lasted;over, a decade*
Floods, droughts and locusts befell the country in 1876« Fam­
ine in Shansi and other provinces between 1876 and 1878 added
201
to the already long list of calamities* In 1894 war with
Japan became unavoidable," and .China'was defeated* . After that
" : 202 '
she was confronted with the threat of partition toy foreign 
Powers*" ■
, Meanwhile, at court intrigues were increasing,'.and the 
struggle between advocates of reform and the conservatives was 
threatening to lead-to"a'coup-d*¿tat* The Dowager-Empress,
’fcho backed the latter, was triumphant* The conservatives made 
her connive with the Boxers, and an anti-foreign movement was 
°rgani£ed in North China, As a result a force of eight count­
ries combined to attack China and invaae the capital, ana the 
Dynasty was once more humiliated. The protocol then signed 
(1901) impo sed a crushing indemnity and the Imperial court had 
perforce to accept such terms as were offered*
These events struck a fatal blow at Imperial prestige in
f$l* See H*B. Morse, The International delations of the Chinese 
fiasire, Vol. XI, pp. 3o7=IS; ’ ' ! ;
?02. In tha case of Tlbat, tha British statesman Clsraall Kould 
dave used the word "dlsaealxirttont” instead of «partition8 as ho 
?ld in tha case of Egypt* But as pointed out by K.L* Danger, 
1t makes little practical difference to the victims.
Tibet, while the situation of Tibet itself had been going from 
bad to worse. As v,\3 shall see in Part II, the menace of Brit­
ish encroachment isas aggravated by Hussian activities. The 
British influence:was felt'by Tibetans especially after the. 
bocognition by tho Imperial court of the British protection 
°Vcr Eikkia In 1890, The Tibetan authorities for a time ent­
ertained tho hope of relying upon tha Russian Tsar rather than
-,V. 203
°n the Emperor at Peking* ; Under these circumstances even a 
capable Resident working hand in hand with a helpful Governor- 
General of Ssochuan could hardly salvage much of tha Imperial 
authority«
In fact, as was remarked by Ting Pao-cheng, the Governor- 
General of Swechuan from 1876 to 1885, in his memorial to tha 
throne, tho control of ths Tibetan administration had been 
belsjced since the last years of the Hsilan-tsung reign (1321-
I850), and the Tibetan civil service had become a separate, 204
u°cy, no longer subordinate to ths Imperial Institution.
Buring tho last decades of tha ChTing dynasty all tha occup­
ants of the Residency, with tha exceptions of Ten-shlh (1335-
Infra* n* 207 and Chap* VI, n* 7*
?G4* ch*in*-chi ch1ou tsang tsou tu {PDespatches and Memorials 
if the Throne conearnlng Tibet of tha Ch*ing Period"), edited 
%u Feng-p*el, Vol. I, Ting ?ao-chsng tsou-tuf p* f.
1J4
205 ■ * ■ 206 ■1888)'.' and'Shong-t’ a l , ' . . r e r e  either grasping or.ineompat- 
207 :ent -■ or both. The 'corruption of the Imperial institution
, 2 0 3from the Resident down was bared-by Chang Ting-tang in Bis
205* Sen-shih' was' very. popular among: the ■'■Tibetans*. - Hs'wasy- 
cashiered because of his baching of the Tibetan arguments in 
the dispute with-the .British and declining-: to carry out the -v 
Imperial order to force the Tibetans to withdraw from Lingtu. 
His merit: and his'.keen, sense of --responsibility. can :-be ...seenfrom, 
his official papers and memorials to the throne collected in 
ibld.y Vol. I, "Won-shih tsou tu", Chiton I-VIII.
206, ShSng-t*&i was appointed, deputy Resident in 1887* H© 
succeeded hen-shih in 1888 and.died at his post in 1892» Re 
Performed his-duty to:tha best of his ability-and knowledge and 
did a commendable job under most difficult circumstances. For
&is record set ibid.f Vol. II, »Sheng-t’ai. tsou tu,* Chtaa.I-V*
207. As an illustration, one Resident was not able oven to ■ Sdard an important document from being stolen. In Lu C h u m -  
ling» s memorial to ’ the ' throne,-: it was stated that during the 
4na@d conflict with the. British over the ■ Sikkim frontier issue, 
-Russian travellers '* gave Tibs tans throe confidant! al let­
ters and promised the latter military assistance. Rssidsnt 
^neng»t.fai'heard, of-, tha" existence of the so letters and tool: 
ihea over. After he had loft the post, these letters disapp­
eared from the secret files. It was said that the Tibetans 
them back through bribing the keeper of the archives,
Vol, IX, *Lu Chuan-ling tsou tu," Cfcaaa III, p, I.
^  Chuan-ling was governor-general of Ssechuan from 1895-1897*)
iQ8,. Rsaideney in Tibet w as a post r e s e r v e d  m a in ly  f o r  h & n c b a s , 
so m etim es f o r M o n g o l s .  Chang |ing~tang was s e n t  to  i n v e s t ­
i g a t e  a f f a i r s  i n  T i b e t  ( I n f r a , - p*  J o G ) ,  , He c a r r i e d  o u t  some
.^ost needed reforms and made valuable suggestions, Vhile In 
r}"yt he was appointed Deputy Resident, the first Chinese ever 
■ gritted''.to the .high'office of residency in Tibet* Ho declined 
CE[ honour and his resignation was accepted, & m  ibid,. III,niaii II, pp, 15 -16 , For his suggestions »«* ibid,, Chian II, - 
51-551 cb&an V, pp, 1-10.
dorriorial to tho .throne* ■. For example, a Resident usually took 
bribes of. no. less: than twelve .thousand taels in .reeoEraending 
one'.tKa*-blon#-and. several-.hundreds or several thousands of
taels in appointing a Tibetan official or officer in accordance 
tith. his r a n k . 1. The retinue., .of. s . Basident was. full „of, persons 
dishonourably discharged from former services .or. with.criminal 
Records» A treasurer at Chlng-hsi.had to bribe■the Besidest 
annually/with .three thousand taels.: ,.’!ost officials in charge 
°f various'treasury and supply, offices:expropriated official 
fuads, to-the extent.of .tens...of. thousands of taels in n single 
Case. naturally, they connended no respect from the Tibetans
£hd could not enforce regulations or administer justice.
As a result of the conciitiens described above, real power
Equally passed into the Calai Inna»a hands. This explains 
«1 210ftiso why in 18B5, thon a dispute arose between üepal and
Ib id ., chain II , pp. 17-20, 22, 25, 55-57* 33.
]«?• Ch’ ing-gMh kan (p. Ifia) erroneously gives the data as •¡.:u*nj8 find the dispute recorded in the previous year of sMh-luf Chap, 173, p* 4a and Chap* 172, pp. lla-b*or® ***oCfaao Ikn-chung, Chih_ lino.ehl-Ifi-sh (»A Brief Account
4 Mission to liepal*j,T7Ta; " 1
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ta.tor* ■ ' A settlement was reached in - the- next yeer. The.
Tibetans agreed to'pay a considerable sum of money as an Indem­
nity, mere than"one-third of which w a s ■covered 'by a loan drawn
. .  212
from'the.Gsochuan treasury.' .
* : . The .transfer .of the real power to the -DalalXama can bo
■more :clearly seen ;from :the.handling-of the internal affairs of 
Tibet. , In 1830 trouble again broke' out in Byrong* Tho Tib­
etan magistrate So-k* ang-se bached the rebellious tribesmen to 
defy the Imperial authority. Though the rebellion was supp­
ressed by an Imperial force, the ^osident had to ask the Df.lal
lama to replace Eo-k’ang-so with another Tibetan magistrate*"
m - 213This the latter accordingly did. £intoan years latsr# the
Tibetan magistrate of Syrens openly defied the Imperial author­
ity by extending his jurisdiction to tho neighbouring tribes» 
This time tho Tibetan authorities refused to comply with tho 
Imperial order to havo tho magistrate replaced. ' lu Cbuam- 
Ung, Governor-General of Szechuan tlun resorted to force and
211 .
. To -tcung shlh-lu. Chao. 179# PP* 5-~b# and Chap. lOj#
PP*
2}2. Ibid,f Chap. 186, pp* 13b-14aj Chap. 187# pp* 9a~b, Bee 
l1** lEllag J & i . Vol. 2# . «Ting pao-clwng tsou tu#« pp. 3^357
2i3, Ibia.f pp, 20-26.
2J4* Ibid.# Vol, II, «Lu Chuan-llng tsou tuf« Chian I, p* 6, ghs Resident at that time «as h’usi-huan# &nother grasping one# ti-spised by tho Tibotans (ibid,, p. $),
157
occupied the whole of Nyrong.•' ; la spite- of his -repeated 
requests to take - back Nyrong from the Dalai Lama and incor­
porate it under his Jurisdiction, the Emperor finally decided 
in favour of the commander-in-chief of the Manchu garrison 
forces in Szechuan Kung-shou1 s memorial and ordered the with­
drawal from Nyrong and the return of the latter to the Dalai 
215
lama* In 1902, though the Dalai lama still observed the 
formality as a nominal respect to the Emperor and recommended 
two candidates for successor to the magistrate of Nyrong who 
had been promoted to bKa'-blcn, he could order the first cand­
idate to proceed to the post and taka office only to be con-216
firmed by an Imperial edict*
The helpless position of the Resident in facing the Brit­
ish advance demonstrates further the decline of the Imperial 
authority. As pointed out in Lu Chuan-ling*s memorial to the 
throne sent in the spring of 1896, the Resident, K ’uei-huan, 
snd the deputy, No-ch*in, could not get transport from the 
Tibetans, nor Tibetan officials to accompany the trip, when
For Lu Cbuan-ling*s arguments, see ib id », pp* 15-15# 231 
Jkfian II, pp. 1-4. 12-15# 28-50> Chtan iIÏTpp. 1-29* ' For ' 
|ung-shou*s memorial see Ch*tng ch i wal chiao shih 11 ao ("The 
Sources of Diplomatic History Toward the j^cTof the" Ch’ing 
dynasty1*), od* by Wang Liang and Wang Yen-wei, Vol. 127#
Pp* 28a-5lb (nereafter cited as WCSL)*
Ch*lng chi ch*ou tsang tsou tu. Vol, II, #An-ch*eng tsou
i^r^5HV'^',A ^ Tch’leng1-W M ”ma e p u ^Resid@nt from 1900 to 1905*
1J8
they intended to dispatch someone to demarcate the frontier
217
with the British, In 1902 the Resident, XU-kang and the ;
deputy, An-ch* eng, experienced "the same difficulty, They
found the position:so untenable that they begged the<Emperor218
to relieve them from their posts.
Meanwhile, the Dalai Rasa was concentrating the power in
his own hands. In 1900 he killed his own tutor, Demo Rutukh-
tu, who had been in power up to 1895 and who hid always enjoy-
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ed-the confidence of.the Imperial court. After the Boxer
catastrophe, he and'the fibstan officials listened to the Res­
ident* s advice only when it was acceptable to them, and orders, 
regulations and treaties which were distasteful to them were
2V?, Ibid,, "Du Chuaa-ling tsou tu,* Chian I, pp, 5-6.
Ibid,, »An-ch*eng tsou tu,* pp, 17-191 To-tsung shlh-luf
Chap#3o5, pp#:10a-b| .their'-resignation was .not accepted.
They faced more difficulties,-which lire fully described in 
Jt-kang's dispatches to Wai-wu-pu (the Chines© Foreign Office), 
.{£&&» Vol,: 179# pp* :la-bf Yol, 180,. pp, l6a-bf Yol. 182, pp, 
Xt-kang was finally replaced by Xu-t*ai and left 
iibet in.the-spring of 1904. The helpless situation in which 
xh-t*ai found himself is to bs inferred from the following 
chapter,
SlilifiSmSMhJSM# 32$# fan S,:p..20a, lha Dalai > a m a  apparently realised, the . formidabits opposition to what he had 
cne to Demo' ttitukhtu.and his followers and the danger of 
possible revenge , ' 1 Among the conditions put to Do Chang-chi 
m i n the latter came to India to urge the Dalai Rama's return, 
ne was »not to raise the Demo case end never reverse the ver- 
w S  (Infra, n. 229), Bell, Tibet, p, 140, mentions the 
hen* y held criticism of the Dalai Rasa because of »his treat* 
^®ath°f Ten-gye-ling Regent, which resulted in the latter's
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utterly disregarded# The'.nominal authority"of the Super» ’ 
or, however, continued to ha acknowledged# A Japanasa writ­
er, Ekai Kawanguchi, who was in Tibet at the tins, has descri» 
bed the holding of a "service of prayer for the victory of 
China, the safety of the Emperor in the Eoxsr war, and the 
salvation of the country#
In 1904, Japan, which had made an alliance with Great 
Britain in 1902, declared war upon Bussia and the fighting 
took place In the dynastic homeland of Ilanchuria, In the
saaa year an armed mission was sent by the British into Tibet,
222 *
&nd Lhasa was forced to open its gates to foreign troops#
As explained later, a treaty was signed in 1906 between the - 
Imperial government and Great Britain under which the court 
S&ve its sanction to the Lhasa Convention, which had been . 
dictated to tha Tibetans by the British commander in the ab» 
sence of the Dalai Lama, although not a single llarxhu. or 
Chinese signature was attached to it# Under the treaty Great 
Britain formally recognized China's rights in Tibet, and China 
Paid the indemnity on the latter* s behalf.
?£§• I'or examPle# tbs treaty of 1890 and the Regulations of 
yssh signed between China and Great Britain, were denounced
** the Tibetans#
42X* £bree.Yftars ln.,TlMt# p. 297.
???• for an account of the mission, see Francis Younghusband, 
India, and Infra# Chap. V#
140
/ The Chinese Resume Fall Sovereignty - In Tibet
Roused by the British advance upon Lhasa in 1904 and 
alarmed at the terms forced upon Tibet* the Imperial govern­
ment felt the necessity of entrenching itself there sore firm­
ly. Feng Chlen* the 'Assistant Besideat, was instructed to 
proceed to Tibet with a view to curtailing gradually the powers 
of the native rulers and bringing Tibet under the sore direct 
control of the Imperial government. Ha took up his residence 
temporarily at Batang''and began to carry out reclamation work 
and mining operations. These activities caused unrest among 
the superstitious natives and his arrogance in interfering with 
the authority of the lamas* together with the harshness of M s  
measures* led to an open revolt. His troops ware quite in­
sufficient to quell the outbreak* and ha was killed by the 
rebels.
The Imperial government was prompt in taking punitive 
measures. Under the able leadership of Chao Erh-feng* Chin­
ese troops conquered Batang and the adjoining district in the 
summer of 190(5* The Resident* Lien-ytl, who had bean waiting 
for Chao to open the road, was now able to proceed to his post* 
Chao was granted honours and created a frontier high commiss­
ioner. Ha abolished the rank of native chief and appointed 
Chinese magistrates in their places, introduced new laws lim­
iting the number of lamas and depriving monasteries of their 
temporal power* and inaugurated schemes for having the land
141
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cultivated toy Chinese immigrants* !
In I908 Chao was appointed Resident and ordered, together 
*ith Llen-yd, to Investigate local conditions and prepare plans 
for comprehensive measures in Tibet, He conquered another 
important district called De-ge in the autumn of 1903 and the ! 
districts of Chamdo, Draya, and iiark&m in the following year* 
Meanwhile, a comprehensive scheme for the development of Tibet 
^as worked out* It covered military training, reclamation 
work, the spread of education, the encouragement of trade and 
ike general,Improvement of administration* How far those 
Measures impressed the people, in spite of the difficulties and : 
opposition they naturally encountered, can be fairly gauged 
from the words of Sir Charles Bell*
It may be freely conceded that China’s work in Tibet 
had its own good points. The Chinese officials of the 
. modern school, who came in now, lessened the bribes taken 
by the Tibetan officials from the poorer classes, and in 
ordinary non-political cases gave straighter .Justice than ; 
that dealt out by tho Tibetan magistracy. There was no 
doubt some foundation for the Amban*s claim £pat the poor-, 
er classes in Tibet were in favour of China,^24
In a masting of the Royal Central Asiatic Society held in
223. For details refer to Si-k* ann chi on sh eng chi (ffPro vinca 
Building of Sl-k’ang**), The author, Fu Bung-mu, was the succ­
essor to Chao Erh-feng as frontier high commissioner.
224. Tibet, p. 95*
London, in March, 1924, the speaker, Brigadier General II,E. 
fcilloughby, an old China Hand, and Sir Francis Younghusband,
who forced open the Lhasa gate, both praised Chao Erh-feng’ s
225
Work, Sir Eric Teichman, who spent a number of years as
British consular officer at Tach'ienlu, made the comment that
"Chao Erh-feng’s justice and fair dealings are remembered to-
226
day in Eastern Tibet as well as his severity,”
In February, 1910, the Imperial army marched from Chaabdo
into Lhasa, The Dalai Lama, newly returned from Peking with
227
the additional title of «Loyally Submissive Viceregent,« 
was having difficulty with the Resident, Lien-yU*  He was 
greatly disturbed by news of the far-reaching measures Chao 
had carried out in Eastern Tibet, especially the curtailment
the power of the monasteries and the restrictions on lamas, 
filing to come to an understanding with the Imperial author-
223. CAS& XI (1924) Ft. Ill, 196, 205*
226, Teichmau, Travels in Eastern Tibet, p, 57*
^ 7* The Imperial decree issued in November, 1903, conferring 
this title on the Dalai Lama--ostensibly as an additional hon­
our-« contained in reality, as Sir John Jordan put it, «the 
tirst unequivocal declaration on the part of China that she
*e£arded Tibet as within her sovereignty«— sovereignty, ba it 
tooted, ' ‘
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1ties in Lhasa, ha fled before the Imperial army arrived and
became a guest of the government of India* On the recommend*
fction of Lien-yH, the Chinese government immediately issued a
223
decree^depriving the Dalai Lama of his titles, The Chinese
government soon found out the error it had thereby committed,
and an effort was made to secure the return of the Dalai Lama 
V ■■ 229
to Lhasa, but it proved futile*
In 1911, as a result of the revolution, the Mancha dynasty 
was overthrown and China became "’a republic* , The Chines© sold­
iers in Lhasa were originally soldiers of fortune hastily en­
listed in Szechuan, with many belonging to the Ko-lao-hui, a 
secret society composed of both national revolutionists and 
hoodlums* Since their arrival they had been suffering from
223, Hsttan-t*ung cheng chi of Ta Ch*lng shlh-lu. Chap, 50# ■ 
pp, la-5a, -
229, The Imperial court at first felt that it would have been 
awkward to ask the deposed Dalai Lama to return (Hsttan-tUing 
¿tong chlf Chap, JO, pp, 22b-25a), but its rep re sen tativa on 
the spot, the same Lien-ytt who had made the suggestion of the 
Lama» s deposition, found it necessary to persuade the Lama to 
com© back, The counsellor Lo Chang-chi was sent to India for 
this purpose, ills report of the interview with the Dalai 
Lama and th® latterVs demands for the evacuation of Szechuan 
troops and other conditions to be laid down in a written agree­
ment, with the British a© witness, was published by his son 
after the tragic death of his father, under the title Ch*l 
toueh ch<l ts»un* After the mutiny, another counsellor, Chlen 
HsiZpao, left his post when he found the situation untenable,, 
under the pretext of going to India to urge the Dalai Lama to
return.
tho high cost of rice, their staple food, whoso market prico 
in Tibet was three times higher than it was in Szechuan, . 
Their insufficient pay was also in arrears. They mutinied on 
hearing of the events at home* At first they looted only the 
treasury and the mint. But their call to other units stat­
ioned at outlying points to join their intended homeward march 
brought to Lhasa more mutinous soldiers whoso plunder on tho 
way and in the capital aroused widespread ill-feeling among 
the Tibetans,
After that the situation became fluidj personal feuds and 
political dissensions made the Chinese position in Tibet ent­
irely untenable. For a time the commander. Chung-yin, a Kan- 
2J0
chu, together with some royalists, made an attempt to res­
tore order and discipline by making a.false proclamation that 
the revolution in China Proper had been suppressed. Later, 
when the news of the establishment of the Republic reached 
Lhasa, a council and a new form of administration modelled 
&fter other provinces wore set up, but there were no funds for 
iheir maintenance. Desperation drove the new government to 
attack the rich Sera monastery and thus brought on hostilities 
with the powerful Tibetan church. The failure of this risky 
fceasura brought the downfall of tho new government, Lien-yd,
144.;
250, Teichman, on, clt.. p, 59# says that the now republican 
government cashiered the Mancha Ambon, Lien-ytt, and appointed 
Chung-yin, a Chinese, as Amban in his place*
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fcko had 'been held'for a short time at Tashi-lhunpo as a host-
■■■■■ 251
age by mutinous soldiers, and later was made an administra­
tive advisor to the new government, was now asked by them,
&ft@r several months of hard;fighting, to sake m ,arrangement 
lor restoring peace. In the meantime the Dalai Lama came hack 
i**oa India and-helped to bring about the armistice, iho Tlep- 
. al©se'Agent also rendered.valuable service i n .this connection.
It was agreed that only sixty soldiers Were to remain as &
- 232
bodyguard of the Resident, and Chung-yin was to leave Tibet 
^Ith the rest of the Chinese troops, who were to be dicanned, 
and* their weapons stored in tho Lhasa monastery and sealed by 
k°th parties, Demonstrating no intention of an open revolt, 
Ike Tibetans agreed to the restoration of the status q u o ant® ' 
¿Sibum in regard to the Residency and other commissionerships. 
Tho fighting between tho Chinese soldiers and the Tibetan lev- 
l®s was not at all exclusively motivated by national feelings, 
monasteries of Drespung,' Yuneheng, and De‘mo, did their . 
iQst to help the Chinese with provisions, The last nuaed
231, Grover Clark, Tibet, China and Great Britain, p, 29# says 
that he was imprisoned*!)/ Chung-yiu partly as “a moans of prot­
ecting him from the wrath of the troops,
?|2, Clark says that Chung-yin was to remain as Resident with 
200 soldiers. The writer bases his account on Lu &hlng- 
chi»g manuscript, which was mimeographed by the Commission of 
£°hgolian and Tibetan Affairs for official reference. Lu 
considered an export on Indian ana Tibetan affairs. For 
his connection with Tibet, see infra. Chap. Ill, p, 151 ,
(Ten-gye-llng Monastery).-fought openly for the Chinese,
^hile the Chinese Colonel Hsieh kuo-li&ng and three other 
Chinese officers fought on the side of the Tibetans, In fact 
Q3cpediency was the determining principle and everything was 
in a state of confusion.
At the timo when the last item of the armistice was to be 
carried out and the Chinese troj-ps were being disarmed and 
making preparations for departure, the new republican govern­
ment suddenly appointed Chung-yin to take the place of Lieri-yH 
as high commissioner, Chung-yin was persona non grata to the 
Tibetans, who tried to persuade Lien-yt to remain. As soon 
ns the latter had left, the Tibetans attacked the forces of 
Chung-yin, which fought bravely and held out for two months
254
until they were at last conquered by starvation* Through 
the effort of the Nepalese Agent, it was agreed that all Chia­
ns® soldiers should leave by way of India, while the Tibetan 
Authorities undertook to provide them with transport facilit­
ies, and to protect Chinese civilians if they chose to stay,
233. Refer to Bell, Tibet* no« 120-21.
234, David Macdonald, Twenty Years in Tibet, pp* 110-12*
But.the author .goes-on to .-relate .the-deposition .-of. ¿lea-yd and 
the election of Chian, Hsi-p so which:look;place in the previous 
year, Chien had long left when fighting was resumed In Sept­
ember, 1912*
This; time the '.'Tibetans "refused to let any Chinese official 
organization remain, not to mention the once powerful Resid­
ency, On January 6, 1915# Chung-yin and the last remnant of
. 235
his troops marched out of Lhasa*
^35» The Times (London) last reported on November 21. 1912.
(p*.5f) that lightiag at Lhasa continued up to November 9 hut 
that General Chung-yin, however# was short of supplies and 
ammunition and would probably seek permission to leave for 
India with the last remnant of his troops. The North China 
Herald last recorded on Leccmbor 23, 1912 of ¿patch
from its own correspondent at Tach’ienlu, dated November 23# that trouble on the. north road to Lhasa broke all commun­
ication with the interior of Tibet# and information about the 
Laiai'.Lama and what remained of the small Chinese garrison 
could.,.not reach tho border. ' Bee also Clark, op. clt.# p.Two years later Chung-yin was put to death. His sentence appeared in ..the. Gazette of larch . 22, 1915# wherein he was char* ged-with -failure- to maintain:discipline, leaving Tibet against 
orders, and murdering Lo Chang-chi.
CHAPTER III
Ur?PER THS REPUBLICAN REGIES
Up to the end of tha Ch’ing dynasty, tho government of 
China never waived any sovereign rights in Tibet, Indeed,
©ven on the eve of the revolution, they were arguing with tha 
British government over tha rights they had exercised and clai­
med still to exercise, not only in Tibet, bat also in ¿«opal 
1
^hd Bhutan, They ware then doing what the British Foreign
Secretary and tha British Secretary of State for India called
"deliberately or actively making China's suzerainty over Tibet 2
effective*«
V.hen China was proclaimed a republic, efforts ware soon 
fcade to regain control of Tibet* Seats were allotted to Tibet
X* A and F. Cd, 5240 (1910) , No, 240, i p, 2Q?j Na, J44| Lu îfsing- 
«bits manuscript, lil~twgchij^ Voi, 1, p* 46a-bf
&CSJ| (Hsfan-t’ung period), VoX. ly, pp, 41a«bj Voi* 2o, p, Jl*
l' A end P* Cd, 5240, No, 345, p. 2151 No, 347, p. 215,. Note 
«bat in both the Adhesion Convention of 1906 and tho Trade Reg» 
hlations of I90B there is no provision that China should oxer- 
«Is® only suzerain, not sovereign, rights In Tibet! China war 
n«t a party to the Anglo-»Russian Convention of 190/ which roc- 
«Snizos tho suzerain rights of China in Tibet,
in the national Assembly and the five-coloured national flag
had the black bar to stand for 11bat. On April 12, 1912,
President Yuan Shih-kai issued a proclamation declaring that
libetf Mongolia and .Turkestan,- would henceforth be regarded as
on equal footing with the provinces of China Proper and as int-
ogral part3 of the Republic. He mobilized the troops of the
Provinces of Szechuan and Yfinnan and appointed General Yin
Chang-heng, Governor of Szechuan, as the Coimaander-ln-Cliief of
the expeditionary forces with the object of retrieving the
4
Chinese position in Eastern Tibet, and raising the siege of 
the Chinese garrison at Lhasa.
But, under the pressure of the British, which will bo 
Pully described in Part III, Chapter VII, and In view of the 
internal difficulties as well as the international implications 
'She Chinese government had to abandon its plan. The central 
administration in Peking could hardly command the respect, not 
■to say allegiance, of many southern provinces. The conserva­
tives, composed mainly of the militarists and bureaucrats of 
the old regime, and the revolutionists, known as Kuomintang, 
*ere but ostensibly reconciled, Ihe expeditionary forces had
3* British Foreign Office, Peace Handbooks. He, 70, «Tibet,®
PP, 40-41,
f* Sir Eric Teicbmaa, Travels of a Consular Officer in Eastern ¿ibet, pp, 41-42,
Initial .-successesvand'. recovered'many-frontier districts!' b u t \ : 
they u -2 re facing stiff or and better organised resistance, while 
the ill-disciplined Chinese garrison troops at Lhasa were run- 
ding short of both munitions and food and could not hold out 
such longer,
The international prospect v.as even more gloomy since 
Russia, the only power that could be expected to counteract any 
British action in Tibet, was herself engaged in carrying out 
her own design in Mongolia. On October 21, 1J12, the Russo- 
Moagolian Agreement was signed in Urga. By this agreement 
ihe Russian government made herself a virtual protectorate over; 
d Vast part of the Chinese territory which had a close relig­
ious tie with Tibet, Besides, thore were strong indications 
that similar action night be taken by other powers in their 
respective spheres of influence, especially the Germans in 
Eh&ntung and the Japanese in Manchuria,
Under these circumstances, President Xuan Bhih-kai, wlto 
uas negotiating a loan from the Quadruple (which soon hue *mo
7
tho Quintuple) Syndicate and other foreign financiers in ,
I* A and P. Cd. 6604 (1913)# Kc* 1, pp, 2-3J No, 2. pp, 5-6.documental evidence of tho Russian activities in Mongolia sg§ »Tsarist Russia and Mongolia in 1913-14,* tr&ns, from 
hrasny Archiv,, Vol* XXX?II, pp, 15-68* The Chinese Baetal i 
..Political Science Review, XVI, 652-S8r'WiI, 176-20^
a* 2ho.lamn Uf.okly..C t e m i e M *  May 16, 1912, pp* 872-731
sep t 7 i i r w 2 r p 7 4 B r ^ ^  .;
At the outbreak of tho revolution, the Imperial government 
Was facing bankruptcy (facing an annual deficit variously ost-
V -X5X r  r.;:;'".:
order to pay the a m y  and nest the current expenses of the
Government, would certainly not give offence to the British,
v*hose interests predominated in China. On August 31, 19X2,
he issued orders- to General Yin to halt the expedition and
sight wedks later he sent a telegram to the Dalai Lama inform-
ing him of the restoration of his titles.
With the sea route blocked by the British authorities
*hid the land route cut by military hostilities, Sino-Tibetan
relations were practically severed except for some telegraphic
corarounlcations exchanged between President Yuan Shih-kai and
the Dalai Lama, tho contents of which showed good will on both 
10
sides. On April 2, 1913, Yuan Shih-kai appointed Lu Shins- *810
imated at from twenty to seventy million taelsjl tho^nsw Rep-_^ 
ublican government found itself in even greater iinancial a:Iff 
lenities : For details about the advances .and loans, ■ see T.m 
OverUchi foreign Fi nancial Control 1'R . M m . (1919) * PP v ^o-QQ.
8. The - Times. Capt, 13,1912, P. 3c* ■ 53fV t •
23 *T5To— ^*’*«^ 26. The correspondence of Yuan Chih-Kai, Vol. 1*
591 Ball, T h ^ H j i o n  o£
W " l r o n l : done to tho Dalai Lama by the Resident, Lisa-yH, **Lo,, 
he added, had been cashiered pending a trial.
9« Infra. Chap, VII, p*. 383.
10. Ehlh Ch»ing-yang* s manuscript, Jfrsng >
P* 96 (written in 1933 w S  n r  C l - £  1Commission for Mongolian.and. Tibetan Affairs), / x#^ f. " 
les Eolly Portrait of tho .Dqlai__Luma, pp. l^p, .3^ 0*,. ......
chi, /who., had boon on the staff of fang Bhao~yi and Chang Ying-
taag between -1905 and 19.03 and who had boen sine a thin living
la India as a liaison officer in connection with Tibetan aff- 
' ' • . 11 ‘ 
airs, to bo acting high commissioner-to succeed Chung-yin,
Lut, for obvious reasons, he was prevented from proceeding to
Lhasa to take up ,his ;post*
:. the '.Chinese government, • further; humiliated • In 1915by . the 
Japanese fwenty-Onobenands and fully engaged in civil strife, 
ft,as not in a position to attempt -any solution of the Tibetan 
problem. It had to reach a settlement with the British before 
anything could be dons with Tibet, In Part IV an account will 
L® given of the protracted but futile negotiations with the 
British. luring this period evon u local incident on the 
Eino-Tibstan front!sr had to invoke British iniluence in order 
to bring about a truce,
Vv’bile the authority of the central government catendad not 
ttuch further than the gates of Peking, . ths troops which had 
boon left at the Tibetan border without care and provision*
'feoro eventually reduced to a point whore the British-trained 1
11. Yin Fu-yi, Hsl tsang chi yao* published by the Copula «tetri 
for Mongolian anu i£ be tan Affairs, p. 194.
12* Boll, Tibet, p, 164. The Tibetan army U m d  play ad «God 
£dvo the King* {not intended us a national math®»/ at the rec­
eption given in honour of the Chairman of.the Commission for 
Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, T.u Chung-hsin (Chu Shao-i. ho 
¿a... chlen win chi, p. 44), and also played the same» tuna in tho 
Presence of Lowell Thomas in 1949* (MQut of This World* A 
Journey to Lhasa,« Collier's. Feb* 25, 1950, p. 36.) Beo also 
hsieh Pin, on. cit.^ p, fiT
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and British-equipped Tibetan army easily defeated them when 
their commander at Chamdo, P< eng Jih-sheng, acting on his own 
authority and without the sanction of the Chinese government, 
deliberately provoked a resumption of hostilities in the aut-
W o f  1917*
By the middle of the summer of 1918 the Tibetans, follow­
ing their capture of Chaado, Draya, Markam, Gonjo, and Pa-go, 
were approaching Kanze and Nyarong in one direction and Ca­
l’ang in another* At this Juncture the local Chinese leaders 
on the frontier invoked the mediation of Teichman, the British 
Consular Agent stationed at Tach*ienlu and Markam, whose duty 
It was, according to his own account, to watch events on the
border with a view to keeping the peace between the two parties
13
Ponding a final settlement of the dispute by diplomatic means *
A truce was finally arranged fcy virtue of two documents signed
lh August and October respectively, with Teichman acting as the
14
*&iddleman and witness* By the end of 1918 the frontier reg­
ions had settled down with the Chinese remaining in control of 
Ba»t*ang, Li-t*ang, Nyarong, Kanze, and the area to the east, 
*hile the Tibetans retained Ch&rndo, Draya, Markam, Da-ge, and 13
13. For details see Teichman, 00* cit*. pp* 51-58 et sea.
14* For the full text of the two documents see Hsieh pin, Hsi ■ 
chiao she lfleh shih (»A Short Diplomatic Eistory con­
cerning 'Tibet*), pp. 64-67•
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the area further west. In this incident the Tibetans made a 
successful show of force while British influence, now well est­
ablished in eastern Tibet, was fully manifested in the arrange­
ment of the truce.
In 1924 Brigadier General M.E. Willoughby told the members 
of the Central Asian Society In London that to the best of his 
knowledge no vestige of Chinese control remained in central 
Tibet. But in concluding his speech he gave a "final croak"
In these words* "Let us not be too confident that Chinese con­
trol in Tibet has passed away for ever ... I cannot think that 
a great and populous nation will quietly for ever be shut off
entirely from a region which they have controlled for centur-
. 15 ■■■les."
In fact, the Chinese were not entirely shut off from 
Tibet* In 1918 the Dalai Lama chose three learned lamas— one 
from each of the three leading monasteries— and sent them to 
Peking to fill teaching posts In Yung-Ko-Kung, the noted Lam­
aist temple in the capital. In 1920, the provincial govern­
ment of Kansu sent a mission to Tibet which was given a hearty 
welcome by the Dalai Lama, and which, as remarked by Sir Char­
t s ,  augmented Chinese influence in Lhasa. In 1921, the
*5. CASJ, XI (1924), Pt. Ill, p. 188.
■^6. Bell does not believe that the mission was purely from the 
government of Kansu (Portrait of the Dalai Lama, p, 217)*
Prom the Chinese government archives"the writer finds no evid­
ence to Justify his doubt* The mission was merely a provincial 
^ave, though it had to bo, and in fact was, reported to the 
central government.
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Dalai Lama again sent to Peking three learned laiaas, together 
with their respective disciples, and in the following year a 
higher lama named Kung-chflel> chung-ni, who was later sent hack 
as the Dalai Lama*s representative in Nanking, was dispatched
17
to take charge of the religious affairs of tho Peking temple*
Apart from religious missions, the Dalai Lama sent Tun-
chu-wahg-chieh as his representative with messages and presents ;
to Peking in 1922 and 1924, and was received try presidents Li
lB
iuan-hung and Tsao K ’un. .i l-iV.
.The Panch*en Lama*s Flight to China Proper , j
Sino-Tibetan relations entered a new phase with the Pan- 
ch’en Lama* s flight to China Proper. It may be recalled that i 
in 1904, when Lhasa was under British military occupation, the 
Ealai Lama was temporarily deprived of his rank and in his
Place was appointed the Paach*en Lama as a result of-the tale- -j.
graphic recommendation made by the Chinese Resident* Yu-t’ai,
19 !
and sent through Younghusband. Though the Ranch* en Lama
declined this high honour, he nevertheless offered his complete
support to the Imperial authorities in Tibet during tho period *189
17* Shih Ch’ing-yang* s manuscript, pp* 9b-l0a*
18. Tun-chu-wang-chieh’s arrival in 1924 is mentioned in ¡Shih
pk*ing-y&ng*s manuscript* - fils mission in 1922 la mentioned {, 
lh Hsl tsang win t*i chih chin hsi* p* 4. , ,
19. Infra* Chap. VI, nn* 55# 57# 23.
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of tho Dalai Lama* s absence. In the winter of 1905 ke was
forced to accept the British invitation to visit India* the
“primary object* of which was *to enable him to be present in
20
Calcutta during the visit of the Prince of V.ales* The
Dalai L&ma* who already resented the Punch’en Lama* s cooper-
21
atlon with the Chinese authorities in Tibet* viewed the
Panch1en Lama’ s visit to India as a means of soliciting Brit-
22
ish help to obtain independence from his rule.
Upon his return to Lhasa in 1912 from exile in India, the 
Dalai Lama condemned tho Punch’ en Lama for not fighting the 
Chinese garrison troops who had mutinied on hearing of the 
outbreak of revolution in the homeland. On the other hand* 
the Panch1en Lama* in his concern for the Buddhist conviction 
*«hich forbade killing* viewed with great dissatisfaction the 
Dalai Lama’s policy of allying himself with the British* and
Ills associating with the idea of fighting and of ordering mll-
' 23
itary opposition to the Chinese.
In a word, the personal grievance which was caused ty a
20* Infraf Chap. V, nn. 84* 85*
21. Ho Tsao-hsiang* Tsanft YU. (a record of what ha saw and did 
during 1906-08 while the author was a secretary to Chang Ying- 
t*ng}# pp. 26-27.
22* Ball* Tibet, pp. 83-84. •
25« A. David-Meel* *Tibetan Border Intrigue** Aela. XLI* (May*
1941), p, 219.
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• • 24
Ceremonial incident, or rather a protocol mistake, in 1902,
became a struggle for secular power in general and for the
right to collect taxes and levies in the districts near Tashi-
ihunpo in particular* at a time when Imperial domination was
overthrown and the situation was further complicated by the 
' ' ■ ■ ■ 25 VBritish influence behind the scenes* The suspicion and the
misunderstanding between the two Grand Lamas^lncreased at the 
Instigations of their respective followers* Toward the end 
°f 1923 a rupture appeared in their relations when the Dalai 
lama asked the Panch’en Lama to pay a huge amount in money and 
food, held to have been in arrears. The Panch’ en Lama, not 
being in a position to pay, and facing the prospect of having 
bo go to Lhasa for a conference, fled from Tashi-lhunpo in dis­
guise. After many months of hard travelling and months of
24, The Panch’en Lama committed the mistake of letting his 
retinue beat their drums when passing the Potala and was 
thereby fined 990 taels by the Dalai Lama* This was cited by 
aome Chinese books as the origin of their ill-feeling.
25* Ha Bo-t’ien, Kan ch’ing tsang plan ch’tl k’ ae ch’a chi (*A 
Study of the Frontier Districts“of Kansu, Ch’ingh&i and'^iibGt’’) 
¿Shanghai, 1947), Pt. Ill, pp. 5^8*55# compares the position of 
bhe Dalai Lama and of the Panch’en Lama and gives a detailed 
account of the causes and the development of their rift.
David Macdonald, Twenty Tears in Tibet, pp, 1Q0-101, states 
that two dismissed officials of the Panch’en Lama who went over 
bo Lhasa and wielded considerable influence in the Potala were 
responsible for a great deal of trouble between the Grand Laai- 
*s* Cf, Clark, or« cit.. p. 46.
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&elay caused by large motors of pilgrims who cano to pay 
their respects to him, ho reached Peking in February* 1925#
^here he,was given a state' welcome# -.v.
The Dalai Lama Turning Strongly Away from Britain
Towards „China
 ^:■ With the Panch* on lama taking refuge. in China Proper# the
Dalai Lama*s inclination at this juncture became a decisive fac-
i°r at a turning point not only in Sino-Tibetan relations bat
6iso in Anglo-TIbatan relations and in Cino-British relations
concerning Tibot# Russian archives made public by the Soviet
government revealed that in 1912 the Russian consul at Calcutta
an interview with the exiled Dalai Lama at Darjeeling and
^hded him a letter from tin Tsar# and that tho consul then rep-
°rt©d to his government that the Lama was not really pro-Brit- 
. 28
lsh« Dir Charles Bell always spoke of tho Lama as «pro-29
Britlsh and pro-Russian# but anti-Chinese,« Yet Sir Charles 
to admit that «by 1925 the Dalai Lama was turning strongly
2 *^ China Year Book, 1933# P* 215, 
oftfiejjalal.Mgs,, pp, 117-18*
29* ima.» p. 117.
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auay from Britain towards China." The Balai Lama appointed
&n official named Lung-shar as Commander-in-Chief of the Tib»
. 3 0
6tan army. "Lung-shar was markedly anti-British* Tsarong,
former Commander-in-Chief, who was always vary pro-British, 
lost most of his power and was subsequently degraded." Laden 
a British subject, b o m  of a Sikkimese mother, and a former 
Superintendent of Police in Darjeeling, had been made Commiss­
ioner of Police for Lhasa in May, 1924, shortly afterwards
Saining control of the administration of justice in the capital* 
. 51
°dt he was dismissed as a result of Tibetan public demand.
1926, the English school at Gyantse was closed. At this
time the British political authorities in Tibet started to est- *8
?£• ^hen Lung-shar was imprisoned and made blind in May, 1954, > 
Joe Chinese press reported that his punishment was due to his 
Pro-British activities. The writer then had a hunch that it «as not the case. When ¥.u Chung-hsin, the Chairman of the ' 
commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, was in Lhasa in -939 to preside at the coronation of the 14th Dalai Lama, Lung- ®«ar presented a bronze Buddha as a token of his respects. IVu ®ojt his secretary, Chu Bhao-i, to thank him. The latter had ¡i 
J lengthy talk with the- blind man, who had only been released j3?oa: prison via the previous year. -Proa .the talk (Chu Shao-i, wtn chi (1947).; pp. 91-95)# we can see that he was " Patriot .with pro-Chinese leanings. . No wonder Sir Charles 
.¿Wed: hia.markedly anti-British. Lung-shar la still labelled:
8 oro-British by soma Chinese writers. The pamphlet entitled 
shorn ts«e («Handbook on Current Events»), Ho. 16, 
puhlishaa by the Chinese communist organ, made'the same
S’* £he Times. Oct. 9# 1924. p. 15, gives an unconfirmed report 
.■■hat ho and Macdonald were besieged in Lhasa,
l6o
abllsh a motor mall service between Pa-ri and Gyantse In order 
to quicken the mails, bit the Tibstan government forbade it.* 
lha Dalai Lama rejected the British plan for building up the 
’Bater, electric power, and telephone systems* lie refused, 
too, to accept the British plan for tho joint development of 
*he Tibetan mines*
The turning away of the Dalai Lama from Britain towards 
China did not fail to impress favourably the Kuomintang which 
*&s about to win its anti-militarist cause under the banner of 
San-ialn-chu-i (i«e*, for nationalism, democracy and the peop­
le’s livelihood). In 1923, a year after the establishment of 
the Nationalist government in Nanking, the Panch1en Lama sent 
^legates to express his respects to tho new regime, and at tho 
Sa®o time put forward a request that tho Chinese government 
Assume full charge of affairs in Tibet in order to save it from 
becoming a "second India." It was mainly duo to the Dalai 
lama’s inclination towards China that the authorities in Non- 
htng decided to look upon tho Lhasa government as the proper 
channel for readjusting relations with libet.
Times. April 22, 1929, p. 14.
All the quotations in this paragraph are taken from Boll.
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The Chinese Rational Government*s Effort 
Towards Bapovoehoaient
Thus, in 1929# the Chinese government dispatched Miss Liu 
Man-ch’ing on a semi-official mission to Lhasa for the purpose 
of conveying to the Tibet an government and people the good will
&hd friendship of China and to make a report on conditions in
34 ■ ' ■ '
that region. Miss Liu was born in Lhasa. In 1906 to a Chin-
. *
®se father and a Tibetan mother. She was brought as a girl to
Peking for liar education and went to a normal school. Because
of her knowledge of both the Chinese and Tibetan languages, she
uas employed as an interpreter to the Commission for Mongolian
and Tibetan Affairs in 1923» Che volunteered for the mission
and when accepted she soon started her arduous journey by way
of Szechuan with only a small escort. On February 7# 19J0,
she reached Lhasa, where she received a warm welcome from the
55Tibetan government and people.
In her first interview with the Dalai Lama, Miss Liu took 
P&ins to explain the doctrine of the Kuomlntang and the govero- 
^ent»s plan for national construction and development. She 
alse convoyed the deep concern of President Chl&ztg Kai-shek
C.Y.W. Hang, "Miss Liu*s Mission to Tibet," China Weekly«J&Slss, LI? (Sept* 6, 195C), p* 22« Official documeats’la T 
connection with Miss Liu*s mission arc given in her book, KVrmg 
yao chfeag ("Hy Mission to Tibet and Sikang") *
|5*^Bq11^ »Tibetjs Position in Asia Today,« Foreign Affairs*
16 2
over prevailing conditions in Tibet and his eager wish to see 
Tibet rejoin tho family of the Republic as brothers. Tbs 
balai Lama expressed his appreciation and showed unprecedented 
courtesy to tho young lady by touching hor head with his holy
During the la3t interview granted to Kiss Liu on May 2J, 
the Dalai Lama stated that the Chinese government in the past 
k&d neglected Tibet and, v.hat was worse, even regarded Tibet 
as a barren and worthless land. Ha went on to sayi "Since 
President Chiang had Tibet in mind and had sent you here short­
ly after the establishment of the new government to express 
concern for and sympathy toward Tibet, I am deeply touched and 
fc’ould like to ask you to convey personally my appreciation and 
Sratitude which have also been expressed in my lattar to him.
1 cm looking forward to a day of mutual aid. IVhat Ï expect
», 37®oat of China is real unity and peace."
Touching on his relations with the British, the Dalai 
lama stated that!
The British, indeed, have a mind to draw me to their 
. side. Nevertheless, 1 know the importance of guarding 
tho national sovereignty and 1 have never surrendered a 
bit of it in spite of the necessity of having to deal 
with them, their character and customs W i n g  so different 
from ours*5«
5^* L iu  Man-ch< i n g ,  K *an g  t s a n g  yno chénft (S h a n g h a i ,  1 9 5 3 ) ,
ip. 95-97.
^7* Ibid., pp. 118-19.
58’ Ibid.y PP* 119-20.
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In'regard to,the.situation In.Sikang,.■ ..the Dalai Lama 
wishod to seo the corrupt and adventurous civil and military 
officers removed and replaced by.some honest and well-intent­
ioned men who would work for the mutual interest of the two 
Peoples* ;He was confident that the Tibot-Sik&ng question 
would he easily settled in a conference if the central govern­
ment would consolidate its own position and make such a change 
of the personnel on the spot. He said he was ready to with­
draw the Tibetan troops at any moment. Finally, the Dalai 
lama expressed his readiness to choose representatives to be 
sent to Nanking and his hope that the Chinese government would 
provide £1 bet with weaving and leather-manufacturing machines 
together with skilled workers.
It is significant that the Dalai Lama during this inter­
view expressed his sympathy for the Indian people, who, ho 
omphasized, were suffering from British oppression, and his 
hope that China could render them some practical help* He 
Mentioned Ills relations with Nepal, saying that he never recog­
nised the letter’s independence and that he still addressed her
chief by the old title granted by the late Imperial govarn-
m 59 & eat.
£?• lUá.f P P . 120 and 121. . _
,Alh the. use of force .as the result of sou* -commercial ..dispute.
Nepal was then threatening Tibet
According to a telegraphic communication of Kimg-ehteh^chung-ni sent from Gyantae and received on February 16, «Nepalese govar- nment ordered on Jan* 26th mobilization of 9#000 troops* Tib- 
J!* preparing for a w e d  resistance** In this communication 
^dag-chdeh-chung-ni explained that the Nepalese move was par- 
IiaPs motivated by Jealousy of Sino-Tibetan rapprochement {[while
On July 2 f  Miss :LIu returned: to Nanking via India. Ho 
doubt she succeeded in eliminating some of the suspicion which 
the.Dalai Dana had of the.new nationalist regime and helped .to 
pav© the way for tho resumption of formal relations hatween 
Dhasa and Nanking. Eut, after allj her mission was a semi­
official one, Discussion of matters of a political character
and concerning Tibet’s status was entrusted to Nung-chtloh- 
40 ■
chung-ni, who left Nanking on November 7, 1929$ three months 
&fter Hiss Liu, and arrived at Lhasa on January 16, 1930, by 
*ay of India three weeks before Hiss Liu, who undertook a much 
harder journey by land and who encountered cn rout© difficult­
ies and delays which would have been non-existent in the case
soma Chines© writers ascribed it to British manipulation be­
hind the^sceneS| ©*!*# flung Ti-ehea, gsi .taang ahlh ti ta king
& !!; S ’L“  s'sr.S
Tibetan Affairs thereupon with the approval of tha supreme 
Authorities dispatched ilsieh Kuo-liang to Tibet and Pa Wan-chun 
to Nepal for tha purpose of mediation. Tho former starts! his 
Journey in Hay and died in November only a short distance from 
«hasa* (Bell, Portrait of the Dalai Lama, p. 568, mentions 
¿ho death of a Chinese representative In ¿931 and adds,. »His - 
f° fiy was brought to Lhasa and the Dalai Lama himself is said to 
hav© performed tha fu n era l ceremony*» The y ear should bo 
p930.j Tha l a t t e r  reached tho Nepalese c a p ita l and has warmly 
received. He brought back presents intended for the Chinos© 
government. For details, soo Shih Ch’ Ing-yaag’ s manuscript, 
£&u£it«# pp. 12b*13a, and tha arch ives o f  the said  Commission#
4°* gd?raf p, 155, n, If#
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of Kimg-chloh-chung-ni even if he had taken the same route.
- Kune-chtleh-chung-ni, who, as mentioned above, had been
sent in 1922 to Peking to serve at the Yung-Eo~ICung temple, had
remained there ever since* It was found out that he enjoyed
the confidence of- the Lalal Lama, and for this reason he, inst-
©ad of a Chinese, m s  entrusted with this important mission. ■.
Sir Charles Bell made a mistake in saying that ha was aecompam-
i^d'ly Miss Liu and in referring to them as members of one and
the same mission when he described the way they were warmly wol-
42
corned and entertained.
41
The Dalai Lama’s Answer to the Eight Questions
Here are the eight questions the Chinese government put to 
the lalai Lama, and the latter’s answer to them brought back by 
Kung~ chi eh-chung-ni, who returned to Hanking on August 20, 19501
1. <5, How might relations between Tibet and the Central
Government be restored?
A* If the Central Government would treat- the patronage 
relationship between China and Tibet with sincerity 
and good faith as it previously did, Tibet on its 
part, having always shown sincerity in its dealings 
in tno past, would from now on make an even greater 
.effort to.give full support to the Central Govern­
ment*
2* <j, How shall the Central Government exercise administ­
rative control over Tibet? - ■ - 412
41. Hhih Ch* lns-yang* s manuscript, Chap. I, p. 10b*
42. Rail, portrait of the Palai jga.ma» p. $68. , .
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A* It would bo advisable to work out a written under- 
" standing on tho measures to be taken for securing 
a fundamental;stabilisation b^oth in the political 
and tho religious affairs of Tibet,
3, Q, How shall the autonomy of Tibet and its scope bo 
defined?
A, As from now on, the patronage relationship between 
the Central Government and Tibet is going to bo 
faithfully Observed and the Central Government is • 
to show sincerity to make Tibet feel safe mad sec- ; 
urej the area over which autonomy is to be exer­
cised should naturally bo tho same as before. It ; 
is expected that the Central Government will ret­
urn to Tibet those districts which originally bal- : 
onged to it but which are now not under its cont­
rol so that a perpetual peace and harmony rill 
surely be tho result,
4* Q. Chall tho Dalai and Panch’en Lamas join the Kuo- 
nintang?
A, On account of his advanced age and tho tremendous ■ 
burden in managing temporal and religious affairs, • 
and also considering the fact that he is not able :
‘ to proceed to tho capital until' tho consent of the I 
throe leading monasteries and of tho members of 
the national Assembly is obtained, tho Dalai Lama 1 , 
is not at the present time in a position to join tho Kuomlntang* A3 tho Punch* en Luma is now res­
iding in China Proper and his duty has always boon i confined to the religious affairs of T&sbi-lhunpo, . for ho has no political affairs to attend to, he « 
should bo available for membership of the Kuomin* tang*'- It must bo understood, however, that fee has never had any say in the settlement “of libetas ;- 
affairs,
5* Q. Chall the relative positions of tho Dalai and tho 
Punch»en Lomu and their respective jurisdiction in 
political m  well as religious affairs bo maint­
ained as before or new provision be made?
. A* Political and religious affairs have always boon : administered by -the Tibetan Government at Lhasa, ; Tho Punch» on Lomu has had only the Tashi-lhunpo ! Monastery in his control* Actually the Tashi- 
< Ihunpo Monastery was built by the first Dalai Lama,1 
It was the second Dalai Lama who entrusted tho ad­ministration to a fellow monk and conferred upon
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the latter the honorarytltln of punch*on, when 
.he moved his coat to Lhasa*- . Later, in view of 
■ tha ..tatoi^diseiplQ-./rolatioaship ousting in turn 
- through generations : be tween the Dalai, and tha 
Punch* m ,  the fifth Dalai Lama awarded this mon­
astery .to the fourth Panch*en Lama, if this ago- 
old practice were to he continuously observed, all 
Tibetans would he only too pleased,
6, Q, How shall the Dalai welcome the Ranch* en back to -' 
Tibet and how shall the Central Government escort . 
him?
A» Among the Punch* en*s retinue, many employed the 
• terms *Anterior* and «Ulterior1 Tibet with intent ; 
to sow-discord. They disobeyed.the orders of j 
the Tibetan/Government and acted frequently again-.-' 
st their superiors* Both their thought end their; 
conduct are corrupt* In tho year Chia Ch*an 
(1904), the Punch*en went to India and conspired 
with the British, but all his efforts ware of no 
avail. In the year Esin Bai (1911), ha intrigued 
with Resident Li©n-ytt and made an attempt to seize 
the reins of government and control of tha church 
during the absence of tha Dalai Lama, But his 
efforts were thwarted-by the opposition of tho 
people and especially of the clergymen of tho 
■ ■ three loading monasteries* According to estab­
lished practice, the Punch* on should contribute 
one.quarter of the provisions for the army. Hot 
only did he fail to nuk* such contributions, but 
also committed acts in violation of tho law. Hud 
tho offenders been punished strictly in accordance 
with the letter of the law, there would hnvo been 
■ no. such, state ..of affairs ...as -now-..exists«.. .It is 
only in consideration of the long standing and 
close tutor-discipla relationship between tha 
Dalai and tho P«nch* on through generations that 
a policy of tolerance and forgiveness has been 
followed, let, those people not only remained 
unrepentant, but further advised and urged tho 
Ranch* en to fisc away from Tsshl-lhunpo. A dis­
patch inviting him back was soon sent to the 
Panch* en, but he refused to accept. Ho then 
fled to tfrga and had secret dealings with tho . : 
coamuniats* Only upon the death of tho Chief 
Luma of Mongolia, Cheputsun-tanpa, was ho obliged 
to com® to China Proper* ' Consequently, tho Tib­
etan Government dispatched officials to Tasfai- 
Ihunpo to take proper care of tha monastery.
Now. these offenders are still conspiring and 
making trouble. As tho matter stands, Tibet
168
■ would find it vary difficult ■ to welcome them un~ 
less they can give a satisfactory explanation as 
to - their:reason for taking-to. flight#
7. Q. Has the Dalai Lana the intention of setting up in
the Capital an office for the convenience of keep­
ing closer contact? As to its expenses,-the Cen­
tral Government is prepared to grant the necessary 
funds.
A. At first, offices are to be set up in Hanking, 
Peiping, and Sikang. If and when such offices 
are required for other places, applications will 
be filed accordingly.
8. Q, Is there anything else that Tibet expects of the
Central Government?
A. For the purpose of protecting Itself against agg­
ression. Tibet1 s hope for the present is only that 
• : - the Central Government will supply it with arms.. 
In case any other help may be needed in the future 
for strengthening its security, i twill make re­
quests to the Central Government
The above quoted document shows clearly what stood in the
J3*  shih Ch’ing-yang’s manuscript. Chap. I, pp. lla-12b. The
*he official Chinese translation of the Tibetan text of this 
document is taken word for word from the archives of the Mong­
olian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, to which Shih, as Chair-
of the Commission, naturally had full access. As to the 
Jdtor-diseiple relationship between the two Grand Lamas. Fa- 
jsuaj a Chinese monk who spent nine years studying Buddhism in 
JJkang and Tibet relates as follows* The fourth Panch*en (1567- 
£662) was,tutor to the fifth Dalai (1617-1682), while the fifth 
*'a»ehtejl (1663-1737) »a® the fifth Dalai* s disciple, and tutor 
J? the sixth (I603-1707) and the seventh (1708-1757; Dalais, 
sixth Panch* an (175o-1778) was the seventh Dalai* s disciple, 
«na from then on the two Grand Lamas have always been either 
tutor or disciple to r each other* (Pa-tsun. : Hsian- tai ■ hsl
£19433;, p. 110). According to Shih Ch*ini^ying,s *am- 
¡}JcH/pt (Chap. II, p, 3b), the second Dalai (1476-1543) was a 
?*scipi© of the second P&aeh* m (1439-1504). The dates cited 
for the Dalai and P&nch’en Lamas are based upon ibid.. 
pp* 3b-6b, 9a-b, lOb-llb,
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way of.-a-better understanding'-and further rapprochement, to 
writ, tho definition of Tibet’s status in relation to tho cen­
tral government, tho demarcation of the boundary botwoan Tibet 
and China Proper, and the readjustment of the relationship bet­
ween the two Grand Lamas. Kung-chfleh-chung-ni, when ha repor­
ted to the Chinese government with this written reply from the 
Dalai Lama, acted in a dual capacity because ha had been app­
ointed try the Dalai Lama as his representative in Hanking to
discharge ”3111 the official affairs and handle all cominunica-
44
tions for the Tibetan government.* A few months later the
Dalai Lama sent Chucheng Tantaun to Hanking as his deputy rep-
■■■ 45 • • ‘ ' '
resentative.
A desire for reconciliation on the part of the Tibetan
authorities can bo found from the 19>0 correspondence between
the Dalai Lama, the bKa’-blon, and the Tibetan Commander-in-
Chief, Lung-shar, on the one hand, and on the other Lu Shing- 
. " ■ ■ ' ■ 46 •
chi, the acting Chinese High Commissioner to Tibet who rem- 
. 47
dined in India after his appointment in 1913.
t h  IM1*# PP* lOb-llaj Ming .tsfong chon ,pao (The Mongolian and' 
^ibet&nWeekiy), LXI (Feb. W $  l93i), p. 9.
J5. North China Herald. August 12, 1950, p. 230. The Dalai 
**dma sent an a&cdtional representative with a view to partic­
ipating in a conference which had been suggested but never 
took place.
46. Supra, n. 1 1 .
J7* For the text of the correspondence, see Lu Using-chi’« 
Manuscript, Vol. II, pp. 78a-8la.
The Chinese government* having contemplated for a time
folding a conference in Nanking, finally decided to make use
of Etsieh Kuo-liang’s mediation mission to open negotiations
*ith the Dalai Lama in Lhasa, Unfortunately, Ilsieh’ 3 death
only one day’s march from Lhasa deprived the mission of any
chance of success. The written instructions which Hsieh had
received from the central government were brought hack by his
private secretary, Tang Yto-san, and returned to the Commission 
* * 49for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, Hero are the proposed 
+ 50
terms contained in Hsieh’ s instructions*
1, Tibet should restore her close relationship with the 
Central Government,
2, Tibet should not foster any political relations with 
any foreign state*
3, All treaties and agreements still in force between 
Tibet and foreign states should be submitted to the 
Nationalist Government for re-examination,
4, The Dalai Lama should welcome the Fanch’ea Lama back 
to Tibet,
5* The Dalai Lama should restore to the Nationalist Gov­
ernment all the districts of Sikang which he had occ­
upied,
6, Important diplomatic, military, and political affairs 
of Tibet should be the responsibility of, and admin­
istered by, the Nationalist Government*
7, The Nationalist Government should grant Tibet the
§£B£â» un. 39 and 45*
49. Ehih Ch’ing-yang*s manuscript, Chap, X, p, 13&*
50, Ibid,, pp, 17a-l8ft.
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/ right :o f . complete' autonomy.
, 8. Tho secular and religious authority of the Dalai and 
Panchfen Lamas should be maintained as before*
9* The Nationalist Government should appoint a special 
commissioner to bo stationed in Tibot "to conduct 
Tibe tan affairs.*51
10# Tibet may set up an office in Nanking and the Nat­
ionalist Government should make an appropriation for 
the expenses of that office.
Armed Conflict Initiated by the 
Ta Chi eh f>su Incident
The effort for rapprochement was frustrated by an incid- 
in Sikang known as the Ta Chieh Ssu affair which involved - 
not only the rivalry, if not hostility, between the Dalai and 
the panch*en, but also the boundary dispute. It doomed all 
the previous attempts for an amicable settlement to failure.
The incident started from a dispute over a monastery 
named Yala-Ssu in the village of Pei Li, Kanze district.
abbot of Yala-Ssu, who had spent his novitiate in the 
Powerful Ta Chieh Ssu monastery, wanted to have the one Incor­
porated in the other. But the new chieftain of the village,
. ^ 'ho was on bad terms with the abbot, strongly opposed the lat- 
ler»s proposition. In June, 1950, the abbot called in the
Here tho drafter deliberately used tho same term as stip- 
^ a t e d  in,the Li fan vu tse 11 of the Ch’ing dynasty.
The following account is based mainly on tho report of
J Ko-saa who was seat to tho spot for mediation. Tho 
import is kept on file in the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission.
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nonks of TaXhleh Ssu and occupied -.the .tillage*  The Chinas® " 
garrison troops Intervened and clashed with the monks of Ta 
Chieh Ssu who had a record of pro-Tlhotan activities during
■ . ' . \ 5 3
the arsed conflict of 1910.
According to the Dalai Lama’s telegram received by the
central government in October, 1930, it was the followers of
the panch’en Lama who instigated the Chinese garrison troops
to side with Pei Li and deliberately oppress the Ta C M e h
honks* According to General Liu Wen-hui, the Commander-in-
chief of Sikang garrison forces, it was the Lhasa authorities
■»ho sent reinforcements to hick the Ta Chieh monks and renew
the attack* Charges and counter-charges went on till at last
the Dalai Lama refused to deal with Liu tt’en-hui any more and
heked tha central government "to dispatch someone fair-minded
54
«aid friendly to both sides to mediate on tha spot," Tha
II* Liu Waa-hul. • !
U 946) , pp, 6 5 -d o . Liu's story is a bit difiereat* He des­
cribed ■the extremely strained relations between the Ta Chieh 
Monastery and tho Chinese garrisons as existing since 1913* 
Recording to Liu, it was a dispute between the monastery ana
*he cldeftain of Pei Li over tha "Ula" or transport service 
“hat led to the sudden attack on, and immediate occupation of, 
Li. ■ V .
See ■ the telegrams of- the D a l a iLama dated •troveaber''-1 4 and 
jjecembor 23, quoted in Shih Ch'ing-yang's manuscript, Chap* V, 
PP* lb-2a. In the meantime, the national government, accept­
ing the request of the D alai Lama fo r  cessa tio n  o f  h o s t i l i t i e s ,  ■: 
t*;ded orders to Liu to stop fighting. Liu reported (telegrams 
ÏJJad tho 4th and 19th of December) that despite his compliance 
th-a orders, the Ta Chi oh monks, backed by the reinforced 
*ibatan troops, had renewed tho a tta ck * Tha Dalai Lama, how- 
categorically denied this*
mCoaiaiggioa for Mongolian and T1 too tan Affairs, therefore, sent 
one of its members, T ’ang Ko-san, and a technical expert, Liu
. ' 5 5
Isan-ting, to undertake the mediation work.
Ihll© I fimg and Liu were making preparations for the jour­
ney, three Tibetan high ranking officers with four thousand 
horsemen were sent to the front, and upon their arrival in Mar­
ch they launched an offensive. As a result of this sudden 
attack, the Chinese force was thrown into great confusion. 
Resisting vainly for a few days, they began to retreat towards 
K&nze, As reinforcements failed to arrive in time, they made 
fthother retreat to Luho# The central government thereupon 
telegraphed to th© Dalai Lama asking for an immediate explan« 
ation. The latter replied on March 24 saying that a eaase-firo 
order was being issued but that it would taka more than twenty 
^ y s  to reach tho front# Ha shifted the responsibility for 
Resuming hostilities to the Chinese side# But, contrary to the 
kalai Lama» s promise of cease-fire, the Tibetans continued their 
^rive towards Ny&rong#
Before T ’ang and Liu could have reached the place of rend« 
ezvous with the Tibetan delegate, Nyarong had been captured ty 
the Tibetans who took the Chinese magistrate of Nyarong, Chang 
Tz*u-pai, prisoner and sent him to Chnmdo under custody# Iy
5. The ex-commander at Ba-t»ang who signed the truce in August, 
518, with Teichman acting as the middleman# Supra» n. 15«
I ?4
Sow tha Tibetan commander had changed his tune* and he told Liu
ften«hui that his troops were restoring Nyarong, which the Kan-
chu emperor had once given to the Dalai Lama, to the control of
tv, 57'-no Lhasa government} while the Tibetan delegate wroto to
•^’^ ng Ko-san mentioning only the cease-fire arrangement and ref-
Using to reply to the question of withdrawal to the original
53
Positions» On the 23th of July the Commission for Mongolian 
Tibetan Affairs received a telegram from the Dalai Lama ass­
orting that Kanze and Nyarong were originally under Tibetan jur­
isdiction. It is clear that the issue was no longer a dispute 
oy£-r ona monastery, but an attempt on the part of the Lhasa 
ahthorities to fix a boundary line with China Proper by force* 
This sudden change of attitude of the Dalai Lama puzzled 
the Chinese government* The Chinese press attributed it to
56» According to Liu*e telegraphic report, dated June 1, 1951, 
received by the Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs on 
Jdne 6.
57. l a m , Chap. II, n. 200. 
in the summer of 1 9 1 1.
Kyarcng was later taken by Chao 
.■. . S m  Teichman, PP*
58.
24. According to T*ang»s telegraphic reports dated June 2$ and
59* Liu Vien-hui, or« cit., p* 66, mentions the Dalai Lama’s tel- 
^graa claiming Kanza and Kyarong, but mistakenly gives the date 
fts in August.
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British string-pulling and pointed out the various British 
aids, especially the sale of a large quantity of munitions to 
Tibet, In 1952 the Chinese Foreign Office lodged a protest 
-with the British government, charging that the sale of munit­
ions to Tibet was an unfriendly action, and the British minist- 
^  at Nanking, while arguing that the Indian government was 
Acting in accordance with its treaty obligations, expressed his 
readiness to mediate and to help in finding a peaceful solut- 
*°h. The Japanese Foreign Office Archives, made available 
to the Library of Congress by the Occupation Authorities, give 
evidenc9 that according to Japanese intelligence reports, it
*as the*British who backed the Tibetan military adventure and
M  62
eeiped the Tibetan army with officers and munitions, while
I®»Jlde t
JSSs'-m. (July . 
aii secret agreement*
J>1. Ibid*, LXVII (Dec. 50, 1955)i P* 204| see also Hung Tl-chon, 
S£i^cTt7f p. 251.
(Reel 6 656) qhibetto m n d _4  ,oyobl Jllo Xankgi .feasgasj ^ B 
J*|»l*3-4. On January 10, \92?t K. Yoshigawa, Japanese min-
to Cliina, reported to the Japanese Foreign Office that 
British government was trying to assist the newly organ- 
sed Tibetan army, and was ready to concede to the Tibetan 
jJJhest to levy taxes on the border trade between Tibet and 
'hoia, oa August JO. 1929# Major Usuda, Military Attachd to 
nile Japanese embassy In Nanking, reported to the Vice Chief of 
eneral Staff that the Tibetan army, under the leadership ©f 
uJ*tlsh officers, advanced across the western border of Szeeh- 
Provine«. On a date not given, the military officer at 
y/J^ghal, attached to the Japanos© embassy, reported to the 
;Q^lnist©r of V*ar that the British government was supporting 
Oalai Lama in establishing a Groat Tibet Kingdom and in 
to occupy Ch’inghai, Szechuan border territory, and Ytn-
at the same time they reveal the fact that Japan, tv as also a 
supplier of arias and munitions to the Tibs tans from 1921, a
# - ■ 63fact hitherto unknown to the outbids world.
nah. On September 24, 1932, the Military Attach* to the Jap-
anea® embassy .in ' Banking. reported t o h i s  Vice M in ister of. Ear,; 
la y in g -that "judging.from  a l l  news a v a ila b le , T ib e t is a t  pres­
e t  attempting to expand her., sphere of in flu en ce  with B r it is h  
support" and that "no doubt there is a g reat deal of support 
°f B r it is h  im perialism , behind.'the .Tibetans» *.*# dr earn of building.. 
* *0reat Tibet Kingdom* by-.regaining th e ir , l o s t  l a n d s o n  May 31, 
*935| A* Ariyoshi, Japanese minister to China, reported to K. 
Jch id a , the Japanese Foreign M in ister, th a t according to  the 
inform ation furnished by;- Token Tada, a p ro fesso r of the Tohoku 
.'imperial d iv e rs ity ,;" .S e n d a i, who had been se a t to T ib et to study 
Buddhism by the lata Sonyu G tani, ez-Colonial Minister, and 
stayed th ere for twelve y ea rs , "th e Tibetan government was try- 
ing t o ■ organize^new;,troops to oppose the Chinese army who had. 
recaptured Kyaroag, Kanze, and De-gej and though the B r it i s h  
government was now prepared for,/the conflict, tho Tibetan gov­
ernment expressed*, tha wish that...Japan, a brotherly Buddhistic - 
Ration, should check the Chinese power and prevent Chinese 
troops from being station ed  in  T ib e t*"
5^* it is knosr.n to the outside world that some Japanese wore 
there to help to train the Tibetan army when the latter was for- 
Q^d after tho Chinese garrison had been forced out as a result 
p  the Chinese revolution* (fee the report of J* Nobuo, Jap- 
V-hose Consul-General at Calcutta, to K, Kato. Foreign Minister, 
^¿the:; Japanese-/Foreign Office Archives (Reel 126, lif 1.6,1*4-/ 
^dkkoku naisoi kankei &&ssan« China* Chibetto, ¿hinkyo), which 
fJ3Ts that "tho Tibetan army are building fortresses here and 
there, and training soldiers under the leadership of Japanese, 
¿¡Jhgolian, and Tibetan officers*" fee also Boll, Tibet, pp, 
and Lal-'Tse-sheng, h o  Problem«» thibatelfu pp* l/J-74,),
^  is also known to tho outslaa world that the Tibetans got arms 
ana munitions from British India, and the British Armed Mission 
:1903-04. ■captured soma Hussirm-mado rifles from the Tibetans,
enclosure -Ho, 
320, for
* '—>■<» UA f M JMtAUMA OV WUA t.X iv’VUiU Msf A»* A A »-«- U-Ai. pOSSCSS—t°h*5 ■ But the outside world was kept in the dark about the 
^Panose secret dealings with the Tibetans in regard to the 
filing of arms and munitions* Here is the telegraphic report 
Sakai, tho Japanese Consul-General at Shanghai, to K. Uchida, 
Japanese Foreign Minister, dated September 23, 1932* "In 
^21, in India, our General headquarters had contracts with tho
17 7
Ho doubt the higher honour shorn to the Psneh’en Lasa h y :";
. ■ 64tho : national government and .■ the ■ activities .■ of ■. his followers ■:
in Sikang, Ch*  inghai, Kansu, and Inner'.Mongolia must have.made 
the Dalai Lama feel .very ..uneasy* The' 4ealousy and ill-feeling 
between the two Grand Lamas, the extant of which can ba seen 
from the accusatory documents .submitted to Hanging, was per­
Tibetan government to sell arms and munitions for the purpose 
of their defense, a part of which was recently traded with the 
following items*
Field artillery
Machino guns
Rifles
Shells
Ballets
Grenades
, 4
a
1,503
1,0301,000,0001,000
It seems to ma that the above quantity was lesr than expected,«
J4* in May, 1931# the Punch’ cn Lama came to Hanking, lie part­
icipated ■■ln.,,the:Hation4l..:As3eafcly and discussed Tibetan prob- 
leas with the government authorities. Ho was given a new 
title; and .a J ado .-seal. For the memorandum he submit tad to tho
Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, see £hih Ch1 ing- 
yahg*s manuscript, Chap. I, pp, 13a-14aj for tho proposal ha 
submitted to the Western Defense Conference summoned by the 
«eneral Staff, see Bung fi-chen, o p , cit.f p, 268,
6 5 ,  I n  May o f  1952  th e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  t h e  Dalai Lama, Kung- 
ctiteh-chung-ni, submitted to the central government a manifesto
*ssuod by the three leading monasteries o f  Lhasa to support his 
^ c u s a t i o n  o f  t h e  P u n ch’an  Lama and his p r o t e s  against tha l a t -  
“® r’ s  new t i t l e .  The representative o f  th a  Punch* en  Lama, Lo- 
J f u - c h i e n - t s a n g ,  immediately petitioned i n  his master’s defence, 
^ c h  s id e  accused tha other, among other things, of having b e e n  
P r o - B r i t i s h ,  . For tho full t e x t s  of the p e t i t i o n s  s u b m itte d  by 
~°ih sides, see Hung Tl-chen, o n , cit.> .pp, 2$3-66j the author Rupied them from th o  archives of tho .Mongolian and Tibetan 
Affairs Commission*
haps one of :;,the .factors - bringingaboutthis sudden: change of v.
attitude towardsNanking* Whether or not the British were at
the back of it, one thing is certain* the so-called Young Tibet
66
Party consisted mainly of military leaders, some of whoa per­
haps were patriots, but most of whom had received military 
training either in Gyantse or In India, and tended therefore to 
be pro-British. In Tibet there was no such thing as a-politic* 
al party in our use of the word. They were Just a pressure
Sroupj the most outstanding among them was Tsarrong, whom Sir
B y
Charles Bell spoke of as "always very pro-British." They
Wanted the substitution of soma form of civil government for the
lama hierarchy, the carrying out of national reform and economic
development along western lines, and close cooperation with the
British authorities in India in order to establish a "Greater
68
Ubet" independent of Chinese interference. This group was 
Probably as responsible as any for the military adventure int­
ended to push their boundary eastward for the purpose of real­
ising a "Greater Tibet."
The Times. April 50, 1925, p. 11cj China Critic. Vol. 7#
R°* 24, p. 558.
^ *  Supra, p* 159*
North China Herald. July 4, 195^* See also Lang Liang,
«*1 tsang win t»i chih chon hsiang chi ch’i chieh chflah fang 
za« (Tibetan Problem. Its Facts and Solution). Tang-fang tsa- 
Sfeih, Vol. 51, No. $, pp. 22-23*
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The Chinese - National Government not In a : ..
Position-to-Force ■ the Issue
The reader might wonder why the national government did 
hot settle the outstanding Tibetan issue by force and then def­
ine the status of Tibet by an'agreement, as the communists did. 
in 1950*1951# nt a time when its military success was almost 
ns amazing and impressive, having knocked out one militarist 
after another during its northern expedition. An answer to 
this question would help us to understand the circumstances 
that made the vague status of Tibet remain unaffected in spite 
of a sweeping Chinese nationalist revolution#
Besides the hopes of further reconciliation and the actual 
Progress towards rapprochement as described above, there were 
other factors that prevented the national government from res­
orting to force. In the first place, from a theoretical point 
°f view it would have been self-defeating if the national gov- 
ornment, which stood for equality of all nations within the
■ 69
Republic and for harmony and peace, had used force to subdue 
the Tibetan people and impose a certain status# la the second 
Place, from a realistic consideration, the national government 
oould not have employed force even if it had had no theoretical 
®cruples, The reasons may be summarized as follows*
^9. Manifesto issued by the First Plenary Session of Kuomintang 
held at Canton in 1924j San min chu-i, translated into English 
Dy Frank W. Price, pp# 15¿*33# l4o-47.
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■. - Firstly, It was: always tha British- »to had to to- taken 
into- account if - any solution of tha Tibetan issue was to to 
effected. The national government, in carrying out its north­
ern expedition, had encountered repeated menaces from foreign ' 
Powers. In January, 1927# incidents at Hankow and Chiuklang 
brought a heavily reinforced British fleet to the Yangtze ports
70 ■
and created an explosive situation. In March of the same
Year the Hanking Incident, when nationalist troops attacked
foreigners,'killing some, brought about the concerted action
of five powers whose threatening note contained demands the
■ ■ - - ■ 71
hational government had to accept at last. Two months later
^apan landed her troops at Shantung, and in May of the follow-
ing year created a much greater incident as a result of which
tor troops occupied Tsinan and attacked the nationalist force
which was advancing towards'Peking. Again the national gover-
* . n
ument yielded to a foreign power and accepted its terns*
It was therefore not in a position to force the Tibetan issue,
70. Hung Chtn-p’ei, Kuo »In chtng fu wal chiao shlh («Diploma*«
(ed ^ecords bhe national Government11) (1920J",I, 86-104,
fa« Ibid., pp. 139-64. They demanded apologies, indemnity,
Jnd punishment of those responsible for the incident, while 
tofusing to compensate the losses sustained by tha Chinese army 
and civilians as a result of the shelling of tho city by their
«dnboats.
?2* 1*44.» PP. 165-94.
which'would'give'offence ; to Great Britain, especially when it 
had severed relations, with.the U.S.S.R. in Dteembfr,, 1927» -
' Sacondly,* the internal situation would 'not"allow -.th© ..:ns.t-. 
ional 'government to adopt such a.risky.measure as a military 
campaign in Tibet, The:nationalist' force, Indeed, ..succeeded 
in. knocking out .the.leading'.militarists - like ; flu P » el-fu and
Sun Ch’uan-fang, and ousting Chang Tsc-lin from Peking, but
73.there soon developed dissension-among its own,ranks.
Thirdly, the nationalist revolution which started with so 
®uch anti-militarist and anti-iaperialist fury, cooled down on 
going through the experiences just related, Tho national gov-
3^.. Besides-1 fighting, with the communist insurgents and engaging 
*h a local war with the U.S.S.R. (July-Dee, 1929 in Manchuria), 
the following is a list of armed conflicts which broke out 
^ Q h g  the nationalist forces* own ranks, Oct,-Nov. 1927# vs, 
Gen* T»ang Sheng-chih in Hankow, Chla X-chfia, Chung hua aln kuo 
I M &  (“Political History of the Chines© Republic») (]L9;)G5# pp, 
190-99$ Nov,-Dec, 1927, vs. Gen Chang Fa-k’usi in Canton, ibid., 
PP# 202-206| February 1929# Gen. Li Tsung-jen vs, Gen, Du Tl- 
I'lng’in.'vfiunan. Ibid.. pp.: 231-32$ ^-Mareb-April, 1929» 
kwangsi generals in Hupeiy ibid.f pp, 233-33$ May. 1929» latter 
||nerals to fore© Gen. Feng lu-hsiang to resign, ibid,, pp, 248- 
51j Sept, 1929» Gen Chang Fa-k»uai*s second anti-Chlang move 
Joined by Gen, Yu Tso-pei la Kwangsi and caused uprising of Gen, 
!*hg Chen-wu’s troops in Anhui, ibid,# pp, 262—661 Oct,-Nov.
*929f vs. Gen, Feng Xu-hsiang’s followers in Henan and Nupeh, 
•pMid«»:‘pp* 269-701 Mov*-Dee, 1929, vs,- combined force of Gens, .: 
ygang Fa-k*uoi and;Di Tsung-j en in Hwangtung# ibid,, pp. 266- 
Dec* 1929# rebellion of Gen. Shih Yu-san at Fukow. ibid,.
JD* 27l-72| Dec, 1929*Jan» 1930, Gen, T ’ang Sheng-chih* s second 
«ntl^chiang move in &onan, ibid., pp, 272-/5* Note! the above 
¿¡l*t does not include tho local incidents which occurred in YBn* 
Sinklang, Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Ssechuan, Kueicliow,
&Qd Fukien# (For details see ibid,.or, 277-83»)
ernment,; sine®, i tab-removal- from - Can toa. to/Hanking, had become / 
1&ore.!CoaproiBl0izig-.tiian;;revoXutlonax7 .;<.in'character* ■ U m y  for-
tor militarists with .their ill-disciplined..’troops, joined., the
nationalist .forces: with only, their, banners, changed* . Even if
the national, government had decided,to embark-.on a military
expedition - to. Tibet, it would have.-had to .fight its way to the
Tibetan border first, as all roads leading to Tibet, whether
**om Ttnnan, . Szechuan,' Chfinghai, or Sinkiang,- were all In the
hands of those military governors over -.whom.- the national govc-r-
Nment had but nominal control.
Fourthly, the complexity of the situation on the spot
^ould make any government hesitate to start a military campaign
Against Tibet* The old Chinese garrison troops at the Tibetan
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Rentier, as remarked by Teichman, «degenerated into little 
better than brigands»« Liu k'en-hui»s troops, originally of 
Sxechuan, were comparatively better equipped and better fed, 
but not much better disciplined* • For example, they even vent~ 
Ured to kill summarily a local Kuomintang leader who said some­
thing in public against their oppression of ths people. As a 
frsult of this outrageous act, Ke-sang-tse-jen, the Commission« 
for Kuomintang Affairs of Eikang, with the support of the 
^ s s q s, easily disarmed the garrison force of Liu cen-hui at
182
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Ba-t’angand'in'Iareh 1952 declared 'that's tablishmeni of m
75
■autonomous --regime* Another instance of the corruption of 
Liu’s troops was. clearly- shown i n . the mutiny of the -garrison'^ ' 
at Tach’ienlu on February 10,: 1952, : during which - the’' command- : ■' 
Ing officer,'- Brigadier General-Ma' Su, -paid. with his life for 
M s  'Corruption#- -;i ; These- two incidents «lone'give a picture 
of how-complex.was the situation on the' spot* let- the local
situation-was further complicated by the presence of Moslem 
elements. In Chapter II mention was made of the serious Mos­
lem revolt in the latter part of the Ch’ing dynasty. Moslems 
have always been a factor in northwest China politics which no 
responsible government could afford to neglect, Ch1inghai 
and Kinghsia were then governed by Moslems, while the greater 
Part of Kansu was also garrisoned by Moslem troops. Even the 
leading figures responsible for dealing with the Tibetan issue 
Moslems* Me Fu-hsiang, the former Chairman of the Commiss­
ion for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, and the above-mentioned 
M s s  Liu Man-ch’ing, I ’ang Ko-san, and Brigadier General Ha Cu 
all Moslems. There was talk of a Pan-Moslem movement’;
75. Hung Ti-chen, or* cit*. pp* 255*57* The autonomous regime 
up without authority from the central government was later
Qtssolved when Ko-sang-tso-Jjen was recalled to Nanking,
76. Liu Man-ch’ing, sentj - h * Httu vn' op, cit. § pp• 1 Ô2—05* I’ho author was 
ch tho summer of 1952 to Sikang to mako an investigation of the 
J°cal conditions. She gives here a vivid description of tha 
c°rruption of Liu’s garrisons.
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against. Buddhist- Tibet, V. -.The, national. g0y#rment .would...ceft*':-..- 
ainlyv.not,■ dor anything to create a fresh^ danger*i:.:;^ :^ f.;v;y:::.:r;..- 
;-.-;,Finnaly, - the location, and., the composition. of the .national 
government would preclude. any, possibility: of a positive plan, 
Military or otherwise, in regard to Tibet. The seat of the 
national government,was first set up: in.the extreme south, Can­
ton, ,and then moved,to Nanking, still towards the couth. Had 
tt been in Peking, more attention would have,been paid to the 
Tibetan problem. Most of tho Kuoalntang loaders who occupied 
key- positions in the government were bona and brought up la the 
®outh and could hardly realize the importance of Tibet's posit­
ion, Another factor often neglected by observers was the sub­
mission of the national government to the pressure group in 
Shanghai who took advantage of the unique position of this 
"sinners' paradise* created by the Unequal Treaties to absorb 
ail the idle .money, from the ..tumultuous Inland and wield it as ■ 
a Powerful weapon for their own interests, thus leaving the 
^ r a l  economy on the verge of bankruptcy and making the st&nd- 
ar& of living of the people proceed from bad to worse. As 
their interest was so closely tied up with the maritime trade 
®nd local speculations, they would not finance any constructive
for the northwest, to say nothing of a military campaign
^  Tibet,
The above explanation applies to the situation up to the 
^dciio of 1931, On September 18 of that year Japan created 
Mukden Incident and easily occupied Manchuria after having
135
Inflicted -undeclared/war on China, -: Henceforth ever/ ■ move of ■ 
tha national government was overshadowed by: the Japanese men­
ace*  ; í.Any plan for Tibet, had there, been.one, would have had 
to.- give = way - to the more urgent measures'for making preparations 
against further Japanese invasion. ;
- I n  view of the far more serious crisis in Manchuria, vt&o-'■■;/
national:government turned down the petitions of General' Liu "
ten-hui and T'ang-Ko-san asking .for/the Issuing, of' an order
to mobilize the troops of Szechuan, -'Ytanan, and Ch’inghai with
77'
the object of settling tha Tibetan issue by force. Instead,
tt urged T fang to continue negotiations and make a peaceful
settlement even at a sacrifice. Accordingly, T*ang and the
Tibetan delegate Ch’un-jang cane to an agreement of eight 
78
items which the government approved in spito of local prot-
a 79
ests. On the other hand, the Lhasa government became more 
stubborn on hearing tho news of the worsening situation in Man- 
churia caused by the Japanese invasion, The Dalai Lama refu- 
s^d to sanction the agreement as ha insisted that the Chuwo 
(hriwo) and Cbdiung-hsia districts should not be turned back
¥?• Liu* s telegram dated September 21, received the sane day;
* *mg»s telegram dated September 6, received on September 25»
1^* T ’ang*s telegraphic report dated November 7t received on 
¿dveaber 21, 1931* See Shih ChUng-yang1 s manuscript. Chap. 
v» P. 6b.
??* Order of approval issued by the Exécutive. ïttan, received 
the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, on December 11, 
liu Wen-hui*s protest, see Chung kuo tui tsang chih hsln
p, 67,
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to.the.Chinese-garrison as provided In the'-agreement, ,■ later 
in February, the Tibetan delegate Ch’un-jang informed T ’ang 
that his government claimed even more territory and that the 
boundary should ha fixed at least at Tai-ning if not at the lu­
ting Eridge, Facing such a complete deadlock, the hard-press­
ed national government was obliged to reach a decision on Feb- 
80
ruary 19, 1932 leaving the matter entirely in the..hands of 
General Liu V'en-hui and recalling T ’ang Ko-san, who returned to 
Nanking on Kay 20.
7.hen the Dalai Lama was informed of this decision, he 
v»ired back by the end of March strongly protesting against the 
choice of General Liu, who, he charged, hpd always shown ill- 
feellng3 towards the Tibetans. In the meantime, the Tibetan 
forces raided Ch’inghai and occupied a part of Yu-shu. An 
Arrangement for concerted action was then made between Liu and 
General Ma Pu-fang, Division Commander of the Chinese garrisons 
at Jyekundo in the province of Ch’inghai.
No sooner had Liu’s reinforcements advanced to the front 
bhan the Tibetans bogan their attack against the Chinese posit-
Resolution passed at meeting No. 8 of the Executive Ytian 
held on February 19.
?!• Liu’s telegraphic report dated April JOj China feekly Ber- 
|ft# LXV1I (Dae* 50, 1953)# 148. The armed confllii between - ' 
‘boot and Ch’inghai was also caused by a dispute ovar a menus-
*Qry, Coe Ma Ho-t’ien or; cit. pp, 297-99* R.A. Stein points 
°hfe in J. Aslati(mef CCXLvT952), 97# that the Tibetan ortho- 
H aPhy folFTfyeHHdo, • the Chinese Yu-shu, is sEye-dgu-mdo, not
rGy al-kun-mdo.
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ions, ' .They were, ■. however, not only -.repulsed. but'also'-driven 
out of K&nse on ¡¿ay 2 . ' A few ¿ays later, another column of 
. i>iul s ■ retook lyarong, thus ’.restoring .thè ..original : position
Prior to ’theincident^ with-the exception’ of the monastery-' of
. ' ■ 82 .
^u~Chien which they finally subdued on July 9.
tho end of July the Chinese forces had recovered
r ■ . '- 83
Chiang»ch;,ia (Markaa Gartok) and De-ge which had been lost to
the Tibetans in the armed conflict of 1918* The national gov­
ernment learned in the meantime that the Lhasa authorities were 
enlisting more men ana negotiating a large quantity of munit­
ions from India for which they were asked to give some concstss-. . 84-'
^°ns they had hitherto repeatedly rejected, Considering the
^unchurian crisis and fearing that Tibet might be driven mere 
closely into tho arms of the British, it decided not to carry 
military success beyond tho restoration of the status quo 
ante-bellum*
On August 1 Eung-chtleh-chung-ni presented to the Commisg- 
ion for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs a telegram from the Lalai *83
Tho . report , of Liu1 s'representativo, - Lenir ïuns*- to-the 
‘'ÍQiigoiiaa and Ti batan Affairs Commission*............
83. Chlang-Cb'la was. recovered on .
S;nS-tS<e-3 *n v*o, la t“ ato¿w‘r with Wu>their differences and fought shoulder* --  to shoulder with Liu’s
Cîl°ops.
The report of tho Chinese Consulate-General at Calcutta to 
'^ 1-chiao-pu mentioned in the latter’s dispatch to tho Mongolian 
act Tibetan Affairs Commission, and also tho report of tho corr­
espondent K.P.A. of tha Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission 
^ India and its investigator at SIkang, kept in tho archivos 
1 the Commission,
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Lama which, though repeating his protest against Liu V.en-hul, 
expressed his desire for peace. In September he conveyed to 
the Generalissimo'Chiang Kai-shek a-telegramJtrom the three 
leading monasteries and the Tibetan National Assembly which 
reiterated their request for removing the title and honour of
. ,■■85
Paneh’en Lama, and welcomed the decision of the Dalai 
Lama to invite a high-ranking representative from the central 
government to come to Lhasa for a peaceful settlement. The 
national government thereupon issued orders to General Liu 
Wen-hui and General Ma Pu-fang to halt their military actions. 
By then Liu’s troops were approaching Chamdo and Ma’s troops 
had just recovered the lost part of Yu-shu.
On October 7$ the British Chargd d ’affaires made a repres­
entation in person to the Chinese Foreign Office calling the 
Latter’s attention to the serious situation created by the exp-. 
Adding hostilities between Sikang and Tibet, and proposing an 
Immediate cease-fire arrangement by both sides. A few days 
later he was informed that orders to halt military action load 
aLready been issued and that the Dalai Lama had been told to 
leave the whole issue to the mediation of the central govern-
IT, ^®ent.
In the meantime civil strife broke out between Liu Wen-hui 
add his nephew Liu Hsiang, the commander in Chung-king, who for
^5* Supra, n. 65*
36. Shih Ch’ing-yang*s manuscript, Chap. V, p. 11^«
no other purpose;than self-aggrandisement, suddenly attacked 
M.s unci©1 s ;forces .left i n : Szechuan. Liu;ten-hut- was then 
compelled to withdraw a large part of his troops from Sikang 
end thus relieved the tension on the Sino-Tibetan front.
The Truce with Sikang Signed in 1952 
and with Chf lnflhai in 1935
On October 10, 1932, a truce was signed at Gonchen in 
ke-ga whereby the Chinese forces kept the eastern bank of 
Chin-sha-chiang (Yangtze River) as their frontier, with the 
Tibetans on the opposite bank. It provided for the free flow 
°f mutual trade, the protection of monasteries and pilgrimages, 
*hile its sixth and last article made it clear that this inst­
rument was subject to revision by tha Dalai Lama and the cent-, 87
ra* government* A similar truce was signed on June 15,
^933, between General Ma Pu-fang and the Tibetan commander, 
Rawing a demilitarized zone to avoid future conflict and pro­
v i n g  for the repatriation of war prisoners taken by the 
Ciliinghai force# It is significant that in the preamble both
expressed regret that "in view of the prevailing national cris-, 83
*®# a civil strife should have happened,"
Immediately after the conclusion of the truce, the Lhasa 87
87, For the full text see Hung Ti-chen, o p , elt., pp, 270-71* 
^8# For the full text, ibid,, pp, 271-72#
189 ' '
government. discovered . that Liu* s . troops in Sikang had been 
largely withdrawn to Szechuan. ■: á. second; drive ..was planned»;; /
_ ■ . ■; -'89 ■
But, due t o t h e s t r o n g . opposition of the: lamas,, the plan 
failed to materialize.
On December 17# 1935* "the; Dalai lama died. According to
a .special,.article contributed to The Times by a «special .corr-
/ ■ 90
®spondent lately at Lhasa, « «11 bet is stunned by the sudden
death of the Dalai -Dama, Those who knew him thought that ha
*?uld live for at least another fifteen years. An integral
part of the political machinery of Asia has unexpectedly given
Way,« xhis well-informed British correspondent tolls us that
*he Lonchen, or prime minister, a nephew of the late Dalai
kama, a young man of about 26,. years, was powerless, and that
Zumbela, the late Dalai Lama1s chief official favourite and a
British protegí, was not yet in 0 position to «do great work
his country*® ile pinned hopes on «another strong man«
tsarong, whom, as mentioned above, Sir Charles Ball spoke of
91
&s «always very pro-British« and ended the article with 
these wordst «Should ambition stir him £ Tsarong ] to seize the 
r®dn3 of government, ha would have strong support backed as ha 
^'ould ba by the army and by the great monastery of Sera of
5^* it was reported that the lamas* opposition to being 
^ripted into the army became so strong that the Dalai Lama was 
Empelled to leave Lhasa for a while, (Ibid., p* 269*)
^he limes. January 29, 193d, pp, ljf.
^ • gunraf p, 159,
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^hich he has been a generous benefactor* "
In fact, this ex-comnandsr-ln-chief did try to seize the 
reins of government hut failed to get any hacking from Sera or 
any other monastery* ■ The lamas* being loath to lose the 
grants which they used to receive from the Chinese government 
ahd realizing that their former influence was being curtailed
V  the new army which the late Dalai Lama and the Lhasa gover-
■>- 92
were fostering, intensified their struggle with the 
pro-British Young-Tibet group for control of the Lhasa govern­
ment, At one time the Tibetan political situation was so 
■fcsnse that civil war seemed quite possible between the conser-
„ 95
vaU v o  priests and the ambitious military men.
The main target of the struggle was the post of the rag*
6ncy, the occupant of which would be in control of political
and religious affairs until the maturity of the new Dalai Lama.
through the cooperation of the laaaistlc class and the strict
92, Bell. Tibet, p* 214, In this connection, these words of 
Charles are noteworthy* "There is undoubtedly a pro-Chinese 
Party in Tibet among the officials, the priests, and the poop- 
f®»**. The pro-Chinese element in Tibet should not be underest­
imated, but if money can fee found to pay for an increased army, 
the Dalai Lama and tho Tibetan Government should be able to 
control the priests. And tho gradual Improvement In the Tib- 
®tan officers will probably remove the occasional discontent 
aii*ong tho peasantry," (Ibid*, pp, 214-215*)
95« For more information see Hurry Paxton Howard, "Dalai Lamufs 
9|ath Brings Crisis to Tibet," China Weekly Review« L.XVII Vjan, 27, 1954),'341-42J and also Ibid*, pp,
April 22, 1954, Sec. 4, p. 8, col. 5*
” oriiai_X£tis
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adherence on the part of the general public to the old tradit­
ion that the regency should go to a priest and not to a layman, 
Ra-dreng Eutukhtu, the abbot of Ea-dreng monastery at two day’s
ffi&reh northeast of Lhasa, was elected as the regent of Tibet in 
T - 94
January, 1934#
Immediately after his election as the regent of Tibet, 
Ra-dreng sent a telegram to the national govarnment, not only 
reporting the fact of his being elected, but, still more sign­
ificant, requesting confirmation of his appointment by the 
Chinese government. In reality, this was the first time 
since the Chinese revolution of 1911 that an appointment in 
Tibet was ever referred to the Chinese authority. without
ihe least delay the Chinese government granted its confirm-
96 ■ ■
ation.
94. The Timesr March 5* 1934, p. 12b.
??• M4ng tsang hsfln k ’an. Nos. 73-79# March 20, 1937# P* 7t
I S T S ^ ^ C e n t r a l  Pally News»). Feb. 7# 1934, p. 1. 
i R s  sudden pro-Chinese move finds an explanation not only in 
natural affinity and the long connection between China and 
as Sir Charles remarked (Tibet, p, 216), but also in the 
Rrrent ¡situation when':the: priests needed Chinese backing to 
Ranter-balance the British-backed army group. The Dalai 
¿5*** s . manifesto.-., to■ his people,-:- issued in. May# -1952. In which, 
J R n g  other things, he emphasised that »Tibet is Chinese terr- 
having close relations with the Chinese people," greatly 
Rlpid in estivating the subsequent pro-Chinese tendencies, 
tSJ-' details about -this manifasto, sea China Weekly Review.
(Dec. 50, 1933)# P* 204» ~
??* The Time3f February 9# 1934# p. 1 > )  Chen Chien-fu, Esi
4L5LSU4 -(1937), P. 40«
193
As they had done four years before in trying to frustrate 
the rapprochement with China by resorting to military action on 
the frontier, the Young Tibet group decided to make another 
^bive in Sikang to recover their lost prestige at home and to 
forestall the pro-Chinese tendency Inaugurated lay the newly
t -
elected regent.
On February 3, 1934# the Tibetan command called a meeting 
et Al-ta under the pretext of solving pending questions, and 
suddenly handed to the delegate of Sikang the following dem­
ands* • ■ . ? '
1# That the truce agreement signed at Gonchen be canc­
elled.
2.-That Pe-ge. (including Tenglco— «otherwise spelled as 
Dengkoj Chihch’u— also known as Seshuj and paigu—
. also known as Beyu, districts), Kanse, Nyarong,
Chuwo. Yenchlng (in the south of Sikang), and all 
the villages west of the river in Ba-t»ang be surr­
endered to Tibet, and
3* that the monks of the monastery of Ta-Cbieh ba all­
owed to return without any molestation«”/
When these demands net with a flat' rejection and the con­
ference broke up without reaching any agreement, the Tibetan 
force# making use of the Ta-Chieh monks as vanguards, launched 
attack on the Chinese position in Tsngko on February 13* 
^hgko was lost to the Tibetans on the 15th, but recovered two 
later. On March 4 fighting started around Be-ge which
?7. Chen Pao Year Book. 1935. Bee* D. p.
is®. 1934J, 3691 fang
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captured by the Tibetan force after almost two sacks of
. ■ ■ ■ 
siege.
The Chinese government wired the Lhasa authorities asking 
for m  explanation of the breach of the truce* The regent
then issued an order to the Tibetan commander at Chamdo demand-
1' ' .99 ■
xhg a cease-fire at once. He wired back to the Chinese
government attributing the cause of resuming hostilities to ;
the fa-Chieh monks to whom, he suggested, the Chinese govern-100 ■
meat should give due care and protection.
Agreement to Halt the Armed Conflict Resumed
after the Dalai Lassa1 s Death
Being denied the authority to continue fighting, the Tib­
etans reached a conciliatory agreement with the Chinese command 
°n May 1 7, which provided for the withdrawal of treops of both 
6ides to their original positions as laid down in the Gonehen 
^dee Agreement (Art. II). Eevcn of the twelve articles were 
devoted to the disposition of the Ta-Chieh monks and their 
Weapons and the settlement of questions in connection with the 
^dn&gement and the Jurisdiction cf this powerful monastery*
£oth parties reiterated their willingness to abide by the Gon- 
chen Truce Agreement and leave tha solution of other matters 98
98« Ibid.. ,p* 273*
99» Kong.tsang hsfln k1 an» Ko » iSl# April kO, 19*^ # P* 9*
Xoo. Bhih Yin, «Da-lai shih shih hou chih k»ang tsang chiù ^  
fen ,«  (Sikang-Tibetan Confliçts a f t p  the D alai Basa s D^ath),
:ìa&g-fL^' tsa-chlh. (April lb, .1954)? m i  I ho.. Ö, 1*9-30.
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to their respective high authorities. It is significant
that this agreement was signed by a delegate on behalf of "the 
three leading monasteries and the Tibetan government,* while 
his counterpart signed in the name of the local military comm- 
and, i.e*, Liu Wcn-hui1s headquarters.
Follotfing this incident, the regent became fully aware of
the insubordination of the army officers and decided to curtail
•.. / . 102 •
their p o w e r . "  I n -the first place he ordered the disbandment
°f a large portion of the army. Then ho restricted the pur-
105
chase of arms and munitions from the government of India. 
Finally, ha took another drastic step by putting the above-men­
tioned Lung-shar in prison, and appointed Tsang fang Lama his
104
right-hand man, as commander-in-chiof of the Tibetan army*
It is true that the intention of the regent in taking 
s^ch measures was not so much to improve relations with China 
as for the purpose of diminishing the strength of his oppos­
ition, Nevertheless, the reduction of the poser of the army 
group which had repeatedly resorted to military action to frus-
■ 101
*01. Hung Ti-chen, op. clt., pp, 275-274.
lQ2* »<>• 8, ¿prti 5» 1954, p, 99«
¿04, Chung. Chun, "Hst tsang cbfln shih chnang k*uang* (The 
Military Situation inTÎHt7t~ Kang Tao Tg~eml-oj^fêlal public­
ation of the Sikang Provincial dov^rnaiint) (Dec, 1954), V*
**“ . 9, p. 02.
trata a rapprochement undoubtedly facilitated batter under- 
standing.;with the ■ Chinese . authorities*faking adv&ntagr of . 
this opportunity for promoting closer relations with Lhasa, > 
tha national government ’ decided to ’ send a mission ■■to Tibet.
' General Huang*s Mission to Tibet .
General Huang Hu-sung, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, 
chosen as •’Special Commissioner to Tibet” for the purpose 
paying posthumous tribute to the late Dalai Lama, A num- 
Ler of technical experts in various fields were assigned to
105
fd.s mission* On April 25, 1954, he and his retinue reach-
ed Lhasa via Sikang, Xmmediately upon arrival, the mission
, . ’• • " • 106 
»et up a radio service in order to keep contact with Wanking,
Asides taking part in -the memorial service for the late Dalai
lama, General Huang issued a proclamation emphatically urging
the Tibetan people to place their trust and reliance in the
Chinese government which alone, ho claimed, could assure them
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Qverlasting prosperity and happiness,
kith a view to readjusting relations between China arid
»?->* Hong tsang hstta k»an* Hos. 73-79# ¡¿arch 20, 1954, p, 7 1 
Death of Dalai Lama of Tibet Spurs China to Regain Control,» 
If^ns-paciflc, XXII (Aug. 50, 1954), p. 54*
iQ6# The Times. Sept. 6,'1954, p, 11 gj Hsi-ch*ui hsasa-ltaa-shift 
f-HM - e h u  yhi'E-k1 an (Panch* on Lama,Headquarters Monthly),- fab*,m5, piSTyb-SB.
1^7. Harth O dna Herald, Oept, 26, 1954, p* 4501 The Times. 
OSpt, xj,‘'1954, " p T I o K
mTibet," General Huang conducted a number .of discussions with 
the regent and other'highTibetan officials.on ;the basis of 
th©' following proposals .:
’ ■ A , : Two fundamental.'-points ■ that.-Tibet, is ^ asked to observe* 
■ -'1 . 'Tibet.must,bo an integral part of.,the -territory'of 
' 'China. . ■ .
2. -Tibet'.must'obey the Central. Government«--:-..-'
- B. .Declarations in-regard to the-political system of 
■ ■ Tibet* ■
1; Buddhism shall be respected by all and given pro- 
taction and; its. .propagation.: encouraged,
2. In the preservation of the traditional political 
system,: Tibet: shall, be granted; autonomy*1 • Any admin­
istrative measures within the authority of the auton- 
:■ - omy. of Tibet, the Central Government will not inter­
fere with. On foreign affairs, there must be unitary 
action [with the Central Government!• All administ­
rative matters which are nation-wide in character, 
shall be administered by the Central Government, such 
as*
&. Foreign affairs shall be directed by the Central 
Government.
b. National defense shall be planned by the Central
Government*
c. Communications shall be managed by the Central 
Government.
d. The names of important officials of Tibot, after 
they have been elected by the autonomous government 
of Tibet, shall be submitted to the Central Govern­
ment for their respective appointments.
C. The Central Government shall grant Tibet autonomy, but 
for the purpose of exercising full sovereignty in an 
integral part of its territory, the Central Government 
shall appoint a high commissioner to bo stationed in 
Tibot as the representative of the Central Government, 
on the one hand to carry cut national administrativa 
. measures, and on the other to guide the.regional auto­
nomy.
^08, The proposal and the Tibetan counter-proposal are cited
*ï*om General Huang’s Report to the Central Committee of the 
yational government in the archives of the Mongolian and Tlbst- 
Affairs Commission,
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Tha above proposal, if agreed to and carried out, would 
have settled tha status of Tibet in a constitutional sense.
But the intensified internal struggle between the conservative 
lamas and the ambitious military men, the fear of the consequ- 
ehces that might result from offending the British power or 
^roa coming more directly under Chinese authority, as well as 
from the loss of the advantage of sitting on the fence as a 
Buffer state, prevented the newly installed Lhasa authorities 
from taking such a bold step. Avoiding a categorical answer 
Bo the four points under 33.2., they submitted a counter-prop- 
°sal containing the following ten points*
1* In dealing with external affairs, Tibet shall remain 
an integral part of the territory of China. But the 
Chinese government must promise that Tibet will not be 
reorganised into a province.
2, Tibetan authorities, big or small, external or inter­
nal, and Tibetan lews, regulations, etc*, may bo sub­
jected to the orders of the Chineso government provid­
ed such orders are not either religiously or politic­
ally harmful to Tibet.
3* Traditional laws and regulations dealing with the int­
ernal affairs of Tibet shall remain independent as at 
: present«-and the Chinese ^ government '.will n o t'interfere 
with Tibetan civil and military authorities. On this 
matter It shall be in accordance with the oral promis­
es made at different times in the past,
4. To maintain the present peaceful condition of Tibet,
, there shall be friendly relations with all her neigh- ., 
bouring states and all the peoples believing in Budd­
hism* In the future, any important treaty-making 
between Tibet and any foreign country shall be made by 
joint decisions with the Chinese government.
5. One representative of the Chinese government may bo 
stationed in Tibet, but his retinue shall not exceed 
twenty-five. There shall be no other representative 
either civil or military. This representative must 
be & true believer in Buddhism. then -a now "'repress : -
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, enta tive is appointed to replace the., old., the-, rout© '
ha and his retinue take to and fro must be by sea and 
not.through Slkang*.
6, . Before the recognition of the ; reincarnation of the 
Dalai Lama and before his taking over reins of gover­
nment, the inauguration of . the: regency: and, the appoin­
tments of officials from the feECa’-blon up, shall be 
conducted or ■ made. by ■ the, Tibetan ■ government a s . at 
present* Of such inauguration and, appointments, the 
representative; o f ; the »Chinese, government.. In. Tibet . 
shall be notified soon after they have taken place.
7« Those Chinese people who have long resided in Tibet 
. and have, been; under. the. Jurisdiction and; protection,of. 
the Agricultural Bureau since the Chines e-Tibetan ??ar 
.... o f t h e  ...year; Jen-tzu'(1912),-.shall:'-remain:; under the 
control of the Tibetan government and abide by the 
local laws and regulations. The representative of 
the Chinese government shall exercise no control over 
them,
8, Military forces to be stationed on the borders of Tib­
et for defense purposes shall be dispatched fey the 
government of Tibet as at present. If and when there 
should be foreign invasion, the Chinese government 
shall be consulted on military measures to be taken*
9« For permanent harmony and friendship, to avoid any 
possible disputes, and to maintain peace on the bor­
ders, the northeastern boundary between Kokonor and 
Tibet should be maintained as proposed during the neg­
otiations of the year before last, with 0-Lo which has 
long been under Tibet to be included on the Tibetan 
side. As for the boundary between Tibet abd Szech­
uan, the territory and people, together with the adm­
inistration of De-ge, Nyarong, Tach’ienlu, should be 
turned over to the Tibetan government at the earliest 
possible date.
lQ, . The Chinese government should not give asylum to, or 
acknowledge as representative, any Tibetan, ecclesias­
tical or secular, who has rebelled against the Tibetan 
government and escaped to China Proper*
The Tibetan counter-proposal shows clearly that the Lhasa 
Authorities were not yet ready to place their trust and relia- 
bcs on the Chinese government of the day. In particular,
5°int five indicates a British shadow behind the scene, though
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Point eight be tokens the.Tiba tan .fear of a. possible British 
invasion. However, they, went a considerable way to meat the 
Chinese wishes.: First of all.they.accepted the Chines® prop­
osition that fall relations be resumed-, ini.principle but-insis­
ted that the-commissioner or representative’©office in Lhasa 
should not;be established’until.;the over-all differences ware 
settled, They nevertheless permitted the Chines© government 
to have, some liaison officers stay'in Lhasa together with the 
radio service : to . take care of. communications. In regard to - 
the Panch’en Lama’s return to Tibet they expressed great sus­
picion and scepticism, because this question not only involved 
Sino-Tibetan relations but also the internal struggle for power 
between Lhasa and Shigatse. Yet as a result of Chinese insis­
tence as well as for the sake of the Tibetan religious tradit- 
l°n, which established a practice that when either of the two 
Grand Lamas died, the education of the reincarnated successor 
w°uld rest on the shoulders of the other, the regent agreed to 
the return of the Panch’en Lama on condition that no large
6scort should come along, nor should the latter exercise any
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Political influence over the Lhasa government.
Realizing the difficulties that the Lhasa authorities wore
/??• Kuo min ch£ng fu nle-n chien, ed. by the Executive Xttan 
^  p*^ïÿT^ O^^r^î^'aani’Q  report, op, cit., states that» _
p - *,uasa authorities at first made 
^hch’en Lama should return by sea,
it a' conaïtlon' that the 
i.e., by way of India.
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facing from'within and without, and considering the' Inad­
visability of forcing an issue with tho friendly regent or 
with the British while the rich and industrialized part of the 
Country-*-Manchuria— was under Japanese occupation, General 
Huang decided not to negotiate further and left Lhasa in Oct­
ober, 1934* Messrs*'; LiU'P*u-chca'and:Chian chi»yu, council­
lors of the mission, were ordered to remain as liaison offic­
ers for the central"government. 'In addition,'the "radio ser­
vice was left behind to continue its operations in order to
maintain quicker, easier, and cheaper communications between
• ■ ■ ill
Hhasa and various parts of China. General iluang*s mission
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^roused some criticism among the British, but it did undoub­
tedly succeed in bringing about a new phase in Sino-Tibetan 
delations by setting up a direct two-way contact between Nan­
king and Lhasa, though it failed to solve the fundamental issue
^ 0 #  In'May,1'-'1954, while General Huang was there# a plot to 
overthrow the regent was discovered, General Lung-shar, for- 
«erely the commander-ln-chief. was arrested and sentenced to 
hav© his eyes put out and to bo confined to prison* In this 
connection, see The Times. May 51, 1954, p. 15d) "Tibet as it 
stands Todays* >-cHna'"crTilc. Vox. 7# Ho. 24, p* 5581 Worth 
Sgllia Herald, April "¿5, 'T934, p. 94.
^ L *  Chinese Year Book, prepared under the auspices of the 
j-ounclb of International Affairs (Shanghai, 1940), p. 319) The 
ffStl#: Dee 15# 1954* 0. 15b) Lin Tung hai, «Three Months in 
{fhasa.it china Critic (Feb. 21, 1955) VIII, No. 3, 173-74) Bell 
f-SSiralt o f t h e T a l a i  Lama, p* 394* Sir Charles Bell was on 
Jflvata visit to flbet whilo Huang was still' there. (The 
HScs# July 5, 1934# p. 14b.)
A ^ x h e T i m e s ,  Aug, l6, 1934, pp. 10c, lid) Kov. 22, 1924, 
l3T75eII7^Tibot and its Neighbours*« Pacific Affairs? i 
4 (December, 1937)# P * 453. ' * 1
of. Tibet* S''status*
Upon bis return General--."fittang mads several. important 
recommendations ..to the central government* =■ He' found . that in 
Tibet -British influence - was..still prevalent, and suggested 
■that: the Panch* en 'Lama* s wish to go ■ back should be 'met, ■ and a 
Chinese escort provided so that a solution t o ‘the fundamental 
Political, issue could b e . found* - He also recommended the ;■ crea­
tion of the new province of Siksng out of the "Szechuan Border
Territory” which was-later carried out after four years of 
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Preparation.
- The creation of a new province of Sikanfi marking the real* 
Tfcation of a policy inaugurated by Chao Erh-feng, would have 
teen distasteful to the Tibetans. But JCham, which forms the 
kaln part of the present-day Sikang province, was not regarded
a 115
as Tibet proper, and on one occasion the Lhasa government
113
■^3. Hew York Times* Feb. 10, 19*5# P* 24, Col. 2«
U 4, for an explanation of the Chinese decision to create this 
«©w province, see Hew York Times. April 14, 1935# Sec. 4, p, 12 
j’Jis. 3-4$ in February/ 1955# the Commission for the Creation 
Sikang Province was set up, but its work was not much in 
pogress until the removal of the capital to Chungking. In 
’^iy, 1938, It was decided, in spite of Szechuan’s bitter opp­
osition, that 14 districts of Szechuan together with its two 
“Pecial districts should be transferred to the new province to 
the latter self-supporting. On January 1, 1939# tbs 
Provincial government was formally instituted at Tach’ienlu.
ij5. Hoto that the government was formed after the flight of 
|h© Dalai Lama, during the presence of the British Armed Miss-
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told the British irada agant at Gyantse in an official letter 
dated. J u l y : 24, J905# that they could not bo responsible f o r ­
th© conduct-of Kh&nbas, «the-.people of Sham'being -evil per- .
■ 116.sons,» ; If merely on ethnographic grounds, they actually
have no better .claim on Khaxa: than/on Kashmir1-» Ladakh, which ■
U 7
was a province.:of.- Jib©t* As the Hanking government at that
time in fact did not show much activity and enthusiasm towards 
its realisation'beyond ,the-setting up of::a preparatory commiss­
ion, this matter, though distasteful, was tolerable to tho 
libatans*
The Panch*en Lama* s Plan to Return and his Death
In tho eyes of the Lhasa authorities, therefore, it was 
tho return of the Panchoen with a Chinas© escort that constit­
uted an immediate danger threatening their very existence*
Iho panch’en Lama for Ids part originally had not intended to 
lore© a way home* t He had, prior to the Dalai Lama* s death, 
Seht Aa-ehln Hutukhtu as his personal representative to Lhasa 
*ith a view to reaching an understanding on his plan for a 
Seacaful return* The sudden death of the Dalai Lama frust- 
***ied An-chin* s effort and brought about a new state of aff- 
4r** hhile the Young-libet group strongly opposed the
A and P. Cd* 5240, enclosure 3 in Ho. 40, p* 23« 
C&mbrldg© History of India* ,Vol* I, p. 33*
It p
^ru* An-chin Ilutukhtu went to Lhasa in 1933 with" a- secretary 
^ ^ ^Panch*en Lama named fang-chin-pa (Hai-tsang win t*i chlh
of
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Punch* en*s return, the march/oí events -ixr China, as related 
below,:; made/ the Paachdea more; suspected .by and' less acceptable 
to - the Lhasa authorities, and finally made, his'return .imposs* 
tblo without1 the- aid’ of an. arsed Chinese, escort.
• ■/. In February,-' 1954# the P unch1 e n ' was sworn -in as', a , ©ember 
°f the. national-goveriment. In other words*.. he' was admitted 
to-;the-supreme/council— the .highest Chinese honour he could’ - 
have possibly received. On'that occasion-he emphatically dec­
lared that.wthe .utmost efforts,would be exerted'for the purpose 
°f promoting'the national/interest and unity, and the well-
v . ' • 119
°®ing of the whole people, with the blessings of Buddha.«
Ibis utterance shews clearly how far ho was committed to the 
Nationalist cause. The Lhasa authorities, who had requested 
Hanking to deprive the Punch1 en of M s  titles, would certainly 
kQ displeased^ if not offended, to hear of M s  gaining a.new 
distinction*
On February 8, 1955# the Punch*en Lama was appointed
Hrspecial Cultural Commissioner for the hastern Regions« with
kls headquarters at Eining in the province of Ch’inghai.
*^lv© hundred CMnese soldiers were assigned .as M s  personal 121
®scort* -- When' General Huang succeeded S M h  CMag-yang as i
ii9. Huang Feng-shmg, l4ng..Al«n^JigiJMcMh# .Vol. 1# P v 457* 
Cugra, nn. 65 and 85«
^1« The Times* Oct..:28, 1957» P* 15c.
Cfaairnan'of the Commission for Mongolian and' Tibetan Affairs 
in .liarch/ '1935# ho naturally aid all >0 could to carry out M s  
©*h rccoiaacndations Including ths one to ¿ive early effect to 
Panch’en’s return. At that tine the director of dido tar; 
Affairs in the Copiais si on «as a Tibetan nomad Lo-saag-chien- \ 
tsaa who was a follower of the punch’ an ana who would spare no 
effort to see that his master could go back home at the earl­
iest possible date.
As asntioned above* General Luang* while he was in Lhasa,
Procured the reluctant consent of the regent to the Panch’en .
kaaa*s return. Later* the Lhasa government laid down another
condition*. i.e.* that the Punch1 en should make no attempt to,
enter Lhasa. ■ To this the Punch’en and M s  entourage agreed*
deciding to travel by Nachuka* north of the Tibetan capital.
In May, 1956* the Chinese government sent a special envoy to
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accompany the Punch* en who reached Jyekundo in southern
^h’inghai (Kokonor) in March* 1957* while Xoag-yong* tha Pan-
ch* en’s treasurer* with an enormous consignment of boxes and 
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^nndles* arrived at Xach’ienlu by a different route.
The reluctance of the Lhasa authorities on this matter was
clearly shown in an incident occurring even before General
&uang»s return from his mission to Tibet. In the late spring *1
The Chinese government first appointed Çh’eug ïun, and 
^P°n the latter’s resignation in August* X95&* appointed Q u o  
h^ou-yfl, to take his place.
Xho Times. July 22* 1937» p* 15f. Chao Shou-ytt and M s  
{^ty jo Ins a the punch’ en at Jyckondo on July Id* 1937 (^a Ho
11 lea, op. clt.. pp. 361, 372).
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of 1934, An«ch*in Hutukhtu cane back. to Hanking from Lhasa and 
told the.' press’that the government. and people in' Tibet -had 
keenly fait the need of the Panch’en'Lama’s leadership, and
that the delegates from Lhasa would soon come to urge him to
' ',>124 ;
return. lio sooner had . this announcement: been made known
than a categorical^denial'was issued by :the Tibetan représent­
a i  ve at Hanking. , 'It.was stated that "no official, deputation 
^ould be sent to welcome the Punch1 en Lama to Tibet, nor was 
there any intention of doing so in the foreseeable future."
0^ clear up this misunderstanding, An-ch’in Eutukhtu went back 
. 125 . 
10 Lhasa for the second time, but with no better result.
Hihm  General Huang was made the Chairman of the Commission 
ÍQr Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, the Lhasa authorities’ rel­
uctance became more pronounced, and gradually turned to open 
^Position. They attacked Lo-sang-chien-tsan and called him 
*tha Panch* en* s protegí who had nothing to do with the affairs
°f Tibet.8 They even refused to submit official communica­
te 126t4ons through the Commission.
Now when the news of the panch’en’s embarking on his
è24» K’ang tsana chien feng. Ho. 8, April. 5, 1954, p* 9914S£th ctilnâ' tjgr‘ld. ÁrjríTTr. 192«, p. 2j Kw rorfcjawa..VT'.'lrT— "tT*"* -, i a ■^ X ^ T W ^ fio7côi7L'
3,25* Ming„t>?.ang._hf.ln.feign« No. 86, June 30, 1954, p* 12,
A&* Ex-Chairman of the Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan t^airs, V,u Chung-hsin* s report on his Mission to Tibet, Ju T?ao kao. p, 100.
Journey with a Chinese escort reached them, their attitude 
became hostile, and they eventually decided to offer armed 
Resistance should'the Fanch* en persist and force Ills way to­
wards Nachuka* . The Punch* en : dispatched delegates to Chaiado 
. to hold meetings with the Tibetan commander with & view to
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reaching an understanding, but their effort proved fruitless.
: An'inspired article ■entitled «Lhasa. Goverment; Forbids 
Official* s Entry** relates a story that the Panch’en was prep­
ared to carry with him a ready-made reincarnation of the Dalai 
beaa,* and actually found a boy for this purpose. The writer 
^ U s  this an unfortunate faux pas made by the Panch’en* and
believes this was a probable cause of the sudden withdrawal of
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permission to enter Tibet iy the Lhasa authorities, Koth- 
3-hg in Chinese sources can be found to tally with such a story, 
** is much more likely that the sudden withdrawal of their per­
mission, and the decision to block tho Fanch*en’s entry by 
force, was due to hostility to the Punch*en’a return, which had 
been building up since 1954, reinforced by news received over 
bhe wireless concerning the llarco Polo Bridge incident of 
^uly p created by tho Japanese army, and tho subsequent amioua-
*^7 * Eiu Wen-hui, op, cit., p, 54.
^3, x special article from Tach’ienlu, dated September 25* 
®igned **by Tibetan,« but must have beta written by an English- 
mui, appeared on October 27* 1937# in the north China Dally
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cement of armed resistance to Japanese aggression mud© by the 
national'government*
On August'18* more than one month after tho Japanese mil­
itarists had started their second phase of aggression in 
China, the Panch’en and his entourage left Yu-shu (jyckundo) 
and after three days »march arrived at La-hslu Monastery on tho 
border between Kokonor and Tibet, where he planned to stay ten
< % s  to perform religious ceremonies before resuming his jcur-
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a«y to enter Tibot. A few days later he was told by ha
Ko-t'ien, councillor of the escort mission, that the Chinese
government had decided to halt his journey in consideration of
ihe national emergency created by renewed Japanese aggression*
^ho panch’en expressed sympathetic understancting of the situa­
ti 151clon though the nows must have been a blow to him, Ho
s^ill hoped against hope that an agreement might be reached 
^'bth tho three leaning monasteries of Lhasa, tut nothing nat- 
6^ializod. hithout any definite prospect of his return, he
3^* Their creation of the Mukden Incident on September 18, 
“*931, and subsequent occupation of the whole of Manchuria and 
Part of Inner Mongolia, ana their establishment of a puppet 
^Sicie in the eastern part of tho province of Hopei, aro con­
sidered as the first phase*
^Q* Ha Ho-t’ien, op. cit», p. 449*
J3l* Ibid*f p. 457. The Ibccicutivo Ytlan*s telegraphic order 
halt the Panch*on*3 journey reached Chao Shou-yU on August
r M  -Chao sent la to'transmit the message on the next day • and : |'||j himself to-explain tils order on August Jl. ($b|d.*, p*
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withdrew to Yu-shu whore he fell til and died on December 1, ■
„ 132 - 
193?.
Th© death of -.thePunch’en lama removed a source of fric­
tion between .the Chinese government and the Lhasa authorities, 
and the latter soon showed-signs of. rapprochement towards-the 
' former# The regent dispatched a special delegate to the war­
time capital to pledge Tibet’s sincere* cooperation with the 
central government in the straggle for national existence*
also assembled the lams of the three leading monasteries 
. 133to pray for China’c victory* Ho Tibetan troops, however,
^ere sent to the Chinese front* Among the reasons for this 
&a7 be listed the lack of communications and transportation* 
Ihc difficulties Tibetans would encounter in living ari-y from 
^hsir plateau* and tho presence of anti-war sentiments among 
the lamas. Nevertheless, the Tibetan government offered 
3*0,000 sheepskins worth 500,000 dollars in Chinese national
Currency as a token of th© support of the lamas, officials and. . . ■ . . . ■ ■ ■ -1515
aoor peasants by whom these gifts were donated. 132
132. For other relevant information about the panch’en's death 
¥i Ho-t1lea, op. clt.. pp. 651-53, 654-56, 657-59, 665-66,
6 7 1,
i». C.T. K. Long, ”TiboU-ns are Praying for China’s Victory,’* 
<Skta V-eeklv F o v i w r LXXZVIII (April 15, 1939), P* f05*
According to Theodore Bernard, »The Peril of Tibet,” Asia. 
(Cept. 1939), p, 503# & l^Tga delegation of Tibetans - - rought along with then 10,000 she opskins and 500,000 dollars 
J° he given to tho soldiers*
*35« Hew York Tines. Nov. 28, 19*3, p* 6, col. 4,
Further rapprochement was shown in the search For ana 
subsequent installation of the new Dalai Lama, Even before 
the death of the late pontiff, rumours fcaa been spreading far 
ahd'wide,that'the line of reincarnation of the Dalai Lama was 
to be 'terminated with'the 15th, after which would come a drast­
ic change' of government. As : the 15th Dalai Lama failed to 
give the needed information as to the exact location of Ids 
hext appearance on earth, which'had usually.been given by his ■ 
Predecessors, doubts were expressed even in lamaistlc circles
,..V: 156
as to whether there ever would be another Dalai Lama, The
ïoung-ïibet group, whose ultimate object was to abolish priest 
^nle, naturally viewed the search for the new Dalai Lama with 
^husual apprehension. They therefore exerted every effort to 
exploit these rumours ana doubts to confuse the people and to 
Weaken the administration so as to enable themselves to come 
i&ck to power.
The regent, whose primary duty was to find the Dalai 
Damn’s successor in strict conformity with well-established
* 1 37
»-raditions, disregarded all these manoeuvers of the oppos­
ition and went ahead.to put in motion the traditional machinery 
for the discovery of the next pontiff* The delicate procedure
ibid,, Jan, 21, 1954. See. 4, p. 4$ Dell, ’’while ïurcp© 
“Spares for War, Pious Tibet Searches for Child Toiler,” China 
D ^ kly He view. LXXXI (July 10, 1957)# p. 217*
^57• Gordon D. Endors, "A Mew Role for the Panch’en Lama,”
«£lâ, XXXIV (August, 1954), 466-67,
...■210.,
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fading- to the-, discovery':-and the events -.connected with -the-.--
. ' ' - 123 .■■■
installation'were -saply reported In the western press,. re
shall later - see. an official - version,: from-, a coanmalcation sent
*7 the regent ‘.of Tibet ,to- the Chairman: of ■ the Commission for
Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, of how they found and Identified
the new ..Dalai-Lama, fir tyiarlss Bell, retired frera active
service yet still-Indispensable to British activities in Tibet,
v,ho had been in Lhasa TTon a private visit", while General Huang
i‘bd his party rare there, came again ”on a private visit” nins
„ , 139months after the Dalai Lamafs death. Re tells us a colour-
^hl story about the search for, and the installation of, the
Incarnation, basing Ids information chiefly on the account
°f Sir Basil Gould who was the nan officially responsible for
carrying out British policy, in Tibet and who was at the tine
, 140
1h Lhasa and elsewhere in central Tibet,
• A comparison of Sir Charles* story with the following 
Account will chow discrepancies, Since Sir Charles predicted 
that «the Chinese can later refer to their press records
139. A,T, Steele.... „ t .BB o y  Ruler of . Shangri-la*» Saturday Evening v
ML!t, April 12. 1946, pp, 14-151 33w.Times! ifcciriip^o'r** .
2 6 0ct* 1939* P. 9*1 Fab. 9* 1^ 40, p. 8dj v im a ^ r e b .  
jtl 1 2 f ° s i • 54j ISgSJEsa^^tSSS# Cept., 29. 1939, p#~i27-.col. 5j 
p-S* J940, p,13. 0010. y 4 j  j$n. 27* i9m, p, 5, col, 2 $ - 7,;:.^ # 1?4C, p. 11, cols. 2-3; James Shea, *$ew. Dalai Laaa ic Asia# 11 (Jan, 1940), pp* 25-27; nTnreo Rations Hunt u Idvjdig Age, £0, 257, Jen* 1940,'pp, 420-22* *
_ •
111 B® H f  E^rtrait.of the Dalai Lana, p, 390, and supra, a.
140, £&£«» pp* 397-99.
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Rnd present an account of historical, events.-that Is -wholly
i auntrue,w this writer hero purposely refrains from citing 
uny Chinese press records, though other press records, such as 
those of the United States, could he produced as supporting 
evidence»* end bases the following account entirely on the off­
icial. records in the Chi no so government archivas, and Er, !Tu 
Chung-hsia’3 report on his mission to Tibet, Behind all the 
Writings of Sir Charles Bell in connection with Tibet there 
sooms to be on unspoken themeï to undermine Chinese authority 
in Tibet and to justify the British position there— a theme 
shared by most English writers on Tibet, He gives us to
Understand that Tibet is not only independent today, but was
, M 3independent in the tine of the fifth Dalai Lama* According
i° him, tho Tibetans like the British so much and hate the 
Chinese to such an extent that they would not want to have 
ahything to do with the Chinese government. So in his eyes, 
ftthe Tibetan Government allowed a Chinese envoy, hr, *.u Chung- 
hsin, to come to Lhasa for tho ceremony, and the British rep­
resentative was also admitted? ••• Mr, Wu was merely a passive'
141* Ibid.* P. 400.
J42* For example, the ffev York Tines reportad the raaneat-inada " 
z* the regent; to tho - China!o H,ovo ¿Sea^tto ■ be allowed “ to dls- ■■ ■ with the lot-drawing procedure, and the latter*s affirm- ative reply (lan, ^ 1, 1940* p, 3);.the appointment of the reg- .¡ut by the Chinese government to supervisa the reincarnation installation of the nau Dalai Luna, and tho regent's accep­ted, (Jan. 27# 1940* p. 5)I nnd tho message of thanks sent jom the ragout to tho Chinese government particularly for tho Dandonment of tho lot-drawing procedure (fab. 22*, 1940, p, 11),
14J, Burra* Chap, IX* p, 104.
spectator; ha did no more than present a ceremonial scarf,
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as was done by others, Including the British representative.«
Although it Is not the purpose of this study to take issue 
^ith any single author, tills writer feels obliged for the sake 
of truth to devote a few lines to clearing up this part of Sir 
Charles» story. Apparently basing his story on Sir Basil 
Could*s account, Sir Charles informs us that the Chinese gover­
nor, as a price for letting the little boy depart, demanded «a 
Payment of a hundred thousand Chinese dollars (£7,500) which 
Kyi-ts&ng, the chief of the searching party, managed to raise*« 
Cater, »the governor also put in a demand for a further inst­
alment of blackmail, this time amounting to three hundred and
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thirty thousand dollars (£25,000) ,B Kyi-tsang «was able 
^o arrange for a further payment of three hundred thousand 
Collars through a party of rich Mohammedan merchants who were 
going to Lhasa and India, and would provide the escort.« 
Therefore, «only twenty Chinese soldiers« were sent.
During all these years when the new Dalai Lama was sought, 
found, and later installed, the writer was staying in Lanchow, 
hot very far from Ch»inghai and Tibet. Once he flew to Si- 
n3,ng and had the opportunity of seeing the recently found 
fourteenth Dalai Lama at Kum-bum Monastery. He heard nothing
^ 4 «  Bell, Portrait of the Dalai Lama, pp. 599-400*
*}5. In giving tho equivalent amount In pounds sterling, Sir 
¡'Juries apparently forgot tho effect on the rat® of exchange 
°f the much inflated Chinese currency during wartime.
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of such a'scandal* it Is,Incredible that this governor*,'Ma--.
self a Moslem, should dare to hold the claimant to the pontiff
chair as a hostage and blackmail repeatedly— an act which would
dntagonise the numerous Buddhistic Mongolians and Tibetans in
his province— while fighting was .going on with the Japanese in
the neighbouring provinces of Ilinghsia and Suiyu&n* and a heavy
concentration of half a million central government troops with
watchful eyes were stationed in the neighbouring provinces of
Kansu and Shensi, It is true that the lamas of the Kua-buza
Monastery refused to let the boy depart unless he was immadia-
tely declared to bo the Dalai Lana. The national government
Ordered the governor of the province of Ch’ inghai, General Ha
Pu-fang, to tell A-chia Kutukhtu, the abbot of the monastery,
hot to place any obstacle in the way of the boy’s departure,
It took the initiative in making a special appropriation of a
generous sum to cover all the expenses for the boy’s Journey.
It also instructed General Ha to provide careful protection
hlong the route and the latter reported that Major General Ha
luan-hai was dispatched as a special commissioner to escort the 
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“°y with a battalion of bodyguards composed of 500 soldiers.
1^ -6. i'he boy was sent as ono of the claimants, not as the Dalai 
elect. He was thus spared all the-ceremonial ■ porforman-■ 
en route. He and the escorts left Kum-bua Monastery on 
1, and reached their destination on October 7» See V,u 
yhdag-hsin'a report, pp. 5 and 7* Sir Charles Bell montions 
the Chinese government contributed fifty-five thousand 
p°llars for the search and the Journey back. Portrait of the
titiaOsaa, p. 399. ------- — '—
As, early as September 13# 1933# the Tibet.an representative 
stationed at the wartime capital transmitted to the national 
government a dispatch from the Lhasa authorities reporting that 
the coice of one of three boys found in Tibet and on© in Si­
fting near the Kum-bum monastery was to be decided by the trad­
itional practice of oracle revelation and lot-drawing, and re­
vesting that a .permit be issued for the boy found in Cl-ning 
to'proceed"to Lhasa;to .1 take part in the’pending ceremony. The 
Chines© government, fully realising that the choice and the 
installation would tremendously affect its position in regard 
Tibet and might offer an opportunity to solve the fundamont- 
issue of Tibet’s status in relation to itself# decided that 
the Chairman of the Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Aff- 
atrs should be jointly responsible with the regent in supervis­
e s  the ceremony* This decision was conveyed to -the Lhasa 
government by Chang Y;®i-pei, who was in charga of the radio 
service set up since General Hoang*s last mission, and who, 
after the death of Liu pu-ch*en at his post and the departure 
oi> Chiang Chih-yu in the summer of 193-3# had been acting the 
Faison officer for the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Comal 3 g- 
ion* After long deliberation, the Lhasa government finally 
^Pressed its concurrence, which was transmitted by its rapres- 
efttative to the national government In a communication dated 
beeember 18# 1938* The national government therefor® issued 
aft order on December 28, appointing fcu Chung-hsin, Chairman of 
^*Q Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs# and Ra-dreng
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Hutukhtu,'tha regent ■ of Tibat# 'jointly to supervise all matters
In connection; with': the - reincarnation ;a M  las tails ttoa of the
new Dalai lama, ' Of this order the regent acknowledged the
14 7 \
receipt and expressed his acceptance.
Wu Chung-hsintg Mission to Officiate at the 
Installation of the Present Dalai Lama . ■
’’ The Chinese government at .first thought of designating 
someone near or in £ibet to officiate on its behalf, but later 
decided that the Chairman of the Commission in charge of Tibet­
an Affairs should himself undertake the .mission 'in'order to 
c&rry more weight in the discussions regarding the readjustment 
Sino-Tibetan relations. On March 29, 1959# this decision 
communicated to the Lhasa government. On April 25 a reply 
was received expressing hearty welcome, but suggesting that Mr, 
V.U come by sea. The latter part of the message implied the 
Ubetan fear of offending the British power. In reality, it 
^mounted to leaving the final decision to the British govern-
fteht which could have easily blocked Mr. VJu* s entry by refusing
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1:0 give him the necessary transit visa.
In fact, the British transit visa was not given until Oct-
°ker, and it was given only after repeated efforts had been
LU Chung-hsin*s official report on his mission to Tibet, 
W^ i-tsang pao kaor pp,
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ntadg by ths Chinese Embassy In, London. Tho Chinese ambassador 
^as atvfirst-told by.tha British'foreign Office -:that applieat- 
ion for a transit visa to enterIlbat should■ hays.:beah mad©, by 
the Tibetan authorities through the Indian government. ; Of 
course, the Chinese envoy would not accept such a procedure, 
which was contrast to diplomatic practice. He argued,that no 
visa should require that an application he made by a local gov­
ernment instead of going through the proper diplomatic channel. 
But. he was-kept waiting'till October, after, the 'Earopean/war. v.;.,. 
had broken out. It is likely that the granting finally of a 
transit visa was due nore to changes in the international situ­
ation than to the efforts of the Chinese Embassy. The British 
foreign Office might have by then realised that they had to
loosen their grip on Tibet a bit and that it was advisable not
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*0 hurt unnecessarily the feelings of the Chinasa who had 
been fighting desperately against one of the Axis powers.
Mr. Yoi and his staff loft Chungking by plane on October 
21* bound for Calcutta by way of Bangoon. After a short stay
Calcutta and Kalimpong, they took the Yatung-Gyantse route 
(the same route travelled by the Younghusband Mission in 1905- 
1^04) and reached Lhasa on Lecomber 1$ amidst a colourful wal- 
. :
lj9. in using the word »unnecessarily« here, the writer has in 
p h d  the closing of the Burma Road for three months in the next 
Je&j* (1940) which the British authorities explained as & -access- 
measure in the circumstances. But the Chinese people Tall- 
14 to understand the necessity for such an appeasement, ospec* 
iaU y  whan the end did not justify tha means.
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coma, ,, Mr* Wu, ;while:awaiting the British,transit, visa, .dir­
ected Knag Ch!ing-tmmg, :..who succeeded Lo~sang-ehieft-t3an as 
director of Tibetan Affairs, and nine other.members-of the 
staff of the Mongolian and■ Tibetan''-Affairs Commission,^to..-pro­
ceed,to .Lhasa'.by land via TachUenlu, so that Kuag would-bo,." 
able to officiate, on his behalf -at the -Installation ceremony-, 
tn case he was prevented-from attending'in1 person«.. .. hung and
his party left Chungking on July 2'and reached the Tibetan cap-
. . ' ■ 150 : ■
Ital.on..November 25# only three weeks-before V.'u* s arrival,
T.u;was - supposed to come to Lhasa to supervise the oracle 
revelation and lot-drawing procedures for the purpose of choos­
ing the true incarnation out of the three candidates. But 
upon his arrival he found that the regent had eliminated the 
other two candidates and the candidate from Kokonor was the 
°nly claimant to the pontiff chair. In fact, the sllon (equi- 
Vi*lent to prims minister and sometimes misinterpreted as king 
°f Tibet) sponsored one of the other two candidates and raised 
objections to what the regent had done, but the latter succeed- 
in having the silon*s opposition overruled by the national 
assembly. .
The Chinese mission of course supported the pro-Chinese
V * * * *  - v n » -  ~  w , * - , » « , . . .  . . .  w r w m t  -w •*■■■**,
vs secretary to fu, and visited Tashi-lhunpo with another sem- oer of the.mission, flsi Lun, on Wu’s behalf.
regent. As s matter of procedure* it demanded that a request 
should-be' made"byi the regent to the national government for the 
exemption' of - the.' lot-drawing process, ■' and: that'" therhoy should 
W  identified by Mr. b u i n  a private "interview. To this the 
''regent"readily-expressed his-'consent.''- ;'r
Thus-on January 26, 1940, the regent sent Mr. Y.'u a commun­
ication asking the central government to confirm La-mu-tan-chu 
hs the - reincarnation'' of the Dalai Lama without" the' performance 
°f drawing lots*'- The .communication, stated .that"after many i n ­
v e s t i g a t i o n s  and according to all the indications, this hoy had 
been proved without any douht to ha the reincarnation of the 
i^th Dalai Lama. It went on to say*
"IVhsn ha was horn, an image of the house whore his parents 
^wd t  appeared in the Holy Lake of Ch’u-k’o-chi, and this was 
lator again seen and confirmed ly an investigating party headed 
^7 myself. Furthermore, various divine omens foretold that ho 
Was to be born in the eastern part of Tibet. let throe part­
e s  were sent out in three different directions to make sure a 
*rdo incarnation would be located. The party sent to the east 
beaded by Chi-ts’ang (Kyi-tsang) ilutukhtu at first had found 
fourteen male children who bore extraordinary omens and rire 
aPPearances. Among these was this boy by the nans of La-nu- 
^an^chu, b o m  on the sixth day of the sixth month of the I-hai 
(1933) into tha family bearing the surname of Ch’i in the 
^^ •Sinity of Kum-bua Monastery in Kokonor. At the time of Ids
■ ■ : ' :219
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Mrtii, .all tiia people in the s m s  village saw a felicitous 
rainbow pointing towards his house. Afterwards, when the in­
vestigating party arrived at Ills house, although both the fat­
her and the mother had no knowledge of the Tibetan languigo, 
the little boy was very happy to see ,the party and uttered 
words in the Tibetan dialect. Then ha was tested by four art­
icles which had been in daily use by the Dalai Lama, each of 
the four articles having a replica. The boy picked up the 
genuine one in each case. Therefore, all the people, eccles­
iastical and secular, rich and poor, old and young, sincerely 
believed that he was the true incarnation of the 13th Dalai 
Lama. . Since this had been agreed upon unanimously, the per- ; 
fowuwc«-Of lot-drawing from the golden vase would ?esa to bo 
^necessary, and he should.have his hair shaved and be ready to 
take the vows. As Keng-chfcn year is astrologically approp- | 
Mate, tho 14th day of the 1st month (February 21, 19*0) has 
been selected for tho installation ceremony of ascending the 
Pontiff Chair. It is toped that this will moot with.the app-- 
roval of the central government, and an early reply is request-
151 ■ -ed,n
The national government, upon raceiving the above eomaun- 
icatlon and .the favourable recommendations of Mr, ”u,.issued. m  
order on February 5 for dispensing with the lot-drawing.process:
*51. Ju taang nao kao. pp. 13-20. The original text is much 
}°h£er 7&na contains "many Buddhistic terms, a literal trsnslat- 
;Jh of which would hardly be worthwhile. Only a synopsis is 
civen hare.
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&hd for proclaiming the boy as the 14th Dalai Lama* At the
Sam© time, It made a special appropriation of four hundred
thousand dollars in Chinese national currency as a grant to
cover the expenses of the Installation ceremony. The regent
ehd the members of the bKa’-blon sent a telegram on the 1 7 th 
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>o express their thanks to the central government.
As to the private interview between Mr, lu and the boy for 
the purpose of identification, some objections were raised among 
the high dignitaries of the church. The latter insisted that 
the hoy could only receive Mr. »¿u in audience, while Mr. V.u 
r§fU3ad to recognise the boy as the Dalai Lama designate unloss 
was so proclaimed by the central government, and the private 
interview was necessary before he could make a recommendation 
fc)r dispensing with the lot-drafting process. Only after the 
Personal intervention of the regent did the opposition give in, 
•^ he private interview took place on the morning of January 31 
^hsidg a small pavilion in the Jewel Park (Nor-pu-ling-ka), one 
aild a half miles out of Lhasa. Mr, V»u conversed with the boy 
iov about a quarter of an hour and presented him with four 
Sifts, including a watch, which greatly pleased him, Mr. ?,u 
*as deeply impressed by the dignified and natural manner of the 
who was only four and a half years old* A photograph was 
*{dten on this occasion with Mr. V.u and the boy sitting side by
l5!> IMS.» p. 22. .
side in front of the pavilion.
The solemn installation ceremony was hold at the Potala 
at 5 a.n., on February 22, 1940. About five hundred persons 
were privileged to attend* As remarked by fir Charles Bell,^ 
«in the Tibetan mind etiquette is of the first importance"* 
therefore the arrangement of the scats presented special diff­
iculty, The pontiff chair was facing south) the members of 
the Chinese mission, the Chinese liaison officer, and other 
Chinese officials together with the representatives of Nepal 
and Bhutan were placed cn the right facing west) while the reg­
ent, the silon, the hutukhtus, and other high ecclesiastical 
dignitaries were on the opposite side facing east. Down in 
the bis.ll facing the pontiff chair war« seated the members of 
the UCa’-blon, secular officials, and representatives of arts-, 
tocratic families. The master of.ceremonies:at first intended 
to place Nr. Pa at the top of the right hand row vis-a-vis the : . 
regQnt or silon* Bo doubt he had it in mind to place Dir 
Basil Gould, who was sent there to attend the ceremony on be- | 
half of the British government, on the.right also. But the 
Chinese mission insisted that the precedent set by the Resident; 
or Aaban should be followed. At lost the Tibetans agreed end| 
Mr* I'U sat on the. same side as the.now .Dalai .Lama, his parents,;
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P« '^2*; . 'For .details., see ChmShae-i, on,
^54* Bell, P o rtrait of-the E»alai.,-Lu«at - p* 246,
and his tutor, all facing south. It was because of this seat-'.;
iug arrangement that Sir Basil Gould refused to be present.
Ke tendered congratulations the next day when th3 new Dalai
tea-received him in audience. From the seating of Mr. ?<u
alone we can see that the Chinese representative asserted the
traditional position of China in Tibet and did much more than
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present & ceremonial scarf.-.
.There were several other things h e ; did. which have ..their
significance. A week before the Installation ceremony (Feb-
^dary 155 Mr. \Vu, in the name' of the President of the Republic
China, conferred on the regent a tltlo with golden patent
6nd golden seal, and decorated him with the Grand Order of
Auspicious ¿ado Second class in u solemn ceremony at the reg-
sut's own monastery. The title conferred was actually announ-
c®d in November, 1955# and the intention at that tin® had been -
that it should be presented by the Special Commiesicnar who was
have escorted the Panch’en on his return. In the afternoon
°f the same day Mr. bu sent his aides to decorate the members
tho bKa!-blon with tho Third Class Plaque of the same ord- 
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155. Ju tScirip fl&o • ICriop pp* ■ ■ . *&5j ■ ^-. op« . ciLt?• y - -
5^6, xhld.. pp, 75-7d. According to the Chinese regulations 
dpV'srnlng conferment of decorations, the First Class Auspicious 
««ids ¿3 confined to the Chief of State. . So this second class 
tha highest that could be conferred on the regent. See 
Iso Wu*s report, pp. 15*16.
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,: Since - W , s  .-mission - was; intended, to-, readjust ;Sino- fibs tan ;••.
relations,, .he- brought up three problemsj.- viz.i
..-..I.*:...-.The.. Improvement :of, • and .increase .of facilities^to, .? 
the communications between Tibet and the central govern-
: 2, . The ’return.. to. Tibet :of tho.Punch’on’s remains!-. „
.3* - The demands proposed by the Panch*en’ 3 followers as 
conditions of their-return to Tibetj
&hd he dispatched Chou K ’un-t’ien, Kung Ch’ing-tsung, and 
Chang liel-pei to discuss them with the members of the tKa’-blon 
ftt the Ko-hsia (Kashag, or the Cabinet Office) on Lhtrch 10«
The latter premised to give a written reply after careful del­
iberation. Mr* Hu was then told that the regent mas having 
Great difficulty in solving them anti that Sir Basil Gould had 
Earned the Lhasa authorities against discussing any political 
Problems with Hu or anybody designated by him, and a sited to be
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informed should any such discussion take place*
On April 2 a written reply was received. The Tibetan 
Go^ernmsnt expressed therein their appreciation of the increas­
ing patronage shown by the central government. They explained 
the difficulties they were facing, such as & shortage of food 
Production, lack of sufficient funds to provide offerings to 
the Buddha ana maintenance for the monks, and the drain on the 
treasury from military expenses necessitated by tin stationing 
troops on the border, whose presence prevented the pilgrims 
re® coming and therefore reduced the income of the monaster- „
ty. 1 bid«, pp* 17 and 4.S*
.its. They finally, expressed the hope that Da-ge,. Huo-k* 1^, end 
% arong would bo returned to their control so that peace might 
■be assured,and comnunlcations facilitated. In■ other words,
they wanted, first to .settle ;the ..boundary, issue and asked the 
central government to pay,a territorial.price before, the prob­
lems .of cosaaanlcation improvement and..the, return, of v .the,Panch*- 
cn»s followers ware.-discussed. . ■ .However,, -they expressed their
Readiness to receive the remains .of the,:Panch‘en, but asked
- ..... ■ . . . : , 158 ■ , ,  
also concerning the whereabouts of his valuables.
Hr, Wu, realising that there was no prospect of settling 
these problems even if he prolonged his stay for a few months, 
decided to send a letter to the Ko-hsia (Kashag) on April 14, 
the day of his departure, in which he told the Tibetan cabinet 
that those problems were to be taken up further by the Director 
the Office of the ¡Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission 
lh Tibet, and that he could not transmit to the central govern­
ment their request for the return of De~g@, Huo-k’o, end Myar- 
°hg, as these districts since the reign of Emperor Shih-tsung 
(1^25-1755) bid been placed under tlio jurisdiction of Yachow-fu 
the province of Szechuan and had not originally belonged to
a * * . 159
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153* Ibid,, pp. 27-23,
l59* Ibid., pp, 28-29.
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The Getting Up in Lh-.sa of n permanent Office fey 
the ftatton^I Government • ■
Before hi3 departure, Hr. bu managed to have a permanent 
office set up in Lhasa to act on behalf of the Commission for 
Mongolian and Tits?tan Affairs. As mentioned before, of the 
two liaison officers left in Tibet by General Huong, ones had 
W e d  at his post and tho other had left Tibet in the summer of 
2-933. Their work since then had been taken on by Chang V.ei- 
Pei who, though a very capable man, was handicapped by his 
Relatively low rani:, and whoso duty as master of the radio 
station prevented him from devoting adequate time to liaison 
T‘'ork. Hr* V,u on Harch 13 sent Uls adviser, Hal Lun, to sea 
the regent and inform him that the central government intended 
to establish a High Commissioner in Tibet. The regent o'xpl- 
W n o d  his difficulties as follows: (1) The internal situation 
°f Tibet was delicate and complicated. For the central gov- 
eRnment to set up a high post in Tibet at this time would eas­
ily give rise to misunderstanding. (2) Sir Basil Gould was 
5till there. As ha was paying such close attention to the
development of Sino-Tibetan relations, especially their polit­
ical aspect, the Tibetan government had to be scrupulous and 
3houid not give him a pretext for Intervention or for pressing 
a similar demand. (J) According to the practice established 
V  the la te  Balai Lama, matters of such importance ought to bo 
Referred to the national assembly, whore, as far as he could
see, there was no chance of getting it passed. Should it be 
rejected, he would feel guilty of having damaged the prestige 
of the central government. As he was ever grateful to the 
central government, he would do whatever he could to realise 
its intentions at a sore promising sonant. For the tiso being 
be suggested, therefore, that Mr. til leave the setter In his
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hands without pressing for. an immediate solution. '.
hu reported the regent’s anewor to Chungking. On March 
22, 1940, ha received instructions to the effect that Instead 
of a high commissionership, an «office of the Mongolian and 
Tibetan Affairs Commission in Tibet« should bo set up* This 
ties Mr. Y.u choso to avoid any negotiation. He simply notif­
ied the regent and the cabinet in writing of its inauguration 
°h April 1, and appointed on March 25 hung Chfing-tsung as the 
director of the office, and Chang Aei-pei as deputy. To allay 
ahy possible misunderstanding, Mr. fu sent Ms aides to'explain  
Ibe moaning of this establishment and its function to the reg­
ent and the members of the biCa’-blon.
The dispute between the regent and the silon over the
choice of the new Dalai Lama has already been mentioned* Ac-161
c°rdlng to hu’s report, the silon collaborated ’with Taiji
1£0. Ibid., p. JO,
I5W  Ibid., p. 59.
'Su-to, Ku-sung-tzu (for:aer director of tho bureau of finance),
lo2.and tbs above-mentioned An-ctoin Rutukhtu, and triad in 1939 
to overthrow the Ba-dreng regency. The plot '»vas discovered 
‘-on Ku-sang-tzu liras condemned to exile. But the silon, though 
bis function had been suspended, was still a potential enemy of 
the.regent.
The struggle for power between the regent and the predom­
inantly pro-British Young-Tibct group has also been mentioned, 
¿low this ambitious military cliqua became oven more unausy when 
they saw the honour done to their rival by the Chinese mission 
^hd the setting up of the permanent office by the Commission 
ior Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, Moreover, the establish­
ment in Tach’ienlu of a Preparatory Commission to cr ;ate tho 
Province of Sikang, and talk by some irresponsible elementa
^2* Supra, pp, 203, 206. An-ch*in was an outstanding follow-er of tno late Punch1on lama. In the spring of 1957# after a quarrel with other a sabers of the Panch1 enf s entourago, ho wont JJ Boiping# Following tho outbreak of tho war with Japan, to J*id not sake contact with the national government, • I t  was ■ ro~ Ported that to had toon appointed by the puppet rtgias in'Pol- : Ping as the Chairman of its Commission for Mongolian and 'Tttot- r11 Affairs and that to tod returned to Tibet in April, 1959, engage in subversive activities. hr, Vhi ashod him to send 
j tilagraa to Chungking to declare his allegiance, which to did Vs©e b'u*s report, Ju tsan^  rao kao. pp, 16 i.rnd 31.) This 3J|tor found in the Japanese Foreign Office archives (Reel S -g 1,6,1,5-4, Buakyo Aokl1s report) that it was An-chfin helped to get a Japaese nosed J ln z o Homoto in to  Tibet to f^ foria «a special duty,n Hud his anti-regent activities in rltot been connected with tho Japanese, and tod they boon succ- Q33ful, the status of Tibet might have changed radically.
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of extending the Sikang boundary by force to Xiang-ta which
Chao Erh-feng’s army had reached and Fu Mu-ling had claimed
165
as the demarcation line in his proposal to the throne, pro­
vided these military men with means of persuasion. They 
therefor© joined hands with the silon^s group and accused the 
regent of dictating the choice of the Dalai Lama in order to 
satisfy his personal ambition. They also charged him with
inducing the Chinese fore© to enter Tibet to suppress them and
164 ■ ■ ' ■ ■
to consolidate his own rule.
Tho Pro-British Young-Tibet Group Coming to Power
Facing this combined opposition and realising the dis­
satisfaction of the British with the Tibetan situation and tho 
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increasing British support given to the Young-Tibet group,
the regent Ra-dreng thought it advisable to withdraw for a
163, gome Chinese writers assert that in 1912 Yin Chang-heng’s 
army also reached-Xiang«t&. Hsi tsang chi yao, pp. i97, m ,
states cloarly that it did not go so far. For the full text 
°f Fu* s proposal dispatched on the eve of the outbreak of rev­
olution in 1911# see Hung Ti-chen, op. cit., pp, 189-192.
164. The following account of Ra-drong» s downfall and the 
defeat of tho monk3 is based chiefly upon Jen Nai-ch’iang# 
"Hsi tsang eblng pien#* K»ang tsang yen chiu. Ho. 9,
X947, pp, 16- 2 2 .
Sept» JO,
165 » How York Times, Feb. 4, 1940# See. 4# p. 4, col. 8. rep 
orted that j Tb . Gould was watching over British and Italian 
interests in the new reign.
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time and appointed in 1941 Yttn-tseng Ta-dsa, an abbot of 
a snail monastery, to be the acting regent. For the first 
few months ha managed to hold the reins behind the scene, tat 
gradually the acting regent was being won over by the opposit­
ion, and the appointees of the ex-regent were ousted one after 
another until the Young-Tibet group gained full control of the 
government.
In the early part of 1947, whan every indication pointed 
to a showdown, Ta-dsa expressed on several occasions his read­
iness to resign on the pretext of old age. To eliminate any 
chance of Ra-dreng* s regaining power, the Young-Tibot group 
decided to resort to force. On April 14 they surrounded Ra- 
drong Monastery and arrested Ra-dreng on the charge that he tad 
Plotted against the acting regent to regain power through imp­
roper means. The three leading monasteries immediately took 
UP arms and demanded Ra-dreng’s release. The Young-Tibet 
group at first adopted delaying tactics until reinforcements 
came from Gyantss and then launched an attack on Gera Monastery 
fdiich was supposed to he the centre in the anti-army movement, 
After a week of fighting the monks were defeated,
V.hlle the fighting was going on, the national government 
s°ht a radiogram to the Lhasa authorities asking them to give
166, x, Tolstoy, * Across Tibet from India to China, ** National 
ffi&graphloal Magazine, X C  (Aug, 1946), p, 178, gives the name 
% w a h g  Sungrab "itatoh Galtsen,
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2J1
due protection to Sera Monastery, one of the most sacred cen­
tres of Buddhism,-...to settle the dispute -toy ^ peaceful swans, and 
not to do, any harm to the ex-regsnt, In reply,;they wired 
hack the following message!
: Ra-dreng Eutukhtu, ' the ex-regent, was arrested on 
: ■ ; the-charge that he 'had plotted to overthrow the present ‘ 
regent*" . Unfortunately: the monks of Sera Monastery, as 
well as some'other monasteries, misunderstood this fact 
and opposed this ■ government.:; ; To maintain law and order 
this-government sent troops to quell all subversive act»
: ivities. No damage was done to the monastery, and, 
more important, all Chinese officials and traders in 
Lhasa were well protected.
It was said that the radiogram from Chungking had the effect of
hastening the end of Ra-drengfs life. ■ He was"first made blind
167
*dd then poisoned in prison.
The change in Lhasa in 1941 which brought the eventual 
downfall of the pro-Chinese regent greatly affected Oino-Tibet- 
relations. The pro-British Young-Tibet group soon after 
they had established themselves in power set up in the summer 
°f 1945 a Bureau of Foreign Affairs under the Ko-hsia (Kashag) 
and informed the Office of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs 
Commission in Tibet that its business should henceforth be 
conducted with that Bureau and no longer with tha Ko-hsia 
Erectly. This move amounted to treating Chungking as a 
foreign power and asserting that Tibet was an independent 
Country. Tho Chinese officials in Lhasa would not, of course, 
^cognise tills new establishment and insisted on having direct
Li »»nr-r.htftnr" Shen t>i tl' hsi ts«n& (Talpeh, 1951)^ P» 54*
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Contact with the Ko-hsia as usual. .. The Xoung-Tibot . group 
employed ;every possiWLe means to-aako the Chinese officials ■ 
yield to their new creation. For example,' thsy:.. arras ted tho 
■ Chines® residents In Lhasa and subjacted them to all kinds of 
ill-treatment* : : Then they gave the Chines® officials to under­
stand that if they -/would merely protest to the Bureau of For­
eign Affairs these Chinese residents would he released at once 
and even compensated for their damages, When that failed, 
they resorted to the stoppage of all provisions to the Chineso 
officials which, however, proved unsuccessful. This deadlock 
dragged on for soma time. At last Chungking warned them that 
should they continue to force the Chinese officials to conduct 
business through this so-called Foreign Office, tho national 
government would ho compelled to use force in order to safe­
guard Its traditional position. At tha same time, a concent­
ration of Ch1inghai and Eikang troops on the Tibetan border 
^as ordered and carried out. Perhaps due to the realisation 
°f their military impotence# or perhaps duo to the timely ad- 
viee of some foreign power, they abandoned their attempt to
forca the Is l u o . But their Bureau of Foreign Affairs remain-
163
ed in existence.
After the Burma Road had been cut off by the Japanese in
x*I Yu-I, "Ti-kuo-chu-i ch* In Iftah hsi tsang tl shih shih,w 
^historical Facts of Imperialistic Invasions of Tibet), an ort-
®®bodi©d in a booklet entitled.
v8Tibet Pending Liberation®)# (1950) > p* 55* T K e T u t t E r w a s ^
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1943, tli3 Chinsss government planned to construct a Chinese- ■ 
Indian; highway'-through Tibet. Being'asked to;sound out the. 
opinion of the Lhasa authorities on the oat ter;..-the' Director 
of .the Office of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission 
in Tibet reported that the/ would not favour such a project, 
he -stressed--'the necessity of getting British consent in advance 
and suggested■that military pressure .should be brought to bear 
on the Tibetan government to sho?# Chinese'determination to = 
carry it through. In fact, neither the British government nor 
the Lhasa authorities were willing to have such a highway, 
which would bring not only additional Chinese influence but 
also new American influence into Tibet. At first each made 
excuses that the natter should bs referred to tho other. When 
they-were finally-pressed for a definite answer, the Lhasa 
authorities replied that wIt conflicts with the Buddhist ballof
169 '
°f the country to permit any work of that magnitude.” The
Chinese survey groups on the Cikang-Tibotan border were driven 
^ack by tho Tibetan garrison force. In connection with tho 
transport through Tibet, an American military mission was sent 
tc Lhasa in 1943 and dealt with tho so-called Tibetan Bureau 
Foreign Affairs. This American mission night have created
o f t h a  eleven J f
«S a& M ifM u SttSw1 (« d a lly . “» «
«luted it the Time, but only eleven tot tuo ^ritish
H s a , -the rest being rejected.) -
I6 9 , X e a  l e - l ,  » C b u a g -y in  f a m s - l u  e t t h  c M n s - c h l ^ e h l a - e h l , "  .  - 
U sn cht-lf.ng; shih eh'lnEi (Eapt. 1947)i ¥*> ;i0* ?» -5
goodwill among the Lhasa authorities, but its efforts to get 
transport facilities from Tibet were made in vain.
In order to readjust the strained relations with the un­
friendly Lhasa authorities, the Chinese government thought of 
sending new men and strengthening its office in Tibet. In 
August, 1944, Shen Tsung-lien was appointed to replace Kung 
Ch* ing-tsung,/and Chen Hsi-chang was appointed deputy. • A3 
soon as Shan reached Lhasa and assumed the office, ho started 
s series of talks with the Tibetan government which dragged on
for many months. As no common ground could bo found, the 
. A/0
talks mot with no success.
The Chinoso national government nado further efforts to 
■try to win over the estranged Lhasa authorities* In 1945, as 
a Result-of;the secret Xalta agreements lator recorded in the
Eoviot-Chlnese Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of August 14.
' ' ' 171 ■'.■■■■''
*^945, it recognized the independence of Outer Mongolia.
As repeatedly shown in this study, there was a long-standing 
close tie between Mongolia and Tibet. Such a recognition 
t'ould have an impact on Sino-Tibetan relations. As an « p r o  35- 
loh of goodwill, the Chinese government immediately made It 
clear to the Tibetans that they would receive without any res­
e c t i o n  a high degree of autonomy. Moreover, to further tho 
^■vancement of Tibet, tho Chinese government decided to assist 
- |
^ 0 »  Kuo min chtlng fu n i m  chi on (1945), Chap. 17, p*
Current History. Hew Carles, IX (Oet. 1945), pp*- 329-58*
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It in political and, economic development. In fact, on
August 25# 1945# Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek made a state- 
ment in the following words 1
If and when the Tibetans attain the stage of comp­
lete self-reliance in political and economic conditions, 
the Chinese government.would.like to■take the-same att­
itude as it did toward Outer Mongolia, by. supporting ■ 
.their independence. However* -Tibet should ba able to 
maintain and promote its. own independent position in 
order that, the historical tragedy of Korea might not bo 
,repeated*!/3 ,
172
Tibetan Participation in the Chinese 
National Assembly
When World War II came to an end and China began to play
her role as ono of tha Big Five Powers, the attitude of the
Hhasa authorities, or rather that of the Young-Tibot group,
towards the Chinese national government became less hostile,
174
tout still far from friendly. In 1946, at the time when
172» Ta Kung Pao. August 25, 1945» P* 1* mentions that tho 
Sixth plenary Cesslon of Kuomintang decided to grant Tibet & 
toigh degree of autonomy.
175* Tills statement was made in addressing the National Supreme 
uofense Council and the Central Executive Committee of Kuomin- 
^^ng* , .Ta Rung Peo. August 25, 1945# P* lj lew York Times. 
August 25# 1945# P* 1# cols. o-7l P* 3# col. 2* . liereey »th®
historical tragedy of-Korea* ho meant the declaration of Indep­
endence in 1895 only to be annexed by the instigator fifteen 
Years-later* > ■ • - • • •
174« There is another point which has a boaring on the Tlbetnn 
attitude towards the Chinese national government. In 194J,
‘-ho Chinese central government’s troops entered Cinki&ng (Chin- 
esQ Turkestan) and brought this big province, the next-door 
Neighbour of Tibet, under tho actual (a3 heretofore only ncmin- 
al) control of tho national government. For details see Alch- 
eh K. Wu, China and the Soviet Union (1950), pp. 261-62,
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the national assembly'was about to ba convened to adopt a con­
stitution! an invitation was issued to tho Tibetan government 
to send delegates to take part in the deliberation-which was ..to 
determine the legal status of Tibet. ■ As mentioned above, 
seats bad -always been allotted to Tibet since the. first nation­
al, assembly convened, soon after the establishment .of,the,repub-, 
lie*' In 1941 Tibetan delegates had participated'• in. the natio­
nal assembly-to draft an organic law for ..the national. govern­
ment# . : If chronological order may be disregarded for a moment, 
mention might as wall be made here of the participation of the 
Tibetan delegates in the .national assembly convened in 1943 to., 
elect the President and tho Vico President of China according 
to the now constitution, and of tho fact that there were Tibet­
an members in the legislative Than and the Control Yflsn oven
on the eve of the evacuation of the national .government from
175 . ■
hanking in 1943.
In 1946 the Kuomintang and the Chinese communists, to­
gether with some smaller parties, were still negotiating for
175« In the Legislative Yuan ten seats were allotted for the 
Tibetan members among whom five were to ba sent from Tibet,
Mills the other five were to bo sleeted by Tibetans living in 
China Proper* (Mdng ta&ng vtteh oao. the official publication 
of the Mongolian ana Tibetan Affairs Commission, Voi. 19, Ho. 6, 
P. 9*) The last occupants of these seats were T fUr*tan-sang- 
Pu, Chiang-pa-a-wong, Ian-tseng~tung-ehf& 3h, Chi-chln-mei,
Ts’ai-3en-t’uan-chu, T ’u-tan-ni-ma, Lo-sang-chien-tsan, and Na~ 
^ang-chin-pa. The last aim members of the Control Ytten werei
Chiang-pa-cha-hsi, Tan-pa-p»ang-ts’o, La-min-yi-hsi-ch’u-ch’on, 
Chi-ytt-chieh, Ho-pa-tun, and T*u-tan-ts*é-taa.
237
a compromise plan for national unification, and the Internat­
ional situation *33 highly favourable to the national govern­
ment. Though some foreign pressure was exerted on it with 
respect to this unification issue, none was then exerted on it 
ior China’s dismemberment. Paced with such an international 
situation, the Lhasa authorities found themselves even less in
* position to depart from established precedent. In response 
. , 176 
ro the invitation, they dispatched delegates to Nanking*
tfpon their arrival, however, those Tibetan delegates took the 
Position that they had received no power to discuss the draft 
constitution. Yet, when the assembly came to discuss the 
Proposal »Tibet’s local autonomy shall be decided by Law,» they 
demanded that this article be deleted. Finally, e compromise
solution was reached whoreby tho wording was changed to »Tib-
177
et’s autonomy shall be duly guaranteed.*1
The Installation of the Tenth Poach’en Lama
In the meantime another difference arose between Nanking 
&ild Lhasa, concerning the reincarnation of the Panch’m  Lama, 
*hose death, as we have already soon, had facilitated better
176. Namely, So-lang-wahg-tul. Ta*e-wang-tun-chu, J C » „ 
8 hang-ice, T ’u~tan-t3*è-tan, cfdang-pa-a-wang, To-chi-on-chu, 
^i-hst-ti-chi. For the full list of the names of the Tibetan^legates,, including those chosen by the Tibetans living in 
China Proper, see Ibid«» .Voi# 16, .Nos* '11-12,..p* 13*
177* Plen Sh eng Pao (Chongtu), October 18, 19^6, p. 1.
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Sino-Tibetan relations. in 19<1 the followers of tho lata 
Punch*©n Luma, Lo-sang-chLen-tsun and others, found in Chfing- 
kai' a boy - named .Kung-pao-tstf u-taa who seemed to answer to their 
traditional requisites, and identified him as the real incarn­
ation. The Lhasa authorities immediately raised objections to 
their choice and refused to recognise the boy even as a legit­
imate candidate. It looked'as if'..history ware going to repeat 
Itself— that China would back a Paneh*en to oppose a Dalai who 
^as being alienated by a foreign power and influenced by tho 
^oung-Tibet group. - But the Chinese national government acted 
Very cautiously and tried to avoid creating such a situation, 
it did not recognize the incarnation until the August of 19"19 
'^hen the Lhasa government had driven out all the Chinese offic­
ials from Tibet, and when most provinces had been lost to tho 
ChinQSQ Red Army and the seat of tho national government had 
teen moved to Canton. On August ,10 it deputed tho Chairman 
the Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, Ur. Kuan 
^ki-yu, to pros^ 0 tho installation ceremony of the Tenth 
^ n c h ’en which took place at tho famous Kurn-bum Monastery, the 
birthplace of the founder of the Yellow Gcct, Tsong-k’a-pa. 
i’hree weeks later, on September 5, £i-ning, the capital of 
Ch,inghai, together with the newly installed P&nch* on, fell 
into the hands of tho Chinese communists, and tho Chinese nat-
£I& Fu-hsi&ng, Kong tsaag chuang fcyuang. pp. 185-86. •
■ ■ " v  ' '\ 7 ! : ?3 ? : ' 7
lonal government retreated to Taiwan whan Canton and Chungking 
*ere lost on October 15 and December 1, respectively.
So far we have seen that though many attempts and some 
progress had been made, the Chinese national government did not 
re-establish China’s original position in Tibet, and the legal 
status of the latter in its relation to China remained undefin­
ed* On the part of the Lhasa authorities, they demonstrated 
aore than once signs of reconciliation towards the Chinese 
central government, but each time the rapprochement effort was 
frustrated by the Toung-Tibat group who eventually gained con­
trol of the Tibetan government. In 1930, the late Dalai Lama
told the semi-official delegate, Hiss Liu, that what he expect-
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eu most of China was real unity and peace. Indeed, only a
Whited and peaceful China can give Tibet needed assistance and 
Protection. If Tibet had entirely turned away from the power­
ful Great Britain and leaned towards a divided China fully en­
gaged in international war or civil strife, it would have stood 
the risk of endangering its own existence. Unfortunately, 
China, sinco the establishment of the Republic, had hardly en­
joyed any peace. Eight years of continuous hard struggle 
^Ith Japan were followed by a bloody strife between the Kuomla- 
t&ng and the Chinese communists# Even if the Tibetans wars 
ahxious to return to the fraternity of the Chinese family, a 
^-alistic consideration of the situation would make them bas-
^79. Supra« n* 37*
i tata*
Let us not forget that behind the.Internal contest for 
power between . the lanas, and the ambitious.,military .clique „in' ; 
Ubet, behind the repeated harder incidents and sporadic fight* 
ing between the Chinese and Tibetan forces, and behind the sud­
osa decision of the Chines© national government to stop the 
hinth Panch’en from proceeding to Tashi-lhunpo when he had al­
ready got as far as the Ch' inghai-Tibetan border, there was 
always an over-all international picture, and the manipulation 
°f invisible foreign hands. Heedless to say, the protracted 
Slno-Japanese war and the no less bitterly fought Kuomintang- 
Communist strife were precipitated by the international situa­
ron, and they themselves were (and in the case of the latter 
rill is) only a link in world politics.
But world politics became unfavourable to China in spite 
the fact that she emerged victorious from V.orld bar II.
Qhtcr Mongolia was disposed of at the Yalta conference without 
N i n a ’s participation and not even with China’s knowledge until 
®0ia® time afterwards. This deeply hurt Chinese prestige and 
*nsPired the Tibetans to follow the example of their kindred 
Mongolians* Therefore, the declaration made, and the provis- 
3,011 In tha constitution adopted, by the Chinese national gover- 
^ o n t  to guarantee Tibet’s autonomy, with a promise of support 
its eventual independence, failed to make the Young-Yibet 
gi,°dp rest assured* hhile tha civil strife between the Kuo- 
^htang and th© Chinos© communists made the Tibetans hesitate
.':240 ■
to com® to terms with Hanking even if they had had the Inten­
tion of doing so, .the : same international: development alienated 
them and-.encouraged : them .to'...assert 'immédiat®' independence
In Mareh-April of 1947 the Asiatic Conference,' which was: 
intended as a manoeuver to force the British out of India,
l3o
took place in Hew Delhi under the presidency of Mrs*  Haidu.
Besides the Chines© delegation, a Tibetan delegation was-;ln---
VIted* At the opening ceremony there was displayed in the
conference hall a huge map of Asia on which Tibet was drawn
■ l8l
outside the boundary of China. The correction was reluct-
18o, A t :the time.When the conference opened. Great Britain had 
already' expressed her ^tllininasa ■ to evacuate India an Lr* 
Hehru had been made deputy prime minister* Ua found it un- 
necessary and inconvenient for him to preside at the conference 
thick was supposed - to --be a non-governmental organization*
•^1, Most of the maps printed in the United Kingdom and some 
Pointed in other countries.made:-: this-mistake* Ho wonder the
chairman of the El Salvador delegation to the United Nations,~h his letter to.the President :of -the General Assembly, reques- 
¿®d the inclusion of the Tibetan appeal on the agenda of the
*ifth Session, saying* «Anyone who takes the trouble to look at 
54*ap of Asia will realize that Tibet is separate and entirely 
different from the territory of China« (C,N* Document A 1534, 
{£▼• 18, 1950). Here..-..the writer is reminded of an incident
Jdat occurred in 1955 when he was studying in London. In that 
Jea* a Chinese 'Exhibition under royal -patronage was held in Lon- 
«on. The Chinese government sent a part of the Palace Treas- 
dre to be displayed, and dispatched Mr. Cheng Tien-hsi as a 
BP®ciai envoy on this cultural mission. Dr. Cheng had a map 
r* China printed on the cover of the catalogue by a London prin- 
u hg house. On the opening day some Chinese students discov- 
that Tibet was not included within the boundary line on map, A ;censur®:©f the matter.:was called for by the Chln-
r®® Student Association and the error was immediately correct- - 
The writer wonders why the same mistake was persistently 
in spite of the repeated efforts of the Chinese official 
representatives and private individuals to call the publisher’s 
attention to this obvious mistake.
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*ntly undertaken only after representation had been .made to
hr, Nehru ty Mr, - George Yeh «ho was: then the Director of the ..
European Affairs Department in the Ministry of Foreign ."Affairs. ,
end who attended the conference as an observer attached'; to /the vJy
182
Chinese delegation.
■ "It seeas "Strangs that such an; incident -happened'.again, in 
the autumn of 1948 when. the members of the Diplomatic Corps, in 
how Delhi were invited' to see a film entitled «Kashmir« while ■ 
the. K a sh m ir dispute between India and Pakistan was:being taken ^  
Up hy -¿he Security Council of the United Nations* The Chinese ; 
Ambassador, Professor Lo Cliia-lun, saw on the film a map of 
Kashmir with its neighbour Tibet drawn outside the Chinese boun­
dary line* Us lodged a written protest on his return to the 
Em bassy* The Indian government d id  not r e p l y  for. some.,time* 
ter having been urged .several....times,. , it replied to . say , that 
the film was not made by tho Indian government, which would, , 
howQ-yer, pay attention to this matter henceforth* Yet the map , 
tn the film remained uncorroctcd*
In February, 1943, a Tibetan trade mission headed by Hsia-§ 
Eu-pa ' (shakatpa) arrived- at New Delhi and .held,, severalt..*lits . 
n t h  th® Indian government* ■■ . As the mission Included.a military,
^  Chia-lun, »Chieh k ’ai chung yin chien yu kuan hsi-tsarus 
(Raisa Op the Curtain on tho Tibetan Issue in Sino-Ind- 
j S  Eolations), T*6 :Yn_chunfiJmoj ...III (Oct, 1950), No*,.7, p, ,, 
Bril* long article cites cases to show the continuity of
*1* P°4icy by tho Indian government not only in Tibet ,but "■"
s° in Bhutan, Nepal and Eikkim in the years 1947-1950* ; ^
133, I b i d . ,  p* 2 3 1 *
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nan '-named Sul S'fins (Surkhang), ^ on© .might présuma that:'- 
their■talks war© not'confined, to commercial matters -such:as 
the relaxation of Indian control on Tibetan exports-of wool : 
and musk,. and the ''.Tibetan ; request: to be allowed-to receive.': p&yv 
nents in- American dollars, instead of .rupees*- .- After repeated ' 
Persuasions .by. the Chinese Embassy-in. Hew Delhi,'.the. mission 
-then .went t o -Hanking,' where-they, managed somehow or other to 
get special facilities to visit Great Britain and the United
States without obtaining a passport from the Chinese govern- 
185
dsnt* The mission returned to New Delhi towards the end of
*943* They then changed their tune and talked about immediate
186
Independence* On Hew Tear's eve, Ur. Lo, the Chinese Amb­
assador, wrote a letter to Ur." Bahru expressing Ills hope that 
Indian dealings with the Tibetan mission would not be in ony 
Way detrimental to the sovereignty and territorial Integrity of 
China* As the Indian Prime Minister (concurrently the Foreign;
I84, Tu Po's article in the Chinese communist organ Jan Uln J ih 
on Sept. 7, 1949.
*85, Li Yu-i, in his article, *Ti-kuo-chu-i chin lttch hsi tsang 
shlh shih** embodied 'in; the_ booklet T&i - chi eh fang ti hal - -
PP* 3&~37, blamed his old professor, Ambassador XeXThton 
Un?Jri* for M s  alleged part in bringing tho mission over to the 
<u-ted states.
t?6. According to Li Yu~i (ibid*. p* 36), after the return of
“ha Tibetan delegation from the Asiatic Conference, the Lhasa 
wvernaent received a - lot > of, letters. and, documents,from abroad - 
J^glng them to-secure independence and advising them how-to 
e?Ply for admission to the-United Nations * - As the Tibetan 33ur» 
of Foreign Affairs had only eno member who could do -tha;
i^nsiation from English, Li Yu-i was often asked privately to 
a hand.
Minister): was 'leaving;.fo^iAlahabaA'.the•.next; day, he,directed 
•the,Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr.vK.P.B,' Kem>a#v:who 
was'' formerly v Ambassador ■ to China, to reply-on his., behalf*
Mr. Menon: assured: the Chinese Ambassador that there was no such 
intention on the part of the Indian government, via February,,.. 
1949. this Tibetan mission' caae.-again-.•to-.the Indian.-capitals and
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got-in touch with. the. Indian,government.' , >■ •
Chinase Rationalist bfficlal.g.._Ousted
hf'the Lhasa Authorities
.on July 8, 1949, the Tibetan cabinet (Xo-hsla or hashag) 
decided to get rid of all the persons connected with the Chin- ; 
ese national government, including those working in the radio 
station and hospital, and the teachers of the Chinese primary ; 
schools in Lhasa and at Cyantse* . The Lhasa authorities 
took over the Chine so government radio station and sealed all 
its equipment. .They forbad© any Chinese to send telegraphic 
messages even through the Indian wireless service. , A part o f ; 
tho Chinóse personnel, including medical doctors and school 
taachers, together with their families, left Lhasa on the 13 th, 
Mr, Chen Esi-chsng,- the acting director of the Mongolian and
l%7* Lo ghia-lun, op. sit., P* 2P *
183, k Chinese urinary school was first established in Lhasa 
V t h t  liaison office^, Chiang Cbifc-yu, in 1917 ~má later taken 
°ver w  the Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs which v 
^Iso set up one at Gyantse afterwards,, Boo Chu Chao-l, ©£*, 
Mit,f pp, 1 1-12, 116, 120-21,
. • 244 ' ■
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Tibetan /Affairs. Costal salon', s , office in /Tibet, and/.the/ rest,
left a ¡.week later* Tha Chinese Embassy in New Delhi had been 
kept i n . the dark until the 21st then the; news .-.finally . reached 
them, on the 2Jrd !£r#.Lo went to,see.Mr. K.P.S..--.JIenon,vwho ■ 
informed him that the Indian government ..bad,-received telegrams 
from Lhasa: saying that there were communists among ^ the,.Chinos©
government personnel in.Lhasa and-the .Tibetan government had
190
found it necessary to got rid of .all/of; them, . :> General Yen
Hsi-shan, tho /President of the Executive-Than o f . the .-.Chine sc 
hational govoimcnt, issued a statement on August 6 in Canton, 
the;.temporary' capital, repudiating,the „Tibetan. anti*communist 
Pretext* He said that all the officials stationed in Tibet 
had undergone careful scrutiny before appointment and their 
loyalty was beyond question. "Even if the local authorities 
of Tibet had had a rsal complaint about any one of them,« he 
&dded, «the proper procedure would have been to report to tha 
central government.n In this statement ho further implied 
that tha drastic measure was probably not taken by tha Lhasa 
adthorities of their own volition, and he expressed the hops
1^9* .Director. Chen Tsung-lien left, Lhasa- for ■■.■consultation with" 
Ranking in 1946, Since then Chen had been in charge of the 
® J f i c a , ■.Sailing :Yao*wsn:was ■ afterwards appointed to,succeed./ / 
J'hon nhen the latter’s resignation was accepted, but Hsiung did
st- proceed.to .the.post#....
J?0. ho again saw Umon  on July 26 and 50 to talk on ■ the same 
**»Ject. "For details see Lo- Chia-lun,"Chung yin-chian kuan ' ■ 
*;} hsi-tsang w£n t’l ti mu nei chcng-chlen«* (Documentary Evid* 
/uce on yihetan Issue In Cino-Indian Relations), Trh yu cVnins 
^  (January, 1951), IV, Ho*. 2, 56*53. ' ' ~
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that: they: would .sake - amends" for, their ; fault; andino t be coma the J
m
dupe of■ others# - ' Ambassador to...also '„told* the - Indian press - " I 
■that.tha personnel of tha ■: Mongolian and'Tibetan Affairs tomstss- 
ion’s office in Tibet were not .communists*" -He compared the
hovo of the Lhasa government to «fishing for red herring on
■: 192 ■
such a high plateau. 151 He talked with Chen Hsi-ch-ng and 
questioned his staff separately vhen the latter arrived at Cal- , 
cutta# Ee was told that at the time when the Tibetan authorit­
ies were «about to take action and right after the action had 
been taken on July 8, tho former British trade agent in Tibet,
• n.s. Richardson, whose services-were retained by. tho Indi en
government, was extremely active and his office in Lhasa was
193
Unusually frequented by visitors.
*91* Cos the text of his statement in Yen vftan chf mr.' chan*' lim StiLZio (»A Collection of Statements on Political MatteiFTfaHe^ 1 “Y fen Hsi-shan ihile in Office as President of Executive yUrm") 
PP. 274-74. *
?;92* ho Chia-lun, »Chieh k ’&i chung yin chien yu kuan Hsi-tsar*U  ,®U|» jOB,,«—eft., p. ■ 234. -i y--..; : :
*93. ibid.f p. 235# For Chon’s report on what acutally happen- 
from the middle of June to July 20 sea Lo Chia-lun, ”Chung 
chien kuan vu Esi-tsang wOn t’i ti mu nsi ch£ng chien,n op.
S±£»* PP* 53- 50 .  When Chen and his secretary went to sea tha 
"dial Lama in the presence of tho regent to say good-bye, he 
*as well received, tut neither tho Dalai Lama nor the regent 
®uid a word. Chen, on tho ovo of his departure, got a message 
^forming him that »‘the mother of the Dalai Lama wishes to lot - 
the director Mr* Chen know that Els Holiness did not too« ho wai 
fe&ving,for good when he case to take his leave. Tha Dalai Asma was under the impression that'he was going to India to 
wPond a vacation.1*
2 4 7
:• • On the F,ve of-the Chinese ■ Communists*.
. , . Milltary Cairo at m.. Injribat
Jke Tibetan government easily got rid of all persons 
connected with the Chinese national government, but there rem­
ained the problem of how to stop the Chinese communists:from 
entering Tibet* To the Chinese communists, the question of 
Whether they should enter Tibet did not turn on whether there 
^as a single Chinese nationalist in Lhasa or whether there 
still remained an office representative of the Chinese national 
government. They were claiming to «liberate” the whole of 
China; and Tibet, as Ambassador Liu, the representative of the 
Chinese national government, told the United Nations General 
Committee during the Fifth Cession of the General Assembly, was 
regarded as a part of China by «all Chinese whatever their 
Party or religion.«
Those,Tibetans who were responsible for the ousting of , 
the Chinese officials from Tibet must have realised that their : 
Military stength'was not in any way sufficient to back up such;: 
a drastic political■ decision. They .therefore.looked,for, for-, 
sign help."" ' it .was’at this juncture that Mr. Lowell Thomas and 
U s  son £0t unusual permission from the Tibetan government to |
. JQfij .
Hs i t  Lhasa. His dromatic visit and the broadcasting roc-
194, u.H. Documents. Summary Records of Meeting of the General 
Co:dmittae, 21 September to 5 pec ember, 19*0, p. 19*
XP Coo Lowell Thomas, Jr.f Out .Pi 3&Syag tn For bide an Tibet (1 9 5 0) ♦
ords.he made during■ his stay in Tibet, and- .the•- statement ---het, 
issued -on-;his-> return aroused" great interest .iu'.thei.Tibetan
situation- and produced" divergent. comment throughout the .wor-^-
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Id. ,,
In the meantime,-: the Chinese coanunists were Intensifying 
their, efforts, in »siting--preparations for,»liberating*/Tibet..
On October 1 , 1949, the PanchJen Lama;-sent. a ■ telegraa■ :froa^ ■
Ch* inghai t o .the,Chairman of the People1s Central Government, 
Kao Tse-tung,..and..;.the,Comander-in-Chlef of the Peopled Army, 
Chu teh, to express ;hir support -of.; the «liberation*;of Tibet, 
.'and a reply .was..given on Koveabar 25 to assure*him- of the im­
pending'liberation, Cn January 13, 1550, Chu Toh mode a 
statement In tho presence of some Tibetans in Peking which 
reiterated the determination to rid Tibet of imperialistic in—
- Huence,' ! Two days later a spokesman repudiated Tibet's right 
*0 dispatch a so-called goodwill mission intended to declare
1+ 197 its »independence.*
Facing such a menacing situation and realising at tho 
eleventh hour that no foreign power would back their assertion 
of independence with force while the Korean IVar overshadowed 
h^oij* problem on the international horison, the Lha^a author­
ities decided to dispatch a delegation with a view to coming
ft?0* Tal chi eh fans ti hsi tcang. includes a Chinese.translation 
z* a lusoiah"article, ''«Ti-iiuo-chu-i-che tsai hsi- tssng ti yin «ou,« (iho Intrigues of the Imperialists in Tibet), by T. 5Tol~
t°ff in which sharp "criticism is passed on far. Thomas’ visit
m * : 24-25),- !
l97* I M d . ,  pp. I, 5, and 6,
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to terms, with the-'Peking''-government* But-, this: delegation was 
delayed- in'India f$r..&/long:tim®V-' '•: According-.'to. the explana­
tion-given In their-appeal.to the United-Nations.■dated Novcm-
198
her 7, 1950, -.-as .well as :ln'the Indian note to the -‘Peking
_ ■ - - 199'government, dated October 23, 195$i the Tibetan delegation
was:»unable to leave -India through no fault of-their own, but :
for: want-of British: Visas' which were- required'for. transit ■
through Hongkong.»--' ■■"r-"v'; v ;
"The Poking authorities notified the■ Indian government on *:-
^gust:31 that'1'the Tibetan delegation should roach Peking not
later than the middle of September, and- then tries in Ceptom- :
h®r the Peking representative in New Delhi told the Tibetan
^legation that they should at all costs reach Peking bofor®
the end of September and that they would be held fully respon-
200
£tble for any further delay and would take the consequences,
E&t the Tibetan delegation did not leave New Delhi until Oct- 
. ' ' 201 °b«r 25,
The Chinos® Bed Army had mobilised its forces by three 
r°utesi (1 ) from Hotien in Einkiung, aimed at Gartck, (2) from
*93. u.N* Document k/1^9» 24 November 1950.
*99, The Indian note was transmitted by the Indian Ambassador 
Jj Peking, Its text in Chines® i* given in a booklet entitled 
vui!l_chSn hsi tsan* (»Military Campaign into Tibet"), published 
“y the Chines® communist official organ, Jen Min Presa (1951), 
10-1 1 ,
?°0. Peking reply, dated November 1, given in Chin chan M l  - -
?aa& p, 8,
£°1, Tha data of the Tibetan uslegation* s departure from New 
^flhl is mentioned in an Indian note dated October 28, 1950. 
p. 11.
:S5eehawa and Sikang h/, the ^ traditional military route to act
as' a decay, and (5) from Jyokundo in Ch’inghai, over mountain.
■ ■ . ■ 202- ■ 
trails,, as a flanking movement which proved most effective*: ,
On October 7 it crossed the river Dre-chu at a number of plac­
es, • •. Domar, Kano, lunga, Chaae, Bino che go tyu, Yakalo, and 
Uarlchaa fell: to the Chinese after a few engagements» After . 
having wiped out the Tibetan frontier garrisons in Khan, the 
Chinese Bed. Army. converged from five directions on Oliando, a 
Very important strategic point containing a heavy concentration 
of Tibetan forces, and also the seat of the governor who vas 
concurrently one of the four members of the bXa»-blon, Chamdo
foil soon after, and a Tibetan field compandor surrendered to i
:■:• 205 : "
the Chinoso with his troops.
In the above, a detailed explanation has been given to 
the question why the Chinoso national government did not set— - 
tie the outstanding Tibetan issue by force and then define the,; 
status of Tibet by an agreement as the Chinese communists did 
in 1950-5 1, Here tho writer wants to point out particularly a 
(l) the changes made in the international situation a result 
of v:0rid War II, and (2) the much talked of Western projects 
for opening air bases and sotting up a radar network on tho 
roof of the world» The former, especially the removal of
*0?. t< hi.», nh»n gl tl W  ts?ng, pp. 56-5 7.
Joj. u.:i. Docunsnt A/1549, eablogran rscelirod froa th-j Tltnt-ia
^legation, Shakabpa (House Kallspong)*
. 2 5 0
British power from Tibet, helped the Chines®.cosmuaists to';- 
settle the Tibetan issue, while'the latter.--'gar* the .Chinese;:' a j 
communists an additional excuse to carry out a ;military:camp­
aign . in ..Tibet ■.even at a time when their: participation i n . the -s ■! 
Korean War must have already made heavy demands on their 
treasury ■ and manpower.
As to their military success in the Tibetan campaign, two ; 
factors are particularly worth mentioning, (l) The Chinese 
Rod Army had already wiped oat all the local Moslem forces in 
Ch’inghai andithe feudaliStic forces in Ssechuan and Sikang, 
wad thus cleared the way for their military campaign in Tibet.
(2) In 1935, when the Chinese Red Army retreated from Kiangci 
to Shensi, they passed through Xanze, De-ge, and soma other 
districts in Sikang and gained valuable knowledge of the top- 
°eraphy of the northwest and the lives of the Tibetan people*
504]
«osides making friends with local leaders like Ko-ta Kutukhtu, 
they set up cells and absorbed many youths into their party, 
^ o n g  whom the most outstanding one today is named T ’ian Pao 
*h Chin3Se or sang-chi-yueh-hsi in Tibetan, the chairman of the 
&^ tonomous government for thoso of Tibetan nationality in the
■ .,5
204, Kc-ta Eutukhtu, the abbot of Pai-li Monastery, was made 
Chairman of the government set up by the Red Army at lance in * 
7 9 3 5 with Hsia-ke-t&o-teng and Pong-ta-to-chi as members* 5
v£hin chftn hsl tgaxutm p# ?4.) He was made Vice Chairman of r. 
»iking in 1950, ana is said to have been poisoned by a foreign * 
Jtent naaed^ford ■ at Cb&sdo. on August 22 of that year* . {Ibid»a4»p. 2 6-2 7.) - i
. . -.-251:
2G$  ^'province of Sikang. Later they were joined by many foll­
owers of the late regent, Ra-dreng, who were anxious to take 
their revenge on the existing Lhasa regime. Equipped with 
knowledge of the terrain and the assistance on the indigenous 
people, the seasoned Chinese Red Army found little difficulty 
in subduing tho poorly equipped and ill-disciplined Tibetan
forces.
When the news of Peking's resort to force to settle its 
relations with Tibet reached India, the Indian government tried 
to save the situation by diplomatic means. But its efforts 
were of no avail. From its communications to Peking we see 
that it, as its predecessor had done, recognised only Chinese : 
suzerainty in Tibet and attempted to prevent the Chinesj gover­
nment from having'anything to do with Tibet, under the protest 
of autonomy! while it claimed the rights that the British had 
enjoyed in Tibet in tho name of established practice. The > 
Peking authorities on their part reiterated in their replies 
that «Tibet is an integral part of China and tho Tibetan issue 
is an entirely domestic problem," and declared that their army
bust enter Tibet "to-liberate the Tibetan people and to-defend'
■ ■ ■ 206 • ■ ■ ■ 
the national frontier,"
t2* SMllr^jldiyi7ksj 0 Jjg n wu c h l  h ("Who's Who in How China")
iiQngkong, ;"*
Sf; * $ * * * &  text of ~ the. .communication* - la Chinese, - so#':-■ ■_ h g 1^15ang ("Military Campaign into Tibet"), Peking,'
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Facing the advancing Cbineso .Bed Amy. ,an4 aa impasse in  
the diplomatic duel between New Delhi and Peking, the Lhasa 
authorities turned to the United Hâtions for help*, through 
their delegation at Kalimpong they sent repeated appeals to 
the world organization. But, as no big power sponsored
Tibet1$ request and even the British delegate could only say 
that the U.N. »did not know exactly what was happening in Tib­
et, nor was the legal position of the country very clear,« the
item had not even a chance of being included on the General
203Assembly agenda* In the meantime, the regent in Lhasa and
the Young-Tibet group let the young Balai Lama assume full 
power for the administration of Tibet (on November 17} &nd 
moved him to Yatung as if to prepare him for living in exile 
in India as his predecessor had done forty years before.
Under these circumstances, the Tibetan authorities were 
left alone to make a decision— a momentous decision that would 
^ vq a far-reaching effect. A Tibetan predicted that If and 
when »British soldiers leave India, Tibet would throw in her 
lot with any strong power that would trust her well, or would 
Perforce gravitate back to a closer relationship with China«»
«Eu* Document A/1549, 24 November, 1950# A/I565, 30 Nov* 
^ber, 19501 A/16587 U  December,-1950; ■ ' '
yor details of the discussion i n tho General- Committee,' 
J®e U.H, Document, summary.. Bo cord. of .Meeting' (21'. September.-~- 
P bscomber, I950) of the General Committee, pp. 17-20.
^ 9» Boll, Tibet* p. 244.
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Failing the former.alternative, they acquiesced in the latter
course in spite of Sir Charles Bell* s belief that »to the
People of Tibet as to those of Mongolia, Bolshevism is abhor- 
' 210' ■■ 1 ■ • 
rent,» ;
'■'’'The Peking Agreement on Measures for the
. Peaceful Liberation of Tibet' '■;; '
In February, 1951, the Tibetan government under the new
- - ■ 211 ■
leadership of the young Dalai Lama dispatched tKa’-blon 
% a b o u  Ngawang Jigma to head a delegation composed of Dsasalc 
Khemey Bona® Waagdi, Khentrung Thupten Tenthar, Kheachung Thup- 
l®n Lekmuun, and Rimshi Saaposey Tenzin Thuadup, to negotiate 
for a peaceful settlement. Kgabou Ngawang Jigme, accompanied 
V  Thupten Lekmuun and Camposey Tenzin Thundup, arrived in 
Peking on April 22 by way of Chamdo, Taeh’ienlu, Ya-an, Chung­
king &nd Sian, Khemey Sonaa TCangdi and Thupten Tenthar arriv- 
four days later via India and Hongkong.
On April 29 negotiations started with Li Kei-h&n as chief 
delegate on behalf of the Central People*s Government and 
Chang Ching-iu, Chang Kuo-hua, and Sun Chlh-yuan as delegates, 
As a result of the negotiations which were concluded on May 21,
5l0. Jbia., p. 214.
*11. The Poking f<soplets Daily, in an editorial on May 23,
¿351, praised the Dalai lama for altering the past »erroneous 
Policy« of the Tibetan government.
an agreement was signed on the: 23rd containing seventeen art- 
. 212 ■ •iclos, A state banquet was given on May 24 to celebrate
the event and attended 'by: the Punch’ en lama and his -followers* :
the Tibetan delegation, and all'the high ranking officials of
215
the Peking regime.
JE^r this agreement the status of Tibet la clearly defined.
The first article declares that »the Tibetan people shall unite 
and drive out imperial ’aggressive'forces from Tibet, and shall 
return to the big family of the Motherland— the People’s repub­
lic of China. » The agreement promises the maintenance of the 
status quo in the Tibetan regional government structure as well 
as in the inherent position and authority of the Dalai Lana, 
but calls on Lhasa actively to assist the People’s Liberation 
Army to enter Tibet, and consolidate the national defenses 
(Arts. II and IV), while permitting "autonomy under the unified ; 
leadership of the Central People’s Government" (Art. Ill).
The Tibetan troops shall bo gradually reorganized into the 
People’s Liberation Army and shall bocorns a part of the nation- . 
^1 defense forces of the People’s Republic of China (Art. VIII). 
Iho agreement further stipulates that all foreign affairs shall 
t* handled only by Peking (Art. XIV). In order to ensure the ,
212.
|21«
at"
A .booklet. Kuan vu ho-o>ln£,,.(^ leh^ f^ ng hsl-Js^ nfl .pan-fa tl | 
t—i .(»Agreement on Measures ■for...,,th®. peaceful.,; Li bora tioa™ofT,.J 
Jen Min. Press, ...Peking* .1951) $ PP* , 2.6-27*;
Jl5. Ibid., pp. 21-25*
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implementation of,.this agreement, the Central People’s Govern­
ment will establish .in Tibet--a: military- and;.: administrative 
Committee'and a military area headquarters in which as many ; 
Tibetans as possible will be absorbed to work together with 
those officials sent by the Central People*s Government.
These may include patriotic elements from the-localgovernment ; 
of Tibet, various districts and leading monasteries. They are 
to.be'chosen b y  the-representative of the Central1' People *s
G overnm ent a f t e r  c o n s u l t a t i o n  w i th  a l l  p a r t i e s  c o n c e rn e d  and to214
he appointed by Peking.
. In 'accordance.'with the provisions of the agressent, Chang •
Ohlng-wu -was - sent ‘ to’ Lhasa as.--the representative of .Peking who ;
also to taka uo the post of director General of the liilit-
- - 215
aïy Headquarters in Tibet. He left Peking.on June 25 and
drived at Tatung on July 4 via Hongkong and India* Following
& conference with him on July 16, the balai Lama left Tatung.
°n July 21 and returned to Lhasa whence he sent a telegram on
October 24 to Peking to announce his, the lamas’, and the216
People*g support of the agreement* -
In the meantime Chinese communist troops were redoubling 
t h e i r  e f f o r t s  to  construct a  h ighw ay and make o t h e r  p r é p a r â t -  ,
514• IM â .. pp. 1 -5 .
Paris, June 14 (AFP), and Calcutta, July 4 (AFP)* 
Hongksm; standardt Auast 15 and October 27* 1951*
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Ions for..catering Tibet. - ; On. September 9# under . the cos-'’
uand of Vv'ang Chi-msi, they entered Lhasa amidst a colourful
Welcome and ware reinforced a month, later by 20,000 regulars ■■
Under the command of Generals Chang Kuo-hua and Tan Kuan-218 '
sun* I\jr the end of December they had been deployed to sat
up check posts along Bhutan* s northern frontier, the States-
Bâillai special correspondent in Kalimpong reported. On March
*3, 1952, they entered Yatung, fifty miles from Darjeeling,
after having set up guards and check posts along the trade
toute from Gyantso to the Indian border covering a distance of 
„ 219
295 miles*
Throughout this chapter we have repeatedly found the same 
three problems, to wit! (1) tha demarcation of a boundary line 
between Tibet and China Proper# (2) tha relationship between 
the Dalai and the Panch*en Lamas, and (5) the fundamental issue 
°f defining the status of Tibet, which includes tha problem of 
satisfying Tibetan aspirations. to have found also that be­
hind these problems there was always British influence which 
®ade them more complicated, Indeed insoluble, for the past 
forty years. Iiow, as a result of V»orid bar II, British infl- ;
217
?f7. San Francisco, il&y 29 and July 17 (iP). Chasado is in 
Jhaia and outside Tibet proper. The Chinese communist army,
¿bough it hid captured Chanda which was considered a part of 
»Ikang, could not be said to have entered Tibet proper.
Tokyo, Pept* 14 (Pan Asia)|' 5 V
219* Kalimpong, March 14 (Reuter).
hence had been withdrawn, and tha independent Indian govorn-
Qeni, which, for a time appeared to have resumed the British
^ole in Tibet* has at last found it advisable not to inherit
tho British policy that would lead to a clash with the Chinese
communists beyond the Himalaya mountains* By virtue of tho
agreement explained above, Peking settled tho issue of the
status of Tibet* Its army entered Tibet with the assistance
of the Tibetan government, as the agreement stipulated, and
took up positions along the western frontiers of Tibet for
National defense* In fact, Tibet has been made a military
, , 220
district of China* There can bo no more question of a 
boundary dispute between Tibet and its neighbouring Chinese 
Provinces* There remains to be settled, however, the quest­
ion of the relationship between the two Grand Lamas.
According to Article Y of the agreement, the inherent 
Position and authority of the Panch*an shall be maintained.
And Article X stipulates that the people of Tibet must be 
United. So, there should be no objection to the Punch’eu’3 
return. Backed by Chinese power he easily crossed tho Tibet­
an frontier, guards of which had prevented his predecessor from 
doing so till the latter’s death, and arrived at Lhasa on April 
23, 1952.' In tha afternoon of the day of arrival ho mot tho 
&*Iai. Lama at the Potala. After a solemn ceremonial meeting, .
...........'ll n m,r ir ]irTr.ftlT^ 1- r .mn^ .^ - r ..n - ,r r ^r -n r  ~T~‘~t~TlT  f
220* Hongkong Standard* February 22, 1952*
the-Dalai, Lama invited him to Ids private apartment;for::a ■/■>?•' 
talk, Xh# ..Chinese communist ; press. sad#: much of -the. occasion, : 
It reported that they »held a friendly exchange-of opinions on 
implementing, the »Agreement on the Peaceful Liberation.of Tib­
et, »» and the Tibetan people rejoiced at the' happy unionof. 
the two brand:’ Lamas,
■ • After forty-three-days», stay in the Tibetan:capital, ho
m
left ■ on June 9 ' for..;.Shigatse. ■ > He sent * a - telegraphic■. mcssage 
to'Peking.; declaring his determination to «unite with the Dalai : 
lama and fully carry out the agreement on measures for the
Peaceful liberation of Tibet and build a'new, free, and happy
. . 222 ‘ •
ilbet," He was warmly welcomed on the way, especially at 
Gyants© whore he left on the' 19th. fibs» he returned to Tashi-
Ihunpo, he received a most jubilant ovation from the popul—
'■ 223
dee.
In Chinese historical, records, the Tibetans are know» ns. . 
an unruly people. There must be some trutn in tna words of 
their appeal to the United Nations that »there cun bo no kin— 
®hip or "sympathy between such divergent creeds (one highly 
^terialistic, the other highly spiritual) as those espoused 
%  China and Tibet,* And to adjust a feudal society and a *2
22±. Th<» "Shanghai'PailrJl&SS* ter 10* 1952* 
222, Lhasa, May 8, 1952 (Hsiahua).
223* - The Shanghai Daily I gM* . 2$ anti; 21 *
224, u,N, Document A/1519*
theocratic and aristocratic,; government to-.the Peking pattern 
*ould unavoidably cause serious friction# Ilia re are reports •
' 225 ;
of unrest in Tibet.7 7 ; il Uew Iork..Tlmos editorial rightly
remarked, «It is sad, but a case of.simple common;sense, to
accept tha fact that so long as Mao and his Communist:regime
ore in control of China, they will also be in control of Tib- 
; 226
et.a. • • The.Chinese communists ;seea to .have acted very care­
fully in Tibet* : This writer has' heard many.severe criticisms 
on other measures of the Peking regime, but ha has, so far, 
hot heard any adverse comment from a non-partisan compatriot of 
his on the agreed measures for the peaceful liberation of Tibet,
y- ; 77 7; yy-y-.y '7 v >7' - y :7 V ■ 4-  4; -7 .;44- 7444,7-7 ■ '77^'y7y77'Y77YYY7;
*. • -■ ■ -4 ; 4  ' 4 4 4 .  • V ■' '' ’ ' 4' 4 ‘ ‘ . ' . O'''’: _. ' ‘ '"4 -  -4 44.4 ' 4 ¿ -
^  5 '  9521 * “ YYM.fi,■ ■:
ii6v I M d . , ; p . ,24,
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A11GL0-TIB5TAN RELATIONS 
CHAPTER XV
British Efforts to Open Tibot
Tibet was not a forbidden land from the outset. Mention
has been made of the early religious contacts between Tibet and
its western neighbour— India, But since the end of the twel-*
fth century, when the Pala and Sena dynasties in India were
swept away by a Mohammedan invasion led by Muhammad Bakhtyor,
and as a result of the subsequent decline of Buddhism in India
h^ci the stoppage of the route to Bengal, which never escaped
from the rule of the Mohammedans for any considerable time un-
til they were superseded in the eighteenth century by the Erlt- 
. 2
lfib, Eindu-Tibetan religious ties were practically cut off.
l*'guar*/'Chap; If W
^ t a e r i t u d y  ou Itoi&v-IilMtsn. religious relations, sea Yin
fa Philo Shin. o d . .cit, • After the revival of Buduhism 
X n H B l r S ^ r t t n t h ^ c t n l n S y ,  t l b s t m  lamas went to India and 
studied at the monasteries of m a a d l  and Yikramasila* and many 
Indian Buddhist monks visited Tibet, among whom the best known 
Atlsa,. .......
J.IW4» lie V , I1* ***f ""*VM *»*•***««» %». V* ,;i
l afabout the close of the year 1199» while ~th» - Ciabridgo 
rv of India says it took place In 1202* The discrepancy'^ n point«! Qut ^  gcijayi@r casssann, Trade, JMough, Binal»» - 
1951), p .  9 ,  h e r e a f t e r  c i t e d  a s  G a s m a n ,
Bad the-'"two’'military ■■expeditions ’into Tibetan1 borderland— ono ' 
led by Ikhiliyar-ud-dia of Eengal in 1205, and the other sent 
by Muhammad bin 'Tughlug'152 years; l a t e r — been successful, 
Political relations would have been established between Tibet 
and India, Bat both expeditions were frustrated by natural 
barriers and both met with groat disaster, Tibot was thus 
free from any interference from its western neighbour till the 
establishment of'British rule in India,’though’ the frontier 
had always been open and in fact Jesuits crossed the Himalayas 
In the early seventeenth century and built the first Roman-
Catholic church in Tibet in 1626.
The impact of the west in general and of the British in
P a r t i cluar, so far as Tibet is concerned, was not felt until
1763, when the Court of plroctors of the East India Company
.recommended the obtaining of-intelligence.regarding.whether or
Pot cloth or other European, commodities., could find a market in
5
Tibet and West China by way of Nepal, This step was taken
ft p c l t a d  as a a S u i f c r S i S S :
S llliatorr. '
(Toulouse, 1948), pp# 261*.516.
* .S*C,,: Bar car,:..: «Bose .Jot m  i-onv. the--Intercourse 'OfBengal :with;" 
rf Northern Countries in the Second Half of the 13th Century. 
Past and Prasant. ZLI (Calcutta, 1931), p. 121. *
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when Harry Verelst was governor of Bengal; but his successor, 
barren Hastings, is usually given the entire credit for con­
ceiving and initiating ths idea of trado between Bengal and 
libet.
It was for this commercial reconnaissance that George 
Bogle:was'sent to Tibet by Hastings in 1774* though ostensibly: 
Be was sent »on 'the justifiable plea of paying a proper tribute
of respect in return for the advances which had been made by
i 7 ......
the Lama,» Here we must point out that the advances made by 
the Punch» on Lama ware for the purpose of mediating between
the English and the Bhutanese while the latter, Ms  vassal sub- 
3octs,a were suffering from an unprovoked aggression fey the 
former- As remarked by camaaim, Hastings entered the war ■ 
under the pretext of helping the wronged ruler of a weak state 
to regain his rightful position, but he privately adnlttsu In 
correspondence that Ms purpose was..to gain possession.of , , 
Gooch Behar for the Company- Bo it was the English who made 
the first advance when their troops invaded a state under the 
suzerainty of Tibet, In other words, the impact of the west 
*48 imposed on the Tibetans without choice from the very bag-
Caamann, p. 26«
7* Turner, "An Account of an Embassy,« p. xlv, quoted ty Cwa- 
^nn, p. Ji,
gunro. Chap. II, n. 87*
9* Cammann, p* 155*56*
264
10
inning.
This first English mission failed to procure permission to 
trade in Tibet,. -. It was.prevented from coming .'.to.'.Lhasa- from 
fashl-lhnnpo because of the hostile attitude of the regent.
The government at Lhasa, as,.Eogla wrote .in .his - general., report, 
considered him «as sent to explore their country, which the
ambition of the English night afterwards prompt them to Invade
'll
and their superiority in arms ..render .-their ...attempt successful.« . 
It Is worth noting that Bogle was told by the representatives 
of the regent who came down to see him that the regent «would 
do everything in his power, but that he and all the country were 
subject to the Baperor of China*• • The reference to the Sapor- ;
0r's ultimate authority made Bogle exclaimt «This Is a stumbling 
iiock which crosses me In all ny path.«
Despite the great setback suffered from the sudden deaths 
of Bogle and the Punch» en Lama to his plan for promoting and 
extending the Company» s trade with Tibet, lias tings was not 
daunted*-"' • la 1783 he sent his -kinsman, ..Lieutenant .Eaauol ^ IlMr-. 
her, to -Tashi-lhunpo under the pretext of presenting his res­
pects to his old friend ■ the .Lama la .his, new rein carnation.........
IQ* c,p, Younghuahaad,. P*. 5*.
■^i* Markham, p. 203* '
l2' Ibid,* p, 148. Can also p* 151 for the words of the 
^ a c F i l  Lama, who to ld  B o g le .th a t the regent»s apprehensions,*•«*««*.»**?..'T'ftiiir^ from'’himself»-.but. niso^froa his 
^ o S \ ? l i v i n g &of!e»srto thl Chinese, to whose empire Tibet 
ta3 subject. ■. 1:
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This-second m is s io n  a c c o m p lis h e d  no m ore th a n  ce m e n tin g  a l r e a d y
relations with the authorities of Tashi-lhunpo. Turner, like
Bogle, could not proceed to Lhasa to try to obtain permission
f o r  f r e e  i n t e r c o u r s e  b e tw e en  T i b e t  and B e n g a l .  B u t h i s  r e p o r t
on T ib e t a n  t r a d e  was f a r  m ore d e t a i l e d  and co m p re h e n s iv e  th a n
B o g le * s  and h e  o b ta in e d  a  c l e a r e r  id e a  o f  th e  co m p lex  e le m e n ts
involved in Tibetan politics which would be very useful for the
. 15
Company* s enterprise* Though ho had the advantage of not 
dealing with the same regent at Lhasa who had plagued Bogle, 
he realized, as had Bogle, that the power of the Court of Pek­
ing and of the new regent was an insurmountable barrier to any 
Permanent negotiations at that time* Eo found that the Tibet­
ans had the greatest awe of the Emperor, of his Residents and
14
other officials, and of the Lhasa regent.
Less than o n ©'year after Turner* s return,-'Hastings ^ resign­
ed and left Calcutta for England, But the question of how 
Best to establish trade relations between the Company and Tibet 
Remained a live issue. In March, 1736, the Directors declared 
that a very beneficial commerce with Tibet— both in Indian and
British goods— ought to be practicable, and that from it Bengal
15
Would, receive a much needed supply of gold,
*3. Camaann, p, 96*
Ibid., p, 87; Turner, p* 245.
A. ¿spinal, Cornwallis in ^ e n g a l . (Manchester, 1931), p* 
quoted in C&ma&nn, p. lib.
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I n t h e  ..second .chapter of Part X, mention was. made of 
British help not being forthcoming when the Gurkhas were being 
beaten by the Chinese Imperial forces. In this Cino-Kepalese 
war, we can already see the complications of an international 
situation hitherto unknown in this remote region. The Gurkha 
• HaJ&h, at the time when the Chinese armies sent to the rescue
of the Tibetans were approaching, suddenly signed on March 1,16
1792, a commercial treaty with his old enemies, the English, 
after having held off their representative for some time. 
Cammann suspected that Jonathan Duncan, the Company Resident 
In Benares, had held out to tho Rajah some hope of assistance
lh his Tibetan. campaign. in . exchange, .for . the . commercial - treaty 
*hich he had worked so hard to obtain. . In fact, a few mon­
ths later, when he had sustained numerous defeats in Tibet and 
the Chinese forces wars at the heels of his fldeing army, • the 
Rajah wrote repeatedly to Lord Cornwallis, tho successor of 
Rustings, asking for ten cannon, together with ammunition, and
ten young Europeans who would understand how to manage artil-
.  18lery,
To this request Cornwallis sent a reply on the 15th of 
September, the day on which Puncanfs report on the repeated
15# The text of the treaty is given in Aitehison, XI?, (1929
°4*), pp. 56-57.
J-7• Cawaann, p .‘ 127« 
18.. m < 3.. BP. 126-27«
defeat of the Nepalese reached Calcutta, He pointed out in 
reply that it was especially necessary to adhere to the policy 
of non-interference, because the Company had interests in 
China, and could not afford to .3end aid against a dependency 
of hers* He closed by offering1 2to assist i n : mediation, - and 
fcy the end of the month; he had actually sent for this purpose 
an envoy* Colonel Kirkpatrick, who arrived at the Nepalese
■ ■ - 19
capital when the war, had been over for several months. . Here: 
^e find documentary evidence to show that the English recog­
nized Tibet as a dependency of China as early as 1792.
Lord Cornwallis wa3 also approached by the other party of 
the armed dispute* Marshall Fu-k’&ng-an, the Commander-in- - 
Chief of the Imperial forces, wrote him on March 21, 1792, 
asking him— just as he asked the rulers of Bhutan and Bikkim—  
as a neighbour of the Gurkhas, to help the Chinese to punish 
the invaders* The Dalai Lama and. the Panch’ea Lama, too, 
each sent him a letter (that of the former being written in 
Tibetan, that of the latter in Persian) urging him not to help 
the Rajah who would ask for English aid, and requesting that 
Tf any fugitive Gurkha chieftain should fall into his hands, 
he should seize him and deliver him up to the Emperor of China,
19. ibid.* p, 12§, based upon Diekalkar, no. 15# VP* 535-85#
*ad Sripatrick, pp. 549-50| m v m *  Chap, II, n. 143.
20. Kao-tsung s^ih-Iu* Chap. 1393# pp* llb-15b.
■ ; 2 6 ? .
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or at least prevent him from: returning boss*
To -these letters Lord Cornwallis replied,Explaining that;
the: Company could not •interfere in disputes between foreign
powers except when self-defense or wanton attacks'obliged thorn,
and offering to help to mediate In the quarrel as soon as the
' 22
season permitted* His proposal to mediate got a response
only from the Punch» en Lama, who told him that there was no
Point in going to the trouble of sending 'an agent to the Gurlc--
ha Hajah because now the latter had also become a dependent of
the Emperor of China, and within the Empire there was no reason 
, 23
*or dispute*
In spite of Lord Cornwallis» declaration of neutrality,
Marshall Fu-k»ang-an, according to Lord Macartney, suspected
2$ ■ ■
that the English had aided the Gurkhas. Members of the Mac­
artney Mission, while on their way to Peking by boat up the 
Pei Ho, in the summer of 1 793$ found that the reason for their
being watched with an unexpected degree of suspicion was that
the English were suspected of having given aid to the Gurkhas 
« 25
*h the recent war* This belief on the part of the Chinese
21''
21* Caaaanm,■ p*--li8* - •
22, Ibid.*' g* 129* '■■
23* Liskalkar, g M * S n * ^8, p p * > 9 j"v 8* . 
24, .Casaaann, .pp*-..135# 57# X33# n *
| J 5 II, pp* 20>04| Cammann, p* 138, n. 65.
wa3# as remarked by-Earl H* Pritchard, a serious impediment 
to the Macartney Mission.
At the suggestion of Lord Macartney a letter from the King 
of England was sent to Peking in 1795 and reached:its destinât- 
ion early ;in the following/ year# ; ■ : Xhis told -the•M&nchu court ■ 
how the English had attached the Gurkhas in the rear and urged 
them to submit to the Imperial forces. " The Emperor, Kao-tsung, 
wrote S' cold formal reply#;explaining that.his Marshal, Pu- 
h ’ang-an# had defeated the Gurkhas' unaided and that the English 
had received the wrong story about the war. The noted 
Chinese historian, fcei fuan# mentioned this communication in 
his Ehsng-wu-chi2 with a remark that# «till so told by the 
English envoy, the Court was not aware that the Gurkhas were 
facing soma trouble on their southern frontier while they were
being beaten by the Chinese forces*«
The English tried to open Tibet net only from India# but 
also from the other end through Peking. In the spring of 178? 
Uautenant-Coloncl Charier Cathcart# M.P* and Quartermaster- ■ 
General to the Company’s army in Bengal, was asked by the Cl­
og t i i,yrWj «Anflo-Chineso Halations Luring the l?th
&  £ § &
Social sciences (1929)* aos# 1 Z$ W
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ish government ■ to ■ servo as envoy on. England*s first mission to . 
China, In his preliminary proposals to Henry, Drodas, who was 
acting head of.the Board of Control for India, -Cathcart said.-: 
that he wanted to take with him as, his'private secretary Capt­
ain Patrick Alexander Agnew. If the reception'Should be esp­
ecially favourable, "Ague* was to return to India by way of Tib­
et with proposals for the opening of comaercial relations bet-
29 ■ ■
weaa ' the-latter-and Bengal. : ' Cathcart, however, died on route 
on December 21, 1737,' and the mission was forced to return ■ - 
hoaa.50 •
■ In 1311, Thomas Banning, a scholar of Chinese with some 
medical knowledge, which he learned In six months in a London
31- . ■ ■
hospital« * achieved the distinction of being the first English— 
man to reach Lhasa and have an audience with tho Dalai Lama, 
Whether he had been provided with all facilities by Lord lanto, ; 
the Governor-General of India, as pointed out by Tarhknath
29« Pritchard, «îha Crucial Years of Early Anglo-Chinase Rel-- Jtlons - naseareh Studies...M.„mV^att o^ilegt..,nf - -
ÎàsàlBiM iW&L fvrHSTF4T259.
_ r .- - TW w *;*W «*»■» VW VMHW tm ****%# ■
*>177. ■■■■■
Si. Sandberg, The giroloraMon of ,T 1 M <  P> ll6<
?*• Besides a formal audience, t ^ ^ t e d / S t ^ h i r u â l t s d  lÛtï- 
6?, 238, and 292.)
2 7 1
Bos, or had been left entirely to his own resources without 
official recognition of any kind, as remarked by Markham, ha 
did not and could not accomplish anything of political consequ­
ence. .
• Later in the.1840*s, Sir John Davis, as the first British
Minister to China,.tried again to get China to open Tibet to
35 36
trade, is he himself wrote, Lord Harding, the Governor- 
General of India, engaged the services of His Majesty’s pleni­
potentiary in ^hina to communicate with Kiying, the Grand Sec­
retary of tho Court. . The latter replied that »trading with 
Tibet would not be in conformity with the Maritime treaty, as 
it is not included in the Five Ports.» Though Kiying later 
Admitted that.the traders on the Indian frontier might carry 
on a commerce entirely different from that of the English mer­
chants at tho Five Ports of China,.and promised to transmit 
faithfully to his sovereign tho whole tenor of the correspond­
ence, Sir John’s effort was after all made in vain.
* 33
35* Tsrakaath Das, Britis-h.lygmslon jtn.„.Tibet (Calcutta, 1927), 
P* 6*
34, Markham, p, civili*
35* Cammann, p, 84, n, 7*
56., sir John Francis Davis, a M n ^ o macellanlest A  Collecting
^ L M 2 Z L 3 S i J l 2 M  (1865), p T l d T
« At that time the frontier was between Kashmir and the Lad- 
h territory. Ibid.» p. 47 (Ladakh, formerly a province of
'gift..n%staw.,M,Tibetj see Cambrì §to|L i L I a i & i  Voi* I, p, 35),
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• As the English had been trying to open Tibet, ** was only 
natural that in 1376, by which time England was free to impose
terms which had to to accepted without demur by China, her min-
. . 33 . .
ister, Sir Thomas 7.:ade, inserted in the much-criticised 
Anglo-Chinese Chefoo Convention a separate article providing
for proper protection  for a British mission of exploration■ ■ ■ 39 ■
from China to India, or from India to China, via Tibet.
Tibetan Reaction to the Approach p_f _tha_Br^lsh
how let us see what reaction the Tibetans had to this 
Provision* Mention has been made earlier of Bogle*s* having 
W e n  suspected by the Tibetans «as sent to explore their coun­
try.., .» v,hen told of his coming, the regent of Lhasa wrote 
to the Panch* en Lama to refuse admittance to him, saying that 
the English »were'fond of war; and after insinuating themselves 
Into a country, raised disturbances and made themselves musters 
of it.*» Later events in Ilepal, Bhutan and Sikkim, as relat­
ed below, seemed to confirm their fears*
Nepal
In 1814, Gurkhas attacked three police stations in But-
38, For the criticisms, see H.B. Morse, Eiejfe|©patimml 
Eolations of the Chinese JEBBlgfi* Vol* II, pp. 303*05*
39. S.T, w&ng, v *« Margarv Affiir,mi.Jlkt„Chsfgo^ Ai£SMgl£t • '
P. 115*
do. Markham, p. 131*
wal— a disputed territory which they tod conquered hut which 
■fc&s regained by the British without open hostilities. The 
Barque3s of Hastings answered with a declaration of war, and 
Binself planned a campaign to attack simultaneously at four 
different points. On account of the brilliant qualities of 
the Gurkhas ■ as 'soldiers and the ’British troops’ lack of 'know* :.: 
ledge of the geographical difficulties of the mountainous 
legion, the British at first met with reverses. It was not 
hatil liovember of the next year, when there was no hope of 
further resistance, that the Gurkhas were forced to sign a
treaty at Sagauli. But the - Hepale.se government - hesitated to -41 . . ....  .
ratify the treaty and hostilities wore resumed.
■ After another defeat i n ,a decisive battle fought at.K&k* :: 
*anpur, close to their capital, on February 23, 1816, the 
Gurkhas ratified the treaty. By its terms they gave up their I 
claims to places in tho lowlands along.their.southern frontier,; 
ceded to the British the districts of Garhwal arid Kumaon on tho 
*Qst of Kepal, withdrew from Sikkim, and agreed to receive & 
British Resident at Katmandu. Tha British now obtained sites 
for important hill stations and summer capitals such as Simla, 
Bussorie, Almora, Banikhet, Landour, and Kaini Talj and also 
Greater facilities for communications with the regions of Cen­
tral Asia. py a treaty with the Rajah of Sikkim, signed on
41, Majumdar and others, An AdvMici?a p* 722.
the 10th of February, 1817, a tract ceded by the llepalese was . 
given to him. This not only showed favour to a protégé, but 
also created'a.stratagic&lly/advantageous position.for the- 
British by setting a barrier between the eastern frontier of 
Sepal and Bln ton*
Bhutan ■ '
In 1826 the British annexed Assam and brought the territ­
ories of Bhutan into contact with British possessions* in con­
sequence of which constant friction arose regarding the border, 
?or strategic reasons the British authorities wanted to secure 
control over the rich and fertile Duras (passes) between the 
two states, They tooh over some of the Duras and paid the ., 
Bhutanese an annual subsidy* thus creating wide-spread ill- 
feeling among the Bhutanese and giving rise to what John Claude
fthite called «constant aggressions committed by the Bhutanese
44
on our frontier,*» In 1865* under the pretext of avenging 
the insults inflicted upon Ashley Eden* the British envoy* a 
^rge-scale campaign was carried. The Bhutanese after several 
Months of successful resistance were forced to conclude a 
treaty on the 11th of November at Sinchula* known by the Bhut-
—--  • ~ • " • 1 __T ;
i2- ms.-, p * 723.
4J, Taraknath Das, Britt sh Bxp anM.on J ji . J!i bet, p, 10,
J4, y0hn Claude V-hite, §ikktm and m
Îho gowth-Eaat y r o n t l e g ^ M 7 ^ 5 T Il9Q9T> PP» W  et seq, .............
■ ■ • 274 ■
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an©s© as thaTen-Article treaty of Rawa Paul. Under its - 
terms Bhutan codad Athara Duras, a narrow strip of territory 
lying at the foot of the hills, to the British, who also re­
tained possession of the Assam and Bengal Purasj while the 
Eastern Puras, lying east of the Sanko River# was incorporated 
with the Goolpara and Kamrup districts of Assam. It also 
agreed to arbitration ty the British government in all disputes 
between the Bhutan government and the chiefs of Coach Buhar and 
Sikkim, In return Bhutan was to receive from the revenues of 
the Puras an annual sum beginning with Rs 25#000 and later in­
creasing to Bs 50,000 on fulfilment of the conditions of the 
^  '
treaty,
Sikkim■
In 18>*-J5 another internecina strife broke out bo tv; eon 
Repal and Sikkim* Captain Lloyd was sent by the Indian gov­
ernment to interfere. Be.obtained a grant of a strip of terr­
itory including Darjeeling, whoso value as a sanatorium he had 
discovered during a similar mission in 1825, In 1349, after 
the representative of the British government had been captured 
tout released, and Doctors Booker and Campbell had been mal­
treated while travelling in Sikkim, the Terai, which hud been 
i*9atorod to Sikkim in 1317# other territory amounting to
<5* Xbld,, pp. 280-31.
4.6
1,676 square «lies*., were-seized.-.as a punishment# This 
naturally led to further trouhle# Finally, after a military
expedition to Tumlong, the capital, the treaty of 186l was en-
■■ 47
acted. Pty this treaty the government of Sikkim, among other 
obligations, agreed to refer any disputes or questions between 
Its people and those of neighbouring states, to the arbitration 
of the British government, and to abide by its decision, and 
the whole military ..force'or Sikkim would afford every aid and 
facility to British troops when employed in the hills. Art­
icle 19, in which the government of Sikkim engaged not to lease 
any portion of its territory to any other state without the 
permission of the British government, shows still more clearly 
the status to which Sikkim was reduced#
These events in their neighbouring states must have deep­
ly impressed the Tibetans# What had happened in Sikkim and 
Bhutan especially would not and could not pass without being 
noticed by them, as these two states ware then closely linked 
with Tibet by religious as well as political ties. Even 
Ashley Eden, the British Envoy and Special Commissioner to 
Sikkim, acknowledged in bis dispatch to the secretary of the 
governor of Bengal (dated April 8, 1861) that "Hepal is trib­
utary to China, Tibet is tributary to China, and Sikkim and
46, Majumdar and others, An Advanced History of India, p, 768, '
47, m t e ,  Sikkim aM.Jftmtan# p# 17#
Bhutan are tributary to Tibet.* Bhutan. *of the same race
' 49
and religion as Tibet. * had been under the Tibetan suzerain-
50
ty since the P ’o-lha-nas days. Sikkim aas originally under
Tibetan rule. Its ruler «as little more than an official of
the Tibetan government, and even today its ruler and most of
.51 "
its leading men are still Tibetan. The Tibetans must have 
drawn from their fate a reference if not a lesson.
■ In view of-these-facts, and also of Sarat Chandra Bus’s
clandestine entry into Lhasa and his surreptitious erplorat-
52 -
ions, it is not surprising that the Tibetans raised strong 
objections to a proposed British mission to Tibet in 1835.
In that year Colman Macaulay, a secretary of the government of 
Bengal, obtained Chinese assent to conduct a mission to Lhasa 
in accordance with the separate article of the Anglo-Chinese 
Chefoo Convention.
Imperial power was by this time at a low ebb. Having
43
48. Quoted in T&raknath Das, o p . c i t ., p. 12.
49. Bell, Tibet, p. 106.
50. Surraf Chap« II, n. 07«
51. Bell, Tibet, pp. 8, 46#
52. Sandberg, fffea Exploration of Tibet, pp. 16>72| see also ■ 
Bell, Tibet, p« 5$, which says that the secret exploration of 
Baj carried out under the auspices of the Indian government, 
filled the Tibetans with distrust of the power that ruled Ind­
ia« in this connection, eeo also L* Austins hdddell, Lhasa; id3 its Mysteries, pp* 8-9*
4ust been defeated.in a war with France .and having lost another 
vassal state, Annan, the Peking government could not evade its 
obligations under the Chefoo Convention, Nor was it in a pos­
ition to force the Tibetans to accept this foreign mission, its
weakness having been made known to the Tibetans in the settle-
53®ent of their dispute with the Nepalese in the previous year. 
Besides, as Chinese policy in Tibet had been one of exclusion, 
forbidding the Tibetans to communicate directly with their 
Neighbouring countries, it would have been awkward to force 
the superstitious Tibetans to admit Macaulay^s mission of ex­
ploration and investigation of their minerals, even if it had 
possessed authority and power to do so.
The Chinese government1s dilemma was soon solved by giving 
to the British a new and greater concession. In the next 
year (1886), China signed a convention with them, recognising 
the latter1s annexation of her vassal state, Burma, in order to 
secure the provision of Article IV which reads* »Inasmuch as 
inquiry into the circumstances by the Chinese government has 
shown the existence of many obstacles to the Mission to Tibet
provided for in a separate article of the Chefoo Agreement,
55England consents to countermand the Mission.» *54
53* Surra* Chap, XX, n, 211
54, Burra* Chap, II, n* l6o.
55* Hertslets, China Treaties. Vol* 1, p, 89*
mEvents Loading to the British Expedition •
The' Tibetans, ignorant of this convention, mistook the 
British withdrawal- of th© Macaulay- mission as .-a. sign of weak--:; 
ness* They crossed .the Jeylap ha: and built■a fort at Lingtu.- ; 
in Sikkim to block the latter’s communication with India,
They persuaded the ruler of Sikkim to move his seat to Tibet as 
he had formerly done. This, however, was apparently contrary 
to Article 22 of the Anglo-Gikkimese Treaty of 1861, which pro­
vided that h© should move the seat of his government from Tibet 
to Sikkim and reside there for nine months in the year. But 
the ruler took the Tibetansf advice and Joined the anti-English 
front. , According to the British, the Tibetans violated the 
sanctity of Sikkim and challenged British authority as the suz­
erain power; while the Tibetans believed that they were acting 
within their rights inside their own dominion, and considered 
the establishment of the British protectorate over Sikkim as a 
clear usurpation of their Jurisdiction, After all, their 
action cannot be simply interpreted as «an ’inexplicable in­
vasion1 into the protected state of Sikkim” as some English
56
end Indian writers assert*
In March, 1033, British forces under General Graham drove 
the Tibetan3 out of lingtu and took up a position at Gnatong* 
The Tibetans mad© two other attacks in the autumn. They were -
—-..  \ 1 ..—
56* Majuadar and others, ¿ n .Advanced '.History.' of India, p, $o3.
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again driven "back after having sustained heavy losses, and the 
pursuing British troops entered the Tibetan Chuubi Valley.
Tho Peking government was then stirred to action. It ordered 
its Resident in Lhasa to stop tho Tibetans from further advent-57
ure and to try to effect a settlement. The British found 
the expedition too expensive to maintain and were eager to sec­
ure Chinese recognition of the protectorate over Sikkim. of 
course, they also took into consideration the improvement of 
trade which would result from the demarcation of the frontier 
and the restoration of peace.
Because of reasons ve shall explain in Part IV, a treaty 
settling this issue was not agreed to until 1390, and the reg­
ulations regarding trade, communication, and pasturage, were 
only reached three years later. The treaty and the regulat­
ions gave the British subjects in Tibet various privileges 
which were not to be reciprocally enjoyed by the Tibetans in 
Sikkim. It was further stipulated that the Tibetans in ex­
ercising their customary right of gracing cattle in their for­
mer vassal state would have to abido by such regulations as tho 
British government might from time to time enact* To these 
■provisions it was only natural that tho Tibetans raised tho
57* Sheng lung Ch*ia lung# £gjag.jrJajBisa.m . l M  (»The Resident'
2h^ng*ttalfs Records and Officialpapers Concerning Tibetan sad 
Indian Frontiers*}, Vol. 1, p. 7b-8b. The British troops 
withdrew from the valley after representation had been node by 
a Chinese colonel sent there by the Resident.
■■ 53 .
gravest objections,
.The-Tibetans refused also .to countenance the delimita­
tion of the Sikkia-Tibet frontier as provided in Article I of 
the. treaty., of, 1890* : They, pointed to-the ancient marks or 
Italics erected in 1794 as evidence to show-that-some,original 
Tibetan territory had been marked off. as-being on the side of
59
Sikkim, r They. blsmod the Imperial,delegate for his arbitrary 
decision without their .concurrence, and. went so'far as to dest­
roy the new boundary pillars erected by Mr, White, the Politic­
al Officer in Sikkim, at the Jeylap la and lonchuk La, . Even
lord Elgin, the Viceroy of India, conceded that to this disput-
■ 6f)
ed region Tibet had a »»reasonable# claim, end both the Chin­
ese and British authorities once tentatively agreed to demarc­
ate as the Tibetans insisted, provided the latter let the 58
58, Ch*lng-shlh kao, 525# 3# P* 20a,
59, f i h l i M t l L M
*m Feng-p1®!* pp
annex, 5, pp, 
m  In. Vol, I, la-2b, 5b-7a# 21a, 25a, and
6q * A and P. Cd, 1920, Ho, 16. p, 52, The govornaent of India 
admitted that «In respect to territory near Gi&ogong, the Tib­
etans probably possess claims which it would not only be impol­
itic mat inequitable to ignore,# Bee ibid. No»' 18, enc, 3,
Pp, .58-59, and A, Kaccallua Scott. Tfae (l§05)i
p, I7 , It also admittod that «there is ,,, no evidence that 
the miscl-iiof [demolition of the pillars"] is to be directly 
attributed to Tibotm officials#  irnd that «demarcation woe not 
provided for in tho Treaty of 1890; no serious practical 
inconvenience Imd apparently arisen through tho frontier being 
utideaarcated*« A and P, Cd* 1920, No, 15, p, 25*
2$2
' ' • ' 6l
customs.house.bs removed from Tatung to nine bin gong. The
Tibetans* being reluctant from the beginning to open Tatung,
and having »prevented Tatung from becoming a trade mart in any-
■62
thing but name*» naturally refused to give trading facilities
. . ■ 62 ■ ■ ■ ■ 
in a place deeper within their frontier. Furthermore* tho
new viceroy* Lord Curxon* attached as an additional condition
for his concession to the demarcation issue, the right to trade
as far up as Pharsi, This demand sealed the fate of any poss-
64
ible agreement.
As early as 1895 l*13 Tibetan commissioner on the frontier 
question* Tekedcnay Tensing ’¿angpu, made a statement to Hr, 
Ivhito that the Tibetans did not consider themselves bound by
65
the Convention with China, as they were not a party to it. 612
61, A and P. Cd. 1920 (1904) fo# 26* end. 8* annex. 1, pp* 93-
95| ending*tal hsi-tsang shlh 11 ao ta*ang pp. 13-14» '
62, A and P. Cd, 1920, on cl. in Kb. 18, p. 38.
Ö3» C h U o a - t d  hsl-tsung ohih llao ts*ung k*an. pp, 3.6-17*
-4. Ibid., pp. 14-16.
6 5* A and p. Cd.,.1920* Ho, 18, end. 1* annex, p, 55, The 
Sri tisEror sign Minister* tho Marquess of Lsmsdowne. once told 
Farliamonti »As a matter of fact X believe that a Tibetan off­
icial accompanied the Chinese Araban who negotiated the treaty 
of 1890#* Parliamentary Debates. Vol, IJO* p. lt€f, . A 7nd P Cd. 5240* Xo7~%§3g P* ib2* aeationed the newly appoint®d“m B e t ^  
&a regent* Shata Shop4* as »the same who had been to Darjeeling In connection with the SlJckis-Tibataa Convention of 1890,» Tho 
Amben, in his memorial to the Throne commending tho merits of his staff on that mission, mentioned Tibetan officials. Cheng 
Xung Ch1 in Sung. fosag yin d e n  wu lu. Yol, X* pp. 47b-48b. ■ 
iho British would not*'' of course* use this fact to argue with 
tho Tibetans on this point as they themselves were seeking dir­
ect relations with them.
This position they still maintained whoa Mr. ¥,hite reported to
66 ■■■ ■ ■
the government of Bengal in December, 1393. But the British 
on the one hand still maintained that there was some prospect 
of exchanging their territorial claim for some concession in 
regard to trade* Tho Tibetans, cn the other hand, as Mr, P, 
Dolan, the British Commissioner, remarked in an official comm­
unication dated May 4, 1890, "value their isolation more than 
thesoasastures, and would not cachango the first for the sec­
ond,« . ■ . ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Lord Curson»,g._Alterad_og JEo r * arA^ligy
In the meantime China’s position in Tibet was further 
weakened by her defeat in war with Japan and the insurrection 
of her large Moslem population cn tho route between Lhasa and 
Peking. • The Chinese officials in Tibet, as Mr* P. Holán rep­
orted on the 24th of Hovember^ 1395, "sincerely desired to see 
the Convention carried out," but they had no means of malting 
the Tibetans toe the lino*' It vías under these circumstances 
that Lord Cursan secured in December, 1399# approval for hiss 
hew course of action— to open.direct negotiations with tho Tib--
66, a and Pt Cd. 1920# Ho, 26, end, 8# annex. 1, p* 94.
6f, A n.n-1 pf cd, 1920 (1931)# Ho* 29, end* 1 , annex.-1, p, 104,
63, XV.id. * JTo* 18, end* 1, annox., p, 56,
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etans, and formulated in January, 1905, Ills «altered policy,« 
otherwise known as the "forward policy"— "to cover not merely 
the small question of the Sikkim frontier, tout the entire ques­
tion of our C British] futur© relations, commercial or otherwise 
■: ■ 7 0  ■ . .
with.Tibet.»
The British having decided to eliminate the Chinese factor 
in the controversy, made various attempts to open direct negot­
iations with the Tibetans. The,■ government of :India| after
having unsuccessfully tried the Sikkim route, contemplated dis­
patching a suitable emissary to Lhasa either through Yttanan, or 
through Nepal, or by way of Ladakhi but its efforts were of no 
avail. They tried as a last resort to send a letter addressed 
by the Viceroy to the Dalai Lama* The first agent dared not,
in the face of the regulations against the intrusion of foreig-
■ . 71 ,
ners into Tibet, send it to Lhasa, and the second agent, who 
was in the service of the Dalai Lama, brought back the letter 
with the seals intact, and giving the explanation that the Dal­
ai Lama refused to accept it on the ground that he was bound by
agreement not to correspond with foreign governments without
72
consulting the Council of State and the Chinese Resident.
It is obvious that the British efforts were not frustrated by 
the regulations which.the Chinese.Residents ..were.mo longer in
£9. Ihid.. No. 26, pp. 74-75) No. 27, p. 99) No. 29, pp. 102-3) 
No. 3 3 7 p * i n .
70. ibid.. No. 66, pp. 15 1# 155/ and 155.
71. Ibid.. No. 29, ?* 103) No. 37, pp. 118-119.
72. Ibid.. No, 44, p. 125,
a position to enforce; it was rather deep-rooted suspicion of 
the British on the part of the Tibetans that doomed these eff­
orts to failure*
When all these attempts failed, lord Curson, in February,
1902, called it "the most extraordinary anachronism of the 20th
century that there should exist within less than 500 miles of
the borders of British India a state and a government with
whoa political relations do not so much as exist, and with whoa■ 75
it Is impossible even to exchange a written communication,«
Now he talked about political relations, called Tibet a state
and the Dalai lama & de facto as well as a de Jure sovereign
of the country* the issue was no longer a matter of mere trade
and frontier relations between Sikkim and Tibet,
In the next year— one year after the conclusion of the
Inglo-Japanese alliance, the primary motive of which was the
protection of the interests of the two parties in the Far East,
in China, and in Korea— the ambitious Viceroy of India, in his
letter of January 8, 1905* to the Secretary of State for India,
spoke of "Chinese suzerainty over Tibet as a constitutional
fiction— a political affectation which has only been maintain-
74
ed because of its convenience to both parties,*
This often-quoted remark of Lord Curzon on the status of 
Tibet requires some comment, Mr, Joseph H* Choate, United
285
75, Ibid,. No, 44, p. 127. 
74, Ibid., No, p, 154,
236
States Ambassador to Great Britain, was instructed in June, 
1904# to acquaint the British foreign office with the State 
Department* s views on the British expedition. ills instruct­
ions took strong exception to the official references of the 
Indian government to Chinese sovereignty over Tibet as a «cons­
titutional fiction« and a «political affectation,« and stated 
that Great Britain had three times (in the Chefoo Convention 
of September 15, 1876} in the Peking Convention of July 24, 
1836} and in the Calcutta Convention of March 17# 1890) recog­
nized Chinese sovereignty by negotiating with the Chinese gov­
ernment on questions relating to Tibet, and since then the
75
Chinese had waived none of their sovereign rights.
In fact, Lord Hamilton, the Secretary of State for India, 
in reply to the above-mentioned letter of Lord Curron, though 
ho did not repudiate categorically the latter* s remarks, had
75» Department of State Archives, Great Britain Instructions, 
Vol. 54, pp* 656-6 5 9. No. 1455, Hay to Choate, June 5, 1904.
In this dispatch we learn that the Secretary of State had an 
exchange of views with the British Ambassador. Sir Mortimer 
Durand, who told him that there was no intention on the part of 
the British government of the permanent occupation of Tibet, 
nor of any action in violation of the integrity of China* But 
when Mr* Choate made his formal representation to the Marquess 
of Lansdowne on June 29# 1904# asking for assurance that no 
steps would be taken by the British government which might tend 
to disturb the present government of Tibet or lessen Chinese 
control over it, and assuming that the British "still regarded 
Tibet as a part of the Chinese Dominions" and that the British 
"did not desire to alter the status of the country In that res­
pect," he received a most evasive reply (A. »hitney Griswold# 
Ifeft.FggJBastera .Policy,...og-SM.ffiAfeed Jitatf.s.* p. 101).
these words in his instructions which shed some light on the
actual status of Tibotj «His Majesty1 s Government cannot regard
the question as one concerning India and Tibet alone, The
position of China in its relations to the Powors of Europe, ha3
been > so modified in recent years .that it is necessary to take
into account those altered conditions in deciding on action
• 76
affecting what must still bo regarded as a province of China.«
Six months* after Lord Curion wrote.that letter, the Brit­
ish delegates, Mr, White and.Colonel-Younghusband,;handed to ■ 
the Tibetan official, in the presence of the Chinese delegate,
7 7
Ho Kuan-hsieh, at Khamba, a memorandum written in Tibetan in
which the Eritish told the Tibetans that «Elsewhere within the
Chinese Empire, British subjects are allowed to carry on trade
without any obstruction; Tibet as a dependency of the Empire,
has been the only place that made obstacles to trade ever since 
73
1886.« Here the British, instead of describing Chinese 
sovereignty over Tibet as a «constitutional fiction« and a p o l ­
itical affectation,« admitted again that Tibet was a dependency 
of the Chinese Empire, Their contradiction can ba easily ex-
76, A and P. Cd, 1920, Ho, 73* P* 135.
77* According to Ho« s report, the British delegates had the 
memorandum read by an Interpreter first and then handed it over 
to the Tibetan official who refused to accept it* It was liewho instructed his own interpreter, Shea Chin-hsl to take it m  
as to break the deadlock, Chlim^t.ai,,h.sl_tjang. shlh„.liap,
tsung kf an, p, 2 9*
78, Ibid«, p. 50; A and p, Cd, 1920, annex, to end ,  21 in 
Ho, 129,' P* 2J2, -
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plalned: ty borrowing Lord' Curzoa1 swords, ■ «because of'its con-/ 
venienee.w
In order to justify M s  forward policy, Lord Curxon
brought up' the . issue; of the ■ Russian .menace*. ; Ever since the 
fourth decade'of the' nineteenth century, British and Russian ■
Interests had'clashed on another threshold of India— Afghanis-
. . 79 . ■ .
tan. From 1371 to 1883 tho famous Bussian officer cad ex­
plorer, H,H, Prjivalsky, explored Mongolia and northern Tibet,, 
In 1899-1901 his assistant, P.K. Kozloff, headed a team to 
explore Tibet under the auspices of the Russian Geographical 
Society, Luring this period other Russian explorers like 
Sosnoffsky (1872, 1374-75), Kropotkin (1876-77)* Ivaaoff (1833), 
end Grombchevsky (l839j^ explored the Dwungar, Tien Glun, Pamirs 
and Karakoram regions* On the British side, the well-known 
Survey of India started its work in 1342 which was extended to 
Kashmir in i860. Following the footsteps of W,II, Johnson 
(1865), Martin Conway (1892) contributed valuable geographical 
knowledge of the mountainous route from Kashmir to Tibet, In 
I896-97 H.H.P, Deasy surveyed Northwestern Tibet up to Sinkiang 
and went as far as the upper valley of the Yarkand river*
Among the British explorers, in addition to the above-mention­
ed, garat Chandra Pas and Sain Singh (Pundit) cams to Lhasa in 
1866 and 1874, Kalian Singh cams to Shtgatse in 1863, and Kish- 
an Singh entered Tibet in 1371* 1374 and 1873, and visited both
79. plo-carlo Teransio, Ia j e
Pp. »iSaJ^ailSffiLA££2E
80. Hsu Irh-hao,
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Shigatse and Lhasa. In 1891-92, H. Bower, another noted
British explorer# traversed Tibet from Leh to China Proper.
The roads of these British and Russian explorers crossed each
other in-Tibet and Sinkiangj and thus#.'the■ Russian menace
became a familiar topic to the British public# even had there
been no conflict of Interests ,
Despite these exploration and survey-activities'and her
* 82
interests in trade# especially thé' trade:la.silk# Russia*g - 
chief- connection with’ Tibet was through'her Buriat subjects 
who were followers of the Yellow Sect. In August# 1901# owing 
to the visit of certain Lamas from Tibet to Russia, Sir C. 
Scott, the British Ambassador in Petersburg, was Instructed by 
the Marquess of Lansdowne to inform Count Lamsdorff# the Russ­
ian foreign minister# that "His Majesty*s Government could not 
regard with indifference any proceedings that might have a 
tendency to alter or disturb the existing status of Tibet.**
The latter assured the British Ambassador that the visit was 
"chiefly concerned with matters of religion# and had no polit-
83
leal or diplomatic object or character."
A year later# "the British government believed that Russia
81
Ifleh. pp. 3-7, 9-10» After the death of Prjivalsky in 183-3, 
the Russian "Tibetan expedition" was led by Pievtsov.
81. Ibid., pp. 2-7, 18-19.
82. Bell# Tibet, pp. 222-23*
83. A and P. Cd. 1920 <1904)# Ho. 66# p, 153*
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was making a secret treaty to help China against those who
were pressing her from different directions« and that Russia
■ 84
was to: receive. Tibet in return .for her services," • ./,,In Sept-*:: 
ember, 1902, Sir E,; 8atow, British Minister in Peking, was 
instructed to intimate, and did intimate to the Peking govern­
ment, that "should any agreement affecting tho political status 
of i'ibet be entered into ty ^hina with another power, ilia Maj­
es t y ^  Government would be compelled to take steps for the pro­
tection of British interests," The Peking government stron­
gly denied that there was any such secret compact regarding 86
Tibet. In spite of the above-mentioned Russian assurance
and Chinese denial, however, the British authorities in India
were still of the opinion that their "vastly greater interests
in Tibet clashed all along the line with those of tho Muscov-
87
its,"
Mention has boon made above of a meeting at Khaaba in 
July, 1903, To use the words of Lord Curzon, "tho Tibetans 
who were in occupation of the Giaogong plateau were directed 
by Mr. Y.hite to withdraw beyond tho frontier, and our [the 
British] right to insist upon tho observance of the boundary
34. Bell, Protrait of the Dalai Lama, p, 62.
85* A and P. Cd. 1920, Bo. 66, p. 152.
86. Ibid., Nos. 49, 52, pp. 140-41| No. 55* P* 14Ji No. 57# . .
p, X l f T
87« Perceval London, The.,Opening.of,.Tibet, p. 21,
laid down by the Convention of 1890 was clearly asserted.«
Iha:Chinese : government for their part, while complaining to the 
British authorities about Mr* '»bite’s breaking down the barrier 
in the Ifa Chin Pass with a force of over 100 troops without any 
previous notice, thought it an opportune moment to reopen tho 
negotiations, and. therefore named Ho ICuang-hsieh as its delegate
89
in July, 1902* By making this overture, as clearly soon by
the Secretary of State for India, "China ... implicitly accepts
. 90
responsibility for the affairs of Tibet." Lord Cur¿on, how­
ever, regarded the "Chinese proposal for a conference as afford­
ing on excellent opportunity for pressing forward ana carrying 
out" his altered policy. he suggested the attaching of a cond­
ition that the conference should take place not upon the Brit­
ish frontier but at Lhasa, and that it should be attended by a
representative of the Tibetan government who would participate
< 91
*n the proceedings.
Later, Lord' Cur20a thought it politic to name Kluaba in­
stead of Lhasa as the meeting place. Ha did this, apparently, 
in consideration of international complications. Russia had 
aaaa it clear to the British that they could not remain indlff-
291
■ ' 88'
83* A and P. Cd. 1920, Ho. 66, p. 151.
§9. Ib id . ,  end .  in Bo. 55, ? .  142$ annex. 4 to e n d .  f in
90. Ibid., No. 61, p. 143.
91. ibid.* Ho. 66, p. 155$ Ho. 74, p. 182$ Ho. 76, p. 135,
©rent to any serious disturbances of the status quo in Tibet,
saying they regarded Tibet as «forming a part of the Chinese
■ ■ $2
Empire, in the integrity of which they took an interest*n 
Lord Curzon had taken into consideration also the lack of 
enthusiastic support on the part of the Secretary of Stats for 
India, who told him that «it would be premature to adopt meas­
ures so likely to precipitate a crisis in the affairs of Tib-
93 ■:■■ ■ ■ ‘
et,« as those the Viceroy had proposed* For the Khamba 
meeting, however. Lord Curzon demanded that «the Chinese dele­
gates should be accompanied by a duly accredited Tibetan rep­
resentative of the highest rank whose authority to bind the
94
Tibetan government is absolute and unquestioned*«
As to the scope of the negotiations, the Chinese were 
under the impression that Mr. fthite was probably proceeding to 
the frontier in the vicinity of Giaogong »with the object of
. 9 5 ’ •
discussing some frontier matters locallyj» while on the part 
of the British, even the Secretary of State for India presumed 
that «it will . be necessary to include in the scope of the 
negotiations the entire question of our future relations with
92* ibid.. Ho. 83, p* 187) in£l&* PP* 572-375.
93. Ibid«, No. 78, p. 185.
94, Ibid«. Nos. 86 and 87# P* 189) annex, to end. 7 in No, 99
p* M r
95* Ibid., annex, to end. 5 in No. 6 6 , p. 159j annex. 4,
® n d *  7# *n No* 66, pt l6l. -
- -292 ■
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Tibet, commercial and otherwise** but eventually he decided 
that the negotiations should bo restricted to questions concer­
ning trade relations, the frontier, and grazing rights, and 
that no proposal should be made for the establishment of a 
Political Agent either at Gyantse or at Lhasa as Lord Curzon
t 97had suggested* . ;
Since januray, 1905, the Chinese delegate, Ho Kuang-hsieh, 
had been waiting at Yatung, the trade mart on the frontier*
On April 6th the Chinese Resident ?;rote to Lord Cur son in the 
following wordss "Mr. Ho, who has now been at Yatung over throe 
months, has petitioned me to the effect that during his enforc­
ed stay at Yatung he has on several occasions communicated with 
Mr, White and urged him to begin the discussion of affairs with­
out delay, but failed to elicit any satisfactory reply. Also, !' 
Your Excellency has failed to vouchsafe any reply to my dispatch 
dated 28th November last year, and I feel much concerned in con-
98
sequence. ...I venture to beg an early reply.«
The Chinese, of course, had no idea that Lord Curzon was 
planning some «more practical measures with a view to securing 
commercial and political facilities," and the British govern­
ment was seeking for clarification of the Russian attitude, and
96, Ibid, No* 85, p. 183.
97* Ibid., ifos, 95 96» p. 193*
98, Ibid* |, annex* to end .  2 in No. 99# P* 196*
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waiting for a more opportune moment and »a better position to
9 9
decide the question.* Lord Cur jeon always blamed the Chinese 
authorities for their procrastination* lie may have been just­
ified in his accusations on previous occasions, but this time, 
to use the words of Sir E. Satow, the British Minister in Pek­
ing! »The Chinese Government is really desirous of seeing the
r " 100 ■
matter brought to a satisfactory conclusion.»
99. Ibid., Mo. 66, p. 151I Nos. 78 and 79# P* 185.
100. Ibid., Mo. 116, p. 212.
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CHAPTER _Y
Tir, BRITISH ARMED MISr.IOH TO LHASA AI-TD AFTERY'ARD3
In the preceding chapter we saw that the Chinese govern­
ment at Peking and its officials on the spot were unaware of 
the*altered policy* formulated by the Indian Viceroy and tot­
ally unprepared to meet the" new'situation when the small local 
Sikkim frontier issue suddenly became the entire question of 
British *future relations, commercial or otherwise* with Tibet. 
VJe also saw that the frontier Issue could and would have been
settled, had Lord Curson not attached an additional condition
1
which scaled the fate of any possible agreement, whereas in 
fact he admitted that the British «right to insist upon the ob­
servance of the boundary laid down by the Convention of 18902
was clearly asserted.* V*e have further observed that while 
the Chinese government was still desirous of seeing the matter 
brought to a satisfactory conclusion, the British had already 
decided to eliminate the Chinese factor in the controversy and 
sought direct dealings with Tibet*
In the present chapter an account will be given of the 
British expedition to Tibet which succeeded in forcing open
1. Surra, pp, 231-82, nn* 60, 6l and 64»
2. gupra,-- p, 291# n* 83*
3* Surra..p. 234.
the gates of Lhasa and establishing direct relations with Tibet,
According to Professor Vincent A. Smith, »the expedition was un-
.4
necessary and,all. tut. fruitless#» The writer in presenting a" 
factual-account intends to give some indications of ^ whether the 
expedition, if it had not been avoidable from the very beginn­
ing, could not have stopped short of forcing its way into the 
Tibetan capital, and what, ■ if-any thing,-It. did achieve in imp- 
osing a convention upon the Tibetans.
of the British Armed iftfdon
On June 5, 1905, lord Curzon wrote to the Chinese Resident 
at Lhasa notifying the latter of his momentous decision, and 
on the sane day he dispatched Colonel Xounghusband, a noted ex­
plorer, and Mr, «hits, .- the Political: Officer in-.Sikkla, - to -pro*- 6
ceed to Khaaba with an armed escort of 200 men to be supported 
V  another 300 men who would bring the ordnance reserve aatamn-
7Ition for the escort* Mr.: Scott calls this mission to Khaiaba 
*U deliberate violation of the Convention of 1890, carried out 
with a high-handed disregard for the elementary principles of
International -law,»-
4. The Oxford History of I n M *  (rev, ed, 1928), p. 771*
5. i|dd., annex, to e n d ,  7 ia lo, 99# PP* 200-201,
6* Ibid., end. 6 in So. 99# PP* 193-200.
7. Ibid., en d ,  ? in »o. 99# P- W l  *>; detail; of Colonel 
'oungiueUiufc preparations, see his letter written on June 1.
Scott, pp. 29-30*
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As a matter of fact, Mr. Eo, the'-'Chinese-delegate/-wrote \
to Mr.-Wilts to say that »We are, and have been, quit© prepared ] 
to proceed to such place as r.ay seem to Ills Excellency the Vice­
roy more desirable for the better discussion of the points at 
issue,* The Chinese Resident wrote to Lord Cur ¡eon to say that 1 
*1 trust that Your Excellency will, without further loss of 
time, depute someone to discuss matters. The Deputy appointed ; 
by Your Excellency can either come to Yatung, or the Chinese
Deputies will proceed to Sikkim, or other such places as may
' 9
be decided on by Your Excellency. * Neither Mr. ho nor the
Chinese Resident had the least idea that the meeting place of
a conference which was to «open negotiations *,• for the ful-
10
filaent of treaty obligations,* would not be limited by the 
terms of the very treaty which recognised their rights to ex­
clude Europeans from Tibet, with Yatung the only exception.
■ From the moment that the armed mi scion beg&n to approach 
the frontier, both Tibetan, and Chinese representatives contin­
ued their protests against the invasion. On June 15# 1905* 
the Chinese Frontier Commissioners sent a telegram to Mr. White ; 
requesting the British Commissioners not to proceed across the 
frontier fixed by the 1890 Convention, and stating that Khamba,,
9. A and P, Cd. 1920, annex, 2, e n d , 1, and annex, to en d . 2
in p, 196.
10. Ibid,, No. 86, p. 139.
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being on tho Tibetan side of the frontier, was an unsuitable 
11
rendezvous, Nevertheless, Mr, Y.hite arrived with a full
escort at Khaaba on the fth of July, and Colonel Xounghusband
12
arrived there twelve days later. On July 22 the Commission­
ers met. The Tibetan officials raised objections not only to 
holding negotiations at SChamba, but also to the size of the 
British escort. They/refused:to receive-any written communic­
ations from the British delegates, and when the latter ashed 
them to report «hat had been said to their government, they 
replied they could not even do that such, and that they could 
aalce no report at all unless the British mission vent bach to
the frontier at Glaogong, which was the place at which they
15
meant to discuss matters,
When the Chinese learned of the forthcoming armed mission, 
the Resident took action with a vieiv to deterring the Tibetans 
from showing hostility to the English on their arrival. Ho 
admonished the h£a*blons in person, tolling them not to be ob­
stinate as before, but to discuss matters with the mission on 
the basis of reason, and warned them that wif hostilities once 12
11. Ibid.* annex, 1, oncl. 5 In Ho. 129, p. £23. Later, on 
July“T 3, the Chinese Resident wired to Lord Curson reiterating 
that hhamba was in Tibetan territory and unsuitable for discuss­
ion, and requesting that the British Commissioners bo removed to 
the boundary, Enel. 20 in Ho. 129# P* 230. See also Hos,
103, 109, pp, 205-206.
12. Ibid,, ends. 9# 12 and 1J% pp, 224-25 and 229.
13* Ibid., end. 22 in Ho. 129# P* 231.
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begin, the horrors of war will hi more than one can bear to
think upon, and even the mediation of the Imperial Resident
14
will ba of no avail,» Fearing an attack, tills extraordinary 
«commercial mission« wa3 «strongly entrenched in the op con with
■ 15 :■
Maxim guns and perfectly ready,« But though large numbers 
of Tibetans were gathering along the lines of further advance, 
no attack was made upon the camp or upon the individual offic­
ers as they freely explored the neighbourhood.
On July 29, & deputy from the Panch’en lama called upon 
Colonel Younghnsband «to demand the reason for his armed pres­
ence ... and to request ••• immediate withdrawal« of the miss­
ion. This shows that in spite of the «considerable friction 
between the Shigatse and Lhasa people,» the Tibetans were unan­
imous in demanding the withdrawal of the armed mission »across
the frontier, or to Yatung, which was the place fixed for moot-
16
ings of this kind.« The impasse dragged on. By the end of 
August Younghnsband had entered these words in the Political 
Diary of his mission* «Their present policy is one of passive 
obstruction. They have mad© up their minds to have no negot- 
iations with us inside Tibet? they will simply leave us here.«
14. ¡tbld«. No. 97 and end., pp. 194-95»
15»'ifeid.f e n d ,  25 in No 129, p, 24J,
16, Ibid,, en d ,  24 in No, 129, PP» 241-42,
17* Ibid,, end, 54 in No, 129, p. 267.
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:In,.the.meantimea pretext for.furtheradvance,was found.
Two sen had been sent out on July IB by the British to spy out
the land and were stopped by the Tibetans aha seat the® to 
18Lhasa* In reporting the incident to his home government 
Lord Curzon wrote*
The most conspicuous proof of th@ h o stility  of the 
Tibetan government and of their contemptuous disregard 
for the usages of civ ilizatio n  has been the arrest of two 
British subjects fro® Lachung at Shigats®, whence they 
have been deported to Lhasa* and i t  I s  credibly asserted, 
have been tortured and k ille d .*9
As a matter of fact, the men were released nine months 
la ter at Lhasa, on the insistence of the Chinese Resident, 
without prompting from Colonel Younghusband, and were found to 
be safe and sound. A medical examination by the ply si clan of 
the British mission reported they were "in excellent health" 
and had been "well fed, showing no sign of i l l  treatment beyond 
imprisonment*» In the meantime their imaginary sufferings 
served a useful purpose. After having made what Scott called 
"the old clvis pomanus sum appeal,» Lord Curzon secured
18. Ibid. ,  end. JO in Ho. 129, p. 245, Captain W.P. 0*Connors 
Bi&ry.
lQ Tivfri 112» 113. 123, and 123, pp. 209# 210, 215, and
219,^~~fn! British Foreign Sinister toid the ^ Russian Ambussad-
or* »The Tibetans have seized, and as we believe barbarously
Put to death two British subjects.» IM i** Ho. 141, p. 299*
Pt* xx, encl* nu, *-vj*
p 0- 257, When "the, two dubious and anoiympu® British' siib-
p. 551
No. 265,
LmLl, cd. 2570
pp. 224*225, and No, 29:
, to. 130, 
# pp*
th^fSreatLofatoSt S5 so» fomod.on. Of tho wln. »a.««.
'the mission' "ill-t?eatoS?hal not ;b®enand that.h e  was satisfied t h a t  wne ***■ *'
severe.» -
f-
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approval for/ the occupation:of the.Chaabl Valleyj and then, 
under the pretext that a rupture of negotiations had taken > 
place, while in fact negotiations could hardly* he said ever to 
have begun, he eventually secured the sanction of the new Sec­
retary of State for India, Mr. Broderick, for an immediate
advance to Gyantse with reinforcements under the command of
21
Brigadier-General MacDonald.
On the way, at Geru, where the Tibetans had built a*wall 
of loose stones across the valley, «a ridiculous position” was 
formed with ”Sikh and Mongol swaying backwards and forwards as 
they wrestled for the possession of sword and matchlock,” when 
the former was ordered to disarm the latter forcibly* Then 
somewhere in the swaying mob a shot was fired, and a massacre, 
not a battle, followed, as a result of which at least 628 Tib­
etans were left on the field killed and wounded, and 222, incl­
uding some slightly wounded, were taken prisoner. On the 
British side one war correspondent, Mr# Candler, was dangerous­
ly wounded, and one officer seriously wounded, and in addition
22
two native ranks were wounded severely and eight slightly.
21, A and ?, Cd, 1920 (1904), Mo, 113, p. 2l0j No. 120, p. 213l 
Nos, x S a a d  12o, p. 21©I Mo. 132, p. 294. * To strengthen his 
appeal, lord Curson reported, ”An overt act of hostility has 
taken place, Tibetan troops having attacked Nepalese yaks on 
the frontier and carried off many of then,* Ibitf.# ~lo*~1 2 y>-• - 
P. 218.
22, For details of the slaughter at Geru, see E. Candler, The
Unveiling of Lhasa. on. 102-109». ..-..The author was an eyewitness 
serving as the correspondent of the pally Mail. . for the offic­
ial report, see A and.£» Cd. 2054, No ♦ lo, p* 5l Mo. 11, p* 6|
No, 23, pp, 9-10. Among the Tibetans killed wore two command-
At Tatung, Colonel YoitngMsbaiid had given a pledge to
the Tibetan general in these words*  «7»'e are not at war with
Tibet, and unless we are ourselves attacked, we shall not
25
attack the Tibetans.» Now the Tibetans were blamed for 
having mad© an unprovoked attack upon a peaceful «commercial 
mission,» and henceforward in the dispatches it was no longer 
»the Tibetans» but »the enemy.»
On April 11, the »mission« arrived at Gyant3e with 190 
Tibetan corpses marking the trail of the British advance bet­
ween Geru and Gyantse, not to count those who crawled away to 
hide their agonies and who died afterwards from their wounds, 
Tounghusband reported to his government on that day that
»General MacDonald has brought the mission here without loss■ 24 '
of a single man, having only three wounded,»
The »Mission* remained at Gyantse for three months end­
eavouring to open negotiations and being met with the stereo­
typed demand to return‘to the frontier# . ■ The Tibetans:explain
ing officers, one from Lhasa, the other from Chlgatsej another 
officer in command of the Phari Regiment was taken prisoner '
*hile seriously wounded. Ibid., No. 29* P* 11* The writer 
is inclined to believe that it was due to the English sense of 
fair play, rather than the official explanation, that the Geru 
Incident was not included in calculating the indemnity of 7$ : 
lekhs# Cf, A and P. Cd. 2570# No. 517* p* 246.
^5# A and ? f Cd, 1920, No. 153# P* 304. . /
24, Bcott, on, clt., p* 441 Od. 2054# Nos, 22 and 25# 
Pp* 9 and, lo.
' ' ■ 502
ed that .-.they had to wait for .„the representatives of the three 
great monasteries for consultations before any reply could be 
made., To lounghusband this was not a good excuse* and ho soon 
proposed the advance to Lhasa because the "psychological mom­
ent" had arrived and he was sure that by carrying the Chinese 
Resident with him he could probably manage this advance with­
out further fighting, or, at any rate, without a serious coll-
ision* ;Lord Curson then:pressed,upon his home government
■.}
the suggestion "that some definite limit of time should bo imp­
osed,« and that a further advance toward Lhasa should be sanct-
26
ioned to be effective after the elapse of the time limit.
June.-.25'was-naaed as .the last day of grace allowed to the
Tibetans for opening negotiations. Later, the time limit was
extended for five days, due to reports about the departure of
27
Tibetan delegates from Lhasa. No negotiations, however, 
took place or were expected at the eleventh hour. The Tibetan
25. A and P. Cd. 2570 (1905)» No. 2, pp. 1-2. Colonel ïoung- 
husband was then expecting the Chinese Resident, who would have 
found that had he come, he was not to negotiate at Gyantso but 
to be instrumental for a further advance of the British mission.
26. Ibid.. No. 71 PP* 5-4* In which the Viceroy mentioned the
attack on the British camp at Gyantso as evidence that the 
Lhasa government was irreconcilable• Tills attack was made by .
700 Tibetans from Shigatsej as a result, 250 were killed or 
wounded, while the British casualties were only 2 wounded.
27. In reply to the British ultimatum, the II be tan general said 
that it was not their custom to receive communications from the 
British and that it should be received by a Chinese official.
delegates.sent .by the■Dalai lama .had not had credentials with
•them*';and Younghusbamd.considered himself unable to deal with
them* in spite of tho assurances given by »»so staunch a friend
of the British'government* ".Tongsa'Panlop of Bhutan, that the
28 ■
Tibetans were really eager to negotiate. In the meantime* 
another reinforcement 'consisting of eight companies of infan­
try* one mule corps* and four guns* was called up fro® India. 
On July 14 the mission set out for; the last, stage of the ad­
vance'.
. On the 20th* Younghusband reached Negartso, Once more
Tibetan delegates appeared on the scene and bogged the British
to return— this time not to the frontier* but to Gyantsa for
29
negotiations. Younghusband refused to comply with their 
request and led his mission towards the Tibetan capital* meet­
ing practically no further opposition. On the 24th the Tib-
30
etan national assembly communicated with Younghusbaad, pro«-
""304".:.' ;
¿3. Ibid.* No. 72# P* 24} No. 63# P* 2»| see also No. 95# PP* 
32-33 for Tongsa Penlop's repeated solicitation. Tho Dalai 
Lama wrote to ask hi® to assist in peaceful settlement, "fight­
ing being bad for both animals and men.» - Younghusband «alls 
Tongsa Penlop "so staunch a friend of the British government** 
in en d .  No. 328, p. 2$6.
29. Ibid.f Pt. II, No. 237# end., pp. 201-203*
50, The national assembly of Tibet (Tsong-^ in Tibetan* ladd-
P* 396)M # was a creation of the 
a representative body} itthirteenth iSlii La»». I t * » »  not
»as composed of all'ecclesiastical and secular officials below 
the rank of the cabinet* or rather such of the® as happened to 
be stationed in 
P* 144«) Nor was
C U X IU lW * VJt i f t H C i  V *  UU
or near Lhasa (Bell*r  it -a responsible organ. It could only make
Recommendations on questions referred to it by the government*
and the Dalai Laaa often ignored its recommendations and aado
ising to negotiate, but requesting the British not to proceed
■ 51 . ■ ■further, Younghusband refused. Three days later, at Chak-
sam ferry, several Tibetan delegates again called on Younghus-
band with a letter from the Dalai Lama himself ana requested the
mission not to come to the holy city. They argued that if the
British went to Lhasa, the religion would be so violated that
. 32■the .-Dalai Lama might die. Again Younghusband refused.
As late as the afternoon of August 2nd, at Camp Tolung, 
the Ta Lama, the Tsarong Shappa, a Chinese official deputed by 
the Laban, the abbot in private attendance on the Dalai Lama, 
a secretary of the council, and the abbots of the three Lhasa 
monasteries visited Younghusband and repeated the usual requ­
ests that the British should not go to Lhasa* The latter re-
53 ■ iiterated his statements that "we must go there." Here the 
reader should be reminded of three facts in this connection*
(l) The Cocrotary of State for India, replying to a question on j 
July 27, told the House of Commons that "there is no tiling to ; 
Prevent negotiations taking place at any point on the march to j *51
Autocratic decisions, 
P* 13 2 0
( U M « f  P* W #  aad Ball, Tibet,
The date was not the 26th as given51. ibid., »0. Ill, p. 44. i 
on p T l i ,  Lee Wel-kuo#®hcl, so. - 245, annex, 1 , p ^  ®  cirho7^4o7p7209 *
32. Ibid., No. 118, p. 43j oncl. No. 252, p. 211,
35, Ibid. f e n d .  Ho. 256.
" 34 ■■
Lhasa if competent negotiators appear.« (2) But three mon­
ths before, on April 22, Ycunghusband had officially recomm­
ended to Lord Curson and the latter had duly transmitted to 
the home government that «negotiations should take place at
35the capital instead of at the half-way house,« (3) And 
Lord Curzon reported to the Secretary of State for India on 
July 10 that Younghusband had been instructed» «Should Tibetan 
delegates appear after he has started, he is to explain our. 
terras to them, to warn them ... and to invite them to accomp­
any the advance of the Mission;« and he again reported on 
July 18 that «Younghusband before making a further diplomatic 
move, is awaiting definite advances on their part In
any case, however, the Mission will not postpone its advan­
ce,«
Lhasa Reached and a Convention Imposed ,.
37 ~On August 3$ Lhasa was reached, - The Dalai Lama was 
reported to have fled to the north, and the government heads 
shifted responsibility, ' According to a report by a corres-
34# Parliamentary Debates, Yol, 138, p, 1334#
35* A and'p. Cd, 2370 (1905), No, 2, p. 2.
36, Ibid,. No. 85# P* 291 No# 95# p# 33#
37* For a complete list of the officers, civil and military,
of the mission who actually reached Lhasa, and the force which 
moved to Lhasa from Oyantse, see London, Thr Opening of Tibet. 
Append!* 1*
pondent of the 'London. Dally Ch.ronie.lp. »»the expedition has 
looted monasteries, and for weeks past, bales of plunder have 
been coming over the passes Into India, Their contents have 
brought Joy to-the officers* rives and friends whose houses in 
the hill stations began to look as soso of thorn looked after
the sack of Peking four years ago [during the Boxer uprising. *
The Chinese Resident, Yu-t*ai, who had been prevented from.
meeting the British Commissioner before the latter*s arrival at
Gy antes by the Dalai Lama*s insistence on British withdrawal to 
59
the frontier, now called on Younghusband immediately and ox-
40
pressed hl.s readiness to assist in arranging an agreement. 
During the return visit the next day, Younghusbmd asked him to
got the Tibetans to depute two or three representatives, which
41 58
he readily promised to arrange,
Yu-t*ai, in spite of all the difficulties he must have had 
with the Tibetans, could have gone to meet the British mission 
before its advance to Lhasa, if not before its arrival at Cyan- 
tse. Lack of transport was only a pretext* Nor was the
58. Quoted fcy Das, British Expansion .lfo.Ti.tegt, p. 651 for ref­
erence to the contraryr see A and r , Ca« 22/Ö, Nos* 122 and 125,
PP* 150*511 end. Ho. 274, P7 223; On tho question raised in 
Parliament as to the reported loot, see farilaimtorr. JtetM19gf 
Vol;:140, pp. 11-12,
A and p. Cd. 2054 (1 9 0 4 ), Ho. 1 4 , p . 7| Cd. 2}70 (1 9 0 5 ), 
II, end* No, 23, pp, 104-105»
40, Ibid., Cd, 2570.(1905), Ho» 119, P» 49*
41, Ibid,, Mo, 121, Younghusband, India andîibet», p, 266,
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Dalai Lama*» insistence on British withdrawal an insurmount­
able difficulty or a prerequisite condition. It was rather 
his cowardice that prevented him from shouldering a respons­
ibility on behalf of the Imperial court or doing something for 
the Tibetans when he was most needed. In his telegraphic
report to the V«ai-wu-pu, this Manchu official expressed his
hope for a favourable turn in the situation if the Tibetans
■ - -v- ■: -. ■ 42
should meet another great defeat at the hands of the British.
For him it did not require any effrontery to tell Xounghusband
that he had no authority to get transport to proceed beyond
Lhasa so as to serve as an excuse for his dilatoriness and in-43
action. Apparently he entertained the queer Idea of util­
izing the British military might to reassert his lost authority 
in Tibet and therefore he did the best he could to collaborate 
with Xounghusband. Actually# he played into the latter*s 
hands*
Since it was no longer a negotiated peace but a dictated 
one* there remained only the question of the drafting of terms 
to be imposed upon the helpless Ti bo tans. If Lord Curzon* s
mission had so far had any real fight at all, he himself was
» 5 2 5 » 8» p .  1 2 !  C fa*lug _ chl c h * o a Asms
*Xu-t* ai tsou tuf * C h l m  ¿7 PP* 2*^0*
43. Ibid.. »Chang ying-fcang tsou tu, ” ChtUn IX. p. 18| cf* 
A a n Q 7  Cd. 2370 (190$) * Ft. II, e n d .  Ho. 264, p. 223.
mabout to put up a harder fight with his own homo government on
this question. His policy was one of complete political dom­
ination# He was resolved upon securing a solid and permanent 
footing in libetj but his home government, on the other hand, 
had to examine his proposals from the wider point of view of
and Asiatic* ihen the home government sanctioned the advance
entanglement, since the world situation was tense and the Hus so 
Japanese war was in the offing. Sir Ernest Satow, British 
Minister in Peking, was instructed to explain to the Chinese 
government the reason for sanctioning the advance of the Brit-
ish government had not any intention of annexing or even perm­
anently occupying Tibetan territory and reiterated that Great
Britain1s sole object was to obtain satisfaction for the aff-
45
ront which she had received from the Tibetans# Again when 
it sanctioned the advance to Lhasa, it informed tha Peking 
Court of its decision and Sir C. Hardings was instructed to 
repeat to the Russian government the previous assurances and ■ 
to add most emphatically that ttso long as no other power end-
the relations of Great Britain to other powers, both European
of the mission to Gyantse, it wanted to avoid international
Ish mission Lord Lansdowne assured Russia that the Brit-
oavours to intervene in the affairs of Tibet, [the
44. a and P. Cd. 1920 (1904), ho* I35, p. 296
45. Ibid** Nos. 155# *41, pp. 294, 296# 298 and 299.
will not attempt either to annex it, to establish a protector­
ate over it, or in any way to control its internal administra- 
■ . 46 
tion. *
lord Curzon knew pretty well the position of his home gov­
ernment* He was too wise to defy openly the Instructions of 
the Secretary of State for Xndi&f hut as'there.are aora ways - 
than one that lead to Rome, he skillfully entangled Hr. Brod­
erick in long and devious arguments, and trapped him into loose
and unguarded amplifications of his originally definite and
47
precise statements* Since he was told that the advance of
the mission should not be allowed to lead to occupation or to
49
permanent intervention in Tibetan affairs in any form, ho 
calculated that there surely could be no objection to forbid­
ding the Tibetans to have any relation with any other foreign
49
power without British consent* His home government stated
clearly in the instructions that they were not prepared to
establish a permanent mission in Tibet and neither at Lhasa nor
50
elsewhere was a Resident to be demanded* _ He was, however, 
sure that there could bo no objection to retaining for the
46. A and fr Cd. 2570 (1905)# Has. 57# 45, pp. 15# 15* 
47* Scott, OP. clt*. P* 4 9.
48. A and P. Cd. 1920# Ho. 152# p. 294.
49. Gee Art. IX of the Convention.
50. A and P f Cd. 2570 (1905)# Ho. 79# P* 26.
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trade agent at Gyantso the privilege of «proceeding to Lhasa
as occasion may require to discuss matters with the Chinese
51
Anban or with the high officials of the Dalai Lama.« In 
his eyes, C h u m M  Valley «lies to the south of the main water­
shed, and is Indian rather than Tibetan'in character!« so it 
might toe considered as separate if evacuation had to be effec­
ted In accordance with the instructions* And if the home 
government was pedantic enough to regard the Chumhi valley as 
coming within the scope of its pledge to Russia not to annex 
Tibetan territory, there could be no harm in «reserving to our­
selves the right to contract such communications as roads,
52
railways, telegraphs, etc.«
As to the indemnity, Mr. Broderick laid down clearly in 
his final instructions that the sum to bs demanded should not 
exceed an amount which, it was believed, would be within the 
power of the Tibetans to pay, by instalments, if necessary, 
spread over three years, and that the occupation of Chuatola 
Valley as security for the indemnity and the newly opened 
trade marts would continue till the payment of the indemnity 
had boon completed, or the m-rts opened effectually for tho
51. Coe tho subsidiary agreement! Younghusband, I n ^ k i M  
£lb£t, pp, 299.300.
52, Scott, fit..Oil«* P* 50*
spaca of three years, whichever was the latest* Here Lord 
Curzon decided to take the hold step of disregarding the inst­
ructions and confronting the Secretary of State with a fait 
accompli*. ..
On September 1 Youngusband with the whole staff, all in
full-dress uniform, rods through the’city'tothe Chines© Has-
■ , 5*idency, The Chinese Resident thereupon summoned the Shoppes 
who took their seats on stools in the centre of the room,
Host of the members of the Tibetan national assembly then pres­
ent in Lhasa also came in and were huddled into the corners. 
Younghusband then arose and presented the final draft of the 
Treaty in English, Chines®, and Tibetan,,to the Resident, who 
then handed 'the Tibetan .copy to the Shappés#
Its leading items werei
i «Php i/nvflrna*nt of Tibet engaged to respect-the Anglo-% 
lt ïw?„p?T cSvettUon of 1890 and to recognize the front-:; 
g Ä v e e f « S i »  «d. I l ^ t  as defined In Article I
of the said convention. ; ^Art, l),
2. in n a t i o n  to ïaturl2, U o  f r « h  t n d .  « u t .  «ere to be opened at (iyantse and O^tok. iArt. IIJ. v
■; * ■ - mt*« **,w-»* »« 'government undertook, to levy no .duos ,of. .„ 
5V  i ä Ä f ?  than «.oee provided ior in the tariff 
to be mutually agreed upon. (Art, IV),
* . . , , e f >vrif a million pounds— equivalent to
4 ’ rupeefsoventy-five lakhs— »as to be paid by the lib- *54
55. A and P. Cd, 2570 (1905)# Wo* 106, pp.- 42-45,•
54. ■ i S h a W . t  also known as bla*-blen, is a member of tho -
kashag or Cabinet which is usually composed of one priest ana 
throe laymen,
<,■■■.. etan government in instalments.: ;■ Chnmbi Valley was 
to remain in British occupation until the payment was 
. completed.: (Arts• • VI and VII).
5. The Tibetan government agreed to raxe all forts and 
fortifications and remove all armaments which might 
impede ■ the course of free communication:between the 
British frontier and the towns of Gyantse end Lhasa. 
(Art. VIII).
6. Without British consent no Tibetan territory was to 
be ceded, leased, etc., to any foreign powerj no con­
cession for roads, mines, etc., was to be |iv@n| and 
no Tibetan revenues were to be pledged to a foreign 
power or to ary its subjects. No such power was 
to be permitted to intervene in Tibetan affairs, or 
to send agents to Tibet. (Art* IX).55
Then with the permission of the Resident, Younghusband 
addressed the members of the national assembly, telling them 
that he was prepared to explain any point in the final draft 
which they did not understand, but lie could not further dis­
cuss the terms and that they were given only one week within
5 6
which they might receive explanations and think matters over.
On the sixth day the treaty was signed in the presence of 
the Chinese Resident in the Audience Room of the holy Fot&la. 
Younghusband nearly persuaded the Chinese Resident to attach 
his signature* Yu-tfai might have done so but for the inst- 567*
55* There.was, in addition,,« single-clause subsidiary agree­
ment, the content of which is referred to on p* 318 infra.
56, Xounghusband,. PP* 291-92,
57. t hid Tin to0-1502* By insisting on the Petals, Young-
todPin mind to strike the imagination of the Nepalese, 
Bhutanese Sikkimese, and men of Kashmir and Turkestan, and to leavflSslakaSe lvidcnee that the Tibetans had been comp­
elled to come to termA#
ructions of the Wal-wu-pu, which not only' refused to give
sanction ■■bat''adabnished his for having let the Tibetans enter
. 53
into such a questionable agreement with the British. The
signed document had only one modification* the payment of the
indemnity was distributed over seventy-five years instead of
three, as would be the occupation of the Chumbi valley which,
under the terms of the final draft as well as of the signed
convention, was to be continued till the full amount of the
v 59 ■
indemnity had been paid*
When the ceremony was concluded, Younghusband addressed 
the Tibetans, saying that **we were not interfering in the 
smallest degree with their religion, we were annexing no part 
of their country, we were not interfering in their internal 
affairs, and we were fully recognising the continued suzerainty 
of the Chinese Government. We merely sought to insure that ■ -  
they should abide by the treaty made on their behalf by the 
Ambm in 1890 In his report to the government of
India, Younghusband spofce of the convention as defining the 
boundaries, placing British trade relations upon a satisfactory 
looting, and giving the British the right to exclude any for­
eign influence If they should so wish, and containing an aeimow- 5960
3 14
59. Arts. VI and VII of the convention.
60. Younghusband, p. 505*
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ledgeaent from: tha Tibetans that m  indemnity was-due for tha
insults shown them* In addition, ha procured ona passport for
a party to proceed from Gyantso to Cartok to open a trad® mart
there, another for a party to proceed down the Brahmaputra to
Assam, and a third for Mr. V»llton to return to Chengtu by way
of Tach*ienlu. Furthermore, he procured from the Bhutanese
government permission for the construction of what was hoped to
be the principal road piercing the Himalayas throughout their
6l
entire length. ,
Mow let us go beyond these diplomatic utterances and sea
what change the provisions of the treaty brought to the relat­
ionship of Tibet with the British. It is obvious that the 
provisions of the treaty, if accepted as drawn, would have mad© 
Tibet a British protectorate in the tru® sense of tha word.
Hot to mention the restrictions on her foreign relations and 
defense; the uses that could be mado of the right of the trade 
agent at Gyantse to visit Lhasa! the collection for 7 5 y®*rs 
of an annual tribute which might give occasion for Interference 
in the affairs of Tibet! 5 and the military occupation of 
Ghutabi Valley, «the key to Tibet,« «tha only strategical point 
of value in the whole northeastern frontier from Kashmir to
&U A and P. Cd. 2370 (1 9 0 5 ), e n d , 1 in  Ho. 194,  p . 8 ? . 
Pa», British V* Clark, a&bot,
63# A and P. Cd, 2570# Ho. I65, p. 67.
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to Burma,» which would give ■< the British a - clear ran into ■ Tib- ■ 
64
etj -«lust the indemnity of five hundred thousand famdr:.,:,^:;; 
(equivalent to rupees 75 lakhs) alone would have reduced Tib­
et to a state of financial vassalage to British India for 
three generations*
■ Such a- sum-was not within the power of the Tibetans to '"'
65
pay— a fact which Younghnsband at first admitted and which
was clearly shown by the opinions expressed in this connection
06
by the Chinese Resident and the Punch*en Lama. And to fix 
such a sum was diametrically contrary to the instructions of 
his home government* Yet Younghusband was bold enough to 
impose the crushing burden on the Tibetans and to allow the 
payment to be distributed over seventy-five years, while rot-
64. Younghusband, p. 297*
telegram to6s? & ««d p  Cd 2^70 (1905) # Ho*.-139# P* - 571 ^  ■
the Younihusband said* »Amount of indemnity which I m
Z l l i t n l  l’s X «ould not press it jorlousay.. tat
sa— s aiiss.'ss as „
L  re ^ t b a t a t s  of one lakh of rupees
fi»S »b i?wrt 1 n P  t«. P. 26J.) Ihoy asked for nothing tat 
that! because"all°their'request/ for exemption, reductlon. and
P".oche tad told bln repeattaiy w  ^ k h
Idea of Prolonging the ttaejurinj kBpt up ind
friendship ™ u l d  be diffl'cM-t,« and they wanted to settle the
business at once and have dona with it* (IMS*# 31/#
P. 246| No* J40, p* 260.}
66. No. 151, p. 55! eoel. 1 in No. 194, P- 83.
aining without modification the proviso that Chumbi Valley was 
to he occupied as security till the full amount had been paid.
tVia convention Amended in .Deference 
tr> London Authority
Hr. Broderick, on learning the contents of the signed con­
vention, pointed out to Lord Curson the difficulty presented by 
the amount of the indemnity, especially when the provision for 
its payment was read in connection with Art. VII, the effect of 
this being that the British occupation of Chumhi Valley (which 
had been recognized in the convention of 1 S9O and the trade reg­
ulations of 1893 as Tibetan territory) might have to continue 
for 75 years* fíe called this inconsistent with his instruct­
ions and with the declaration of His Majesty's Government as to 
withdrawal. Three days later ha told the Viceroy that the 
home government «felt it highly undesirable that a term should 
be fixed for payment of indemnity which would have the effect 
of throwing the burden on future generations and of relieving 
fro® any ^ immediate sacrifice the monasteries and .those to who® . 
the present troubles are due,« and that they did not wish that 
the indemnity should take the for® of what would be regarded as 
a permanent tribute. Broderick therefore authorized a reduct­
ion of indemnity fro® 75 ^ hs t0 lakhs of rupees, i.e., one 
third of the original amount and a revision of the provision in 
connection with the occupation of Chumbi Valley.
■ 3 1 7 :
67* Ibid.f Hos. ,155 - and-156,. pp. : 62,: ;65*
EL3 instructions reached Xounghusband on the eve of the 
latter’s departure from Lhasa and no action was taken. Lord 
Cur son had intended to ask the Tibetans to agree to the estab-* 
lishment of an additional trade mart in Eastern Tibet and to 
other concessions such as survey, new trade regulations^ and 
lien on customs, as a bargain for indemnity remission.
Finally, Mr. Broderick in reply to Lord Curaon’s further 
explanation, told him bluntly that in regard to the indemnity 
Younghusbsnd’s convention had been framed in defiance of expr— 
ess instructions and "we cannot accept the situation created 
for us by cur representative’s disobedience to orders.” he 
agreed to Lord C u n o n ’s suggestion to have a declaration appen­
ded to the ratified convention to give effect to the reduction 
of indemnity, but insisted that "it should be so worded as to 
maintain the stipulation providing that, as security for ful­
filment of provisions as to trade marts, Chumbi Valley is to 
be occupied until the marts have been opened effectively for 
three years.” As regards the subsidiary agreement giving the 
trade agent at Cyantso the right of access to Lhasa, he decided 
to disallow it, as the hose government regarded the agreement 
as unnecessary and as inconsistent Mthjthe principle on which 
their policy had throughout been based.
68. Ibid.. Ho. 154, PP* 68*'~
69, ib id . .  Ho. lid , p* ¿51 ®0®* l ?0 and l84# PiU ^
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■ Thus the Secretary of State won' the tattle at ’ last» lie , 
won It with the support of Parliament. As early as July 13* 
1903* Mr» Weir ashed in the House of Commons whether the gov­
ernment of India contemplated the dispatch of a commissioner 
■ 70
to Tibet* whereupon the Tibetan expedition seized the attent­
ion of the members of Parliament, Lord Curzon was often under 
fire* Lord Reay in the House of Lords assailed the Viceroy»s 
policy as embodied in the letter dated January 8* 1902* point 
by point. He held that the proper method of communication was 
with the Chinese authorities and called Curzon»s phrase «const­
itutional fiction« an »extraordinary expression.» Ha added* 
»This strikes me as an extremely impolitic assertion that a 
s i t u a t i o n  which our government had always recognized, which is 
founded on law, history and tradition should be considered a 
constitutional fiction-extremely impolitic when wa realize 
what suzerainty means to us in India,« He further pointed out 
that »far from looking upon the suzerainty as a constitutional 
fiction, the home g ov ern m en t looked upon Tibet as a province
* ?2 of China.«
The Marquess of Ripon, who had been both Secretary of 
S t a t e  for India and Viceroy of India (1830-1834), called Lord
£&Silaa<sfltarr.MbMs.1* Vol, 125* rpp # .,401-402»
'ri* i m m ,  chap, IV* n. 70, .......
E&lUaaeatary . Vol, 130,. p p . 1112, 1116-1 1 1 7 ,
520
C u rio n * s  fo rw a rd  p o l i c y  i n  I n d ia  d a n g ero u s and u n w iso  and  t o l d  
th e  House o f  l o r d s  t h a t  th e  v a lu e  o f  t r a d e  :w ith  .T i b e t  w as n o t
e r e e  by t h e  agency o f  f o r c e .  He was c e r t a i n  t h e r e  w as n o  E u r­
o p e a n  pow er u n w ise  enough to  in v a d e  I n d i a  th ro u g h  T i b e t ,  o v e r  
t h e  h i g h e s t  m o u n ta in s  in th e  w o rld , and m a in ta in e d : t h a t  th e  
B r i t i s h  g o v ern m en t sh o u ld  « n o t g iv e  an  o p p o r tu n ity  t o  any o t h e r
Pow er to  s a y  t h a t  we a r e  interfe r in g  w ith  C h in a  o r  t h r e a t e n i n g
■ '. ■ ' "75 ■ •
the independence of any portion of her country."
The Earl of Rosebery, .«ho did "not think: there le anything 
in the Papers ahich really Justifies the dispatch of this exp ed ­
ition," sarcastically remarked that "the first hundred pages or: 
something like that of this Blue-book are devoted entirely to 
the desire and ambition of the Indian government to impose tha^ 
drinking of Indian tea on a people *hlch prefer Chinese tea.»"' 
He «»s'of the opinion that "there is little or no commerce to 
he got out of Tibet" and ho doubted that the expedition took 
Place vith the authority of the Chinese government, as the 
latter had with such anguish pressed on the British government 
the abandonment of the Macaulay expedition In 1833. Eo called 
the sanction of the advance of the mission to Grant»., "the 
surrender of His Majesty's Government to the Viceroy," "in def-
. / p *  1 1 4 1 1  lord n m j  a l s o  brought up this point m t e a ,
much and i t  was u n ju s t  t o  a t te m p t  to  a d v a n ce  and d e v e lo p  com a-
*3.* pp. UJi, 1133-1124, 1137.
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I serence to the strong and energetic impulsion of Lord Curcon."
. fjjsya were no less heated debates in tbs House of Commons. 
For example, Mr. Gibson Bowles, who "did not believe that the 
results of the expedition would have a beneficial effect on 
Imperial interests and Imperial trade," told his fellow M.P.s 
that* "Lord Curzon was a military and strategically-minded man 
and ... it was to him that this Tibet expedition was due) It 
was his intantion to take into India an uneonquered border for 
political purposes."
Vihen the Curzon-Broderick difference and the terms which 
Vounghusband had imposed on the Tibetans were brought up,.Parl­
iament showed even more indignation. In the House of Lords 
Earl Spencer attacked the terms by which the British covenant; 
were to occupy an Important part of the country for seventy- 
five years, as contrary to the spirit and the letter of British 
assurances to the C h i n e s e  and Hussian govermonts. ^ o  thought 
that "if anybody is to blame, it is rather the government of 
India, who:differed from the'Kerne Government,.than Sir Francis 
l o u n g h u s b & n d * s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  in the Lower House, Sir H..
I M d . ,  pp. 1140, 1142.
IM i . ,  Vol. 140, p. 464. !
J?* JMjU# Vol. 141, p. 23* L e e  bei-kuo m e n tio n e d  t h i s  p a * .  ■
rj-t^ealy gave lasted
4 K arl Spencer.' '
Campbell-Bannerman said that ha gave the Secretary for India 
full credit for refusing to ratify the arrangements made at 
Lhasa) "but," ha added, "it »ould have been better 3till i f  the : 
government had put do*n their foot earlier» Knowing the ob­
jective of the Indian authorities, and being strongly opposed to 
it, they yet suffered themselves to be goaded into proceedings ) 
which brought damage to the prestige of the country and • in v o lv e d ]  
the massacre of unarmed men." He thought it was not Colonel 
loungbusband's fault and asked the censure to be carried higher 
to the principal. 73 Hr. Gibson Bo*le3 described Lord Curscn 
as »a very ambitious Viceroy, who, »hen he saw all the world 
annexing territory, said-'I *111 go one better) I »ill annex 
not territory, but the Incarnate Buddha) I »ill have a divinity 
In ay service. This is »hat I will do for my country.'« He 
believed that there »as no doubt that It was with Lord Curion'a 
knowledge and acquiescence that this «defiance« of tba author- ; 
U y  Of the home government by Colonel Xoungbnsbaad had been 
carried on, and he thought that »the hard words defiance, 
disobedience, end disregard of authority might more properly ; 
have been applied to the Viceroy than to the able and gallant v 
officer *bo conducted the expedition.*
V.lth hostile criticism not confined to the opposing minor­
ity party in Parliament, Lord Carton.could have no locus.standi
?8. Ibid.. T o V 141, PP-
?9. Ibid., p. 149. ... ' ’ ' -••
fron which'he sight defy-the Secretary ofv State * V : The', amend­
ment sad© at the time of ratification wa3 the only way to patch 
u p !tha open breach.
The Mew Relationship Established^.J&eJLhasa Arrangement
: How let us put aside the legal aspect find see what new pel*- ; 
atlonship was actually established for Tibet by the Lhasa arr­
angement in its amended fora minus the .subsidiary agreement.
In reviewing the settlement arrived at in Lhasa, the Secretary 
of State for India explained to the Viceroy the object of Brit­
ish policy in his letter dated December 2, 1904. Unlike a 
similar letter written almost four months before in which ha 
reiterated tha importance of considering the question, not as 
a local one concerning India and Tibet alone, but from a wider 
point of view of the relations of Great Britain to other powers
both European and Asiatic, and as involving the status of dep-
80
endency of the Chinese Empire," this time he spoke of His 
Britannic Majesty*s Government only as one «who have more im^ed 
lately before them the interests of the British Empire as a 
whole.« Tills shift of emphasis was probably due to tha pro­
gress of the Russo—Japanese, war, since by this time Japan,v 
Britain*n ally, had won some decisive battles both on land and 
on tha seaj thus the Russian throat was being reduced. 80*
80. a and F. Cd. 2370# So. U 5* dated August 5# 1904, p* '46.
81* H.B, Morse and H.F. MacHair, Far Eastern 
Rglatiang.» PP* 512-513# 515.
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In this review the Secretary of State for India expressed 
his satisfaction in thass wordsi "If tho Tibetan government 
had bacons involved in political relations with other Powers, 
a situation of danger night have boon croated on tho frontier 
of tha Indian Enplre. This risk has now been removed by tho 
conclusion of tha Convention," According to his author!tatlvo 
opinion, the object of British policy was that "British infl­
uence should be recognised at Lhasa In such a manner as to ex­
clude that of any other Power, and that Tibot should remain in 
that state of isolation from which till recently she has shown 
no intention to depart and which has hitherto caused her pres­
ence on our frontier to be a matter of indifference to us."
"Se have aimed,» lie further explained, "at effecting this res­
ult, not by establishing a resident at Lhasa, but by obtaining 
the consent of the Tibetan Government to a Convention by which 
they undertake neither to receive the Agent of any foreign 
Power nor to grant concessions or assignments of revenue to the 
subject of any foreign Power without the previous consent of 
the British Government." 1» other words, the British gover­
nment intended to make, and in fact did make, Tibet a buffer
state, as a result of the armed mi«-ion.
But legally speaking, in spite of the impressive show put 
bp at the Petals and the so-called "perfectly satisfactory set- 82
82. A and P. Cd. .2370, » » . 193» PP* 84*86* '
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tlement,* the fact remains that neither the Chinese Resident 
nor the Tibatan representative had full power to enter into a 
treaty with ïounghusband. Tho British Commissioner brought 
back with him a »convention* signed only by a miscellaneous 
assortment of $11 the officials and ecclesiastics he could lay 
hands on in Lhasa. As Scott put it, *their worthless signat­
ures and seals are all duly attached to the * Convention* in im­
posing array, but they have no more binding effect than if the 
Archbishop of Canterbury and the Chairman of thg^London County 
Council were to sign a new treaty with France*» However, as 
we shall see later in Part III, the Lhasa arrangement was legit­
imised. by an Adhesion Agreement signed in Peking on April 27, 
I906 between the Chinese and British governments, and the newly 
created buffer-state relationship was further secured by the 
Anglo-Russlan Convention of 1907»
,Tha British government lost no time in cultivating the new 
direct relationship with Tibet. A year after the signing of 
the Lhasa convention, ana while the Adhesion negotiations were 
going on, the government of India asked the Punch* en Lama, whose 
office had been closely associated with that of the Viceroy 
since the days of barren Hastings, and who was now acting as 
the spiritual head of the whole of Tibet, to make a Journey
85.■ Scott, oo« cit». p* 59* For the question raised in parl­
iament as to the precise British position towards China in reg­ard to ■Tibet with the ■ signing of the Lhns| convention, and/.the:; 
evasive answer given by tho Secretary of btste for India, see - 
pS 157# duly 11, 1904, pp. 1205-1204.-
with the »primary object to enable hin to be present in
Calcutta during the visit of the Prince of Wales,» According
to the explanation of the Viceroy to the Secretary of State, 
the "invitation to the Lama was complimentary.” But accord­
ing to the letters of the tana to the Resident, ha was forced 
By the British trade agent at Gyantse, Captain O'Connor, to 
take the journey In spite of his plea that he dared not leave 
his country without the sanction of the Chinese Emperor.
In 1908, when tha question of new trade regulations was 
brought up, the British government notified the Chinese Foreign 
Office, liai-wu-pu, that according to Article III of tha Lhasa 
convention, the Ilbetan government undertook to appoint fully 
authorized delegates to negotiate with tha British representa­
tives as to the amendment of tha regulations of 1893- As a 
result, a Ilbetan delegate was appointed to take part in the 
negotiations and signing of the regulations, the details of 
which will be treated in Part IV. Though the Tibetan delegate 
could only act under the direction of the Chinese plenipotent­
iary, his participation marks a further success in the British
!4 ’ Ibid., Cd, 5240, So. 57, ?• 3J* .According to Chang Xing- 
Waugt s reports to W&l-wu-pUj the British had designs to bar the
J e t u m  of the £al«l-¿asa'and to sahe use of the Punch* ©a hanyr
to turn flbut into. a British protectorate,. .geo ..ChUme chi..,
SMou taanjt'tsott ttt» Vol*' III# * Chang yi»f-tsn<s ■
.*# pp. X0"-Ti# Ix-12# . wad. 15~X$*.. -. ......
5 ;  g : ‘5 S ' S . " 8 .  " ■  “ • < • -
A and P f cd, *1240, enel. 2 in Bo, l$0, p, 1X6,
mefforts to have direct dealings with the Tibetans.
In February, 1910, as mentioned in Chapter II, the Dalai 
Lama fled his country with pursuing Chinese at his hools.
Before his departure he sent officials to Calcutta to put be­
fore the Viceroy his case in the trouble with the Chinese auth- I 
oritles* These Tibetan officials spoke freely at an interview ; 
with the Secretary of the Foreign Department concerning their 
apprehension of the Chinese^ and said that they looked for 
assistance to the British. V.hen the Dalai Lama passed 
through Tatung, he left with the British trade agent a report 
to be forwarded to the Viceroy In which he wrote: *1 now look 
to you for protection, and I trust that the relations between
the British government and Tibet will be those of a father to
83
his children."
During a private interview with Lord Uinta, the Vicaroy,
on March 14, the Lama appealed to the British authorities to
restore Tibet*s right of dealing direct with the British and to
rid Tibet of Chinese troops as well as Chinese influence. He .
gave an account of his relations with Dorjieff, who, he said,
89 1
was a purely spiritual adviser* flis ministers in Sikkim 879
87. Ibid.p No. J02, p. 1891 see No. 312, p. 194, for the Dalai 
Lama’s communication with the British representative In Peking. ■'
88. |bid., No. 311, p* 193* The Dalai Lama told the British 
political officer when he arrived in Sikkim that he cama to 
India for the purpose of asking the help of the British govern- ; 
ment against the Chinese* (No* 323, p* 200.)
89. Ibid., No. 337# PP* 206-207.
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asked the British political officer that British officers ?/ith 
soldiers might ha sent to Lhasa, to inquire into and discuss 
with the Chinese the current condition of affairs. They also 
proposed an alliance Between India and Tibet under which each 
party would help the other on the same terms, as in an arrange­
ment which they said existed between the governments of India 
90
and Nepal,
According to the report of Count Benckendorff, the Russian 
Ambassador in London, to the Acting Foreign Minister in St, 
Petersburg, the British considered the Dalai Lama useless to 
serve their purpose, as he was a man lacking courage and ener­
gy, and had very little influence over the Buddhist subjects of
the British Empire* They also doubted his popularity at
91
home. ■ No doubt the Liberal government in London must have 
considered this Tibetan appeal and the Dalai Lama1s request to 
come to London from the wider point of view of Great Britain’s 
relation to other powers and the world situation as a whole*
But the official explanation to the Tibetan representation from 
the very beginning was that "treaty obligations with china and 
Russia preclude the British Government from interference in
90. Ibid*. Nos. 549 and 552, pp. 215-17*
■arsM  -girm f
' yer'the Dalai Lama’s similarrrtquest to 
No, 106, .pp, 114-151 J o ,  122, I* 1521 No*No, 140, p*Russia, S&Q xuxu» f i*v* *WW|.J^|4* * * ’* *^ a v * -u 
140, pp. 151-55* Chap, XI, a, 219, for widely held
criticism of the Dalai Lama* ' •
Tibet’s internal administration»”
But when the situation in Tibet was undergoing a funda­
mental change as a result of the Chinese revolution, the Brit­
ish stand in regard to Tibet underwent a no less fundamental 
change* Documentary evidence of the new British policy is 
clearly shown in the following message of advice and farewell 
to the Dalai Lama, which the government of India had been 
authorized to communicate to him when he ?;as about to return 
to Tibet, and of which, together with tho date of the Dalai
t
Lama»s proposed departure, the British government had kept the 
Russian government informed*
The Government of India wish the Dalai Lama a safe and 
prosperous Journey, and hope that he has found his stay in 
India comfortable* The desire of the Government is to 
see the internal autonomy of Tibet under Chinese suzerain­
ty maintained without Chinese interference so long as 
Treaty obligations are duly performed and cordial relat­
ions preserved between Tibet and India. . They look to the 
Dalai Lama to do his best to secure the objects. The 
first essential is that there should ha a cessation of 
internal discord and a restoration of order.95
The above message can be interpreted on the one hand as a
pronouncement of the British intention to maintain the status
of Tibet as a buffer state. But, on tho other hand, it was
no less a pronouncement of a change of the status i^ uo compaiv
able to that which the British government had charged China
92
92. Ajmdje, Cd, 5240 (1910), No* 502, p. 190j No. 354, p, 218. 
Infra, Chap. VI, a, 6j.
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v-ltli intending. Instead of abstaining from all interference 
In Tibet*s internal administration, it defined the internal ad­
ministration of Tibet as autonomy without Chinese interference* 
It was under this new policy that the British government, 
blocked the sea route from China Proper to Tibet and tried: .to
force on China an acceptance of this »hands off*» condition at
95
the Simla Conference* V.e shall see later how this confer­
ence came into being and was finally brought to an abortive 
conclusion. At the conference the Tibetan delegate, no longer 
under the direction of tho Chinese as during the negotiations 
of 1907-1903, was a plenipotentiary on an equal footing with 
his Chinese and British counterparts. Y<hen the Chinese ref­
used to accept the British amendment as the final agreement,-'" 
the British government warned China of the consequences of 
denying herself the rights accorded by tills agreement, and 
nullifying all the previous treaties entered into between 
China and Great Britain, and between Great Britain and Tibetj 
and went so far as to say that the British government would be 
obliged to render substantial help to the Tibetan government 
against aggression .from"Whatsoever?.source»>.<-.• i.-.Finally.;, the 
British and Tibetan delegates affixed their signatures on July 
3rd, 1914, when the Chinese delegate refused to sign* *96
94* Infra* Chap, VI, n. 106*
95* Infra* Chap, VIX, a* 6*
96. The contents of two British Botes delivered to tho Poking 
government on June 2 and 5*
94
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Even "before the signing of this questionable instrument* 
the British authorities in India had already taken advantage of 
the conference* Sir Charles Boll tells us that one of his 
duties was to negotiate with the Tibetan delegate the frontier 
to be established between Tibet and northeastern India* follow­
ing a line eight hundred and fifty miles long* marked out on a 
map by the British delegate* Sir Arthur Henry HcUahon* Ho was 
able to gain the Tibetan delegate’s consent to the frontier 
desired by Sir Henry, which stands back everywhere about a 
hundred miles from the plains of India* Another duty of his 
was to negotiate a fresh trade treaty to govern commercial rel­
ations between India and Outer Tibet, «In this,” he said* »»as
§3far as I can remember* I was free to follow ray own ideas*«
97* Infra* p* 401* n. 47* and p* 411.
98. Ball. Portrait ot .ttw.PAlidA m .  P. 20S. from Bell’a account that the Dalai Lama did n< W@ may assura© ot ratify theseSimla documents, as Bell wrote that he was dissatisfied with his delegate’s conduct of the negotiations and not fully satis­fied with the Simla Treaty, For details of the n m  trade treaty see British Foreign Office Ftacj» Handbooks. Ho. 70, pp, 72-73* It is significant too that neither the so-called Simla Treaty nor the new trade treaty is to be found among the comp-
~ ‘ It il
ill tem son* pvt* ecu * revisey. w**uwuvu vu j ority of the Foreign and Political' Department. Maedlua 
Treat! AjgemgBiO ^  (p. 532} .saying that«the Convention and exchange of notes signed by the British and Tibetan representatives on July 3rd* 1914* have not yet been 
officially made public*”
mWlam the First V.orld V.'ar was over, Anglo-TIbetan relations 
entered, a new phase. The Soviet revolution minimized the pre­
war function of Tibet as a. .buffer state, and afforded Croat 
Britain an opportunity to establish a predominant Influence 
there. As China Proper was t o m  by a prolonged civil strife, 
no interference on"the part of the Chinese government was poss­
ible. It was rather the impotence of the Chinese government 
(so impotent that no further positive action was required to 
safeguard British interests in Tibet) and the trouble in the 
Indian situation (such trouble that no free hand was available 
for strengthening the British position in Tibet) that kept the 
British from adopting another «forward policy* like Lord Cur- 
son’s. They could, however, easily forestall any advance or 
offset any gain made by the Chinese in readjusting their■rel­
ations with Tibet.
In 1920-1921 Sir Chirles Boll was on a mission in Lhasa 
«to explain the present political position* which ho found «tan­
gled and unpromising* and to counteract the Chinese mission 
which stayed in Lhasa from January to April in 1920, and which 
"considerably augmented* Chinese influence in the Tibetan enpit-
9 9 -
al* Ha reached Lhasa on November 17» 1920. His arrival
was, as he called it, «opportune* in that it frustrated the 
further progress of a mission headed by the Commissioner of 111 
of Chinóse Turkestan, who came «to negotiate on behalf of China 9
99. Supra* Chap. Ill* n. 16. All words in quotations are Sir
Charles’ * Seo Tihot, pp* 176-177*
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with the .Tibetangovernment In-order to brine Tibet back to
the Chinese fold and to oust British influence from the ccuxw 
100 
try#*..
During his stay he had frequent private conversations
with', the"'Dalai-Lana which «ranged over a ride variety of suh-101
Jects,*: and discussed plans for increasing the Tibetan amy.
It was these plans'of"his that aroused strong opposition among
the priesthood and led to unsuccessful outbreaks while ho was 
102
there,
Ha left Lhasa on October 19, 1921. Upon his return to
New Delhi he worked out with the Indian Foreign Department the
details of a new policy to be adopted towards Tibet which con«
10J
slated of seven main items* - . • Every one of his proposals was
104
accepted by the British government. Els only disagreement
with the Foreign Secretary was in the selection of the expert
105 ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
who would prospect for minerals in Tibet.
It is noteworthy that since Bellas mission, five hundred 
to a thousand more men were recruited yearly to be trained by
100, Ibid«» P« 133.
101, loll, p p * 2#-55.
102, Ball, Tib-ij, PP« 167*39*
103* Ibid,, pp. 193*95 «** E2Z$33lLa£«SM-Salal^saii PP*. *41
43,
104, Ball, Tibet, p. 197*
.105, Bell, portrait of .the.J>alg4._feg&Sj> P* 342,
British officers at Gyantse, and the British government allow-
. . " ' 10 6'. ■ 
ed an :import of.munitions from India. In July, 1922, the
construction of telegraphic coacnunications between Lhasa and
107
India was completed, -An English school was established at 
Gy&ntse in 1923 with a view to facilitating British activities 
in Tibet through educational means* This school, .lihe, the ■
telegraphic line between Gyantse and Lhasa, was suggested by 
Eir Charles in his seven-item new policy.
But, as mentioned in Chapter III, by 1925 the Dalai Lama 
was turning strongly away from Britain towards China, and con­
sequently the new policy formulated by Sir Charles suffered a 
setback,*^ The British, however, were still in a position, to 
exert a predominant influence so long as they remained• the* ral- ; 
ing power of Indie, controlled the exports of Tibet,-enjoyed
th* privilege of exemption of duty on their own goods Imported110
into Tibet from India and had the collaboration of the Young-
Tibet group, whoso members were mostly British-trained military: 111
leaders.
106, Bell, portrait of the .DalalJtoaa, p, 252, - 
107* The Times. August 10, 1922,. p* 7*
100, Spenser Chapman, Lhasa tha Jloly City, (1933) # P* 109*
109, Surra, Chap, XII, pp, 155-156.
110, fu Chung-hsin, • jrtt._tsaagrJBaaJEaft# p, 90,
111, Bmm*  Chap* ill, p* 174,
m• have seen • that at ' the-: time;, when Mr. *,u Chung-hsin aas ■
on & .mission I n  Lhasa,to.officiate at the Installation of the
present Dalai X»ama. Sir Basil Gould, «the man officially res-
■:■■■■ u ■■■■■;-. ■ ■ 112 . 
ponsifciQ. for.: carrying-out-British policy in Tibet," could
and did warn tho Lhasa authorities: against discussing any pol**-.
113 '■ '
iti cal. problems with, hi« or anybody... designated -.by U a ,  . ,v;e .
•hava also seen that, the-regent.told .the' Chino so mission that
tho Xibotun government had to be scrupulous and should not give
Dir Basil Gould a pretext for intervention or for pressing a
114 .
similar demand,
Indeed, whenever the Chinese made an advance for rappro­
chement with I’ibet, tho British were-never,-slow in doing the 
same. Cir cUarles Bell-was «on a private visit« to Tibet 
while General-Huang and ills party were there, He came
again to Lhasa on "a private visit« nine months after the 13th
116 .-■
Dalai Lama*s death. Since General Huang left two liaison
officers and & radio service at Lhasa, the British trade ugant
; frsQuented the 11 Be tan capital-, and-w British radio-: station was
117
■ a g o  set -up, *•. ' After-a ■ permanent office :ws$ established ..in-: =
112, Sir Charles .words, M E S , - Ch&p. ;IXI, p, 211,
113, Surra, p. 224.
114, gurraf p# 226,
115* Supra,. Chap, III, n. 111,
Il6. Surra, Chap* H I ,  n* 139*
117* In tsang paoJsaQ., 5» 89*.........' ;
Lhasa to act or* Behalf cf the Chinese Ccmaission for Mongolian
and Tibetan Affairs, a British office cane into existence,
whose reaarkahle activities even after the evacuation of Brit-118isli power from India have already Been set forth»
113, Supra, p* 246,' n# 193* fos? Mr. Bichardsoa» e p a rt during 
th e  S o r n g - f l i s t a t t a c k  on Sera Monastery (Su rra . p# 251 
^ ee 'L ov C h ia-lm , "Cfcieh k»ai chung y in  chlen yu kuintsl-tsang 
ti a % R mjuMl*) -
p a r t  III
3 3 ?
pTMft-BRTTISH RELATIONS <MNCBBM|K<l_TI.BSt ;
Chanter VI
P w w  the Middle of the 12 th C -nf.ir/._tg 
the Eve of the Chinese Revolution, 1911
In Chapter IT an account was given of the p e rsis te n t  
B ritis h  e ffo r ts  to  open Tibet ever since the l a t t e r  p art o f the 
18th  century. In  Chapter I I  an explanation was given of the 
d eterio ratin g  position  of the Chinese government in  Tibet as a 
re s u lt  of China's repeated defeats imposed from without and the 
corruption of her adm inistration which develops* w ithin. I t  
i s  n a tu ra l, th erefore , th at s ln o -B ritlsh  re la tio n s  concerning 
Tibet could only be an aggregation of concessions and humilia­
tion s on the p a rt of China.
then the B r it is h  f i r s t  ra ised  tha issue of fix in g  the 
boundary o f , and establishing trade with, Tibet in  the January  
o f 1847 ,1 Chi n» bad already suffered from her defeat in  war 
with Great B rita in  fiv e  years before, but had n ot y e t  fu lly  
re a lise d  the impact of the w est. bhen the B r it is h  M inister, 
Dir Thomas hade, in serted  in  the Anglo-Chinese Chefoo Agree-
X, Susy a, Chap, IX# a, 190# ^ad Chap, IV, na, 35 mä 3 6,
aent of 1876 a separate article providing for proper protection
for a British expedition from China to India, or iron India to
China, via Tibet, it was, as already mentioned, the time when
Britain was free to impose terms which had to bo accepted with-2
out demur by China, Thus China could only free herself from 
this Tibetan-opposed commitment by paying a heavy price. Her 
helpless position can be seen from the words of the Earl of 
Rosebery spoken in the House of Lords during a debate on Tibet* 
■I shall never forget the anguish ••• with which the Chinese 
government pressed on us the abandonment of that expedition,
and the abandonment of that expedition was one of the main f&c-
4
tors in securing that Convention [on Burma] ,**
China, however, did make attempts to preserve her rights. 
The fact that she faced aggressive power other than that of
Great Britain thwarted her efforts .to guard her position in
5 .
Tibet, As mentioned above, when the British forces entered 
the Tibetan Chumbi valley in 1838, the Peking government was 
stirred to action and ordered its Resident to endeavour wo set­
tle the issue with the British. But because of Peking*s refu­
sal to recognise the British claim of protectorate over Sikkim 
ever since 1861, one yearns desultory negotiation passed with­
out a settlement. The British lost their patience and prop-
2* Supra, pp* 1^0 and £72»
5. Surra, p, 278* • ■
4, Parliamentary Bftet.gg, Vol, IJQ, p. 1140. - -
5* Supra, p, 280,
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osed to close the incident without insisting upon a specific6
agreement#; : The Chinese, fearing that leaving the matter In 
abeyance might usher in future trouble not only from the Brit­
ish but also from the Russians, decided to give in, in 
agreement was finally signed on March 17, 1890, by the Gover­
nor-General of India,: .Lord iansdowne,.; .and; the Resident, Shang­
h a i ,  in Calcutta# Besides sanctioning British control over
the internal administration and foreign relations of Sikkim, 
the treaty stipulated that the water parting of the Teesta 
river should form the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet.
Regarding the unsettled questions mentioned in Articles 
4, 5 and 6 of this treaty, further negotiations went on bet­
ween the Chinese delegates, Huang Ehao-hsun and Ho Chang-yung, 
and James H# Hart, on the one hand, and;the British delegate 
A#W# Paul on the other# A compromise was at length reached 
and the Regulations regarding Trade, Communication, and Past­
urage were signed in December, 1893# The chief provisions 
established a trade mart at Tatung, eight miles on the Tibetan 
side of the frontier, and the practice of extra-territorial
A and P# Cd. 1920 (1904), Ho. 1. p. Xj Tounghusb&nd, India
 ^Tlfet /p# 50| 'Beil, flkti# P*r» x-r - ... - ----
. See Resident Shlkg-h&ilh memorial., .to the -Throne,--which-ex- tains the situation and his fears| Team? vin ci&n, *,u 1». vrtV
PP. 29h~lUl mû also
- ...- • •. ■ v* ; ¡r - ...' A  ^ '
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jurisdiction in the event of trade disputes arising between
■ 9
British and Chinese or Tibetan subjects in Tibet.
The situation in Tibet became untenable end Siho-British 
relations entered a tense and somewhat peculiar phase, when 
the British armed mission was forcing its way to the Tibetan 
capital. For the purpose of our study it is essential to look 
at Sino-British dealings on the spot and see what moves were 
made later to put the so-called Lhasa Convention on a legal 
basis and give it binding effect on China, who hitherto had not 
been a party to it*
Though Lord Curzon regarded «Chinese suzerainty over Tib-
*  , V
et as a constitutional fiction,« Younghusband found it necess­
ary to rely upon the collaboration of the Chinese Resident to 
effect a settlement of some sort. Mention was made of the
meeting between Younghusband and the Chinese Resident who ex-
10
pressed his readiness to assist in arranging an agreement.
As the Tibetans had very little say in the matter, and were not 
allowed to have any of their way, there was practically no neg­
otiation as the word is understood in diplomatic practice.
The terms, based on telegraphic instructions, were first given 
and explained orally to three of the Resident1s secretaries, 
and the written reply of the Tibetans to them, was unofficially
9. Hertslets, on. clt,, p# 97} kMi<LZ$ C 7312 (1894) Treaty 
Series Mo# 11J Cd, 1920# Mo# 12* end# 1, annex,, pp, 22-2J| 
Bell 
lu,
Sol#
10. Eui>raf p. 307*
» » p R - s s  :1ft.
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sent by the Resident to lir. bilton, a British Consular off­
icer in Szechuan.; temporarily, attached. to the mission. The 
second reply of the Tibetans Eras also submitted to the Resid­
ent, who handed it to Younghusband during a visit on the ,19th 
of August. Later a letter agreeing to all the British terms, 
except that regarding Indemnity, was t handed to the Resident and 
a written assurance from the Tibetans accepting the ninth 
clause— the very clause that made Tibet a buffer state if not
a zone of British interest— was also handed to Younghusband12
through the medium of the Resident* And it was in the pro— ;
sence of the Resident and at his official Residency that the
final terms wore dictated.to the Tibetans, and the final draft
of the treaty was handed to thorn through the Resident.
Younghusband came forward, together with the Resident, to
ascertain from the Tibetans precisely what they did agree to,
point by point, once it was clear that the Tibetans were trying
13to cause dissension between the Resident and himself. ¡¡a
told the Resident that »»nothing could be got out of those Tib­
etans except by pressure ... and it would be much more satis­
factory if the needful pressure could be put on by the Ambon..th
•:' 11
11. A and P. Cd. 2370, end. No. 264, p. 224| No. 127, P. 51 < 
The Resident found the Tibetan reply so Impertinent that he 
told Younghusband that he could not even mention it to him 
officially. Gee end* 289, P* 233.
12. Ibid.. Nos. 276, 278, pp. 228-291 end .  No* 318, p. 24^| 
end.,Nos. J00, 505# PP* 259, *41. -
15, Ibid., en d .  No. 339, P* 259#
and. in fact, »after pressure from the Anban ••» the Chappés 
■¡we distinctly more subdued.” Ho -shoved Ti-Rimpocho, the 
acting regent, special attention, »as the Aaban recognises him
15
as principal in these negotiations.” Ha reported to his
government that Ti-Rimpoche »with the Araban1 s consent, commenc-
■ ■ ■ l6 ■■
ed to use the seal left by the Dalai Lama.” This shows the 
authority which the Resident still retained over the Tibetan 
government even when under foreign military occupation* It 
is all the more significant that in his »report of the circum­
stances under which the Convention between Great Britain and 
Tibet was signed,” Younghusband wrote* ”In deference to the 
wish of the Amban, I did not insert the words »Regent of Tibet* 
after Ti-Rimpoche, as ha has n o t ^ e t  been officially recognised 
as such by the Chinese Emperor.”
In the meeting to arrange final details and formalities 
regarding the signing of tho convention, Younghusband commenced 
by asking the Resident whose name ha should enter in tho conven­
tion in the place of the Dalai Lama»s name, and the latter* s 
reply, »Ti-Rimpoche*s,” was adhered to ty the Tibetans, As to 
the place to bo selected for signing the convention, Younghus­
band insisted on the Pótala, When the Tibetans murmured their
14, Ibid*f end. No. 31$, P* 24?J end. No. 243, p. 206*
15. Ibid., end. No. 367, p. 225* No, 313, p. 247.
16, Ibid., e n d .  No, 316, p. 245,
17. Ibid*, end. No. 360, p. 271.
545
objections, the Resident told them the matter v.-as settled and 
did not admit of further discussion. Even to inspect the 
Pótala for choosing the most appropriate room for the cerem­
ony* Younghusband ashed the Resident to have Chinese and Tib-
■ • 18
etan officials deputed to accompany his officers. Indeed.
„ 19
as hñ wrote in his book India and^iibet, he worked through- ■ 
out with the Chinese Resident, and never directly with thé 
Tibetans to the exclusion of the Chinese,
In the address delivered at the close of the ceremony as 
mentioned above, Younghusband told the Tibetans that »the Brit­
ish Government fully recognised the conitued suzerainty of the 
Chinese Government*» The Resident showed special pleasure 
when these words were translated to his. Younghusband then
turned to the Resident and thanked him for the help ha had .
20
given him in making the convention.
Indeed, Younghusband knew how to win the collaboration of 
the--Resident,'.-.-He explained to the Tibetans I n  ills presence, 
that by clause IX tho British »had not the least desire to 
supplant China in the suzerainty of Tibet and China vms 
not included in the term »foreign Power*» and later ho address-
18* Ibid*, e n d .  So. $ U 9 pp. .263-64,, .
19 * Ibid.* p. 421-22*' ;
20, Enel, Ho. 360, p. 270, annex. 1, p, 271. ' Sugra* Chap,
n, 60,..On leaving Lhasa, Younghusband prsscatod, the. Resident j
with 8 or 10 repeating rifles ha had among his articles for presentation, and he gave no rifles to the Tibetans. (India ‘ 
M i L l i M I ,  p. 422.) - ' ; • — '**■*" -
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ed a nets to the Resident-confirming tho exclusion of China
from the term «Foreign Power« and the right of Chinese merch-
■ 21 v l ■
ants to the trading marts* V.hen Ti-PdLmpocha in. another 
interview dwelt upon the impossibility of paying what ho cons­
idered too heavy an indemnity and told Younghusband that the 
British were putting on tho donkey a greater load than it could 
possibly carry| the latter replied that he was not asking the 
donkey to carry the whole load in one single Journey. Ti- 
Rimpoche laughod and asked what would happen if the donkey died. 
Younghusband said, "I should ask the Ambon to see that the don­
key was properly treated so that there should be no fear of its 
22
dying* *
This could bo interpreted not only as a recognition of tho 
Resident’s position and authority, but also as the imposition, 
on him of a responsibility. Indood it was rather the latter 
that Younghusband took into account. As early as August 10, 
he paid a visit to the Resident and «impressed upon him tho 
responsibility which lies on tlis^Chinase Government to mdko the 
Tibetans conclude a settlement.« On being told that the 
Resident was instructed try the Chinese government not to sign,
21. A and P. Cd. 2370* end. Sot _339, P* 239* Q £ M & = M L M i z LP* 65* - -- , -
22# A and P. Cd. 2370, en d . Me* 3*0, P* 2&>.
23. Ibid.. No. 127, P* 51 (the date was mistakenly given as ; 
August l6j| see end* No. 259, P* 219 hnd e n d *  No, 312, p, 243,
ha addressed his a note holding China responsible for any diff-■ 24
lenity arising in the enforcement of the convention. At 
Gy&ntse, in April* he thought of carrying the Amban with him,
now that he had succeeded in carrying him to the point that
. . ■ ■■'■ '25 ■
served his essential, if not full, purpose.
In fact, the collaboration with the Chinese Resident, 
which the government of India had in mind and which Younghus- 
band carried out, was on a larger scale than the signing of the 
convention. In a letter to the Secretary of State for India, 
dated June 50, 1904, the government of India expressed the 
«hope to be able, with the help or assent of the Chinese auth­
orities, to establish a new Government with whom wo could nego­
tiate. and to secure the cooperation of the Chinese Amban in 
• 2 6
the appointment of a Regent.*
Younghusband was, of course, fully aware of the difference 
it would make when the convention originally drafted for sign-
27
ature by him and tha Dalai Rama was signed by Ti-Rimpoche in
the latter1s place* The Dalai Lama, according to Lord Curzon.
• ■ • ■ ■ - 28
"was a de facto as well as do Jure sovereign of the country,»
24. , C h f f o g - t d P* 64. ....
25. § m m *  c^ p .  V, n. 25.
2 6 . A and Cd. 2570 (1905)# 3 ° .  9 7 »  P- 59.
27. Ib id ,.-  end. Ho* 341* P. 262^
28* A_an$Jk 0d, 1920 <1904), Ho. 66, p, 15 5, Supra, p, 283,
Ti-Rimpoche told Younghusband that he thought the Dalai Lama 
ought to be present to make a settlement with the British, and
Younghusband replied that he wished the Dalai Lama to affix Ids
29
seal in his presence# But the Dalai Lama fled not only be- 
fore the arrival of Younghusband»s armed »Mission,« but before 
the arrival of Ti-Rlmpoche, whom he had hastily summoned. Ha 
communicated with people in Lhasa while on Ids way and wrote to 
the national assembly, saying that the «English are very crafty
50 4
people« and warning them to be careful, but never did he iss­
ue a full power or definitely authorize anyone to sign the con­
vention which imposed so heavy an obligation on his people and 
which even changed the status of his dominion. Even had he
done so, it would still have been a question of «incapacity
21
arising from status."
The fact that both the Chinese Resident and the Tibetan
authorities sent messages to the Dalai Lama asking him to ret-
22 ,
urn shows clearly the importance of his presence. Young- 
husband, at the moment of dictating his terms to the Tibetans 
at the Residency, still found it necessary to ask the Resident, 
«is there any chance of the Dalai Lama returning in time to
29« A and g, Cd, 2370, end .  Ho. 291, pp* 235-36.
30. Ibid., end. Ho, 280, p. 229l Ho, 325, p* 253. -
31. Arnold R. McHair. fra.w of Treaties, p, 135l ®«e also t* Opp- 
enheiau International „Law I/ta ed. by H. L&Uterpacht) , X, 795- 
96, ana GeorgScwarzenberger, A Manual- of International L&m  
(I95I) 1 PP* 58 and 62. •
32. Ibid«. e n d . , Ho* 291, p* 2351 Ho* 286, p* 225*
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to conclude the Convention «1th me?» though ho had previously 
reported to his government in these words* "People of all 
raiücs sincerely trust ha has gone for good and we have no reas­
on to regret his departure, for a perfectly satisfactory sett­
lement can he made without him in a manner suggested by the
Amban* His departure is not regretted ty Tibetans, and it
33
would not prove prejudicial to our interests •.."
i
Younghusband must have worried about the consequences of
the Dalai Lama!s return and feared that he might be able to
upset the convention. He reported the opinion of Tongsa Pen-
lop of Bhutan and that of the Nepalese representative on this 
34
pointj but it seemed that hi3 worry was not allayed by their 
consolatory opinion. Something still had to be done. He 
told the Resident that "the Dalai Lama should certainly either 
come back or abdicate} and if he remained away at this import­
ant juncture, the assumption would be that he renounced the 
function of government." He gladly forwarded to Peking via 
Gyantse a telegram which the Resident asked him to have dis­
patched as quickly as possible and which contained the recomm­
endation to the Emperor to denounce the Dalai Lama. He said 
to the Resident that he would do this service for him and "con­
sidered he was acting with great wisdom in denouncing the Dalai 
Lama, for it was he who had brought all this trouble upon his 
country and he deserved to suffer for it." No doubt Young-
33* XfeM** end. No. 26?, p. 225f No* 280, p. 223. 
34. £Md<, <®cl. No. 3 2 5 m P. 253*
husband must have been happy to hear from the Resident that the
effect of ■ his denunciation would he to reduce the Dalai Lama to
an ordinary man or common monk,■ and that:the Punch«enLama
would he summoned to Lhasa with a view to making him head of
the whole Tibetan church. Hera we should be reminded of the
long-standing friendship between the government of India and
the Punch* en Lamas of Tashi-lhunpo, established since George
Bogle1 s mission in 1774, and of «»the friendly relations which
Colonel Younghusband was able to establish at Khamba Jong with :
ecclesiastical envoys from the Tashi (Punch» en) Lama of B h l g a W
56 .
s® (Tashi-lhunpo). •* yj
■ As a result' of this telegraphic recommendation,the Dal­
ai Lama was temporarily deprived of his'rank and in his place 
was appointed the Panch’on Lama,- .The writer.considers-that-- 
Sir Francis Younghusband should be given ovary benefit of the 
doubt and no criticism should be .based on conjecture,;= ^ B u t  - i t ; 
is significant that when he replied to his government’s enquiry.: 
as to whether there were precedents for the degradation of ,tho 
Dalai Lama by the Chinese emperor, or for the assumption of M s  
place by the Tashi Lama, he should have included these words* *97
35.:- Ibid*» Ho, 130, p* 52j end, Ro, 266, P* 225} Nos, .2/3 and 
319» P* 249. .. .
-£ _ ■ . j n i «tter from the .government, of..India ;.to., the-,
S i ^ S t o W  o f B t o U  J » e  JO, 1904. IMd., Ko.
97, P.,36,
m  ; -Hi« text of the ■ telegraphic recommendation,see 
57* tiiu tn.* voi, i n ,  ««Yu-tui tsou tu,«« chissnrr
I ^ | * ^ | ^ ^ i ^ ^ i a l  to the Throne on the same subject
la £iven. jM.d,» . p* 19*.....................
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"the fact that I endeavoured to induea the Dalai Lama to come 
in is well known to Buddhists here, and they are also aware 
that, after he had definitely fled the country, it was on the 
initiative of the Amban that he was denounced.» He added*
BI personally consider the denunciation a very politic step.
, ' 33
It also has the approval of Tongsa Penlop and the Nepalese.»
We can well imagine how deeply he was involved in the matter 
and the extent to which ha collaborated with.the Basident.
Chinese Adherence to the Lhasa Convention
As we have already seen, a new status as a buffer state was 
created for Tibet as a result of the British armed mission.
But this new status was without legal foundation unless some 
sort of formal agreement could be reached to make it binding ■ 
on China, whose continued suzerainty over Tibet the British 
declared they fully recognised. In short, the Lhasa arrange­
ment was made by the agency of force. The only validity that 
the convention had was derived from the continued exercise of 
force. The queer and undefined status created was well illus­
trated by two items at the end of the Blue-Book, Cd* 2370, 
which could not be more fittingly concluded by anything else* 
The one was a letter addressed toy the Nepalese Prime Minister 
to the four Kasis (bKa’-blons) at Lhasa which was »written in 
the hope that it may assist in tho due observance of the terms
38. Ibid., end. No, JOf, p, 241,
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of the treaty recently signed between the British Government 
and Tibet, and the spirit and intention which has prompted it,« 
and which contained the following remarkable passage*
••• you must not forgot that the very existence of 
Tibet as a separate nation depends upon:your ¿ religiously 
carrying out the terms of the treaty, -• and scrupulously 
aveidl^| any occasion of friction with the British Pow-
The other was a notice posted by the Chinese Resident in 
Lhasa denouncing the Dalai Lama while the British armed mission 
was still in the city (dated September 10, 1904, three days 
after the signing of the so-called convention or treaty). In 
the notice the Resident started by saying »For more than 200 
years Tibet has been a feudatory of China,» and ended with 
these words*
In future, Tibet being a feudatory of China, the Dalai 
Lama will be responsible for the yellow-cap faith and 
monks, and will only be concerned slightly in official 
matters, while the Amban will conduct all Tibetan affairs 
with the Tibetan officials and important matters will be 
referred to the Emperor***'
Here we see that the Chinese government, maintaining its 
traditional position, did not feel itself bound in the least by 
the newly created status of Tibet* China rightfully maintain­
ed that she was not included in the term »Foreign Power» as 
provided in Clause IX of the convention. As we have already
39. A and p. Cd. 2370# annex* to end. Ho, 363# P* 276.
40. Ibid., annex, to end. Ho. 3^2, pp. 274-75* The Irans-
lationTaere used is the version sent by Younghusband to M s  
government* ’ '
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related in Part I, Chapter II, she made a great effort after­
wards to reassert her full sovereignty in Tibet#
The British government saw clearly the necessity of Chin­
ese adherence to the convention* On the 17th of August Young- 
husband called on the Resident and handed him a draft of the 
Proposed Adhesion Agreement intended to register Chinese sanc­
tion of the convention without modifying any of its terms#
Two days later he reported that the Resident raised no object­
ion to the form of it* He explained to the Tibetans on Aug­
ust 31 that »the Chinese suzerainty was fully recognized in the 
Proposed Adhesion Agreement.« But, as mentioned above, the 
ft&i-wu-pu telegraphed to the Resident instructing him not to 
sign it*45 Jiang Shao-i (Tong Chao-yl) was then appointed to 
proceed to Tibet to investigate and conduct affairs. Cinco 
the British »¡fission* had left Lhasa without an Adhesion Agree- 
nent, and the weal: Peking governnent could not resist the 
pressure of the British, T'ang was then reappointed Minister to 
the Court of St. Janes and instructed to proceed to Calcutta , 
instead, in order to negotiate with the government of India.
The Viceroy was naned to conduct the negotiations on behalf of
41. Political Clary of the Mjsflon, ifeid., end. Ho. 520,
p. 25o T  : '
4 2 . I& id.» end, j f o . 559 , p . 259 . 
* h .  iSM., end. So. 554,  p . 253 . 
IH£., >;o. 1 6 ?, p. C?. :
5 5 2
. '45 ■ •
the British government.
arrived at Calcutta in February, 1905, and shortly4o
afterwards negotiations began. The British delegate at 
first insisted on the acceptance by China of the proposed Ad­
hesion Agreement which Younghusband had. handed to the Chinese 
Resident at Lhasa, whil© T*ang insisted on redrafting Clause 
IX of the Lhasa Convention in order to clarify the British pos­
ition in regard to Tibet and to safeguard Chinos© sovereignty, 
It was on the question of Chinese sovereignty or suzer- ; 
ainty over Tibet that the issuo centred, T ’aa*, citing as 
evidence the investiture of the Dalai and Ranch*en Laimas, the 
appointment of Hia»-blons and local Tibetan officials by the 
Chinese court and the supervision o f 'the native- troops by the 
Imperial Resident, maintained that Chinese sovereignty in Tib­
et should be recognized. Facing British opposition to the 
mention of sovereignty, he later proposed the insertion in 
Clause I of the recognition by the British of tho original cad 
the existing rights enjoyed by the Chinese government in Tibet 
and the amendment of Clause IX to the effect -.that the China«« v- 
government should be the sola intermedia^ in all communicat­
ion* between India and Tibet. Bat the British government
45t jLMil*» 171# P» $9i ïîps» 186, 187,  188,  pp, 77*,*78. 
4 6 , ISSfcf .Vol, I8 3 f p ."4 6 .' '•......
f7. Lu Hsing-cM* s manuscript on figj.fiang ehlao. shl chi-*a©--;
(«Important Diplomatic Dealings concerning Tibet«)
C hap, II, » ,  252), C hap. H ,  p p . '25*-?7»l i $ S #  V o l . ^ l j 3
could agree only to the recognition of Chinese suzerainty in 
Tibet and would «abate nothing of their right to enforce the 
fulfilment of the terms of the Lhasa Convention by such means 
as may be found convenient," although, by seeking Chinese ad­
herence, they intended to secure Chinese help in the execution
of the convention and wanted to bo relieved of the pain of
48
enforcing it alone*
Being unable to break the ensuing deadlock, T»ang asked 
leave to return home. In September his request was granted 
and his secretary Chang Xing-tang was appointed to go on with
49
the negotiations.
Then the Chinese government communicated to Sir Ernest 
Satcw, the British Uinistsr in Peking, "an Imperial Decree 
commanding that the indemnity in consequence of the British 
military expedition shall be paid by the Chinese Government 
on behalf of Tibet.« -This nova, according to the British
u’&âj'.ft gSàËPSs..- ssii «L.SS S’
lRqn MlKtinp to 6iSci» «a<l libat, tha British hid provided in 
h!t tittat » ..neither the ruler of the Cikkin a u u  nor 
tnv'o^its Officers shall have official relations of any kind, 
formal or Infernal* with any other country."
48. Ibid.. Bos. 4 6, 47, pp. 30-51) enbl. in Bo. 6 3, p. 59) and 
•I»*®? b70 (1905), »0. 144» P* »5.
AQ TMd cd. «1240. So. 51, p* 23. Va&g did not go to Lon- 
H *  his post and war appointed junior vice-president
O f the I S ? d ^ f  F o r l i s n  A f f a i r s  i n  B e c o n b a r , 1905.
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Minister, was «intended to force the hand of the Indian Govern­
ment and to induce them to accept an arrangement which the
Chinese Government could afterwards quote as a precedent in
50
other matters*«
fhe British government maintained that the indemnity was 
required of the Tibetans, partly as a punitive measure and 
partly in order that by the annual payment of the necessary in­
stalments they should formally recognize the binding nature of 
the obligations entered into by them towards the British govern­
ment, Should Tibet be released from such a burden, that fund­
amental purpose would bo lost. At the same time, they believ­
ed that the Chinese government made such a move «with tho obj­
ect of re-establishing their theoretical right to supremacy • 
over the Tibetan Government,* as well as from the fear that 
British troops would remain in the strategical Chumti valley 
for a long time in case of default of payment by the Tibetans. 
They therefore replied that «unless China adheres to the Con­
vention in the form in which it is now presented,« the propos­
ed arrangement of payment on behalf of Tibet could not be ent­
ertained. For, in the eyes of the British Foreign Office, 
acceptance would be tantamount to admitting the intervention 
of China In relieving Tibet of this portion of her obligations 
while avoiding all responsibility for any other portion of tho
5 0 , ibid.. So* 42, P* 291 *o. 59 also its ernel., p. 55*
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■convention*
■■■ Since the'British-"delegate ted not only Maintained-'his
original position, hut even pressed Chang either to.-accept--the-:
proposition or drop it altogether, the negotiations made no
progress. At last, Chang, at.the.break-up-of the Mooting,
announced that the reason for the suspension m s  the uacompro- 
. . ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 52
mlsing attitude of the British delegate.
Negotiations were, however, soon to he resumed between Sir 
Ernest Satoir and r a n g  "at Peking. — The' change of governaont in 
London with the Liberals in power gave them a better prospect 
of success.’ ■ ■ in the meantime,■the first instalment of the in-,; 
demnlty was due and the Government of India notified the Tibet­
ans that they desired it to bo paid on January 1 at Cyaataa. . 
The Viceroy w a s 'of "the-opinion"-that
in Tibet, even though China . should provide tho money,. would. - be | 
preferable, from the point of view of the local^oliticaX eff­
ect, to payment of a lump sum by China direct. ■ ■ .Ti-Kimpoche
51
51. y m rt vn 4^. pp. 29-501 Ko, 46, pp* 50-31$ end, in Ho,6* | ^ 4 a > ! Beslâes strategical considerations, both tho Chio-.
S2i■:■S*A^*¿n^KtaJl»-■had.;reaaon^*to■.^fear..naoag.,occttpaUou,.of:í,,^ ,
S S %  t S d S i  £ « £ « l M  to theirpo m t, l U  «rt-pX-Jur. la
master of - the 'valley, was -eraattng'a-xauater ' of Hi e n d .  1 la Bo, 59, «ei. 5 la Mo, 40, :
pp. 23-26, 27-28.)
52*--M S H »  Vol. 196, pp. l&-2b and
A and F* Cd. 5240, *»• 50, p. 32* Ho* 54# P* 33l W d  Ho,
si, p T w r ^ . . .  ......-
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In reply stated that he learned from the Resident that the 
question of payment of the indemnity was to be the subject of 
a discussion with China and a month later the British aere in­
formed by the Lhasa authorities that under orders from the 
Emperor of''China* Sechung Sfcappe was being deputed to Calcutta
where he was to receive the amount from Chang and pay the gov-
. 5 4
ernment of India there*
Tho Viceroy took the non-payment resulting from China’s
action as placing the British in an advantageous position in
further negotiations that might bo undertaken with the Chinese
government, and the British Foreign Secretary thought that a
refusal to accept payment was likely to make the C M  nose gov-
55
ernment adhere to the Lhasa convention. The government of 
India believed that the suggestion that the whole indemnity 
should be paid in three instalments instead of twenty-five ann­
ual instalments of one lakh each was a Chinese device having 
for its object the weakening of the British position in Tibet, 
but the Secretary of State for India, Mr* Horley, ®wblle recog- 
nixing that certain advantages have been supposed by some to 
arise from the political point of view in maintaining [the 
British] hold over the Tibetans for the full period of twenty- 
five years,* was of the opinion that such advantages would be 
altogether outweighed by the relief from the necessity of en-
54. Xbld.f Bo* 61, p. 381 No. 68, P* 42.
55* Ibid*. No. 61, p. 38| No. 77* P* 45.
J5 1
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forcing a direct annual tribute* for so long a period.
So when the Adhesion Agreement was signed in Peking on 
April 27, 1906, the British government immediately consented 
not only to let China pay the whole indemnity for Tibet but
1 5 7  '•
also to pay it in three instalments. And later when the 
last instalment was paid by China in January, 1908, the evac­
uation of Chunbi Valley was effectively carried out on Pebru-
58 ' .
ary 8. From the point of view of our subject, it is inter­
esting to note that in paying the third instalment, the Chino so 
government wanted the c ha quo to be handed over by Chang Instead 
of by the Tibetan Shappo, aid the British government saw in it 
«firm determination that Chinese sovereignty over 1'ibet, to the 
exclusion of all local autonomy, shall be indicated and that 
direct communication of all kinds between [British] officials 
and Tibetans’ shall bo prevented." - It was only after a repres­
entation made by the British minister under instruction from 
his government to warn the Wal-wu-pu of "the serious consequ­
ences» and effectual delay of the transfer of authority in
Cbumbi Valley, that the Chinese government agreed to having Its
t . 59
cheque delivered by the Shoppe on January d/*
As to the terms of the'Adhesion Agra ament, hare Is the ■
56. Ibid.. Wo, 7 6 , p* 44j Ko. ■ 79, p* 7
57. -Ibid. .  lias. 3> 37  and 89-91# PP* 46-48.
58. Ibid. ,  Jibs* 210-213# PP* 135-138j So« .217, p. 1591 ifo* 226*
59« Ibid., »os* 218-221, pp, 139-140.
: » 8 ,
official explanation on the part of tha British government 
given in reply to questions put both in tha Ilousa of lords and 
tha House of Commons on Hay 1 and 2, 1$06, respectively!
It secures the adhesion of China to tha Convention 
established with Tibet in 1904. It does not alter the 
arrangements arrived at under: the: Convention. of ■ Tibet as 
, confirmed by the Government of India. It contains an 
engagement on our part not to encroach on Tibetan territ­
ory nor to interfere in the government of Tibet, the Gov­
ernment of China undertaking on their part not to allow 
any foreign State to interfere in the government or Inter­
nal administration of Tibet. It also states that wo do 
not seek for ourselves any of the concessions mentioned 
in Article IX of the Convention of Tibet which were den­
ied by that Article to any other State or to the subjects 
of any other State. It doe3^not alter the amount of the 
Tibetan indemnity in any way.
From the above wo have seen that the new status of Tibet 
as a buffer state was now more clearly defined, The Adhesion 
Agreement gave sanction to the Lhasa convention and made China 
share with Great Britain the burden of securing the due ful~ 
filment of its terms. In other words, the fatherless child 
born of the rendezvous between Tounghusband and a miscellan­
eous assortment of all the officials and ecclesiastics he 
could lay hands on in Lhasa was hereby legitimized.
6o Given bv the Cnder Secretary of State for fortifia. Affairs, ' 
Trtrd Fitzmaurice. in answer to the Marquess of Lansdownet by
Series So
Let us see then what consolation China could derive from
the new agreement* Whether the British government would 
' ■ 6l . ■■
still regard Tibet a3 China* 1s province or only recognise
China as the suzerain of Tibet, the fact that they sent a mil­
itary expedition to Lhasa without consulting China beforehand 
had already imperilled her position, whatever it may have been. 
Now, by signing the Adhesion Agreement, China’s imperilled 
position was saved. The British government formally acknowl­
edged China’s rights in Tibet. China’s payment of the indem­
nity for the Tibetans not only re-established her right to 
supremacy over the Tibetan government, but also created re­
newed friendly feelings among the Tibetan people. kith Russia 
definitely excluded and the British tied to a self-dsnying 
clause, the way was paved for her to consolidate her power in 
Tibet* In fact, as already described, for a time she resumed 
full sovereignty and ruled Tibot through the Lhasa government 
which was brought under her control during the absence of the 
Dalai Lama*
To consolidate bar position further, China took steps to 
forbid direct communications between the British and the Tib-
It is 'noteworthy: that ■ as 'late as June 14, 1904. thaflri*" : ^ 
ish foreign Minister,;in his official dispatch to the British 
Ambassador to Russia, wrotot » ... Count"Laasdorff had added ■ 
that it had given him great satisfaction to note that the - 
British government, for their part, recognize, in terms of thn 
aemorandtmti; which t . had; recently handed to Count Beackeadorff
1 f ! ? i  ^ . A » d i , n o c « s . s i t y  of maintain- ing tht political status quo in that province of this ChinaS 
Empire.» Cd.: 2570, 55# p* - 1 8 .) w  ¡ B m
Chap. IT, n ' l f i v S r  Chap, f, n. 72. 4 1
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et ans in commercial transactions at trade marts and appointed 
Chinese instead of Tibetans as diplomatic and commercial rep­
resentatives at these trade marts* Chang Ylng-tang who was 
then in Lhasa to make a. general investigation and undertake 
local reforms, took the view »that virtual recognition of Chin­
ese sovereignty over Tibet was involved in the signature of the 
Adhesion Agreement, and that »Chinese authorities in Tibet» 
should consequently be the interpretation placed on the phrase
* Tibetan Government* wherever the latter occurs in the Lhasa 
62
Convention.»
There was much British opposition to China* s assertive 
policy in Tibet and numerous representations were made to the 
Chinese government against what the British considered a change 
of the status quo in Tibet. But after all, as the British 
Secretary of State for India admitted in a letter to the For­
eign Office, »the principle has been recognized that provided 
nothing is done either by the Tibetan or Chinese authorities . 
to impair those privileges secured to Great Britain by the 
Lhasa Convention of 1904 and the Peking Convention of 1906, 
the British Government are precluded by the terms of the Con­
ventions from interfering, even if they had the desire to do
63
so, with Chinese action in Tibet.*
62. Xbid*> Ko. 141, p. 86$ Ko. 234, p. I6I, 
65« I M d .f Ko. 143, p# 87. „ Infra,, n. I06.
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. Trade
■ . plenlPQtmtiarigs.;.^ d_tht ;
Tiletan Delegate ^
Considerable friction had developed between the Chinese 
officials on the Tibetan frontier and the British authorities 
regarding the questions of direct dealings between British and 
Tibetan officers and merchants, the appointment of Tibetan off­
icials to trade marts, and the interpreting of previous treat- 
64
ies* In consequence, both Great Britain and China deemed it 
necessary to negotiate new trade regulations to replace thoso 
of 1893, provision for which had been made in Article III of the 
Lhasa convention*
First of all the question of Tibetan representation called 
for a settlement. As mentioned before, the British government
demanded fully authorized Tibetan delegates in accordance with
,6 3
Article III of the Lhasa convention. Peking agreed that 
Tibet should depute a Tibetan, but wished that the action of 
the Tibetan representative bo subject to the approval of the 
Chinese delegate. This point was finally won, and the Pre-
I M & t #  No. 103, p. 561 No. I05 and end., pp. 57-6X 1 So
»03.. 122.and 124, p. 06s Nos, l2§, l29,/p, L v  ¿ Q3
133 and 134, p. 751 annexs. and encli, in No. 135, pp.
No. 148, ■ p. ;93l No, 150, pp. $4,; 95) No. X60, p, loof So. 1 I2 : 
p. 101J No. 17ft P. 107) No. 192, p. 116) No! 136, p! 1 1 9 ,' *
65* Surra. p, 320, ^ .• - , ■ . T
66. Ibid., end. 1 in Ho, 193, p, 1 1 7 .
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amble clearly laid down that |h authorities of Tibet
tnot the Tibetan government] nave named as their fully author­
ised Representative!; to act under the^directions of Chang la» 
Jen and take gart in the regulations, the Tsarong Chappe, fang 
Ckuk Gyalpo#* ■■■;.
In an official dispatch from the Undersecretary of State
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India Office, to the Undersecretary of State, Foreign Office,
drafts of the proposed Regulations show that the points at real 
issue in the Regulations are not only those of political status 
involved in the wording of the Preamble, but practical commer­
cial questions ©f great complexity and inherent difficulty, 
such as that, for instance, to which the Government of India 
draws special attention, of tho terms under which Indian tea 
is tc be admitted into Tibet.«
After having gone through «difficult and troublesome reg­
ulations,« the agreement was signed on April 20, 1903, at Cal» 
cutta. Ratifications by the Chinese and British governments
were exchanged on October 14 of the same year* The regul»
195#^p^iiS?nCl* 1 111 *°* p * x51j and also los. ■ 194: and 
6g*; Ibid., Ho. 215, p. Ip8. .
we find these words* «A comparison of tho British and Chinese
ations. $ tipulatedthat'.,the. administration of trade .»arts should 
remain with the Tib©iaa officers, under the Chinese officers’ 
supervision and directions. Direct relations between local 
Tibetan.-officers .and,the British trade agents,were established. 
Even in cases of disagraaaent between them, China w a s  not to 
decide* ; Her Besident was, to be notified, but the settlement: ,. 
was to be effected by the government of India .and the Tibetan. 
high authorities atXhasa, Only when questions could not bo 
decided by agreement between the high Tibetan and Indian auth­
orities was China invited to arrange with Great Britain for a
settlement« (Article III)*
In the event of disputes arising at the marts between.
British subjects and persons of Chinese and .Tibetan nationality, 
they wero to be adjudicated by a personal conference botween 
the British trade agent at the nearest mart and the Chinese 
and Tibetan authorities of the Judicial Court at the mart.
Where there was a divergmee of views, the law of the defend­
ant » s . country was to prevail. In any such mixed cases the
officer or officers of the defendants nationality would p r « - -
Kfai-wu-pu. ( M i  ,Tol. 216, ,pp., 2M b )  m d , also Wai-im-pu’ a ■ c o m ». 
ent on Chao’s letter (Ibid., pp* oa-lOb). For dot-alls of »r^vw 
aratory works.a nd.arguments..-advanced ..and..concessions- mada m-
both parties m ■ well. m  - the answers to Chao’s charge, see the 
nemorial of Wai-wu-pu and four other ..competent ministers (ibid 
pp. 12b-17b) * for a time, tho,Britlsh;g o v @ T O » t  
return for the withdrawal of troops from Chuabi Vailty, tint
the Trade Regulations would bo speedily concluded in a satis*.
factory- manner, ;!,©*, . to -meet. th# .,Britiih '«&«hes. ■ :, fA
Cd* 5240,-Ifo* 216, p. 139.) A— -
ide at the trial, the officer or officers of the plaintiff’s 
merely attending to watch its course. All questions regarding 
rights, whether of property or person, arising between British 
subjects were to be subject to the jurisdiction of the British 
authorities. British subjects who■committed any"crime at the 
marts, or on the routes to the marts, would be handed over by 
the local authorities to the British trade agent at the mart 
nearest to the scene of the offence, to be tried and punished 
according to the laws of India, (Article IV)*
Great Britain agreed to relinquish her rights of extra-« 
territoriality only when the Tibetan authorities, in obedience 
to the Instructions of the Peking government, had demonstratad 
a strong desire to refora their judicial system and to bring it 
into accord with that of western nations, and to relinquish 
them only when "such rights are relinquished in China, and when 
sha Is satisfied that the state of the Tibetan laws and the 
arrangements for their administration and other considerations 
warrant her in so doing*n (Article V)* The regulations in 
general and this article in particular, manifested the British 
genius for safeguarding their self-interest.
There arc soma further provisions which have a bearing on 
the triangular relations between China, Britain and Tibet,
Great Britain announced her readiness "to consider the transfer 
to China of the telegraph lines from the Indian frontier to 
Gyantso when the telegraph lines from China reach that mart.
©ad in the meantime Chinese and .Tibetan messages’.sill toa -.duly... : 
recaived and transmitted 'by :-tbo - line'-^constructed:toy the gover** 
nmcnt o f ' India.» (Article TH) * • £hs would 'also ■ consider the ■ 
abolition ©Iher^trade agents* court era »when efficient arran­
gements have been made : by China in.fitoot for■©-postal service*«. 
(Article VIII)* She undertook to withdraw the trade agents* 
guards at the marts and to station no troops in Tibet, co as 
to remove all cause.for suspicion and disturbance among the i n - : 
habitants* when .China had fulfilled her obligation to.arranga . 
effective police measures at the marts and along the routes to ; 
the marts« (Article XII). «British officers and subjects* as ; 
well as goods, proceeding to the trade ©arts ©mat adhora to the ; 
trade routes from the frontier of India* They :■ shall not* - 
without permission* proceed beyond the marts* or to Gartok from j 
Xatung and Gyantse* or from Cartoh to fatung and Gyantse* toy ; 
any route through the interior of Tibetj but natives of the Ind—1 
iaa-frontier who have already by usage , traded and. resided. I n .. 
Tibet elsewhere than at the'marts shall -to# at liberty't© eont~'"f 
inue their trade in accordance with the existing practice* tout ; 
when so trading or residing they shall remain, as heretofore*
amenable to the local Jurisdiction.® (Article IX)* ......
■I®,- spite •■of long-find- strenuous offorts mad#.,ly^th:port^ob8 
ies* certain topics were not settled * and had to be reserved for•^  
subsequent consideration* They vero questions relating to
extradition* the *ppointment of Chinas© trad® agents with con-
* ' -i
fttlar 'privileges -■ at Kslimpong near, the, Silchia m i  Indian. front«*, &■ • ■ ■ ....... •••'••••• •••
ieiV across which half the entire:trad«,between Tibet and India 
70passes, ' the levy of custom duties and the importation of Ind­
ian tea into Tibet,^ to which, as mentioned above, the govern­
ment, of 'India drew special- attention« . ..
The main difficulties t h a t  prevented their settlement 
arose from the lack of any clearly defined status for Tibet in 
her relations with Great Britain and China, Bad the British, 
or rather the Indian government, still regarded Tibet as a
province of China, as the Secretary of State for India had once
72 ■■■■'■*■
maintained, or had they looked upon Tibat as an independent
country, as Lord Curson once had a mind to do, and refrained 
from making her virtually their protectorate, these questions 
would have been easily settled in one way or another*
As an illustration of the confusion, the question of imp­
orting Indian tea into Tibet may be considered. It involved 
depriving the Chinese government of an annual income of more 
than one hundred thousand taels of tea duty collected at lach^— 
lenlu alone, if the China tea market in Tibet were taken over 
by Indian tea. The transport cost of Indian tea by rail up 
to the frontier would be far less than that of China tea, more
70. Bell, Tibet* p* 19* The writer adds "at Kallapoaf,*- - 
which was not given in the Blue Bookj he drew this information 
from the minutes of negotiations kept in the Chines# foreign 
Office Archives.
7 1, ibid., No. 239, P* *51* and also No. 227, p. 1433 Ho. 263,
P. lTJT"
72. purrs, n. <5lj Chap. IV, n. 7&I Chap. V, n. 72*
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than 90$ of the latter’s market price in Tibet being usually
paid for transport. It also..involved' the deprivation of a ■
huge revenue to the Tibetan treasury which annually advanced
to the Tibetan and the Chinese tea merchants great quantities
of local currency at a very high interest rate. Further,
there was the existence of several tons of thousands of Tibetan
coolies who made their living on the transportation of China73
tea from the province of Szechuan. This conflict of inter­
est could have been solved had it not been further complicated 
by the lack of any clearly defined status for Tibet. The Ind­
ian government on the one hand was opposed to the conversion of 
the trade marts in Tibet into the same type of treaty port as
then existed in China Proper, «whereby,® in their opinion, «ob~
74
jects of their policy in Tibet would bo entirely defeated.«
But on the other hand they argued that Yatung, also a trade 
mart, should be considered a treaty port of China, whose Indian73
tea ought to be subject to 5% (ad valorem) duty only.
73. Lu Hslng-ehi, Hsl-t*ang chlao.gka_gM._z_ae,, PP* 33&-b and
53a .
74. A and F. Cd. 5240, Ko. 141, p. 86.
2» 651 133~54j lo. ' ■ 
2} No. ‘
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Tibet*s Buffer State- Status.Confirmed by the ■■
Angio^ms.siaaj^Lam^ea -
Externally, Tibet*s status as a buffer state could not bo 
secured unless there were a written agreement to bind Russia 
to the recognition of such a status# The Adhesion Agreement 
signed between Great Britain and China in 1906 made the Tibetan 
status as a buffer state more clearly defined, but not more 
secure, as China Proper itself was subject to partition into 
zones of influence and her adherence did not change the inter­
national picture in the least# Her helpless position can bo
76
seen from the above-mentioned Incident of the panch* en Lama* $ 
being taken to Calcutta to be present during the visit of the 
Prince of Wales* All she could do was to address a semi-offic­
ial note to the British Minister in Peking asking him to inform 
the Indian government that she «will refuse to recognize any 
agreement which the Lama may make, should he, on his visit to
77
India, discuss any business matter*« Indeed, Mr. Broderick,
the Secretary of State for India, told the members of the House
of Commons1 «The negotiations have to take place with the Suz-
78
erain Power.« But in fact, China by then had been written 
off as a power# t
76, Supra, p. 526.
77* A and F. Cd, 5240# No. 51# P* 35*
78. Parliamentary Debate*« Yol. 142, p. 407# •
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, ;AS'-h8.=had done un.:previous'.occasions, .Lord. Qxrson, :Xn . 
def ending his forward 'policy,; conjured up the o ld. bugbear of 
Russian intrigue, though he was aware that »the Russian border 
nowhere5even- touches that;of Tibet and that the nearest point 
of Russian territory is considerably more than a thousand miles
■ 79 . ■ . ■ ■
short of the Tibetan Capital*» Besides, as pointed out by 
the Marquess of Ripon in.the House of Lords, there was no Eur­
opean power or any power in its senses, silly enough to invade 
. ; ,' : . . 80 
India through Tibet, over the snow-clad «roof of the world.«
81
The much-talked-of visits of Dorjieff, the tutor of the 
Dalai Lama, to Russia and his audience with the Tsar were ex­
plained by the Russian Foreign Minister to the British Ambass­
ador as a religious mission »with the object of making money 
collections for his Order from the numerous Buddhists in the 
Russian Empire,« having no political or diplomatic object or
character, and the British government received this assurance
82
with satisfaction. Further, the Russian Ambassador, Count
79. A .and P, Cd. 1920 (1904), No. 66, p. 153.
80. Cunra. Chap. V, n. 73*
Si. Dorjieff, known by his Tibetan name Ghoaang Lobzang and 
called by Kawaguchi as Bor jo tho Is&a-nl Kenbo, was born a .■ 
Russian Buriat and Budchist by religion. He settled in Tibet 
in 1881 at the age of 55» (A_.anfl.$>, Cd. 1920, end. No. 34,
P* 157*) ........He .became .one. of the four tutors of the Dalai-Lam': -
and virtually monopolized tho confidence of the Pontiff* (Kaw­
aguchi, «Russia's Policy in Tibet,» Open ..Court. XXX [1916],
PP* 370-380.) - -
82. sniaa. Chap. If, n, 831 ¿JS&SUL* Cd, 1920 (1904), No, 55,
p. .'HoTlos* 39 :and.; 40, p, 124.: - .Borjieff wsat.: to 'Russia^ 
was received by the Tzar in the palace of Livadia at falta on
Benckendorf, officially assured the Marquess of'lansdowne,. the
British Foreign Secretary, that ”there cas no Convention about 
Tibet, either with Tibet itself or with China, or with anyone 
else, nor had the Russian Government any Agents in that count­
ry, or any intention of sending Agents or Missions there#t 
Again the British governaont accepted with confidence Russia* s 
official assurance and. regarded the satisfactory nature of . 
these pledges as having «modified the apprehensions .that had : 
been felt as to the-establishment at Lhasa of .foreign influen­
ces incompatible with our interests« (the words of tho Secret-
03ary of State for India)« Yet, despite all this, as a aon-
-xr\ 1 onn (ibid.* No# 31 and e n d # , P* 113)* wont 
thers again^ln l p T a i d  »as given an aualenca *ith tha liar at 
o S M I d f  on Jalv 6. Tor related details, see Ibid*. 3 o b . 32- Peterbof on Jury 0, larch, 1906, be arrived at
St Petersburg Sites'messaga iron tha Dalai Lana tooths effect ; 
thit he loSed to the Isar for protection, and as baforo, »asThis tine tha Russian Foreign Ministry, 
apparently lifiie» if the forthcoming rapprocheaent with Grcai 
inforaid the British iabassador of exactly »hat had 
SSunid' as th?v were afraid the press would probably nate out
audience hid a p o l i t ic a l  ch aractar, ( j J & O ^ c a .  ,
S S !  flQlol si 74. P. 43.) Perclval London, ZteJteaafeUL?.t !
5?i + M  rlnt-ions Dorileff ’ a earlier Journey to Russia in 
P a r  Dorileffls activities in Lhasa, see^Bell, Ji%t, 
£ % ,  aid ¿ 3 e , M .  2370 (1905), end. No. 244, p. 2077
83. 4 and P. .Cd. 19*0 (1904), No. 83, p. 187, and Cd. 2370 
(1905T7No . 61, p* 20) Ho. 115i P* 4°« Aa* *   ^-r# * _ ?. * 1 rtA1! <5:%» .aw* ¡£54 1* if?. . *hrv¿4#- .Mi,■ *,#,. w- -- - -—.-to ■ th® Chin®99. sidsiiearlier in September,' 1902, when Sir B. Catow aaar Prince Ch’lmgi and the Ministers of the Foreign Board to transmit a warning from his government against. .tho....conclusions. of...an. alleged.-agr meat between Russia and China in regard to Tibet, tha latter strongly denied that there was any such agreement# Both prince ■ Ch’ing and Chu, a member of the Grand Council, declared that no ; such agreement had over formed a subject of discussion between 
. the Chinese .and rites si«.; ■ govt rnsonts.;: (Cd.. 1920, No,: 55, p., 143), :
ber of the British Parliament said in the'House of Commons,
»the whole Blue-book £ ha referred "to. Cd. l$2o] showed that a
■ ’ ' ’ : i 04 - ■ !■ ’
fear of Russia was at the bottom of the business,« and this
fear did not abate notwithstanding the repeated assurance given
by the Russian Foreign Minister, Count Lamsdorff, in Juna,
-85- ’ • • ■ :
1904.
The reason for this persistent fear of Russia can best be
explained by the statement of A.JT, Balfour, the British Prime
Minister and First Lord of the Treasury, made in the House of86
Commonsi
I admit everything that has been said as to the imposs­
ibility of invading India by way of Tibet.... But that 
does not alter the fact that though no army is likely to 
penetrate our northern frontier from Tibet, it v^oula bo a 
serious misfortune to the Indian Government and a danger 
to our northern frontier, should Tibet fall under any Eur­
opean influence other than our own.
There seems to be no reason to doubt the remark made by Oscar
.. - . . >
Crosby, who in 1905 travelled in Tibet and Turkestan, that
British state dispatches did moke vague, one sided statements
to the effect that soma Tibetans relied upon «¿mother power«
for protection, and made these accusations serve as the excuse
for their attack upon Tibet and for executing the extremist I
87 i
policy of empire-stretching. Nevertheless, from a Russian
$4« Parliamentary Rebates. Vol* 155# P* 119« |
85. A and P. Cd. 2J70 {1905), No. 55, p. 18. S
86* Pnrliaaont^ry.. . M M M a * Vol. 155, pp* 150-51, • .{
87» Oscar T* Crosby, Tibet and Turkestan (1905), p, 229* f
source to find evidence that the British fear was not altogeth­
er unfounded, For example, on March 1, l9Gjü, General Kuropat-
■ : * ; '- 88"
kin, Bussian Minister of V.'ar noted in U s  diary*
X told litto that our Tzar has grandiose piano in his 
• . head* .to-capture Manchuria for Bus sia.'and'to annex': Korea.
■ Be is dreaming also of bringing Tibet under his domina-
- . tlOÏU*..' ■
Besides, the Bussisar never, consented, to-lotting the Brit­
ish have a free hand in Tibet. V.hcn they gava the above-ment­
ioned clear-cut pledges to Groat Britain, they nada it plain 
that though they "had no designs whatever on'Tibet,- they could - 
not remain indifferent if the status quo were seriously dist­
urbed, in which case it might ba necessary for them to safe-, 
guard their Interests in Asia,•though even then the measures 
they sightvba compelled-to • t&ke would bo elstwhiro, as . Tibet 
was in *my contingency outside the scope of their policy ("no 
viserait le Thibet on aucun cas»), and they had no desire to 
interfere in its affairs. They wort interested in the Integ­
rity of ;the Chinese f&pir®, of which they regarded Tibet as a 
part,**^ m a  this, it say ba seen that Great Britain and
Bussia did not entirely roe eye to eye, and a pact was &**£*&
to reconcile tbeir interests.
The difficulties in th® way of a rapprochestut botween
Kr&snyi.irkhiv, H ,  2 1 quotfd_in C.B. f m  m —  
igino of tho\o.giiLSa£t Vol. I, p?. ........ , .
a  &nd p. -.cd.t..,192Qi -»Qg* W #  ,84,.. PP<C^-33», „Junjm, f ,; ^ 2,
Great Britain and Bussia, especially in the light of their
greater... conflict of interests elsewhere in the world,, were
serious enough to make it seem impossible. Fortunately for
their chances of reaching an agreement, the way was paved by
the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale of 1904, which "had removed
England’s principal fear of Russia as ’the ally of Franco* and
cleared the way for England to deal with her as * the invader of 
90 ■ ■
India«*" The success of tho British expedition in Tibot 
must have convinced Russian leaders that they were not in a 
position to compete with the British there, owing to the immen­
se geographical barriers. Moreover, Russia’s position in the 
world had so changed since her disastrous defeat In the war 
with Japan, that she could taka no effective part in tho crit­
ical events of the following years. Weakened by war and torn
by increasing acts of terrorism, she was no longer a serious
' ' 91
throat to tho vital interests of the British Empire.
Thera were two further facts that rendered tho accomplish­
ment of an Anglo-RU3sian rapprochement somewhat easier. One 
was the granting of a constitution to Russia by the Tsar and 
tho opening of tho first Duma (March 5» 1907)# despite its sub-. 
sequent suspension. Thi3 fact made it easier for a Liberal 
government, which held offica in Great Britain after 1906, to
90. Griswold, op. clt., p. 99,
91, Ramsay Muir, The E^anslon _of Europe (6th ed. 1939)#' p. 199*
mhold out tho hand of friendship* : The second fact was the, loss 
of English influence, at Constantinople,.and -the gravitation of 
the Porte towards Germany— a -fact..that. had. heen;evident in the
confidential reports of the British agents at Constantinople
- ■ 92,
Since about the year 1890. Above all, it was the serious 
German threat, ©specially her growing.navy,.that.made it pass» 
ible for the traditional rivals to form a common front,.alth­
ough in the beginning the German government did regard the 
Anglo-Russian rapprochement with benevolence and accepted Sir
Edward Grey*s explanation that they were not making a ring ag~
93.
ainst Germany.
Sir Charles Hardings succeeded in laying the foundations 
for the Anglo-Russian negotiations, but ho was soon appointed 
Permanent Under-Socretary at the Foreign Office. Sir Arthur 
Hicolson succeeded him as the British Ambassador to St, Peters­
burg. On June 6, 1906, only nine days after his arrival in 
the Bussian capital, and the day after the presentation of his 
letters of credence, ha opened formal negotiations. Ho prop-
92. R.B. lio.at, A KistogJ?X..iaropean Diplomacy. 1315-1914,
p. 272.
p. 5641 the Gorman representative in St. Petersburg commented 
on the Anglo-Bussian convention in a dispatch* »These plena need 
not necessarily bo ascribed to any anti-German tendency, yot 
Germany is the country most affected by the agreement.« The 
Emperor William minuted this dispatch as follows* *ïas, when 
taken all round, it is aimod at a-*.«
osed to U. Is voi sky, the Russian. Foreign Minis tor#" that the 
scope of the negotiations should he restricted-tova natter of 
fact''treatment of the respective British and Russian interests 
in'certain specific regions and' that:the discussion should 
Begin with the question least likely to lead to controversy,
94
Consequently, the question of Tibet received, attention first.
The Tibetan pro bica in itself was simple enough. The 
British wished to keep Tibet as a buffer state immune from pene­
tration by either power and they were prepared to abandon the 
position implied in the Xounghusband convention if Russia would 
agree to regard Tibet as a sono forbidden to her agents and her 
infiltration. But Kicolscn was instructed to obtain also a 
full recognition of the British predominant position and an en­
gagement on the part of Russia to abstain from any interference.
95
direct or Indirect, In the affairs of Tibet.
In the first instance, Isvolsky seemed to be troubled by 
the British demand for special Interests in Tibet. In the 
course of negotiations throe main difficulties arose. The 
Russians wer© unwilling to accept the British formula by which 
the British claimed a predominant position in regard to the ex­
ternal affairs of Tibet, They were unwilling also to renounce ■
p«i. Harold Ricolcon, Portrait of a Diplomatist (1950), pp* 150. 
152, 158 and 159.
95* Ibid., pp. l6o and 175« For the full text of the Draft 
Instructions to Hicolson. s m  British Document on the Origins 
of War, Voi. IV, Ho. J10, p. y$T* ^
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the right of sending Buddhist pilgrims and scientific missions 
to Lhasa* And they objected to the British occupation of 
Chunbi Valley. These difficulties were net in a conciliatory 
spirit and the reluctant compromise was embodied in a ccnven-
96 ■
tion which is a masterpiece of drafting.
■ The Tibetan negotiations proved the simplest of the three 
subjects of discussion, the other two being related to Afghan­
istan and Persia. By January 15» 1907# they reached a stage 
where only a few final touches were required. The whole con-
- ■’ 97
venticn was signed at the Russian Foreign Office on August 31, 
In conducting those negotiations the British may have faced 
more difficulty from their own government of India than from 
the Russians. In a letter from the British Foreign Minister, 
Sir Edward Grey (later Viscount Grey of Falloden) to tho Prime 
Minister, announcing the conclusion of the agreement, va find 
these words:
But without Horley we should have made no progress at 
all, for the Government of India would havs blocked overy 
point and Morley has removed mountains in tho path of tho
negotiations,
In tho preamble of tho convention, both the suzerain
96, HicolSOU, p. 175*
97. For tho full text, see A end P. Cd. 5240 (1910), Mo. 203, 
pp, 12Ô-131I Cd. 3753 (1907^ Treaties Series Mo. 34|'2ell, 
Tibet, pp, 209-291»
9 6 .  Viscount Grey of Falloden, T w e n ty -five Years 1 6 9 2 - 1 9 1 6
(1925), I, 1 ^0. Harley Si sieretiïry ' of 'Èîatïrmfor,JXrndi0» ;
rights of China i n • Tibet and the special; ..interests. of . Great 
Britain in tho maintenance of the status quo in the external 
relations of Tibet, by reason of her geographical position, 
were recognized. Both parties pledged themselves to respect 
the territorial integrity* of Tibet and to abstain from all in­
terference in its internal administration. They engaged not 
to enter into negotiations with Tibet except through the inter­
mediary of the Chinese government. Direct relations between 
the British commercial agent and the Tibetan authorities were, 
.however, not subject to the provision. The British as well as 
the Russian government undertook not to send a representative 
to Lhasa. . Though the Buddhist subjects of the two contracting 
countries might enter into direct relations on strictly relig­
ious matters with the Dalai Lama, neither government was to 
allow those relations to infringe on the stipulations of the 
convention. They also undertook not to seek or obtain, 
whether for themselves or their subjects, any concession for 
railways, roads, telegraphs, and mines, or other rights in Tib­
et* Nor should any part of the revenues of Tibet be pledged 
or assigned to them or to any of their subjects.
In an annex, Great Britain reaffirmed her Declaration as 
to the evacuation of her forces from Chumbi Valley. In an ex­
change of notes both parties expressed their desire that for a 
period of three years no scientific mission should be allowed 
to enter Tibet, unless by previous agreement, and promised to 
consult each other at the expiration of the term of three years
■ . . 377
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'Carlpuslyr;-enough#'they.agreed to approach the Chinese govtra-;'
meat with a' view to inducing them to accept a ■ similar obliga* ■'
99
tion for a corresponding period, /. yet the latter,"not being a 
party to the convention, were not consulted at all in the 
course ;of the negotiations'whose object was- to conclude a con­
vention applicable to a part of China’s territory— Tibet,
The convention was not published till September, I907.
It was favourably received try the Russian press, which lauded 
its equitable character and noted that the withdrawal of Russ­
ian political influence in Tibet did not prejudice Russian int- 100
crests. In Groat Britain a full blast of criticism did not 
burst until February, 1903, It was on February 6 that Lord 
Curson launched a full-dress attack upon the whole convention 
in the House of Lords, He called it the most far-reaching 
and most important treaty that had been concluded by the Brit­
ish government during the past fifty years. But he held it to
be unequal and unfair and named the Tibetan convention an ab-101
solute surrender * Similar strictures were made in the
102
House of Commons ten days later. The convention was, how-
99. Refer to A and F, Cd. 5240, Hos. 206, 207, PP* 152-155, ’ 
The British and Russian ministers to China agreed to drop the 
matter after having received a memorandum in reply to their 
draft note. This episode afforded the Chinese government an 
opportunity to reassert its authority in Tibet.
100. The Times, Cept. 27 (p. 7&), 23 (p. 5c), JO (p, 9b), 1907.
101, Parliamentary Rebates. Vol. 18J, pp, 999-1024,
102, Ibid., Vol, 184, pp* 460-64.
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ever#' ratified*-rand-;it ease into force.
■' - According. to Lord- Grey,; what Great Britain gained-.' by .the
103
convention was real, -: what; Russia gained, .was apparent! and in 
fact the British gave up what was of little or no practical 
value- to? them, - - In -defending the- convention he wrote?
• - Our-interests, were so-important-and'in.such intimate ' 
contact in Asia that, without an understanding, there was 
hound-to: he' friction increasing to the . point-of danger— -a 
friction that was an increasing cause of weakness and in­
security to the posltlon of ^ the-British-Empire.*.* The 
cardinal object in these negotiations was to secure our­
selves for@v@r,-:ia s rfar :as :a :treaty could secure us, from, 
further Russian advances in the direction of the Indian 
• frontier. Russia-was .to-.cease .threatening:and annoying 
British interests concerned with India, This had been a 
■ ■ formidable diplomatic weapon in her hands. She was now, , 
once and for all, to give it up, The gain to us was 
-• . great. . -W@ were freed from an anxiety that had often pre­
occupied British Governments! a frequent source of fric­
tion and a possible cause of war was removed,,,,
The Tibetan part of the convention was faithfully observed 
105
by Russia, Thus the status of Tibet as a buffer state was
made secure both by letter and deed. In the following years 
Great Britain, being freed from the anxioty caused by Russia, 
was worried over a possibles change of status quo caused by Chin-
103* In this connection, mention could be made of Louis Fisch­
er* s remark on the Tibetan convention? * .».London recognized 
Russia*s right to trade with Tibet and thus by implication, her 
special position in Chinese Turkestan on the borders of the Indian province of Kashmir.* (The Soviets An fCerld Affairs. 
1930, X, p. 424.) . But the writer fails to Vea such en uneier-
taking and such an implication.
104, Viscount Grey, ywentF-Fiva years. I, p, 154. *
105. Speaking of the whole convention, Harold Hlcolson remarked 
that it was faithfully observed by Great Britain but not by 
Russia, (Portrait of a Diplomatist, p. I87*). . .
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ese assertive measures in Tibet. The Russians did not ex­
ploit this delicate situation in Tibet to their advantage, ha
find, instead, concerted action and mutual considération between
■ 107 ,
Russia and Great Britain on several occasions, though they were
108 . -v.-.-,'
not entirely free, from suspicion.
The increasingly favourable situation of the world and her
own strength made.Great Britain feel well disposed'to leave Tib­
et in a state of isolation. As we have already seen, she rec­
ognised the principle that her government »are precluded by the 
terms of the Conventions [the Lhasa Convention of 1904 and the
Peking Convention of 1905] from interfering ... with Chines©
109
action in Tibet.” Che told the Dalai Lama that «treaty
obligations with China end Russia preclude the British Govern-110
ment from interference in Tibet’s internal administration.*
1 q 6# For representations made by the British to the Chinese 
government in this connection, see A and P. Cd
Has*: 287, 288, pp. l80-8l| Kos. 293-501 an
I Ho. 536, pp. 205-206) Ho. }&'/, p.
For Chinese replies see Ho. 519# p. 196) Ho.:. 525, :pV
5240 (1910),
M - 9 0 Id 505, pp.
547. P  215) Hb.'350*
ipIriftX et rrovisoire. series xx, vox. ju
HoT T 5 5 7 p p . I p r s f i H o . 147# pp* 160-6 1.
108. Ibid., Vol. 19# Ho. 544, pp. 193-97*
109. Surra, p. 360, n. 63) Chap. V, n. 92.
110. Surra. Chap, Y, n. 92. A similar attitude on the part of 
Russia can be seen in Count Benckendorffs-report to tha Russian 
Foreign Office) see 3Bocm«ints.._de_g .„archives. da a, gpuvsrp^ant 3 . lap ¿rUl.fe.t-. .Pf ovl
3 3 1
But the actual British position can he better summarised, by 
borrowing the words Lord Cranmore and Browne once used in the 
House of Lords, »Do not let us forget that if we abstain from 
interference in the Internal affairs of Tibet, it is only on 
the condition that similar abstention is practised by other
powers, and that, should occasion arise, whore Englishmen have
' v  . ’■ ■ ■ ' ■ ' ■■■ 111 ; ■ ' 
been once, there they can g o ,again**
.■ •
' . ;
; : ■- ■ ■ '■ ■ .■ ■. .. . ■ ■
■ • • . ■ ■. • •W-- ' /'-S
111«; . ?ol*. 141 y. February 14, Xj|05'^ p ¿> 1 4 ’
-V -
• "
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CILAPîKR VII
■ —  ■ - ■■-■ THS'SIMLA' CONFERENCE M D  AFTE^
Negotiations Leading to the Bimla Conference
; A s : was pointed" out in Chapter • V, • a ; fundamental change was 
brought ; about in the Tibetan situation by the Chinese Revolut­
ion o f 1911» and the British policy of non-interference under­
went a no less fundamental change. The British government, 
being determined, as shown in their message of advice and fare­
well to'the"Dalai Lama, "to see the internal autonomy of Tibet 
... without Chinese interference,« intervened in spite of the
treaty obligations which precluded them from interfering with2
Chinese action in Tibet. On August 16, 1912, Sir John Jor­
dan, British Minister in Peking, having been instructed to take 
up the matter with the highest authorities of China, had m  
audience with President Yuan Shih-kai and protested orally ag­
ainst Chinese military action intended to relieve the stranded 
Lhasa garrison and also against the alleged Chinese intention 
of converting Tibet into a province. Yuan told him that no 
treaty provision forbade China to dispatch her troops to Tibot. 
The Chinese troops, he added, were only settling some frontier 
affairs at Li-t»ang, Ba-t’ang, and Cliomdo, and no attempt would
1« Surra. Chap. V, pp# 329-330*
2* Supra. Chap. YI, n. 63# and also Chap. Y* nn. 92, 93.
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tea made to convert Tibet Into..a.province, lie finally disclos­
ed his intention of restoring the titles of the Dalai Lama and.
lotting him return to Tibet to take charge of the situation,
1 ; ■ : 5 .
To this the British Minister readily agreed, .
The next day Sir John Jordan addressed a. stiff and threat­
ening memorandum to the Chinese Foreign Office in which he laid 
down the fundamental;, views:of his .government;on the Tibetan 
question, While recognizing Chinese suzerainty over Tibet,
.the British government were not prepared to admit the right of 
China to intervene in the internal administration of Tibet) 
they would not tolerate the maintenance of an unlimited number 
of troops either at Lhasa or in Tibet generally) they would 
demand a written agreement made on the foregoing lines as s 
condition of extending recognition to the Chinese Republic) 
and, in the meantime, all communications with Tibet via India
must be regarded as closed to the Chinese and would be reopened
4
only when an agreement had been concluded.
The Chinese government considered this memorandum a gross 
violation of their legitimate rights in Tibet as well as an in­
fringement of the spirit and letter of the Anglo-Chinas© Con- 3
3, Lu Using-chi, H? 1-1snn£_chjaarshe„chl-y:-io, Vol. II, pp. lb« 
2a.
4,.IMA«# PP*: 4b-5a) (a document on Tibet) in
the ftai-chiao-pu (Chinese Foreign Office) archives. Ft, II n
3 3 4
Vention of 1906, and therefore made no immediate reply.
Meanwhile, British intervention met with unfavourable 
criticism from the Legation Quarter in Peking and gave rise to
public anger among the Chinese. Most representative of the* ■
latter was Dr# M  Chao-chu's comment, which maintained that 
China's position was not one of suzerainty, but of actual sov­
ereignty# Quoting Article II of the Anglo-Chlnese Convention 
of 1906 to the effect that China'undertook not to permit any 
other foreign stats to Interfere with the territory or internal 
administration of Tibet, JDr. ?*u argued that China could never 
undertake the duty if she did not permit herself to do certain 
acts# Moreover, she was not included in ”other foreign states« 
so that it was completely legal to adopt such policies as she 
saw fit with regard to Tibot. Otherwise, why should she have 
been allowed, Dr. %u asked, the right of keeping the Chinese 
Anban in Lhasa, and why had China boon recognised as the proper 
channel in dealings between the governments of India and Tibet?
5«J f e l a p - A , , , f f ^ 9j| l.c| e, September 1 2 , 1912,' » .  4?3#'"ren» 
orted  - t h a t .:th e , Peking correspondent o f , the Asshi had incuirm i ■ 
concerning' the ;views- of the United S ta te s  Legation and l e a r n t  ; 
th a t the Untiod S ta to s  had no in te r e s ts  in  T ib e t. ¿cco ra in *  ; 
to the Anglo-Chinsse Treaty , however, it was thought th a t tb™ * 
was no;reason.w hy:Chinese troops should n ot en ter  T ib e t. —*■
"STSSLSi
lomat# At the time, of .w ritin g  M s  pamphlet on th / iib e ta n ^ i l“ 
sue, he was not In government service#
,But, internal. difficulties and international. implications 
as described i n 'Chapter,III, deprived'the Chinese government 
of any chance to take advantage of the public anger for warding 
off ;the British 'demand, , The British,government still demanded 
a new agreement, Lhen the Chinese Foreign Office asked the 
British Minister for a visa for an envoy who was being sent to 
take the patents of the restored titles to the Dalai Lama by 
way of India: and Sikkim, . tho request: was t a m e d  down. . Later, 
when the Chinese Foreign Offico lodged a protest against the 
British construction of a route from Gyantse to Lhasa, the 
British Minister replied that his government could not discuss
any matter concerning Tibet before a reply was received to the
8
memorandum of August 17th.
The reply was finally made on December 25, 1912. The 
Chinese government emphatically stated that they had no inten­
tion of converting Tibet into another province of Chinaj their 
Tibetan policy wa3 governed by the various pronouncements, as 
well as by the principle of the union of the five races into 
one family as provided in the provisional constitution^ and 
that the preservation of the traditional system of the Tibetan 
government was as much tho desire of China as of Great Britain, 
The reply also asserted that the right of dispatching troops 
into Tibet was necessary for the fulfilment of the responsible
585 •' '
1 * SlEEi# PP* 1 9^-50.. ^ ' .
8* Lu Bsing-chi, B a i ^ s a y ^ c t o a m ^  , Yol. II, pp, Jb-
6a.
tty attaching to China*s treaty obligations with Great Britain 
which required China to preserve peace and' order throughout 
Tibet. But China never contemplated the idea of stationing
an unlimited number of troops there. As to the British re­
quest that China should negotiate a new treaty, the CMn®so 
government argued that the existing treaties signed by the late 
regime had defined Tibet’s status with sufficient clearness and 
that therefore there was no need to negotiate a new one. In 
addition, the Chinese government expressed regret that tho Ind­
ian government should have closed all communications between 
China and Tibet via India, such an act being rarely resorted to 
except by nations at war. Finally, the Chinese government 
regretted that Great Britain should threaten to refuse recogni­
tion of the Republic, and expressed the hope that an early rec­
ognition be accorded as such recognition would be of mutual ad­
vantage to both countries.
In the meantime an important event gave both Great Britain 
and China .cause for worry. It was reported in the press that
on January 15, 1915,'DorJleff, acting as the Dalai lama’s agent.
■ ■: 10 ; .
and equipped with the latter*s credentials, obtained during 
the Dalai Lama*s flight to Urga, signed a treaty on behalf of
9# Tsan^ an chi i&eh. Pt. II, p. 2* Tung-fan tsa-chlh, Vol. IX,
10. Bell, Por,traU..qf_J^h^JilaA-Daia.4. p. 5*5$ Bell, Tibat, tm. 
151-52* The Dalai lama and the Tibetan government later den­
ied that Dorjieff’s credentials Justified anything in the nat­
ure of & treaty.
11
the Tibetan go Vermont with Mongolia at Urga. In that 
.treaty, both Tibet and Mongolia declared themselves free from 
Mancha domination, asserted their position as Independent. ; 
states, and declared: themselves allies in view of their common : 
religion* (Art. IX, III, amd.V.) - Each.recognised:the other’s 
Independence, and .both agreed to work for the 'advancement of 
Buddhism and to.assist each other against external and internal 
dangers*(Art. IV). , : .
I n : Chapter II mention was mad® of China» s grand strategy
to, prevent Mongolia and Tibet-from Joining'hands. This strat-
12 '
egy .had:been in operation since the Han dynasty. How, acc­
ording to the press report, they hid Joined hands in an open 
rebellion.which menaced the very existence of tho trouble-rid­
den Infant republic. horse still, a treaty like this would 
certainly involve the two big powers whose respective designs 
in Mongolia and Tibet had always worried China, Great Britain 
also was concerned over the treaty as it might give the Russ­
ians the advantage of extending their influence through the
medium of Mongolian traders and pilgrims into Tibet* and a Hass-
13
ian influence in Tibet, as Sir Charles Bell asserted, could
537
11 >^Tung-fan^ tsa-c.hlh.» Vol, IX, Ho. 9, p, Ij China,Y#ar ,Bookf 
12. Sacra, p. 59*
13. Bell, I 1 M ,  p. 229.
not fall to endanger British and Indian interests, ,, Great 
Britain had been crying wolf in regard to Tibet; .this tint she 
seemed to hear at least the distant .footsteps.of a bear*■ ■
. The, British intelligence service must have had beforehand 
some information of Dorjieff* s renewed activities at Urga.
This was indicated by,the fact that the British government 
found it so imperative to consolidate its own position in Tibet 
by concluding a new. agreement. Sir. John Jordan, being discon­
tented with the Chinese reply, told the Chinese Foreign Office / 
that if China should again refuse to take part in a meeting
with a view to concluding a new treaty, his government would
■ 1 4 ;
directly negotiate one with Xibot alone.
It was under such pressure that the Chinese government
notified the British Minister of their readiness to discuss the
Tibetan problem in order that all misunderstandings between the
two .countries might..bo ..avoided ..&nd..a.harmonious agreement reach- 
15
ed. Hence the conference at Simla— & meeting initiated by 
the British government and reluctantly agreed to by the Chines®,
The Simla Conference and its Failure
Even before the opening of the conference, China had to 
yield on two points. Che suggested that the meeting place be
14, Xm  Hslng-chi, op_,...T_glt», Volt II, p, 6a, -
1 5 * i l L J p S i ( a n o t h e r  document oa Tibet'' 
in the wai-cniao-pu archives), p. it sea the Far Eastern ^  
Jan. 15, 1915# P* 550* ; ......
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.either Peking or London,. while ■ the British government, insisted
not only that/the.meeting be held in India, ' but also that the
Tibetan plenipotentiary should participate < on an equal rfooting
lo
with both the Chinese and:British dslegates*;.
■ The Chinese knew pretty well the‘attitude of the British ■ 
authorities in India toward Tibet* A Booting in India would 
without doubt doom their .efforts .to .recover their position held 
at tho time of Chao Erh-feng’s conquests. It was because' of 
.his.opposition, to India as.a meeting placa that Ken Chung-yao, 
f o ^ r X y  deputy Radid.nt In to . a ,  ^  to acc.pt appoint- 
sent as the Chinese delegate. Chen I-faa (Ivan Chen), Spec­
ial Commissioner for Foreign Affairs in Shanghai, was sent in­
stead.
In the preceding chapter we saw the hard struggle put up 
by the Chinese plenipotentiaries to cake the Tibetan delegates’ 
position subordinate to their own during the negotiations of 
1907-1903 which terminated in tho Trade Regulations. In the 
preamble of that instrument it was clearly stipulated that the 
Tibetan representative was to act under th® direction of the 
Chinese plenipotentiary, and Article III provided that the ad­
ministration of the trade marts should remain with the Tibetan
. 539
16. Telcfcasn, op. sit.. P* 44.
17* The Timgg» Harch 29, 1915# P* 7cj HggthJ^jia „Herald, July 
20, I912, p. 117* ^
18. Surra. Chap. VI, nn. 66 and 67.
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officers under the Chinese officers1 supervision and direction,
How, as mentioned above, the Tibetan representative vas to bo
regarded not as a delegate under the direction of the Chinese,
but a plenipotentiary on an equal footing filth his Chinese and
British counterparts. The status of Tibet had indeed changed,
19
■ • On October 1 3 $  1 9 1 3 $ the tripartite conference was con*
voked at Simla with the British delegate 'Sir Arthur Henry ilcBah- 
on in the:chair, ■ The Tibetan delegate, Lonchen Shatra, having 
stayed for mors than three months with Sir Charles Bell «ho had 
been sont to Gyantsa to meet him, submitted a proposal consist*
"  ; ■ 2 0 ...........ing of six demands. Besides asking for independence and in* 
damnify as well as the right to denounce the Anglo-Chinaso Con­
vention of 1906, .and to amend the Trade Regulations of 1B$3 end 
1903, the Tibetan delegate insisted on the return to Tibet of
*61 Hua Ch'i yisa. fis ifc l 
219i and also Lu fising-chi, p l - t s a n g ^ h | ^ ^
II p # fa, give the date as November 13* *• Bhih cE*I5i->yan|»s 
manuscript, fsa^ig shih chijcao. Chap, IV, p, IJb, relates that 
the preliminary meeting opened in November, Taichman (p, 44) 
mentions that the tripartite conference met towards .the close of 
1913, The date given by the writer, and soms of the accounts 
below, are based upon the notes he took from the archives of the 
Chinese Foreign Office in 1941, Boll, then advisor to the ' 
British delegate at the conference, writes of the meeting as o]
ious day,
20, m a t  the Dalai Lama asked for was not necessarily th* crit 
erioa of independence as known to students of political sÀlntZ ■ Ce.i.r Walter
f a - f e n s i  m i ) ) .
ShTfînf ^ lrlAÎ EBS Bel1' nisi, p. 1521 -  • •• r
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all. the land as far as.Tachfi@nlu and..the,.extension of..the'Tib­
etan- territo ry  to include Kokonor, In this connection let us 
quote the words of two British old China Hands to show the ab­
surdity of the Tibetan claim. Sir John Jordan said at the 
Royal Central Asian Society in 1924*
The Tibetans, in my opinion, have always been very un­
reasonable about the boundary, and have claimed a'..frontier' 
right away.to Taehfienlu, Ho one could make no believe 
,V: that Tach'ienlu and Ea-t'angare not Chinese.21
Brigadier;M.B.' Tillloughby said at the same meeting*
.By the way, I .would hero remark, that the. inclusion of 
Kokonor in our European maps in Tibet is somewhat mislead- 
.. ing.,■1:Tibet,.under the temporal control of the. Dalai lama, 
extends northwards only to the Dangla range, separating it
■. from Kokonor« v
The. Chinese counter-proposal consisted ©f - seven, items* '
(1) It asked for a clear provision to .the effect that Tibet
should bo regarded as an integral part of China* (2) China would 
undertake not to convert Tibet into a provincej (j) Great Brit­
ain ‘should undertake not to annex Tibet or any.portion of her 
territory* (4) a Chinese Resident should be stationed at Lhasa 
with 2,600 soldiers, of whom 1,600 were to be posted in such 
localities as the Resident should see fit* (5) the foreign and
21. CA5J. Vol. IX (1924), Pt, III, pp. 201-202.
22 Ibid. p, 183. Bvcn'Cir Charles Ball conceded that soma . . 
o f * t l f % 8 t r i c t s . claimed, by... tho .Tibetan delegate!. h a d ..U m  ....brought under Chinese-control-during the last two hundred years,
(Tibet, p. 152.)
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military affairs of-Tibet should'-beconducted under Chinese 
direction! (6) apart from contacts with the British' "trade agents 
as provided in Article 7 of the Lhasa Convention of 1904 (con­
firmed by the Adhesion Agreement of 1906), Tibet should not 
enter into negotiations or agreements with'any foreign country ; 
except through the Chinese government! and (7) tha Tibetan boun­
dary should be fixed at Glarnda, a line once suggested by Fu
24 ■
Sung-au after Chao Erh-feng* s conquests*
L’ith two proposals so widely apart, there was no basis for 
agreement even after months of negotiation. On February 17, 
1914, the British delegate, acting as a middleman, proposed the 
division of Tibet into two zonos— Inner and Outer Tibet, At 
the end of March he submitted a draft convention and told the 
Chinese delegate to give a definite answer within one week. 
Should the answer bo in the negative, the conference would be 
called off.
In view of the precedent set by the'Busso-Chineso agreement
25
in regard to Mongolia signed in November, 1913, which divided
24. Surra. Chap. XX* n. 22?. For details about the ^ boundary 
issue; see I2a Chl-lu, Hsl-kang cMang-yu I3  (°A Histor­
ical Study of the Boundary of Sl-kang*) (Shanghai, 1928),
25* Ball, Tibet* pp* 305-306, gives the text of the agreement, 
Tha Chinese text is given in the g t o M  v l M - S M n g ^ e  Kuan yft Hal- 
tsang ll^ng-ku yo .c&mgJ*gJaL£3 ("Treaties between China, Great 
Britain e n O u s s i a  concerning Mongolia and Tibet"), published ' 
ty the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission,
Mongolia into-Inner..end Outer zones, the Chinese, govemsant; 
found it very,difficult to reject the British -de©and# - FroB 
there on,- the arguments shifted to the delimitation of the boun­
dary for ■ Inner and Outer Tibet# . ■
It is beyond, the scope of this study to relate the details 
of the protracted haggling which on more than one occasion 
brought the conference to tha verge of a breakdown,. The Chin­
ese, on the boundary issue alone, made four concessions on 
March 18 and 28, and April 5 and 20, respectively, while the
British delegate aide two amendments to his original draft on
. 2-6.
March 1 7 ."and 27* . According to China»® last;concession, the '
land north of the Dangla range should belong to the province of 
Ch*inghai with the original boundary maintainedj Ba-t’ang, Li- 
t»ang, and Atuatse should bo regarded as a part o f 'China Proper 
under direct Chinese rule} while tha land east of the Ealween 
river Including Doric, Nyarong, and the territory of the Thirty- 
Mine Tribes, should form a special district called Kang (Kh&at), 
According to the first British amendment, the land north­
east of the Jagchuka rang® (in Ch»inghai, otherwise known as 
Kokonor), Chinchuan (in B*echuan), Tach’ienlu, and Atuntse (in 
Yttnn&n) would be put under direct Chinese rulej while Byarong 
and De-go should bo turned over to Inner Tibet# ■ s i n c e  the 
Eritish insisted that for the sake of security of the autonomous
56# For details see llrieh Fin, Rsl tsang chiao she lttah s H h  
PP* 49-51. .
■ ■ ■ ■ 595 ;;
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Outer-.Tibet, no--Chinese/troops should be stationed*«!thin a 
-distance'of-three .hundred miles from.Lhasa, they, rejected the 
legitimate demand .-of -the .Chinese to demarcate at .the-. Dangle 
range, and proposed instead that only the land north-east of 
Burban -. Budda Mountain and Aane Machin Mountain - .should toe, in­
cluded in the province of Ch’inghal. - -.-la fact,- all these plac­
es ' mentioned - in the British amendment had/- long been under Chin­
es® rule, and the Jurisdiction of the province of Ch’inghai, or 
Kokonor, had always extended to the Pangla rang®, as pointed 
out toy Lilloughby* In other words, the Chinese government was
expected to transfer, if not to cod® to Tibet, a considerable
. ' ' ■ 27 /
portion of the territory still under its full control as if 
it had been defeated toy the latter on the battlefield. Mo
wonder it refused to give in on the last point, after having
28
already made many humiliating concessions.
The British Draft Convention consisted of eleven articles 
and seven exchanges of notes* China's suzerainty over the 
whole of Tibet was to toe recognized together with the autonomy 
of Outer Tibet. Both Great Britain and China were to respect 
the territorial integrity of the country, and to abstain from
27. According to Lu Bsing-chi (ial-tsang.chiao-sshe chj-roa,Vol. II, p* IJb), besides the loss of a partofjSzechuan and Mokonor, a' small slice of '-territory; in. tha Minima,:M m m , :&nd Hslnkiang (Chines® Turkestan) provinces was also enclosed with­
in the lino dras.il as the boundary of Tibet.
2 8. yseng an.elLlM i  B* 20*
interfepeace...in-'th®--ftdBlnistpatloa'.of Outer Tibat (including 
the-.selection and-, installation. of -the .Calais.Lama.) * which,wag. to ' 
remain in.tho hands of the Tibetan government In-Lhasa. . into 
that region China,would be;forbidden,to-send:troops,:or civil or 
military .’of fleers#'1 except:»'-Resident sat ..Lhasa with an escort of 
no t ■ more •-than ■ 3001 men«Nor-.mas she, to colonise it. in Inner 
Tibet China could maintain.her.administrative system, subject, 
however, to the proviso that the Tibetan government in Lhasa was 
to retain its existing rights, including the power to select and 
appoint the high priests of monasteries, and to retain full con­
trol in all matters affecting religious Institutions. ’ Tibet 
would-not,bo represented in the Chinese parliament or in any
other similar body* China would pledge not to convert Tibet
29
into. a province, . while Great,Britain would. engage n o t . to ,-sna- . 
ex Tibet&n territory or station troops, or civil or military 
officers, nor to establish colonies, in Tibet*
■ The special interest of Great Britain in tho existence of 
an effective government, and in the maintenance of peace and 
order in the neighbourhood of the frontiers of India and adjoin­
ing states, was to be recognised* The right of the British 
trade agent at Gyantae to have access to Lhasa, which the Brit­
ish Secretary of State for India once declared as «unnecessary 
and inconsistent with the principle on which the British policy ’
2$, Befer to supra, Chap. VI, n* 6l*
has : throughout been hased, * was: now Uefinltcly $tipulatad:ia 
Article VIII, which provided that he could-■visit-Xhasa^ovea-’-i.- 
with his-escort* ,iV-
.--Other, articles not only show the privileged position, of 
Great Britain#- hut also■affect the status of Tibet. Article vx 
provides-that no-less favourable treatment'shall ba accorded to 
British commerce than to the commerce of, China: or the most fav­
oured nations, Article XI provides that in case of differences 
between the governments of China and Tibet in regard to quest­
ions arising out of this convention, the aforesaid governments 
engage to refer them to the British government for equitable 
adjustment. further, Article V provides that the governments 
of China and Tibet engage that they will not enter into any 
negotiations or agreements racarding Tibet with one another, or 
with any other power, excepting such negotiations and agreements
between Great Britain and Tibet as sro provided for by the Lhasa
31
Convention of 1$04 and the Adhesion Agreement of 1906.
It is especially significant that the understanding that 
Tibet forms part of Chinese territory should not be stipulated 
in the main text of the convention and should only take the form 
of an exchange of notes.
Immediately after offering the second ajoendaent (¿larch 2?}t
30* Surra, Chap. V# n, $$•
3 1. T sang an chi iGeh, pp, $~l6.
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the British delegate declared that the general debates should 
coale to a close. lie stated that the results of the delibera­
tions in the ■ conference should be considered as the final ag­
reement acceptable to all parties concerned, "Since th© Tib­
etan delegate has already initialled the draft convention.» ho 
told the Chinese delegate, Ivan Chen, "and if the Chinas© dele­
gate refuses to do so, the British and Tibaton delegates mill 
delete Articles II and IV which are primarily concerned with 
tho interests of China, and forthwith sign it. In such a
Case, the two countries will not consult with China on matters
32
concerning themselves#* Faced with such intimidation, Chon 
found no way open but to initial the draft*
Tho Chinas© government, upon receiving Chen» a report, in­
structed him not to sign tho formal instrument under any circ­
umstances, and at the same time notified the British ¡¿intster 
in Peking that the other items contained in the draft convent­
ion could bo accepted in principle, but the boundary arrange—
- ~ ' - '■■■" ■ ■ ; 33
sent most certainly could not.
The British Minister in Peking then exerted great pressure
. - 3* ■
by sending stern notes. Tho impotent Chinos© government
52# Chenfs telegraphic report to the Chines© Foreign Office,
Tssnff an chi p# 21$ lisieh Pin, Hsi.ts-anc chlao Aha
i S S i p T i r r ” .
55# Tganig an.cfeLlasfe# pt 22*.
54# guprq. Chap, V, n# ?6, :
Bade. two /'further concessions mainly on ■ the boundary - issue,
■;■■■■ 35
which' were - rejected ■ by ■, the British* .■ - / The Chinese d e l e g a t e * 
finally:could >only give notice to the British delegate that he 
was instructed not to sign.'" A few weeks.later World War I 
broke out and Tibetan affairs were thrown'into the background.
It is noteworthy that soon after the break-up of the con­
ference, the^British'foreign-Minister, the same Sir Edward Grey 
who had directed the Anglo-Chinese negotiations of 1906 to a 
successful conclusion and who had defended the Anglo-Kussian -
3&
Comention of 1907 before Parliament, told the House of Comm­
ons on July 10 that Chinese action in Tibet since 1906 had been 
most unreasonable and that the sole object of the new convent­
ion was to get China to agree to certain boundaries, and to ■ 
restore her position in regard to Tibet as it existed prior to 
1906. He expressed the hope that China »may still sign,« and 
he added »but if it does not, and resorts to an aggressive pol­
icy in regard to Tibet which disturbs the Indian frontier, the
• , 3 7
consequences must be disastrous to China.» These words# 
compared with his earlier utterances, as well as those of his 
predecessors and other former government spokesmen, reveal a
35* The Chinese further concessions were made on June 13 and
29. Tseng' m  chUtteh* FP* 23-26. ■ for-soa® details se®' Hun#
PP* 220-22,
36* Biasr*» Chap. VI, tm* 60 and 104, and also parliamentary 
Debates. Yol. 184, pp* 492-93«
37* ParllaamtfryfgMtM. 1914, Yol. LXIV, pp* 1447-43,
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chang® of. British policy and. therefore.■a change of relationship 
38
with Tibet. . According to the records in the Russian archiv­
es, Great ; Britain proposed revision of the Anglo-Enssian Con­
vention of 1907 concerning Tibet in the spring of 19 14. ïhe 
'Russian;Foreign.O ffice;rem arked in its file that as »the Brit­
ish proposal, apparently., amounted'to.' converting 11 bet into B rit­
ain» s virtual protectorate, we should ask for compensation 
either in Afghanistan or Persia. Indeed, the dispensation of 
the,political fortunes of eastern : Asia,- as remarked by..-. Griswold* 
had,become the private ; affairs of Britain and.her allies.
 ^ Th® reason that Sir Edward still, hoped that China might 
sign was because the Chinese signature was necessary in order 
to make the new convention valid. The Chinese government not­
ified the British Minister and telegraphed London that it would
not and could not recognise the Simla Convention even if it
40
were signed by British and Tibetan delegates. Here the 
reader should bo reminded of the provision in the Anglo-Russlan 
Convention concerning Tibet of 1907 (Art. II), that Great Brit­
ain as well as Russia engaged not to enter into negotiations 
with Tibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese gov­
ernment. *40
39#. Griswold, m ^ c l t ., p. 99# "
40. Esleh Pin, M L j i mi^-Chiao:ahe Itteh shih. p, 521 Ball. 
Portrait of .tha P g H  X m a ,  p. £ 5 s 7 ---' 3i| L “ 1 '
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It, is. known/to ever/ student of international.".law usd rel­
ations that when negotiations are concluded and '.a,treaty has
boon embodied in a proper fora, it is only the completion'of
41.'
the first stop in the ashing of a treaty, ■ and that-confirma­
tion and approval, manifested - through ratification, is another
step,to be taken after the signing and sealing of a treaty, toe-:
42 \ :
fore the agreement becomes a binding one* Credentials, how­
ever expressed, and notwithstanding the'implication of full 
powers contained ; in the name »plenipotentiary, i empower the •' 
representative to nothing more than to negotiate and to can- ' 
eludesprovisionally* - - As a rule, the representatives do not " • 
conclude a treaty finally, for all treaties concluded toy such
representatives are, in principle, not valid before ratifica-
. . 44 
tion.
In the present case the Simla Convention called for ratifi­
cation as one of the steps to be taken before the contractual
fatow, A Guide to, m p l ^ a t l c  Practice (3rd ed, rev. ter 
H. Richie, 1932), pp* $71, 5/2.
42. Charles Cheney flyde, InternâMg5| l ^ aw CM e f l y  as Interpggh-
ed and Applied .by.: (Î945J7^°1» XT, p*“î<!5o,
43, John Westlake, ;ntarnatiQnalJ,aw (1910), I, p. 291*
44* Qpoenteslm. - International has (?th «d* toy a. toauterpacht)
P *  7 9 7 * ' It is further stated that although'a traaty fa c a r d .
eluded as soon as the mutual consent is manifest from acts of.
the duly authorized representatives, its binding force is 
rule, suspended till ratification is given (p, 0X3). Sei In*«
S h  M S f - “ -88 tn ï f  e m ?^-aaaliag (8 th edî 
2 * 5 * wlxicn^says| ... tacit or ; express, ratification;
itsvalidity13« treaty**naj£i:aS power of the state is necessary to
relationship could •he', perfected,; and the Chinese delegate,', m /í---:
Ivan Chen, did not even sign, he merely, initialled^ It. ' ■ Since
»it Is not-apparent, how "a legal-duty: to- ratify results:from the
45
sere- signatura of-the instrument,« '-the. writer’wonders how.:'--
Gre&t Britain could regard 11 the convention as concluded by the
46 -
act of'initialling#1* \
i.-: The English .authority on the law of. treaties, McNair, saya
that «the r u le ,which .obtained the widest *.# acceptance in the
past is that ratification is required to give (a treaty] legal
effect.** He further speaks of «entry Into force of treaties«
47
as »the earliest date at ..which.-ratification takes place#«
Let us assume that the convention was duly signed and 
sealed# China still had the right to repudiate it. «Inter­
national law clearly recognises that there is no legal ground 
of complaint by one party if the other should repudiate the ag- 
reeaont signed In its behalf by its agents#» ■ In the present 
case the Chinese government was of the opinion that its dale-
45. Hyde, H ,  p. 1*31«
46# Bell,; t l M t » : p # 15^«
47. Arnold B# M clair, „ 
Opinions, pp. 83 and- ^  
Ífí¡ «Law of Treaties,
and
*J»Ai QJk 9#7~''++'+$ ******** y*.wm WU1 y
;reaties shall become effective from the data,of ratification# 
3e@ also ibid#> pp# 769**78) 798-93*
pi::43S*
gate* Ivan Chen, had acted in excess of his power. His miss­
ion was confined to Tibet, but without ashing for instructions 
he had initialled a draft convention which involved tho territ­
ory of China Proper. His government daisied tho right to de­
nounce him, to recall him, and to disavow his action.
As the Simla Conference ended with the Chinese repudiation, 
Teichman was right inlaying that; »the :Conference finally, broke
up in the summer of 1914 without an agreement having been roach- 
49 -
ed*n
Renewed Negotiations under British Pressure
China, after having experienced a new humiliation and
•50
yielded to the Japanese ultimatum in 1915* found it all the 
more necessary not to give the least offence to the wishes of 
Japan*s ally, Great Britain. President Yuan Shih-kal (who 
also wished to win British support for his forthcoming, short­
lived, imperial regime) therefore directed the Chinese Foreign 
Office to work cut a compromise solution. The latter accord­
ingly drafted a new proposal, and, with the President* s approv­
al, handed it to the British Minister on June 23, 1915* The 
new proposal, besides two other items, made further concessions 
in granting Chamdo to Outer Tibet on condition that the provis-■ *r. ;v. «..'-a;•;%-.> r-VX.'. ; r'
49* Teichman, op. cit., p. 46, The document, even if duly- 
signed by tho British and Tibetan delegates at Simla, would 
have been void because of Tibet*s incapacity arising from stat­
us. See Mohair, P* 155* ■
. *402 '
50* Surra, p. 152.
Ion. that' «Tibet Is a part of China»/ should be Included. In the 
main text of the convention. The British government at first 
agreed to make minor changes to the Simla draft, but finally- 
refused to reopen negotiations. In August, the Chinese For­
eign Office, instructed by Yuan Shih-kai, made/another greater 
territorial concession which still failed to please the Brit- 
lsh. • •
From 1916 on, China hardly had a single year without civil 
strife* Foreign menace, other than that of Japan, was tempor­
arily alleviated because of World War I, but internal dissens­
ion went on with ever greater destruction. From February, 
1918, to the end of the year, the British Minister in Peking,
Sir John Jordan, pressed the Chinese Foreign Office at least
' _  ■ 52.
nine times to settle the Tibetan issue. 'When World War I 
came to an end, the Chinese government realized that they no 
longer had an excuse for putting off this knotty problem. In 
May, 1919, leichman went to Peking to furnish Sir John with 
additional reasons for pressing the resumption of negotiations 
as the truce he had arranged in the previous year was to expire 
after one ye&rTs duration. ■
It will serve no purpose to give an account of the sub­
sequent negotiations which in fact proved fruitless. There 512
■403 '
51. Bsleh Pin, ' Bgj_tsang .chiao..she,. If eh shihf pp. 59-61,
52. Ibid., p. 69s Tg.ang^ an_chi.,lñoh, p. 38,
Curzon was then the Foreign Secretary* Hoto that lord
is, however, one-point worth mentioning/ On August 13, 1 9 1 9 ,
tha British Minister under instructions from his government
presented a counter-proposal to the Chinese Foreign Office
which suggested abandoning tha attempt to divide Tibet into
Inner and Outer zones and to place Ba-tT ang, Ll-t’ang, Tech’- :
ienlu, Daw, Luho, Uyarong, and Kanze under direct rule as a
part of China Proper, while the territory west of this area,
Including jDe-ge, was to be incorporated into autonomous Tibet.
Phen he found the boundary thus proposed not acceptable to the
Chinese, the British Minister suggested adding (Soachcn, the
gateway to Sining, then under Tibetan occupation, to the Chin-
53
ese, Hero we see how freely Britain drew boundaries for 
Tibet and disposed of the territory to which they had no right 
whatsoever*
The Chinos© government sight have yielded to the latest 
British compromise proposal, which, besides the above-mentioned 
arrangement,, was to create a non-military zone outside an aut— ;; 
onomous Tibet, but with a status similar to tha Inner Zone 
originally provided for in the Simla draft, to cover all the 
territory south of the Kuenlen mountains and north of the Dan- 
gla rang®« It was, however, prevented ..from doing so 
of strong opposition raised in the Parliament in Poking, voiced 
by the leaders of the local governments of Szechuan, I M n m ,
53* Ibid,, p, 401 hu Hsing-chi, llsl-tsang chleo-sbe eht-vao.
Kansu, and Ch*inghai— the regions which were adjacent to Tibet 
and therefore bad a keen interest in'tho matter— as well as by 
various civil organizations, when the British demands were aado
known to them by a circular telegram sent out by the Chinese
■: .54
Foreign Office dated September 5, 1919* Popular opposition 
was greatly inspired and encouraged by' current events in Mong­
olia »hero the autonomous Outer Zone was revoked by the Outer 
Mongolians as a result of the Soviet Revolution*
'' V.hen: the Chinese Foreign Office decided to suspend negot­
iations in the face of popular opposition, Sir John Jordan tried 
to bring the matter of a higher level; however, his appeal to
the Chinese Prime Ministar and to the Chinese President was of
53
no avail* In January, 1920, he made another attempt to re­
open negotiations, and suggested a conference at Lhasa to solve 
the problem, but he was soon recalled and left China in March* i 
His successor, Sir Boilby Francis Alston, took up the issue 
in the spring of 1921. The Chinese Foreign Office prepared a \ 
counter—measure of seven points .which.repudiated the:Simla draft? 
as a basis for negotiation and showed a stronger stand than ' be-'.
54* Ibid,, pp* 2Sa~20a.
55* Ha saw tho Prime UlnisUt on Augusfc 27 and had an audienc^ 
?¿ith tha Prosident, Hsft. Ohih-chuag, oa Eeptombar 4; in Loadon 
tha British Foreign hinistor, Lord Curzon, protestad orallv^to 
tha Chinase Miniator,' Alfred Ose. Ibid., p. 27b;' Tsong an ehí
56. Ibid», p* 43; fíung Ti-chen, os* cit., pp, 237-33.
fore. Since the Washington Conference was -approaching,-it, did
57not heed *the urging of the new British Minister, intending to 
thrash out the Tibetan problem in the open* But when the Wash­
ington Conference was convened, the Shantung problem seemed so 
much more important both-to the Chinese and- -the other powers,' 
that the Tibetan issue was not broached. It is significant 
from the point of view of our study that Tibet was alleged to 
have expressed the following opinion in .regard to this confer» - 
encet ■ ■
1. It should not discuss Tibetan problems unless Tibet
were .represented,... But, m e n 'it now -invited,:-.there-;--->■ ; 
would not be sufficient time to instruct and send a
■ vi-.; representative*
:2, References-would have - to - be made from, time -to time a n d - 
America was much too far away for these,
5, They were unwilling to enter into negotiations unless1
Sir Charles Bell'were'present a t ;the«,5d
As the issue failed even to appear on the agenda of the 
Washington Conference, efforts were again made.to deal with it -; 
through''ordinary'diplomatic channels. In 1922 the Chinese 
ch-argl d * affaires i n  London informed the horn* govornmant that
57* Hsl tsang wen t»l cfriJLcMaJtej* p# 4, records that'the 
British Minister expressea his wilXlngnass to persuade the Tib­
etans to accept tho Chinese proposal of May 30, 1919 (it was 
to this proposal that the British presented tho above-mentioned 
counter-proposal, supra, n* 55)# but apparently the Chinese gov­
ernment had adopted toy then a stronger stand and declined to ' 
reopen negotiations on.a once-rejected proposal.
53, Hung Ti-chen, og«_clt,, pp. 233-40; Bell, Tlb*t. p, 202,
Groat Britain .ted. formulated three.conditions for its solutions
1, .71 bet was to have complete .control over hor foreign:.".... . affairs*
2, Great Britain was /to have,the right to,construct the 
Indo-IIbetan Railway.
3 »'Absolute independence:was to he given to Tibet la re-; gard to internal administration*;-
■ In 1924, when the British labour ..Cabinet.-was - formed, .-the ;' 
Chinese Foreign Office entertained the,hope of - settling the - 
Tibetan problem with a Socialist government, said formulated a-.-, 
ten-point measure.59 mt.deteriorating internal conditions, 
which reduced the central government in Peking to a government; 
only in nemo, prevented the measure from being carried out, A 
Change.of the situation in Tibet Itself, as a.result of tho 
Panch’en lama's flight to China Proper in Dacombor, 1913, also, 
made tho Chinese government hesitate to taka u p t h e  thorny 
problem with Great Britain, where a change of govenawnt in 
London did not necessarily mean a change in tha policy or tho 
Indian government reformulated after the^significant mission of 
Sir Charles Ball to Lhasa in 1920-1921, Thus the issuaroa-; 
ained suspended with Tibet's status politically vague and leg­
ally undefined-till tho establishment of the national govern­
ment in Hanking in 1927*
* ;■ ' 4 0 7  ■
59* Hung Ti-chen, o?« clt*, p, 241, 
6o* Supra, Ctep* V, pp. 332-34.
Britain*s Opposition to the Escorted Return 
of the 'PunchTen Lama to Tibet
' k& 'we have' already stated,' ty 1925 Tibet »as‘ turning ;
6l
strongly away'fromvBritain towards China* This fact, to­
gether'with1 the sweeping Chinesa national revolution which for 
a-tins-was linked with Soviet Eussia and which saesed to have - 
the affect of awakening tha «sleeping lion,« made Groat Britain 
more cautious in dealing with China on Tibetan problems. Lat­
er, the world situation, and particularly the Indian situation, 
became such that moro caution and restraint wars required on ■ 
tha part of Britain in taking up the problems of Tibet, Tibet
being a region outside the sphere of her vital interests. as
62
w@ have seen, the Chinese national'government was after all 
not in a position to force the issue, and Great Britain could 
well afford to leave it in abeyance,' This explains tho sil­
ence in Sino-British relations concerning Tibet during tha 
1925-1935 period.
But, when it became known that the China so national gov­
ernment was determined to send the Punch* en Lama back to Tibet 
with an escort, and us the Panch* cn's return could solve the 
fundamental Issue of the status of Tibet and would tremendously 
affect the British position, it was understandable that the
. S a m #  P* 153.
62*. M S M *  PP* 179-134.
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' '
British should have a hand in its opposition. In August, 1935,
Frederick Williamson, British Political Officer in Sikkim, was
sent to Lhasa, and his visit was connected with th® issue of
■ : 64
the Paneh’en Lama’s return. According to the reports of 
Ching Chi-yu, the liaison officer in Lha$% to the Mongolian and 
Tibetan Affairs Commission, the British were, in the meantime, 
exercising pressure on the Tibetan government, demanding either 
the withdrawal of the liaison officers of the national govern­
ment and its radio service, or the equal right to such estab-
, 65 ..
llshments thorns elves. The British government regarded Oiin-
ese sponsorship of the Panch’en1 s return as a ’’military’ pemat-
66
ration.” On November 9, 1935, the British Ambassador, Sir 
Alexander Cadog&n, came to the Chinese Foreign Office (w*ai- 
chiao-pu) and raised his government’s objections to the armed 
escort provided for the Panch’en Lama by the national govern­
ment. He made a similar representation on November 27 and
63. The p&nch’en Lama realized the necessity of clearing the 
way with the British. In 1934, he sent friendly messages of 
greetings to the British King-Emperor and the Viceroy and sol­
icited the help of th© government of India to facilitate his 
return. (The Times. July 5# 1934, p. 14bj June 13, 1935# P* 12ej cf. April 6, 1934, p. lib.)
64. Ibid.. June 13* 1935# P* 12ej North China Herald* June 19,
1935# P* 464. Vdiliamson succeeded Lt-Col. Wait as British 
Political Officer in 1933# and died in Lhasa in 1935 (Ball, 
Portrai t of .jam A l a i ,  PP*. 369-70).
65. Hsi hat. pp. 11-12.
66. Chapman, Lhasa, th®,...Holy., Clty, p. 4.
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left a memorandum on December 23* ..Failing to secure & satis- 
factory■answer he took up the Batter again with the Y;ai-chIao— 
pu on February 4 and 22, March 31, and October 24 of the next 
year*
jn August, 1936, J.B, Gould, the successor of billlanson 
as Political Officer in Sikkim, was sent to Lhasa at the head of 
a mission. As reported by ChLng Chi-yu, ha persuaded the 
Lhasa government not to allow tho Punch* en Lama to return and 
at the same time made every effort to bolster the moral© of the 
loung-Xibet group who hovered between the Dalai party and tho 
panchten Party, and who stood for the substitution of some fora 
of civil government for the lama hierarchy♦ In .the:spring of- 
1957# when tho punch’cn and his escort were about to enter Tib­
et, the British Embassy in Nanking mad© further representations : 
to raise strong objections* Mr* Chou K ’un— t’ien, then a senior 
Secretary of the Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, 
and later mad© Chairman of the Commission, told this writer that 
in April of that year both the lai-chlao-ptt end the Commission 
refused to receive a note from the British Embassy which raised 
strong objections to the escorted return of the Panch*on, as its 
content was regarded as Interfering with China’s internal admin!
67, Rai tsanff wen t.ll P*
68* fba Times* February 19* 1957, P* 15**
60, M  t.eanie wen t ’ 1 chjh A l l JlSi, P* 15! 2 M J & S S 5 ,  October
28, IW 7 T T I5 c . :
411
istration. This impasse demonstrated the determination of the 
Chinese government to sea that the P&nch’en ha escorted homo. 
But soon after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident which led to tha 
eight-year undeclared war with Japan, the Chinese government 
had to abandon its original plan and call a halt to the return 
of the Peach* en Lama, who died a few months later at tha
70
Ch*inghai-Tibotan border town of ¥u-shu.
During tha war years both China and Great Britain wore 
too occupied to touch the long-pending problems of Tibet.
After V.J. Day, India kept Great Britain busy, while tha Chin­
ese national government had to engage itself in facing Commun­
ism. On October 9, 1943, the Chinese Foreign Office sent 
identical notes to the British, Indian and Pakistan governments 
proposing revision of the Trade Regulations of 1903 in regard 
to Tibet, Article III of which provides an occasion for revis­
ion at the end of each successive ten years. The first Brit­
ish reply, dated October 29# 1943, stated that the matter was 
being consulted with the Indian and Pakistan governments. The 
second British reply, dated May 24, 1949# told the Chinese
government that the matter no longer concerned London, and re-
71
ferred the latter to the two dominions* Here we note that
neither reply denied the continued validity of the Trade Reg- '
70» Supra* p* :209 and n. 1^2« '
71* Lo Chia-lun, "Chich k&l chung yin chi on yu kuan »*-«„*ti m a # * * ^  ■ltt:saaa:hsl-tsang.
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illations of 1903, Had there been s valid instrument lika 
tho alleged Anglo-Tibetaa treaty or Anglo-Tlbetan.trade Bag* 
ulations which were-supposed-to. have replaced the previous 
trade regulations, their, continued validity would.have been
denied by' the .British, gov o rn a e n t#  . ..Here we also note'.that th e  
second British reply marks the end o f  the century-long G in a -
British relations in regard to Tibet and the placing of C in o -
. '72 ■
I n d ia n  r e l a t i o n s  c o n c e r n in g  Tibet on a  new basis.
72, Just to demonstrate-..tho nev. basis tho .writer quotas here 
a -new dispatch, which appeared in the Iewrlork limes. on April 
30th* 1954i »few Delhi# Indie,.; April 29* . India and Communist 
China concluded an agreement on Tibet .today., guaranteeing-..-taut-- 
ual non-aggression* »id recognizing the principle of «peaceful- 
co-existence* of the two nations*
-The pact was'..signed in Peiping after negotiations lasting four months# . It will take effect upon ratification by the two Government». and will'-remain in force for -eight years, .Further; extension:of the accord is subject to .. 
fresh negotiation if either side requests it six months before 
its expiration* ^
According to the agreement, the text of which w^a 
released here by the Ministry of External Affairs* India has 
accepted the principle that Tibet constitutes an integral part 
of Red China,lew Delhi has agreed to withdraw completely within 
six months the Indian contingent that had been stationed for 
decades at Yatung and Gyantse, These are two important comm­
ercial centers; lying on . the .main trade route between India and -v\ 
Tibet#
Peiping, it is stated, will render all assistance 
and facilities in aiding the-withdrawal-of the Indian troops.
- . India has' agreed also to hand over all her proper­
ty in Tibet to the Bod Chinese authorities, leaving questions 
of detail regarding cost and the manner of payment to be worked 
out later*
These properties include all the telegraph, public 
telephone and postal establishments, together with their equip­
ment, and twelve rest houses situated in various parts of Tibet,
The agreement, containing six articles, relates 
only to two issues concerning trade and pilgrim traffic. Bed 
China will bo permitted to open three trade agencies, in lew 
Delhi, Calcutta and Kalimpong, while India will be allowed to
«113
establish similar offices at Tatung, Gyamts® and Gartok*  Yat- •: 
nag. end; Grants®' are ;'in Eastern Tibot «bile;' Gartok:"is ' the - eapit-' i
al of Western Tibet. . ■ . . . . .
• ••"‘•v - '*•- "the latest press'reports .from Nepal indicate- that ;
Bed China-had launched.a. seven year road-building.program-to.... 
..connect ;th©:'Eastern andjf © s t e m  regions, which are separated by . 
high mountain passes and ..extremely difficult terrain* it is 
reportedthat a'500-mile motor: road already had been completed 
between Gartok.-and.ihigatse,. Eastern Tibet* s principal ■ trade....
center* - - - ....... .. ... ■ . ■
- India-find-Bed.China .have, further-agreed that trade :
and pilgrim: traffic-'Shall-henceforth bo confined to six specifies 
routes along the 2,000-ail® common border*
India and Bed China, the preamble to the accord 
said, have resolved to enter into the present agreement based-on"; 
the following principled
.:■■■■- Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integ­
rity - and soverei gnty, mutual nonaggr« s si©»,: mutual, nonint erf or- • 
one© in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual ben­
efit and peaceful co-existcnce.”
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P A  R T i g
- , CHAPTER nil . 1
Tha P ro b lem s Concerning Tlfeat
After having examined the inter-relations of Britain, China 
and Tibet, let us now see what problems existed to prompt the 
British to come into contact, and in conflict, with the Tibet­
ans, and with the Chinese concerning Tibet. be have seen that 
Tibet was made a sort of buffer state as a result of the Brit­
ish armed mission in 1903-1904, and from that time until recent­
ly its status in regard to China was politically vague and leg­
ally undefined. t.hat made it, after all, an object of the tug 
of war between its two giant neighbours? Its trade, its nat­
ural resources or its strategical position? Or rather was it 
the problem of security that lay behind a hundred years of 
Sino-British relations regarding Tibet?
Indeed, trade was the primary motive that drove the Brit­
ish to open Tibet. As mentioned before, the Court of Xdrsct- 
ors of the East India Company recommended in 1768 the obtaining 
of intelligence regarding whether or not cloth or other Europ­
1, Supra. Part II, Chap. IV, n. 5*
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ean commodities could find a market:in Tibet and l e s t  China b y  
way of Hepal. In 18^3» the Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling, 
Mr. (afterwards Sir); dotal -Edgar,., was deputed to.'enquire-Into
the possibility of re-establishing Indian trade with Tibet
. 2which had been in abeyance for nearly a century. But a close 
examination of the trade itself would show that it was a game 
not.worth the candle."
Thar® are no official data on Sino-Tibetan trade which, 
bains an internal trade subject to no customs control, would 
demonstrate the amount of business that the British could exp­
ect to be doing should they be in a position to replace the 
Chinese. Mr. (afterwards Sir) Alexander tlosll, British Consul- 
General at Cbengtsu, who nade a trip to lach'ienlu ("the chief 
entrepot of trade between" China Proper and Tibet;) and the Tib­
etan frontier in July-October, 1901, and node a study of Sino- 
Tibetan trade b n  the spot, gave the following statistics.
EXPORTS INTO TIBET 
_ Quantity , Value
Brick tea 11 #357*232 IB®
Cotton (native)
Silk and satin 
Xfcata" ' ■
948,591"' taels 
46,500.. - «
,., .1 ,5 0 0 ., *
" 20,000 -:V
3. Bell, yiboí, p. 18.
4, A and P. Cd. 2586 (1905)# PP* 8o-8l.
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Tobacco leaf: 
Foreign goods
63,750 lbs
"-a—-»';
Àj£&ÎJudk
6,000 : taels :
n 
n
The item »foreign goods» was made up as follows:
Shirting
. Satinet-, 
long ells’ 
Foreign sundries
25,000
1,500
400
-Jxoea.
-30.900
If
If
R
»
R
Musk
Gold dust 
fool (sheep’s) 
Skin » 
Medicines 
Borax 
Furs (fox) 
(lynx)
IMPORTS FROM TIBET 
Quantity
24,553 ozs 
8,000 » 
533,333 Iks
145,000 pieces
26,667 Iks 
11,000 pieces 
600 «
Î É 1  ' :
300.000
192.000
48.000
30.000
84.000 
3,500 
9,000
_ M S J L
I M h a a l
«
tt
R
«R
R
R
R
R
The above shows clearly how limited was the volume of 
Sino-Tibetan trade# Now let us see what amount comprised the 
whole trade of British India with Tibet on the eve of dispatch­
ing the armed mission which eventually reached Lhasa. Accord­
ing to the official return of statisticssubmitted ty the Ind-^
la Office to the House of Commons in February, 1904, the imp-
■ 5 ■ ■
orts and exports in 1902-05 ware as follows:
5. A and E, 1904(43), UCVII, pp. 2-3.
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IMPOSTS OF MERCHANDISE FROM TIBET INTO 
BRITISH INDIA IN TEE TEAR 1902-03
Animals, living (for sale) 
B o rses/p o n ies.‘And mules
: Sheep and goats 
Other kinds 
Borax 
Musk 
Salt
Wool (raw)
Other articles
Quantity
1,22?
31,735
232
29,067 cwts
33,30
40,79
Value
§5*393 rupees 
80,712
4,209 
114,920
i M k i j
IÜS:
r
«
it
K
n
«
«
H
EXPORTS OF MERCHANDISE FROM BRITISH INDIA 
TO TIBET IN THE YEAR 1902-03
Quantity
Cotton piece goods 
Indian 
Non-Indian 
Dyeing materials 
Grain and pulse 
Metals 
Silk 
Sugar 
Tobacco
Woollen piece goods 
Other articles
38,486 cats 
6,809 "
Value
5?,100
316,473
30,501
105,332
? M ? 8* AJn.A .
«
H
H
IS
H
If
It
tt
ft
If
It
The above import total in value represents the peak since' 
the date of tbs signing of the convention of 1390, (the year 
1390-91 being 777,123 rupees for imports from Tibet, 401,?40 
rupees for exports to Tibet), while the exports of the years 
1393-99 and 1899-1900 were higher than those of 1902-03 by 
117,726 and 126,184 rupees respectively.' The reader would gat
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a batter Idea of the proportion of the Indo-Tibetan trade if 
tha latter is compared with British India's trade with British 
possessions in China, mainly Hongkong, as well as with China as 
a foreign country. In 1898-99, exports from British Inala to 
Tibet being 1,270,393 rupees, and, Imports into British India 
from Tibet being 1,669,439 rupees, British India exported Ind­
ian produce and manufactures to Hongkong at a value; of 
79,415,690 rupees (£5,294,379), and to the Chinese Treaty Ports 
at a value of 47,665,440 rupees (£3,177,563)1 and also exported :
foreign (Including British and colonial) merchandise to Hong­
kong to the extent of 1,372,930 rupees (£91,529), and to tin 
Chinese Treaty Ports to the extent of 86,340 rupees (£5,739)1 
while it Imported 11,503,760 rupees worth (£767,251) of merch­
andise from nangkong, and 5,410,130 rupeesgworth (£J6o ,675) of 
merchandise from the Chinese Treaty Ports.
For further comparison we give the value of exports of 
Indian produce and manufactures and foreign merchandise to Hong­
kong and the Chinese Treaty Ports, and of imports of merchandise 
into British India from Hongkong and the Chinese Treaty Ports 
in the year 1902-03, 1“ Uia iollo*‘illsl
Place Value (la £s)
Exports of I ^ i a y uroduceo f  d ^  6, I05fX; 0
- - - ■ ^
6. iLSfldJ?» Cd. 1445 (1903), XLVII, pp. 5-7 ,
7. i_ana_£, Cd. 1915, Fp, 5.7, >
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‘Exports of foreign merchandise« K B »
Imports of merchandise 
n n n
to.;Hon^ong . 79*645to Chinese Treaty
?orts .  10^1,
, I S i S S S S S
from Hongkong 1,00 4*042
from Chines©
Treaty Ports 461,624
le note that the volume of Indo-Tibataatrade is infinite- 
ly less when compared with that of the Indian trade with Hong­
kong and China.8 There is another significant point! the 
trade of British India with Tibet had always been unrayoui^ le, 
'ever since the first official return made in 1890 after the 
signing of the convention) while the exports of the trade of 
British India and of China proper with Tibot both exceeded ty 
far the imports#
Perhaps equal in importance ».1th Younghusband's armed 
mission, so far as Sino-Britlsh relations are concerned, was 
the Simla Conference. Bet us sea how Sino-Tibutan and Indo- 
Tlbotan trade stood on the eve of the Conference. According 
to the figures available to the British authoritlas,theTach>-
ienlu trade in 1913 wss valued as follows!
. EXPOETS ■ TO CEIM PROPER
Husk £S ,?22Gold
8* Sir Thomas 11. Haldich in his hook Tibet. /the.- Kygt&rioaav-*^ --^  
(London, 1906), described Tibetan trade Vith India as~«?iSicul­
ts usly small* --taking:it for all- is..all»(p, 527)
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Materials for medicine 
Wool
Skins and hides 
Carpets and rugs
15#ooo 
1 0 ,0 0 0
5,625
IMPORTS FROM TACHMENLU INTO TIBET
Tea
Cottons
Silk
Miscellaneous
72,187
25.000
15.000■* ^
It will .be.Been'that the exports exceeded.the imports by h 
.£13,458 if the figures can he trusted. But 1913 %as not a 
normal year; China Proper was then in chaos after the revolu­
tion and Sino-Tibetan land communications were cut because of '  ^
the armed conflicts.
As to Indo-Tibetan trade, 'the total exports to Tibet from 
Bengal, the United Provinces, and the Punjab, amounted durin* 
the twelve months ending March 51, 1913, to 423,454 dollars] 
while the total imports into India through the same frontier 
provinces amounted during the saao year to 808,475 dollars 
There were also during the same year exports of about 72,000 
dollars worth of treasure, chiefly Indian silver rupees to Tib­
et, and imports from Tibet into India of about 63,000 dollars 
worth of treasure. The American Consul at Bombay, Mr, Henry 
D, BaJcor, in reporting these figures to M s  government, added* 
*tha statistic® of land trade of British India with ferei-n 
countries published by the Commercial Intelligence Department 
of the Covernnent of India, show that the trade betwson India
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and Tibet Is' extremely small, considering the vast area of ■ 
Tibet, and is not even as large as such comparatively smaller ^  
states in the Himalaya Mountains as Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan.» ;
One may ask wbat was 'the potentiality or the scope of ex- j 
tension of the trade between British India and Tibet. Indeed, j 
there was a growth in volume as shown In the statistics. For 
example, Charles A  Eherring wrote in 1906 that the total trade | 
of Western Tibet with ell parts of India, including Kepal and 
the native states, amounted to about £90,000 annually. The j 
'editor of the Peace Handbook on Tibet, in giving the figures 
for exports and imports of goods and treasure to and from the 
United Provinces, Kashmir, and the Punjab, in the years 1914- :
1 7 , said that there had been ¿^considerable Increase in the 
t/ade all along these avenues. Hut one may do well to rem­
ember the words of the Earl of Eosebury who described Tibet as 
»a huge monastery Inhabited by a nation of monks, with a sub­
ject population inhabiting the most inhospitable region in tho 
world, in the worst climate which is habitable by human beings.» 
He told the House of Hordsl 10
10. U.S. Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. Special Con­
sular Reports, No. 72 (1915)# PP* 5^2 and 572*
11. Charles A, .Bharrlni#' Eastern Tibet and th* 
land. 1906, London, p. i b f r  S aV a l s o  ^
12* ?eace,„|feadMej£,Jfq *. _?Q.* pp.; 70-71.
1 5 « ParllamentACT^ Detetesf Vol*.150, p, 1140,
There is little or no conferee to ha got out of Tibet, 1 
.Our commerce undoubtedly • could.■ be extended there, because-i 
■''it 'is not so great that it is unsusceptible of-expansion*'''''-:? 
.It is the most meagre kind..--- But when you'coate to wish'tó^
- expand a ; coaaerce of a narrow ■ kind in - a . country which docs :i 
not want you or your, commerce, .-..it ;is wise to count the .
- 'cost* J
Another, aspect— the consumer’s taste— presents an - lasur- : -
mountable o b s ta c le :to the expansion of trade in Tibet. to j 
have mentioned above the special importance of the . tea trade in •; 
Tibet;1 4 '"- It was to the 'question of the importation of Indian [¡ 
tea that the government of India drew special attention, and 
yet "failed to reach an agreement with, China on'.the issue whoa ' 
the Trade Regulations of 1903 were negotiated* Since then it 
remained a source of conflict between the .British .and the Chin- :i 
eso until the latter were forced out of Tibet after the revolu- 
tion of 1911* According'to the Cass Committee’s latter 
addressed to'the government of India, .a commissioner was sent : 
to China in I905 »»to study the manufacture of bride tea in the 
Province of Szechuan. The results of'this inquiry were em­
bodied in a report, giving such practical directions as have 
enabled planters to make tea in all respects similar to the
Chines® article.»»..But the Indian tea apparently still: did not:
earn much in. Tibet in spite of the advantages derived from 
:vcheap'transport costs by rail to Darjeeling, from free flow ■
i-mra* Chap. V,\n* fé and pp* ,366-67* .
jm m .  Chap* VI, n* ?5j se® olso.Aa^dj», Cd. 
3pfo# 239, p. 1511 220, pp.^9o^7. •
5240, Ho. 213
without customs duties, and from the absence of the privileged 
position the Chinese tea traders used to enjoy. Sir Charles ■
Bell tails us that »the Tibetans did not and do not like It. J
T h ey find t h e  Chinese tea more nutritious, aor© wholesome, and f
. ■ ■ ' • :: ' 16 ' ■ ■ J
more pleasant to the taste.» He added!.«Of a truth there Is {
no doubt as to the popularity of this Chines® tea. Not only in 1
B h u ta n , but throughout th e  Himalaya, i n  Sikkim, Nepal, Lalrul, 1
and Ladakh, wherever Tibetans are found, it is their universal ■;]
delight# Bven in Darjeeling, the Tibetan population prefer tha ■]
Chines® tea that has come to them so painfully across their nat-/i
ive mountains, It costs mor® m &  they are poor, but they must -I
17
have it,»
Mo data are available, to show how much tha trad© of British-" 
India with Tibet was actually extended during those years whan 
British influence dominated in Lhasa, Prom tha above we can 
: safely conclude'that:Indo-Tibetan trade did not justify - British^ 
action to open Tibet and to impose a treaty obligation as intend#, 
ed, M  mentioned in Chapter III, the Tibetan trad® mission 
which visited the United States and Great Britain in 1943, be­
sides Hew Delhi and Hanking, tried to secure the relaxation of
Indian control on their exports and permission to receive pay-
■ - ' ■ ' - - " 'lb ,■
rnentu in American dollars instead of Indian rupees. If the 
' \ á T null, The P» 122.
1 7 * IfeW*» !>• 236.. . .
- l8.: {surra, Chap, XII, p# 243, ..
■■■■■' 42? ' . |
<24
writer may hazard a conjecture, ho is inclined to believe that 
the Tibetan grievance against the Indian control over their or- 
ternal trade night have been one of the reasons that prevented 
the present Palal Lama from crossing the frontier when ho fled 
from Lhasa end cane to stay at the border town of Tatung, end 
made the Tibetan authorities at Lhasa finally d e c i d e ^  throw 
in their lot with the approaching Chinese Red Army.
'■ natural Resources
' The regions beyond the Himalayas have from U s e  tonenorlal: 
been credited with possessing vast resources of gold. A Crack 
legend tolls us how abundant was the precious natal- there.
The earliest Chinese rccord.of the mineral products of Tibet is 
the M a JS B iL S a  » U c h  mentions "gold, silver, copper and t i n ; 
produced in Elfan.« Holdlch is of the opinion that Tibet »is 
not only rich [in gold] to the ordinary acceptance of the tomi 
she must be enormously rich-possibly richer than any country , 
in the' woria/' For "thousands of years gold has been; misted out: 
Of her surface soil by the very crudest of all crude processes, 
and distributed abroad.... Worn every river which has its 
source in the Tibetan plateau, gold is washed.* The Russian *21
19* puora. Chap. Ill# PP* *5y*',5o.
10. Caddell, t,ha»a and its hY»t«:rt.es» P* 4?4 ‘
21. Tibet the Mysterious, op,a..cit., p. J29.
425
explorer, Colonel Prjivalsky, ia describing th3 orography of 
Northern Tibet stated that ia the Central Kuen Luen «gold is 
everywhere abundant, and viill be tlio first bait "to tempt hith** 
or the avaricious European.« Ha saw in the Valley of the
Winds diggings of gold generally not ever two feet below the
■■ 22 
surface* :ia doubt gold is the most important mineral not
only found tat also worked In Tibet since early tays. It was 
recorded by Killian do Bubruquis that a goldsmith iron Paris, 
Killian Bouchler by nano, «boa ha aat at Karakorum, had resided 
at tho gold nines of "Bacol" in north-east Tibet In the middle
of the thirteenth century. 24
Besides gold, according to Hockhill, silver, copper and 
iron are all found end to some «tent worked in south-eastern
Tibet, and this is confirmed by Ksddell and Bell. The fo r m e r  
points out that silver and mercury occur at U-t'ang and Ba- 
t’ang which are situated in Sl'kang, not within the boundary 
of present-day political Tibet. The latter states that 
"other minerals found are silver, copper, iron, loud, sulphur, 
and saltpetre," tat adds, "it is possible that Tibet is rich, 23
22 Hoval Geographical Society, Vol.:,IXX*
pi; go and 72! and also 66 and 7ff.
2 3 .  Crathaa Sandberg, The E x p lo r a t i o n  of_ T lbot_  ( 1 9 1 4 ) ,  p .  2 1 ,
24* Kaclchlll, Dia:
1891 arHl -lSgg :Xba»Eiagtoii,
,urney tli.EQUSh a ^ g U j m j J i t e t ^ l a  
55lJ71ip. lS77T.95, iOi ana y/3.
23, taddell, on. elt., P. 475.
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perhaps very rich, In minerals. But nothing definite can be 
said, until the ground has boon prospected scientifically and 
with soso approach to thoroughness*"
t.'u-shlh gives a list of products, Including 
nlnerals, found In different parts of ethnological Tibet test 
of Tach'lenlu.26 7 A Japaneso writer by the name of Hatsuo lan- 
agata, gathered together information on minerals and other 
products of Tibet, and devotees chapter to them In his booh 
on a general review of Tibet.* Ebat we wouldlike to know, 
however, is whether the natural resources of Tibet ever consti­
tuted a problem in Sino-Brltlsh relations or motivated British 
action in Tibet.
Slf Charles Bell, «a enthusiastic promoter ...of .the est&bl*,;: 
ishment of a modern army for Tibet, once said that the thirt­
eenth Dalai Lama "needs fresh revenua to pay the now army" and 
"is [therefore] keen In the discovery" of mines. , He suggested 
In his seven item proposal for formulating a new policy toward 
Tibet— a proposal made in 1921 after his return from an eleven; 
months visit to Lhasa— that the Indian government should help 
in obtaining good mining prospectors (Item 4) and In Importing
26. Bell, The People of Tibet, pp. 4 and 111.
pp! l&W*  “Ul Sb°ae Ehsng-tsu» gB-’-hlt., Pt. II of Ehib-laeh,
23* His booJc entitled £sl-tsa.nj? t rt m ^ l n n  i s r w . . v  
was revised by a C h t n e t r n S S ^ k r m ^ d o i ^ h S 10 
eclally the 3rd.section of the 12th chapter In pt/i. J osp'
machinery for mining purposes (Item 5). Bis suggestions 
ware adopted, hut against his wishes Sir Henry Hayden, at one 
time Director General of the Geological Survey of India, was 
chosen ty the Foreign Secretary of the Indian government to ex­
amine Tibet's mineral resources. In spite of the criticism 
of Sir Charles on his attitude and his long delayed report, Sir 
Henry Hayden was generally recognised as a noted geologist, 
competent in his work. » m s  report was not favourable as 
regards commercial possibilities.« In other words, his con­
clusion that the mineral resources of Tibet couia not be worked 
at a profit should partly answer the question raised in the 
preceding paragraph. Had the British at any time been motive-' 
ted by the wish to acquire profits from Tlbatan mineral resour­
ces, Sir Henry Hayden's report would have stopped them. In 
the above account of Slno-British relations concerning Tibet we 
found no mention of natural resources as an item in the diplo­
matic dealings between the two countries.
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29
29, ^Bellj Portrait of .the. Dalal Dana, p. 342, and &}$£&., Chap.
30. Parliamentary Debates, 1922, Vol. 156, p. 1461.
v Eut w  recognit i n g  ,the"Lhasa Convention -between Groat Brit- 
ain: and Tihot (annexed to tho Slno-British Convention of 1906)- 
tba Chinese govennaant-'«coptod-the-Obligation that no concosi» 
ion ■ for mining rights should'"-bo "granted to any foreign power or to the subject of any foreign power (Annex. Art# 11).
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Strategical' Position
Xt now remains to "bo seen whether the strategical posit-* 
ion of Tibet played a part in Slno-British relations, Tibet 
was always' considered as a military backwater, for., its road led 
nowhere.^ It was no less duo to its lack o f .s tra te g ic:yalno : 
than to respect for its religious influence that it was often 
left alone in its secluded position. Even the Hanchu .expedit­
ions and Dzungar and Gurkha invasions into Tibet were motivated 
not so much by strategic, as by religio-political considerat-. 
ions. Emperor K&o-tsuag, known as Cbien-lung the Great on 
account of his ten successful military campaigns, told his 
court ministers that to take military steps in Tibet was to 
«use the useful in a non-beneficial place« and therefore ^ a c c ­
essary.^ These words show clearly the absence of.strategic-J; 
value of Tibet itself in the eyes of, the Bap or or who was forced: 
by the march of events to resort to force twice in Tibet during" 
his.long reign, ,
m t  t0day the operation of air power has made warfare 
truly three-dimensional. In a shrinking world divided into 
two hostile camps, such an extended area as Tibet, situated on 
the root of the world, has certainly acquired new strategic 
importance*' Han Kohn speaks of oriental fellowship vis-k-vis 
Anglo-Saxon and European fellowship with'two circles— the east-
«  Potech, China and Ttbetbla.,
pp,  ^9-10 &nd**55^”"" ■ . ■ '  .
■ ■ . . 428. -V
54, fiupra. Chap. IX, n, 110,
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era one embracing India and Ceylon, Tibet, China and Japan, 
and the western one stretching front the western coast of Africa 
eastward, as far as India, m n a ,  Java and the K alaya peninsu- 
la— intersecting in India* N.L. Bpytatan speaks of the
threat to what he calls the Asiatic Mediterranean by a modern, 
vitalized and militarised China, and thinks it quite possible 
to envisage the day when this body of water will be controlled 
by Chinese air power. Amaury de Riencourt speaks of the 
1942 American expedition to Tibet headed by Lt-Col. ilia Tol- 
.stoy as "convinced ... that Its strategic'importance was vary 
great in an age of increasing air power*«:
Security Considerations
Y.'e can well imagine the strategic Importance of Tibet, 
today and tomorrow, but In the past It never constituted a 
problem in Sino-Britlsh relations. It was rather security 
considerations for British India that dictated British action 
in Tibet. In the above we have pointed out the persistent 
British^fear of Russian intrigue In Tibet both proven and imag­
inary* . British Prime Minister A.J. Balfour told the House
35* Kohn, History,jo£Jj[atl^ „Bast, pp. 6, 8,. and 9 ,
3 6 . Spykman, AmerieaL&.jStrate_gy In World Politics, pp, 468-69*
37* Amaury .de Riencourt, M s I ^ILthe...Mrldi Tibet. Kev tn. t n , . 
■ (1950), p. 207. , ■ Cf. I,, Tolstoy,
China,* OP* -git«
33. £upra, pp, 290, 3 6 9 -3 7 2 and 3 8 7.
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of Commons that »though;no arar/ is likely to penetrata our
northern frontier from Tibet, it would be a misfortune to the
Indian Government and a danger to our northern frontier,"should
. 39Tibet fall under any European influence other than our ocn,»
The Secretary of State for. India,. Mr, Broderick, in his review
the armed mission, expressed his satisfaction in these words* 
»If tha Tibetan Government had become involved in political 
relations with other powers, a situation of danger might have
From the above account of Anglo-Tibatan relations and ciao* 
British relations concerning Tibet, wo note that though the 
British authorities had to Judge a situation "from a wider 
point of view of the relations of Great Britain to other powers« 
and had^»before them the interests of the British empire as a 
whole,« it was always security considerations for British Ind­
ia that determined British action in or concerning Tibet»
59» - Voi,,. 153,,ppt, 130-5 1,
■40. JLânÿJb Cd. 2370, : Ho, 193, pjpV, .84-86.
41, Suora, p, 324,
of the settlement arrived at in Lhasa in 1904 as a result of
Sino-Tibetan relations can be adequately, explained only in 
the light of tbs Confucian concept of the world as understood 
by the Chinese and; in'-terns' of patronage in the Buddhist sense 
as understood b y ■the;Tibetans,' : As early as 634' A,B. political 
relations between China and Tibet were established when Ch’i- 
tsung-lung-tsan (Srong Tsan Qanpo) , King of Tibet, sent the 
first embassy to-the. Chinese Emperor, ^ T’-ai-tsung of the T ’ang 
dynasty# Tibet was then a military power, and by virtue of 
its military strength it secured u footing of equality and rec­
iprocity with its two giant neighbours, China and India, and 
absorbed civilisation mainly from the former and only in a 
lesser degree from the latter.
After tho death of Landarma in 842, Tibet became utterly 
divided. It managed to be left alone in its secluded position 
partly because of the natural barrier on its eastern and west­
ern frontiers, and partly because of the fact that »the history 
of China is tho record of an expanding culture, not that of a 
conquering empire,* But Its position was bound to be affect­
ed as a result of tho rise of the Mongolian Empire* In 1253, 
ICublal Khan, in command of the forces that took Ta-lt in XtUmsn
1* C.P. Fitzgerald, giuj&t», p. 1.
three routes, overran eastern T ‘ufan and frightened the 
Tibetans intosubmission. As soon as he was made.Khan la • 
1260, ha appointed Phagspa as national mentor and later raised, 
him to-the rank of priest-king. From that;, tine Tibet was rul­
ed by the Sakyapa lamas as a theocracy. Thr; change1 from tha ■ 
Eakya dynasty to the Sitya..'dynasty in Tibet and from the M a n  - 
(Mongolian) dynasty (1260-1 JS8) to the Iiing dynasty (1568-1644) 
i n ■;China, did not affect the relations between China and Tibet. 
As ^ tha study shows, during the Ilian and King dynasties Tibet ■ 
was in a relationship resembling or suggesting that of a.vassal
in the full sense of the word.
Sino-Tibetan relations entered upon a new phase in the 
Ch’ing (Manchn) dynasty (1644.-1912). It was the march of 
events rather than the designs of man that brought about an­
other change in Tibet*s position. Several successful military 
expeditions enabled the Imperial government to strengthen its 
hold on Tibet, and eventually it went so far as to depose tho 
Dalai lama. For a time the government not only exercised 
sovereignty over Tibet but also ruled it through the Lhasa 
government which had been brought under its control.
The Chinese Revolution of 1911 brought the downfall of tho 
Manehu dynasty and consequently loss of control over Tibet, ~ 
though on the eve of its outbreak the Imperial government was 
still arguing with the British government over tha rights that 
it had•exercised'and claimed still to exercise, not only in - 
Tibet, • but also in Nepal end Bhutan. Rhea China was proclaim-
m .
ed a Bepublic, efforts «are soon to regain control of Tib-j
@t. But owing to its internal difficulties and a gloomy inter­
national prospect, the Peking government had to yield to for­
eign pressure a n d  the Dino-Tlhatan issue long remained unsett­
led, Sihot Laving a status politically vague and legally undef­
ined#'1
: ■ The Chinese nationalist Revolution should have afforded an 
opportunity to settle the issue, as «by 1923 the Dalai Lama was 
turning strongly away from Britain towards China,« But as a 
result of ths:;flight of the panchfen Lana to China Proper and 
the creation of frontier incidents ty the pro-Eriti3h Young- 
Tlbot group, the progress towards rapprochement between Banking 
and Lhasa did not and could not go far enough to reach a fund­
amental settlement.' At the same time, for various reasons ex­
plained above, the national government in Banking was not in a 
position to force the issue by resorting to military action# 
From 1931 tho Tibetan issue was overshadowed by the Japanese 
menace. After the death of the Dalai Lama in 1953, snd of tho 
panch’en Lama in 1937, further rapprochement was made by the 
pro-Chinese regent, Ra-dreng. But before «ay step could be 
taken towards tho settlement of the issue, tho Young-Tlbat 
group seized power-snd did everything possible to undermino 
Chinacc authority In Tibet#
2* Boll, Portrait. . . « P* 336» ■- ,
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World far IX affected Tibet smch'aor©' than World la? I*■
As revealed by the Japanese Foreign Office Archives, Tibet1 s 
position would' have been fundamentally changed bad "Japan turned 
out to bo a victor. - Yet there was no'less'of a :change when 
the allies emerged'victorious. The fact that British power 
withdrew from India, though it affected the fate of the Young- 
Tibet group, did not help to settle the Sino-Tibetan issue.
It was another outcome of World War XI— the Chinese Communist 
Revolution— that brought a solution to the long-pending issue 
as embodied in the Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful liber­
ation of Tibet,
In reviewing Sino-Tibotan relations the writer wishes to 
point out that relations between Eastern nations should not bo 
judged by Western standards. The development of some Eastern 
systems, like the Chinese conceptions of the world and Wang-tap, 
has been independent of political development in the Western 
world. For another instance, the patronage relationship bet­
ween China and Tibet in a Buddhistic sense is not comparable 
with any Western system and no exact equivalent can bo found in 
Western terminology* At least the Chinese part as a patron, 
who is supposed to give and not to take, should not be const-
3* Besides; the Japanese activities in connection with-Tib** 
mentioned above, the archives. of .the Japanese Foreign 2 ^ 5 * ™  
record the visits to Tibet of Ekai Kawaguchi ■
Bunkyo Aoki, Tokan Tada and J ln a o  H ornotl, S u  *hl
J a p a n  and r e c e p t i o n  i n  19 4 2  o f  T c n - p a - t a ic h a  L a » aeie Foreign Office and -Cenaral stuff. - -1 fho - JlfS 'íaísa» ,-
o b t a i n  T ib e t« » , c o o p e r a t io n  i n  th e . ^ - p r ^ o r ^  I p L ^ « a  t0
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rued as a sign, of weakness or us a sort of* bribery.
As a result of mercantilism, the British authorities .in . 
India 'had - been looking for trade possibilities beyond, the Him* v. 
alayas' since the .latter part of the eighteenth century. The 
Tibetans were soon to fool-the impact of: the Host, .anti the Sik­
kim Convention of 1890 marked a real beginning of international 
. complications in the Tibetan problem. . After having made fttU^ 
lie attempts to open Tibet not only from India but also from 
the other end through Peking, the British finally forced it 
.open by sending an armed mission which fought its way to Lhasa,; 
reaching the capital on August 5, 1904. The convention then 
imposed, which was to make Tibet a British protectorate, was 
amended in deference to London authority and in consideration 
of the relations of Great Britain to other powers. In its 
amended form, the Lhasa convention was intended to make Tibet f 
a buffer, state* .
In spite of the impasse on the issue of the Peking claim 
of sovereignty over Tibet and British recognition of no more 
than its suzerainty, China and,Groat Britain managed to con­
clude a convention in Peking on April 27, 19d6, which legitim* 
ijcsd the Lhasa convention end defined more clearly the: now . 
’status of Tibet as a buffer State. The delicate question of 
Tibet’s status in her relation to China remained undefined In'.";;, 
the Trade Regulations signed by Anglo-Chinesc plenipotentiaries 
and the Tibetan delegate on April 20, 1903* But Tibet’s ex­
ternal status as a buffer state was confirmed by the Anglo*
•, / 4J6 •
Russian Convention of 1907 which.bound Russia to the recognit­
ion of such a status and which showed clearly that Tibet plryed 
the part of a pawn in to rid politics»
On the eve of horld bar I the British authorities found it 
necessary to settle accounts with China concering Tibet, Th 
Peking government was forced to agree to participate in the 
Simla Tripartite Conference which, however, "broke up in the 
summer of 1914 without an agreement having been reached,«4 
Diplomatic and military pressure was again brought to bear on 
'China, and the Chinese government actually made repeated off* 
orts to come to terms with the Tibetan authorities as well as 
with the British government. During the negotiations the Brit­
ish freely drew boundaries for Tibet and switched back and 
forth its plan for dividing Tibet into Inner and Cuter nones.
But again no settlement was reached.
World bar I had its effect on Tibet’s position, Th^
Soviet Revolution, a product of ftorld bar I, minimized the pre­
war function of Tibet as a buffer state. Great Britain after 
World tear I began to feel the weight of her international bur­
dens, and the situation in India started to give her cause for 
anxiety. As chaotic conditions in China precluded any possib­
ility of China's regaining its position in Tibet, the British 
authorities wore content with a so-called, autonomous Tlb^t
4. Teichaan, Travels In Tibet, p#
: J«under Chinese suzerainty ..« without Chinese interference,» 
while they consolidated their own position and succeeded in 
establishing a predominant influence in Tibet. Such a posit­
ion and influence were sore or less maintained until 1947 when
the British withdrew from India« India abandoned in 1951 tho
continuance of British policy (if any yet remained) in Tibet, 
and.concluded in 1954 a treaty with the Peking-regime, settling 
some Tibetan issues on a newtbasis, ■ .
In the final analysis it was not trade or natural resour­
ces or the strategical position of Tibet that constituted the 
problem at issue in Sino-British relations. Though Ashley 
Eden, the British Envoy and Special Commissioner to Sikkim, 
acknowledged in his dispatch to the Secretary of the govern­
ment of Bengal (dated 8th April, 1861) that «Tibet is tributary 
to China, and Sikkim and Bhutan are tributary to Tibet,» the 
British authorities made Sikkim in that very year a protector­
ate by force, and thus brought Tibet in contact and also in 
conflict with the expanding power of British India.^ jn thQ 
ensuing dispute on demarcation the Tibetans presented evidence 
to show that some original Tibetan territory had been marked 
off as being on the side of Sikkim, Even Lord Elgin, the 
Viceroy of India, conceded that to this disputed region Tibet
6. Supra,, pp. 2?5~77*
X T ! « .
had a «reasonable* 8101 claim. Yet his successor* s new demand
7
sealed the fate of any possible agreement.
It is still generally admitted today that «a stats viol­
ates no legal duty by declining to enter into treaties with 
other states. If it prefers to live in isolation from the
rest of the world, international law recognizes no lawful
8
means of compelling it to abandon this policy. ** Yet Lord 
Curzon could call it «the most extraordinary anachronism of the 
twentieth century that there should exist within less than 
500 miles of the borders of British India a state and a govern­
ment with whom political relations do not so much as exist, and
with whom it is impossible even to exchange a written com;:,unic-
9ation,« and he finally forced the door open, and Imposed a 
treaty on Tibet which in fact was recognized as a dependency of 
China by the British government as early as 1792 and which 
was referred to in the British Foreign Minister*s official dis­
patch as «that province of the Chinese Empire« as lata as 
June 14, 1904. And after that had been done, the British 
Secretary of State for India then recognized that »Tibet should 
remain in that state of isolation,« but on condition that 
«British influence should be recognized at Lhasa in such a man-
7* Sut>rat pp. 281-32*
8. McNair, L a ^ . O £ t i o n 8 ,  P* 129. Cf. Oppenhelm, Interna tin* 
nal Law (7th ed.), p* 2oo.
9» A and P* Cd. 1920, No* 44, p. 127* ,
10. Supra, p. 267*
H *  B m m *  P* 359, n* 6l.
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nor as to exclude that of any other potter*”
n  would , seem even nor© illogical to the Tibetans that the 
British,armed mission refused to stop its advance and return to 
the border, when it was clearly provided in the treaty that Ya~ 
tung was the only place where foreigners could come and stay. 
The Tibetans would also fail to understand why the British 
should draw a demarcation lino as Tibet’s new frontier standing 
back everywhere about a hundred miles from the plains of India 
under the pretext of preventing causes of future disputes 
while sacred places and trade centres where the Tibetan govern­
ment had been collecting duos were included on the Indian
1J
side*
The only possible explanation of all these contradictions 
is that they stemmed from considerations for British India’s 
security, the necessity of which knows neither law nor logic 
As remarked by the historian Stubbs, modern history is no long­
er a history of rights or^wrongs, but a history of powers, for­
ces, dynasties and ideas. The great powers have been acting 
as a kind of directorate, imposing their will on the world and
12. » «nd P. Cd, 2570, No- 195, p. 86. ^
Of notes-between Sir UsuryHcaahon 2 3  Wn=hen Stoat» on Barth 24 and 2 5, 1914J alao
Justifying their action as enforcing security. £0 find tha 
emphasis of tha Charter of the United Nations is on tha maint­
enance of security, not on justice or a rule of law. Faced 
with the realities of the atom and hydrogen bombs, long dist­
ance bombers and guided missiles, and the crumbling of the barr­
iers of oceans and distance, many have now become Wholly ab­
sorbed with power values to a point where they are impatient 
of any discussion of international affairs that tried to take
account of anything else— inclined to dismiss references to any
• 15
other problems as frivolous and inconsequential.«
So far Tibet has only played the part of a pawn in world 
politics, but its position in the strategical sense should be 
greatly enhanced in this age of increasing air power. By the 
agency of force Great Britain imposed a convention on Tibet in
1904. Professor Vincent A. Smith long called the British ei-
■ '' 16 
pedition «unnecessary and all but fruitless * « One may have
then disputed his statement, but anyhow today there is no vest­
ige of the Lhasa Convention or of British influence left in 
Tibet. It would seem strange to the students of the Power 
school that tha ljth Dalai Lama, whom Cir Charles Ball repeat­
edly described as pro-British, should turn strongly away from
15* Stafford Little lecture delivered by George f* Kennan at 
Princeton University as reported in the New York Tints.'March 
24, 1954. '
l6, nig book The Oxford History of India, op. cit.. p, 77* •
Britain towards China by 1925# when British power was at its 
zenith and China was divided and extremely weak.
It is hoped that some object lessons can be drawn from' 
this study| that might help to build a better world* The 
personal experience of this writer gained from his service in 
the Middle East and in South-East Asia helped his to realize 
how greatly the small and weak nations have suffered from their 
subordination to the Great Powers— especially when the latter 
are divided and antagonistic, and how likely the rivaly of 
power and the grasping of advantageous strategic positions can 
lead to war| the causes of which are inherent in power polit­
ics* He firmly believes that an understanding between China
and India such as exists between the Baited States and Canada, 
with an agreement to demilitarize tho Himalayas, which are the 
controlling fact of both Indian and'Chinas® geography, would be 
not only a guarantee of the autonomous status of Tibet, but 
also a stabilizing factor in the peace of the world. .
Mi,
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